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“On this Human Rights Day, it is my hope that we will all act on our collective 
responsibility to uphold the rights enshrined in the Universal Declaration. We can 
only honour the towering vision of that inspiring document when its principles are 
fully applied everywhere, for everyone.” 
 
Former UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon1 
 
1 INTRODUCTION TO ASEAN’S REGIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS ENGAGEMENT 
 
Whereas former United Nations (UN) Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon underscores 
the importance of the universality of human rights in his statement, he also knows 
the reality; the universal application of human rights remains an aspiration to 
achieve. Moreover, there are different interpretations of what the concept of 
universality entails. In addition, the claim of the universality of human rights is 
being debated from different angles, both in literature and by and among different 
States. 
In Southeast Asia, some States have made a plea for cultural relativism in their 
so-called ‘Asian values’ debate. Although the arguments were brought forward by a 
small number of States, most notably by Singapore and Malaysia, these States 
proposed a certain particularity that would supposedly be commonly shared by 
Asian States. According to its proponents, these characteristics were decisive in the 
interpretation of human rights standards in Asia and would lead to an ‘Asian view’ 
of human rights. 
The Asian values argument reached its peak in the early 1990s, whereby the call 
for relativism, including cultural relativism, also penetrated the international level. 
Significant in this respect is the 1993 Bangkok Declaration, which was formulated 
in the run up to the 1993 World Conference on Human Rights (Vienna, 14-25 June 
1993). Room for particularity was included in the subsequent 1993 Vienna 
Declaration and Programme of Action, albeit that the concept of the universality of 
human rights remained the starting point. 
                                                          
1 Ki-Moon Ban, ‘Secretary-General Message on Human Rights Day’ (New York, 10 December 2008), 
available at <https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/statement/2008-12-10/secretary-general-message-





These factors contributed to the general image that the Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations (ASEAN) and its individual Member States were opposing the 
concept of the universality of human rights, or were at least pursuing their own 
view. However, it should be borne in mind who was making the argument for this 
relativistic attitude. Caution is also needed due to the risk of overgeneralising and 
overstating the argument. While some governments adopted the Asian values 
argument, other Southeast Asian States such as Indonesia and the Philippines did 
not. Others, for example South Korea’s former president Kim Dae Jung, explicitly 
criticised it. In addition, the Bangkok Declaration that was drafted by NGOs argued 
in favour of the universality of human rights. While explicit reference to the Asian 
values argument by its proponents seems to have faded away with the Asian 
financial crisis of 1997-98, scholars vary in their analysis in what is left of the 
Asian values debate. 
While the Asian values debate faded into the background, the development of 
human rights in the ASEAN region, similarly to other regions, continued to be 
influenced by the region’s own characteristics or particularities. Due to the previous 
experience with the Asian values argument, these particularities have often been 
presumed to be detrimental to universal human rights standards. However, a 
lowering of these standards is not necessarily the case. Hence, ASEAN could 
possibly offer an enrichment to these human rights standards. Moreover, ASEAN 
and its Member States increasingly refer to human rights standards set by the 
United Nations and undertake various initiatives in the field of human rights 
cooperation. For instance, ASEAN Member States have become parties to the core 
human rights treaties of the United Nations. At ASEAN level, human rights 
cooperation was intensified and institutionalised from 2007 onwards. This led to the 
establishment of the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights 
(AICHR) as the organisation’s overarching human rights body and the adoption of 
the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration (AHRD).  
While developing an ASEAN human rights system, ASEAN and its Member 
States acknowledged that human rights are universal, indivisible, interdependent 
and interrelated. At the same time, reference is also made to national and regional 
particularities and various cultural and historical backgrounds. From this follows 
the ambition of ASEAN and its individual Member States to connect to universally 
recognised human rights, while also including their own particularities. 
Whereas Africa, the Americas and Europe have all developed their own human 
rights system, Asia lags behind. Argued from the claim to the universality of human 
rights, the development of ASEAN’s human rights system could diminish this 
geographical lacuna.  
 
2 RESEARCH FOCUS AND RESEARCH QUESTION 
 
ASEAN is, like any regional or sub-regional organisation, influenced by regional 





called ASEAN Way, the organisation’s modus operandi, the generality in which 
human rights are formulated in the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration and due to 
the limited mandate of ASEAN’s human rights mechanisms. While ASEAN is the 
common denominator of its Member States, the ten Member States form the 
background and basis for regional cooperation in the field of human rights. The 
organisation’s institutionalisation of Member State cooperation, as well as the legal 
and political context within ASEAN and its Member States are factors that 
determine ASEAN’s current human rights system.  
The claim to the universality of human rights does not preclude such influences, 
as long as these particularities do not bring about a system that is substandard to 
internationally recognised human rights standards. Salient for the ASEAN region is 
that it has been criticised for regressing in terms of human rights standards and that 
ASEAN’s Human Rights Declaration and human rights mechanisms are flawed.  
The focal point of this research is how ASEAN and its Member States 
contribute to and undermine the claim to the universality of human rights. As the 
current literature on human rights in ASEAN is relatively modest and is at times 
out-dated or too general in nature, the present research provides a more nuanced 
and up-to-date picture of particular attitudes that exist within the ASEAN context. 
The research adopts a normative-legal approach, unveiling how the law on paper 
relates to the claim to the universality of human rights. To this end, the following 
main research question has been formulated: 
 
(How) does the development of a human rights system in the ASEAN context build 
upon and/or detract from the claim to the universality of human rights? 
 
The research focuses both on the substance and the procedural aspects within the 
organisation and its Member States. The point of substance concerns the room for 
developing human rights standards based on the context of ASEAN and its Member 
States. Therefore, the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration forms the subject of 
scrutiny in this research. The declarations and reservations to the core UN human 
rights instruments to which the ASEAN Member States are party and the 
fundamental rights in their constitutions reveal the positions of these States towards 
human rights and are, therefore, also included. 
The procedural aspect focuses on the mechanisms that are used for the 
promotion and protection of human rights, whereby the ASEAN Way is a decisive 
factor in the ability to make any progress at ASEAN level. At the regional level, the 
mandates of the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights, the 
ASEAN Commission on the Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Women and 
Children (ACWC) and the ASEAN Committee on the Implementation of the 
ASEAN Declaration on the Protection and Promotion of the Rights of Migrant 
Workers (ACMW) will be researched. At the level of ASEAN’s Member States, a 
choice has been made to analyse the mandate of the National Human Rights 





ASEAN’s human rights mechanisms. In this way, the similarities and differences 
between the regional and national level can be discerned. 
Jack Donnelly’s idea of ‘relative universality’ and his three-tiered scheme of 
‘concepts’, ‘conceptions’ and ‘implementation’ are used as a theoretical framework 
for this study. This will be dealt with in greater detail in Chapter II, but in his view 
concepts are “an abstract, general statement of an orienting value”, 2  while 
conceptions are concerned with the interpretation of these concepts. The level of 
implementation is concerned with the implementation of these interpretations in law 
and practice. 
Donnelly regularly argues for universality in its most absolute form at the level 
of concepts, whereby more room for variation exists at the other two levels as long 
as this variation is consistent with the overarching concept.3 His notion of relative 
universality involves the idea that human rights are relative to various factors (such 
as culture, economic development and time), while the universality of human rights 
remains the starting point. Legitimate particularities can thus only play a subsidiary 
role.  
In this research an adaption is made to Donnelly’s scheme in order to be able to 
fully analyse the normative and procedural aspects of both the human rights system 
of ASEAN and the multiple human rights approaches of its individual Member 
States. For this analysis, an explicit reference to norms of ius cogens, the feasibility 
of human rights curtailments based on international human rights law and the 
procedural implementation of human rights are included. These adaptations lead to 
the following framework and research approach: 
 
1. Concepts: Which human rights are included in ASEAN’s human rights 
system (including norms of ius cogens)? The focal points of this analysis 
are the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration and the constitutions of the 
ASEAN Member States. 
2. Conceptions: Interpretations and restrictions of human rights in ASEAN 
and their conformity to international human rights law. The focus lies on 
the declarations and reservations presented at the moment of ratification of 
or accession to UN core human rights instruments and on fundamental 
rights in the Member States’ constitutions. 
3. Implementation: The way in which human rights are legally protected and 
promoted in ASEAN’s human rights mechanisms. The focus here lies on 
the ASEAN Way and the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on 
Human Rights. 
 
                                                          
2 Jack Donnelly, Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice (Cornell University Press, Ithaca 
2003), p, 94. In later work, he argued that functional and overlapping consensus universality lie 
primarily at this level; Jack Donnelly, ‘The Relative Universality of Human Rights’ (2007), 29 Human 
Rights Quarterly 281, p. 299. 
3 Jack Donnelly, Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice (3rd edn, Cornell University Press, 





In order to answer the main research question, the following sub-questions have 
been formulated: 
 
1. How did human rights develop in international law and what does the 
claim to the universality of human rights entail? (Chapter II) 
2. How do the individual ASEAN Member States interpret human rights 
today? (Chapter III) 
3. How does ASEAN develop as a regional organisation and what are the 
consequences thereof, seen from a human rights perspective? (Chapter IV) 
4. What is ASEAN’s course in developing its human rights system and to 
what human rights approach have led these developments today? (Chapter 
V) 
 
By answering these questions, this research provides a detailed legal analysis of 
human rights in the ASEAN context at a conceptual level and of the mechanisms 
installed to protect and promote these rights. The research provides a nuanced 
insight in the (room for) particularities in ASEAN. When speaking of particularities 
that exist in the ASEAN region, one should bear in mind that there is, naturally, no 
fixed Southeast Asian context in which human rights protection and promotion 
takes place. Nevertheless, this research shows that specific interpretations by the 
ASEAN Member States have implications for human rights in ASEAN and the 
claim to the universality of human rights. By taking the claim of the universality of 
human rights as a starting point, the research reveals the way in which the ASEAN 
region detracts from and builds upon the notion of the universality of human rights 
at a conceptual and procedural level. 
This being said, the current situation is that the ASEAN region continues to face 
severe human rights abuses. Recent examples are the humanitarian crisis of the 
Rohingya in Myanmar, Duterte’s war on drugs and extrajudicial killings in the 
Philippines, and the political instability and curtailment of human rights and 
liberties by the military junta in Thailand. The actual compliance with human rights 
norms falls outside the scope of the research. Nevertheless, this research is also 
relevant for ‘the law in practice’. It is essential to understand the instruments and 
mechanisms, as well as their limitations, in order to get the most out of this system 
when addressing human rights violations. 
 
3 STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
 
Chapter II focuses on human rights from a theoretical perspective, which forms the 
framework for the present research. More specifically, this chapter discusses the 
notions of the universality of human rights, universalism and relativism, with a 
focus on Southeast Asia. Topics of research include the development and nature of 
human rights (including the universality of such rights), the norms of ius cogens¸ 





Conference. The research describes different perceptions of what ‘universality’ 
encompasses. In addition, while relativistic attitudes are often perceived to be 
hostile to the claim to the universality of human rights, this chapter shows that this 
notion leaves room for national and regional particularities. Donnelly’s theory of 
‘concepts’, ‘conceptions’ and ‘implementation’ is explained and provides the basis 
for the theoretical framework of the present study. While building upon Donnelly’s 
framework, both substantive aspects (i.e. legal instruments which lay down the 
norms and standards) and procedural issues (i.e. mechanisms that protect and 
promote these norms and standards) will be addressed. 
Chapter III analyses the formal recognition of human rights in the individual 
ASEAN Member States and the mandates of the National Human Rights 
Institutions to protect and promote human rights. In ASEAN as an organisation, the 
principles of consensus, non-confrontation and the stress on State sovereignty are 
key. ASEAN’s current human rights system has a generally formulated human 
rights declaration, no court to interpret these rights and human rights bodies that 
mainly focus on the promotion of human rights. Consequently, ASEAN’s human 
rights system relies greatly on the interpretation of human rights by the individual 
Member States and their common ground. An analysis of the constitutions, 
declarations and reservations to core UN human rights instruments by the ASEAN 
Member States, as well as the mandate of the National Human Rights Institutions, 
are therefore relevant. This can also assist in explaining the consensus reached at 
ASEAN level and give insight in the possibilities in and boundaries of the 
development of ASEAN’s human rights system. It also nuances the general picture 
that Southeast Asian particularities are essentially detrimental to human rights and 
uncovers which ASEAN Member States are in line with or build upon the claim to 
the universality of human rights with respect to their formal recognition of human 
rights, and which Member States are detracting from it. In this way, the analysis 
offers a concretisation of the framework of ‘concepts’, ‘conceptions’ and 
‘implementation’ at the level of the ASEAN Member States. 
Chapters IV and V focus on the ASEAN level. In particular, Chapter IV 
scrutinises ASEAN as an organisation from a historical perspective, which includes 
its establishment and integration. It provides a brief analysis of ASEAN’s key 
documents and scrutinises the so-called ‘ASEAN Way’, which captures the 
organisation’s key values of its way of cooperation. This leads to a better 
understanding of ASEAN’s integration and the context in which its human rights 
system is still evolving and could evolve in the future. In this way, the context for 
the aspect of ‘implementation’ as part of the framework used in this study is 
provided. 
Chapter V focuses on ASEAN’s human rights protection and promotion by 
analysing ASEAN’s key human rights (oriented) documents. The focus of this part 
of the research lies on universalism and particularities, as well as past and current 
developments in the field of human rights mechanisms. Specifically, the 





on particularities is merged with human rights standards formulated at UN level, is 
scrutinised. The mandates of ASEAN’s human rights mechanisms are also 
analysed. In this way, the framework of ‘concepts’, ‘conceptions’ and 
‘implementation’ is further tailored to the ASEAN level. 
Chapter VI responds to the main research question of the thesis, and is divided 
into three separate sections applying and questioning Donnelly’s model of 




This research focuses on human rights at a conceptual level and as endorsed on 
paper, as well as the procedural aspects of ASEAN’s human rights system. By 
researching the norms and mechanisms to protect and promote these norms, the 
whole structure of ASEAN’s human rights system will be addressed. To this end, 
literature research is conducted and the arguments of the Member States are 
scrutinised. 
This analysis respects key characteristics of international human rights law, such 
as the fact that some norms have a ius cogens character; at the same time, the 
research also recognises the position of the State in general international law, 
namely ‘consent to be bound’ as a starting point. In performing this analysis, the 
stance and activities of ASEAN and its Member States in the field of human rights 
are researched. A modest reference is made to the attitude of actors of ‘Track II’ as 
these viewpoints contribute to attaining a more comprehensive picture of the 
regional context. Track II is described as “unofficial activities, involving academics, 
think tank researchers, journalists and former officials, as well as current officials 
participating in their private capacities”.4 
The procedural part of the research question focuses on ASEAN’s regionalism 
and human rights engagement by also conducting literature research. ASEAN’s 
existing mechanisms and the initiatives taken by the National Human Rights 
Institutions existing in the region have been included. ASEAN has always 
underscored that its integration process and the outcome thereof, including human 
rights related issues, should correspond to the region’s context. As this research also 
focuses on the mechanisms that are already in place at the national level, the 
research uncovers similarities and differences between the regional and national 
level that could lead to possible lessons for ASEAN’s human rights system. 
Field research was scheduled in the early stages of the research in order to gain 
insight on where ASEAN and its Member States stood with respect to their human 
rights engagement. From the preliminary desk research followed that relevant 
factors in the development of an ASEAN human rights system seemed to revolve 
around the notion of the universality of human rights, universalism, relativism and 
the particularities of the ASEAN region. The field research therefore dealt with 
                                                          
4 Desmond Ball, Anthony Milner and Brendan Taylor, ‘Track 2 Security Dialogue in the Asia Pacific: 





these elements, hereby focussing on the extent that relativist attitudes were present 
in the region, and in the country of the interviewee in particular, and the 
implications of these factors for a regional human rights system.  
For the purposes of the research, six ASEAN Member States were visited in the 
period from 1 September 2009 until 1 February 2010: Cambodia, Malaysia, 
Indonesia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. ASEAN Member States Brunei 
Darussalam, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam were omitted. The choice was based on 
the presence of key actors in the regional human rights debate. Many of the regional 
human rights developments were initiated and supported by research institutes and 
NGOs, primarily active in the six States concerned. Practical issues were also part 
of the selection, such as the number of contacts in each Member State and the 
timeframe in which the field research took place. A selection of respondents was 
made in every State; the selection included key NGOs, universities, research 
institutes, the then four National Human Rights Institutions, a ministry and the 
ASEAN Secretariat. The organisations were selected according to their expertise 
and objectivity, and thus the likelihood of acquiring accurate information, as far as 
this could be estimated beforehand. 
The fieldwork included 41 semi-structured interviews. The interviewees worked 
at 25 different organisations.5 The questions were formulated in a broad manner 
(i.e. a semi-structured interview format) in order to allow for space to discuss the 
topics according to the expertise of the interviewee and to leave room for the 
interviewee to add additional relevant points for discussion. Aspects of this research 
were discussed during a short additional field trip to Jakarta and Surabaya in July 
2012.6 At any early stage in the research, the interviews served to sharpen the 
research focus, whilst in later years the reports of the organisations the interviewees 
work for were able to be used to track possible changes in their thinking.  
                                                          
5 Bangkok: Chulalongkorn University, Forum Asia, NHRI of Thailand and People’s Empowerment 
Foundation. Jakarta: ASEAN Secretariat, Demos, ELSAM, Human Rights Working Group and 
Ministry of Law and Human Rights, Surabaya: Airlangga University, Komisi HAM LPPM and 
PUSHAM (Universitas Surabaya). Manila: Ateneo Human Rights Center, Working Group for an 
ASEAN Human Rights Mechanism (Ateneo de Manila University) and NHRI of the Philippines. Kuala 
Lumpur: Malaysian Bar Council, National University of Malaysia, SUHAKAM and University of 
Malaya. Singapore: ISEAS, NUS. Phnom Penh: CLEC, KID Action Committee, LICADHO and an 
organisation that preferred to stay anonymous. The research was conducted from September 2009 until 
February 2010. 
6 Jakarta: Human Rights Working Group, ASEAN Resource Centre for Human Rights (Universitas 














The protection and institutionalisation of human rights at the international level is 
relatively recent. Nevertheless, it is argued that the evolution of international human 
rights law has a centuries old background; religions such as Hinduism, Islam,1 
Judaism, Buddhism, Confucianism and Christianity express ideals on human life, 
human dignity and the responsibility a person has towards others.2 In line with the 
observation of Malcolm N. Shaw, rights can indeed be deduced from various 
sources, whether religion, the nature of man or the nature of society.3  
This chapter starts with a brief introduction to the development of human rights 
concepts, as far as relevant for the subject matter of the research. The development 
of human rights at the national level is also described in brief, as this was the first 
step before human rights were acknowledged at the international level. An 
excursion into the history and evolution of human rights is relevant, as the historical 
origin of human rights was one of the foundations on which a number of Asian – as 
well as other non-Western – States based their critique on human rights. 
Specifically, this chapter shows the historical particularity, or the Western origin, of 
human rights and the implications for the acceptance of human rights by non-
Western States.  
                                                          
1 Abdullahi An-Na’im is one of the leading scholars on Islam and human rights, see for a selection of 
his work Abdullahi An-Na’im, Islam and Human Rights: Selected Essays of Abdullahi An-Na’im, 
edited by Mashood A. Baderin (Collected Essays in Law, Routledge, Abingdon 2016). 
2 For examples of different religious traditions see Paul Gordon Lauren, The Evolution of International 
Human Rights: Visions Seen (Pennsylvania Studies in Human Rights, 2nd edn, University of 
Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia 2003), pp. 5-8. The author contended that there are three key 
contributions to the evolution of international human rights by these religions: “They established 
visions of timeless ideals and normative standards about the dignity of all human beings (...). Second, 
by seeking to develop a moral imperative or universal sense of obligation toward all, these religious 
traditions helped establish an ingredient essential to any and all international human rights: a concept of 
responsibility toward common humankind. (...) Third, developing concepts of duties, these religious 
traditions provided an inherent beginning for discussions about rights”; ibid, p. 9. 
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There is a disagreement as to the nature of human rights, or in other words, 
whether human rights are universal. Cultural relativists challenge the claim to the 
universality of human rights. In Southeast Asia, this reached its peak in the Asian 
values debate during the time of the Asian economic miracle in the early 1990s, but 
the universalist-relativist debate has also occurred on later occasions. Allowing 
room for particularities does not preclude the universal character of human rights. 
In addition, there are different perceptions of what the notion of the universality of 
human rights entails. These variations are analysed in more detail in this chapter. 
As the development of human rights is elaborately discussed in other literature,4 
this chapter will only briefly describe this topic in order to understand the 
framework in which human rights developed. The focus is then shifted to the 
different interpretations of the universality of human rights, universalism and 
relativism and the discussion at the international level by focussing on the 1993 
World Conference on Human Rights. 
 
2 THE DEVELOPMENT OF HUMAN RIGHTS LAW IN SHORT 
 
While the roots of human rights can be found in different societies, it was especially 
in Europe and the United States where the platform for human rights developed. 
Human rights were for example already debated in the early Spanish school of 
international law in the 16th century. During the Enlightenment, John Locke 
amongst others paved the way for the understanding and development of 
fundamental rights that the individual could exercise against illegitimate requests of 
the State.5 In the following passage he made clear that it is possible for individuals 
to uphold natural freedoms against the State: 
 
Nobody can transfer to another more power than he has in himself, and nobody has 
an absolute arbitrary power over himself, or over any other, to destroy his own life, 
or take away the life of property of another. A man (...) cannot subject himself to the 
arbitrary power of another (...).6 
 
The contextualisation of human rights was already discussed during the time of 
Enlightenment humanism, which considered that human rights must be placed 
within a context, as this is a precondition of understanding. 7  Based on this 
perception, some authors argued that it is not only worthless to proclaim universal 
human rights, but also dangerous as it is not based in an historical and cultural 
                                                          
4 See for example Roger Normand and Sarah Zaidi, Human Rights at the UN: The Political History of 
Universal Justice (United Nations Intellectual History Project Series, Indiana University Press, 
Bloomington 2008). 
5  Paul Gordon Lauren, The Evolution of International Human Rights: Visions Seen (Pennsylvania 
Studies in Human Rights, 2nd edn, University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia 2003), p. 11.  
6 From John Locke’s ‘Two treatises of civil government’, see Christian Tomuschat, Human Rights. 
Between Idealism and Realism (2nd edn, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2008), p. 12. 
7 Mark Tebbit, Philosophy of Law. An Introduction (2nd edn, Routledge, Abingdon 2005), p. 143. 
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context.8 Social conditions are thus necessary to take into account; it is not possible 
to “rise above history and impose moral truths upon society from a universalistic 
standpoint outside of it”.9 This school assumed that laws and rights develop from 
local custom, which is rooted in social and legal culture.10 It was therefore argued 
that imposing human rights on other societies without this rooting would 
consequently fail. Within idealism, in Hegelian language, the sensitivity for the 
context can be described with the notion that “rights may well be rational “ideas”, 
but their enactment “stands in the world”, and, as such, “calls for situated judgment 
regarding justice and equity”.11 
In the centuries that followed, declarations and treaties were adopted which 
referred to human rights.12 It must be borne in mind that human rights law was 
initially not inclusive in the sense that human rights were to be enjoyed by all. 
Additionally, human rights at the international level initially only dealt with topics 
in the field of humanitarian law. Human rights were also often considered to be an 
internal matter, only protected by the national States and not allowing room for 
transnational protective mechanisms.13 Nevertheless, human rights became accepted 
as indispensable to a constitutional order at the national level and, as time passed, 
attention became also step after step visible at the international level. 
The development of human rights protection at the international level got an 
impetus after the First World War. This war made it clear that abuse of powers 
could still occur in countries that considered themselves civilised and enlightened. 
Consequently, the League of Nations was established. This organisation had the aim 
of promoting international cooperation and achieving international peace and 
justice.14 The Covenant of the League of Nations only referred to human rights in a 
limited way; some rights of people and mandated territories as well as obligations 
of mandatories were addressed,15  as it was generally known that inhabitants of 
colonies were not treated fairly. Within this organisation, the first international 
control system emerged from practice, albeit that the procedure was defective. The 
                                                          
8 Mark Tebbit, Philosophy of Law. An Introduction (2nd edn, Routledge, Abingdon 2005), p. 143. 
9 Mark Tebbit, Philosophy of Law. An Introduction (2nd edn, Routledge, Abingdon 2005), p. 143. 
10 Mark Tebbit, Philosophy of Law. An Introduction (2nd edn, Routledge, Abingdon 2005), p. 143. 
11 Fred Dallmayr, ‘“Asian Values” and Global Human Rights’ (2002) 52 Philosophy East and West 
173, p. 174. 
12 Peter Malanczuk, Akehurst's Modern Introduction to International Law (Routledge, London 1997), 
p. 209. For example, the Virginia Declaration of Rights (1776), the American Declaration of 
Independence and the French Déclaration des Droits de l’Homme et du Citoyen (1789). In the field of 
humanitarian law, the Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded in Armies in 
the Field (1864) and the instruments adopted by the Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907 are 
important. 
13 Christian Tomuschat, Human Rights. Between Idealism and Realism (2nd edn, Oxford University 
Press, Oxford 2008), p. 16. 
14 Covenant of the League of Nations, preamble <http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/leag cov.asp> 
last accessed 5 September 2018. 
15  See Article 22(4) and (5) and 23(a) of the Covenant of the League of Nations, 
<http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/leagcov.asp> last accessed 5 September 2018. 
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possibility of making petitions made it possible that individuals could play an active 
role before an international body. 
A stronger recognition for the position of the individual came after the Second 
World War; in contrast to the former conception that individuals are only the object 
of international regulations adopted by States, 16 their status was improved as 
individuals acquired more rights. This conclusion can for example be drawn from 
the codification of human rights in numerous international treaties and their 
complaint procedures. This codification acknowledged that human rights are 
considered to be “fundamental and inalienable rights essential to the human 
being”.17 This conception, amongst others rooted in Roosevelt’s four freedoms,18 
accentuated that human rights in many ways do not belong to the exclusive 
jurisdiction of a home State anymore, which was a harsh lesson learned from the 
atrocities that happened during the war.19 
Nowadays, human rights are regularly protected and promoted at three levels. 
The first level is the inclusion of human rights at the domestic level as fundamental 
rights. The second level is the regional and sub-regional level among Member 
States belonging to a specific regional or sub-regional intergovernmental or 
supranational organisation, and the third is the international level among the 
Member States of the United Nations, or what is also described as the universal 
level. 20  These three levels influence each other in terms of interpretation and 
application, making human rights law a dynamic part of international law. Olivier 
De Schutter noted in this respect: 
 
For although human rights have escaped the confines of the territory of domestic 
constitutions, they have not dissolved fully into international law and in fact, they 
resist assimilation. International human rights courts are under the permanent 
temptation to mutate into constitutional courts. The domestic judge in turn tends to 
aggrandize his or her power in the name of bringing home values that are universal 
and rules that are supranational – but, by invoking international law, the domestic 
judge also transforms it into something else, that is better suited to the regulation of 
the relationships between the State and the individual or between individuals, than to 
the relationships among States.21 
 
                                                          
16 Peter Malanczuk, Akehurst's Modern Introduction to International Law (Routledge, London 1997), 
p. 31.  
17 Peter Malanczuk, Akehurst's Modern Introduction to International Law (Routledge, London 1997), 
p. 209.  
18 I.e., freedom of speech and expression, freedom of religion, freedom from economic want, and 
freedom from fear and aggression. 
19 Christian Tomuschat, Human Rights. Between Idealism and Realism (2nd edn, Oxford University 
Press, Oxford 2008), p 22.  
20 Olivier De Schutter, International Human Rights Law: Cases, Materials, Commentary (Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge 2010), p. 12. 
21 Olivier De Schutter, International Human Rights Law: Cases, Materials, Commentary (Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge 2010), p. 1. 
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The initial development of human right concepts can be regarded as a response 
to social challenges in Western States. This does not inform, however, as Jack 
Donnelly rightfully noted, anything about their applicability, relevance, 
appropriateness or value inside or outside the West,22 although generally speaking, 
the West has an “individualist view of human rights”.23 
The idea that human rights are borne by individuals was initially a Western 
notion. Nevertheless, this concept is not alien to other cultures, nor does it mean 
that Western cultures and societies have been pro-human rights.24 In fact, Donnelly 
stated that even though human rights notions were first developed in the West, this 
was not because of specific features of Western culture. Instead, he noted that “what 
we think of today as Western culture is largely a result, not a cause, of human rights 
ideas and practices”.25  He furthermore observed that “[n]o particular culture or 
comprehensive doctrine is by nature either compatible or incompatible with human 
rights”,26 whereas Chris Brown noted that “many cultures and civilizations have 
developed ideas about the intrinsic worth and dignity of human beings”.27 
Nonetheless, although the intrinsic character of human rights matches societies 
across the world, the current international human rights regime is sometimes 
considered to be a Western construct, especially if it comes to civil and political 
rights. Due to the fact that power politics is dominated by the West coupled with the 
history of Western imperialism and colonialism, non-Western governments are at 
times reluctant, to say the least, to adopt the Western influenced international 
human rights regime which they regard as a tool of Western powers to interfere 
with the affairs of other States and as a new form of (cultural) imperialism.28 This 
                                                          
22 Jack Donnelly, Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice (3rd edn, Cornell University Press, 
Ithaca 2013), p. 69. 
23  Paul Close and David Askew, Asia Pacific and Human Rights: A Global Political Economy 
Perspective (The International Political Economy of New Regionalism Series, Aldershot, Ashgate 
2004), p. 25. 
24 Zehra F. Kabasakal Arat, ‘Forging a Global Culture of Human Rights: Origins and Prospects of the 
International Bill of Rights’ in José-Manuel Barreto (ed), Human Rights from a Third World 
Perspective: Critique, History and International Law (Cambridge Scholars Publishing, Newcastle upon 
Tyne 2013), p. 391. 
25 Jack Donnelly, Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice (3rd edn, Cornell University Press, 
Ithaca 2013), p. 107.  
26 Jack Donnelly, Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice (3rd edn, Cornell University Press, 
Ithaca 2013, p. 107.  
27  Paul Close and David Askew, Asia Pacific and Human Rights: A Global Political Economy 
Perspective (The International Political Economy of New Regionalism Series, Aldershot, Ashgate 
2004), p. 26 quoting Chris Brown, ‘Human Rights’ in John Baylis and Steve Smith (eds), The 
Globalisation of World Politics (2nd edn, Oxford, Oxford University Press 2001), pp. 599-600. 
28  Paul Close and David Askew, Asia Pacific and Human Rights: A Global Political Economy 
Perspective (The International Political Economy of New Regionalism Series, Aldershot, Ashgate 
2004), pp. 19-20 and Zehra F. Kabasakal Arat, ‘Forging a Global Culture of Human Rights: Origins 
and Prospects of the International Bill of Rights’ in José-Manuel Barreto (ed), Human Rights from a 
Third World Perspective: Critique, History and International Law (Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 
Newcastle upon Tyne 2013), p. 391. 
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can, however, be nuanced by examining the status of human rights instruments of 
the United Nations.  
With the formulation of the Charter of the United Nations, the conviction came 
that the protection and promotion should not longer be regarded as an internal 
matter, but also an international one.29 Furthermore, the UDHR was an important 
step forward. This document was initially endorsed by the then existing Asian 
States; furthermore, on several occasions they and other Asian states also did the 
same, for instance at the 1993 World Conference of Human Rights. While the 
acceptance of the UDHR and the ratification of human rights conventions were at 
times highly politicised, the subsequent reference to these documents in the years 
after implies that non-Western States have also accepted the substance of human 
rights, at least to a certain extent, as will be demonstrated in Chapter III. 
The Western origin has thus become less relevant. Important, instead, is the 
interpretation of the broadly formulated human rights and its way of 
implementation. It is especially at these levels, on which differences can occur. 
Before this is explained in Section 3.2 of this chapter, the concept of ‘universality’ 
will first be explained. 
 
3 THE CONCEPT OF THE UNIVERSALITY OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
 
3.1 Terminology, aspects and possible forms of universality 
 
From the previous section it can be understood that the universalistic claim of 
human rights caused problems, since the drafting of human rights law originated 
from Western thinking with little involvement of other regions throughout the 
world. Eva Brems captured this in the following observation: 
 
Representatives of several non-Western societies hold a critical human rights 
discourse. They complain that human rights are oriented too much to the West and 
that as a result they do not sufficiently reflect the needs, concerns, and values of other 
parts of the world. The West and the international human rights community have 
generally perceived this criticism of international human rights based on the 
contextual particularities of non-Western societies as an attack on human rights, and 
in particular as a threat to the fundamental principle of the universality of human 
rights.30 
 
Clarification is needed on the meaning of the term ‘universality’ when researching 
the universality of human rights. Brems noted in this respect that the term 
‘universality’ has different meanings. She uncovered 16 reoccurring concepts of 
universality in her literature research, that is to say: all-inclusiveness, formal 
                                                          
29 Christian Tomuschat, Human Rights. Between Idealism and Realism (2nd edn, Oxford University 
Press, Oxford 2008), p. 22. 
30 Eva Brems, Human Rights: Universality and Diversity (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The Hague 
2001), p. 2. 
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acceptance, historical origin, formal origin-norm creation, anthropological or 
philosophical acceptance, functional acceptance, multicultural composition of 
human rights, world-wide observance of human rights, general opposability of 
human rights, human rights as a legitimate concern of the international community, 
absence of double standards, priority of human rights, indivisibility of human 
rights, uniformity of standards, universality in time, and universality as a process.  
These concepts are described below in order to obtain a better understanding of 
this diversity. Although Brems’ research dates from 2001, it captures well the 
diverse concepts of universality. Her observations that the list is non-exhaustive 
because “the list of variations in meaning is as endless as that of human rights 
authors” and that it is “inevitably a simplification of reality”31 is borne in mind.  
The following concepts are elucidated by Brems, which are complemented by 
Donnelly’s notions of universality32 whose extensive research on the universality 
and relativity of human rights can be considered as a major contribution to the body 
of knowledge on this topic. His three-level scheme ,33 which follows from his ideas 
on universality, is used in the present research. 
Universality interpreted as all-inclusiveness is a normative concept and 
corresponds to Donnelly’s idea of ‘conceptual universality’ when he stated that 
human rights are rights one has because one is human. This implies that these rights 
are equal and inalienable because we either are or are not all human, which must be 
distinguished from what Donnelly calls ‘substantive universality’, or “the 
universality of a particular conception or list of human rights”. 34  While 
inclusiveness says something about the idea that these rights are held by all, the 
enjoyment of these rights is relative as the enjoyment is dependent from were one is 
born or lives. 35  Theo van Boven dealt with inclusiveness as opposed to 
exclusiveness when he distinguished three different dimensions of universality.36 
                                                          
31 Eva Brems, Human Rights: Universality and Diversity (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The Hague 
2001), p. 2.  
32  Donnelly distinguishes conceptual, functional, legal international, overlapping consensus, 
anthropological, and ontological universality in his article on the relative universality of human rights, 
see Jack Donnelly, ‘The Relative Universality of Human Rights’ (2007) 29 Human Rights Quarterly 
281. He defends conceptual, functional, legal international, and overlapping consensus universality. He 
argues, however, that “anthropological and ontological universality are empirically, philosophically, or 
politically indefensible”, see p. 281. 
33 This three-tiered scheme is explicated at multiple occasions, see Jack Donnelly, Universal Human 
Rights in Theory and Practice (Cornell University Press, Ithaca 2003), Jack Donnelly, ‘The Relative 
Universality of Human Rights’ (2007) 29 Human Rights Quarterly 281, Jack Donnelly, ‘Human 
Rights: Both Universal and Relative (a Reply to Michael Goodhart)’ (2008) 30 Human Rights 
Quarterly 194, and Jack Donnelly, Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice (3rd edn, Cornell 
University Press, Ithaca 2013). 
34 Jack Donnelly, ‘The Relative Universality of Human Rights’ (2007) 29 Human Rights Quarterly 281, 
p. 282.  
35 Jack Donnelly, Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice (3rd edn, Cornell University Press, 
Ithaca 2013), p. 99. 
36  Theo van Boven, ‘Inleiding’ in Cees Flinterman and Theo van Boven (eds), Universaliteit van 
Mensenrechten: Fundamenteel en Controversieel (Stichting NJCM Boekerij, Leiden 1992) pp. 3-5. 
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He observed amongst others that human rights have developed from rights for 
certain people in certain Nations (exclusiveness) towards the notion that human 
rights must be equally upheld for everyone (inclusiveness).37  
These authors pointed out that this notion of universality is common in literature 
and is included in the UDHR, which is “a common standard of achievement for all 
peoples and all nations”.38 This viewpoint is also described as the ‘natural doctrine’ 
as part of the ‘foundationalist doctrine’: because of the unique foundation (i.e. 
human species), human rights are universal.39  Other authors have clarified that 
alongside the notion that human rights are intrinsic to being human, it is imperative 
to combine this with the idea that one has the rights in virtue of “inhabiting a social 
world that is subject to the conditions of modernity”.40  From this latter line of 
reasoning follows that universality in time does not exist. 
Universality in terms of formal acceptance deals with the formal acceptance of 
international human rights instruments, such as declarations and resolutions. In line 
with the observation of Brems, it should be noted that the universality could be 
problematic in case universality is dependent on the formal acceptance of a State. 
When addressing this concept of universality, authors are however of the opinion 
that “the non-participation of a few states in the international human rights system 
cannot detract from the formal universality of human rights”.41 In addition, Cees 
Flinterman observed that the States Parties to human rights instruments are not only 
restricted to Western States, but spread across the entire world.42 
The Dutch Advisory Council on International Affairs considered the ratification 
of international human rights conventions by large numbers of States as an 
affirmation of the universality of human rights.43 Donnelly speaks of ‘international 
legal universality’, which entails a “widespread active endorsement of 
                                                          
37 However, the aim of making human rights accessible and ensuring them for all people around the 
world is not achieved. The Millennium Development Goals amongst others affirm this. Furthermore, 
the debate is going on as to how to improve the rights for indigenous people. In this sense, the 
universality as world-wide observance of human rights has not been reached. 
38 UN General Assembly Resolution 217 (III) (Universal Declaration of Human Rights), UN Doc. 
A/Res/217, 10 December 1948, preamble. 
39  Miodrag A. Jovanovic, ‘Human Rights - Universality and Context-Sensitive Implementation’ in 
Bojan Spaić and Kenneth Einar Himma (eds), Fundamental Rights: Justification and Implementation 
(Democracy and the Role of Law, Eleven Publishers International, The Hague, Forthcoming), p. 2. 
Available at <SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2641275> accessed 8 September 2018. 
40 John Tasioulas, ‘The Moral Reality of Human Rights’ in Thomas Pogge (ed), Freedom from Poverty 
as a Human Right: Who Owes What to the Very Poor? (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2007), pp. 76-
77. 
41 Eva Brems, Human Rights: Universality and Diversity (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The Hague 
2001), p. 6. 
42 Cees Flinterman, ‘De Universaliteit van Mensenrechten’ in Cees Flinterman and Theo van Boven 
(eds), Universaliteit van Mensenrechten: Fundamenteel en Controversieel (Stichting NJCM Boekerij, 
Leiden 1992), p. 70. 
43 Advisory Council on International Affairs, ‘Universality of Human Rights: Principles, Practice and 
Prospects’, No. 63, November 2008, p. 13. 
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internationally recognized human rights”.44  In other words, despite the cultural, 
political, regional, and economic diversity in the contemporary world, there is a 
near universal agreement on not only the existence but also the substance of 
internationally recognized human rights”.45According to Donnelly, “[i]nternational 
legal universality is one of the great achievements of the international human rights 
movement, both intrinsically and because it has facilitated a deepening overlapping 
consensus”.46 
Donnelly added that international legal universality is relative in the sense that it 
holds across the universe of States and in a particular time, whereby in the past it 
did not and in the future might not have such a widespread endorsement as it does 
today. In connection to Brems’ observation, Donnelly noted that this universality is 
incomplete as some States continue to resist international human rights norms.47 In 
addition, he aptly observed that this type of universality is bounded, in the sense 
that while States agree that they have obligations, significant international 
enforcement mechanisms are lacking. This is related to Donnelly’s relativity of 
enjoyment. Nevertheless, he argued that this universality has immense significance, 
especially since States “are the most important in determining whether people enjoy 
the human rights that they have”.48 
When relating universality with historical origin, Brems noted that one cannot 
conclude that human rights are universal in this sense as historically speaking, 
“human rights are in the first place a Western creation”.49 Donnelly observed in this 
regard that “Islamic, Confucian, and African societies did not in fact develop 
significant bodies of human rights ideas or practices prior to the twentieth 
century”.50  
Universality related to formal origin-norm creation is a combination of formal 
universality and historical universality and focuses on the participation in the 
historical drafting of a human rights text. Brems noted that this concept is used in 
the argumentation whether the UDHR is universal because of the participation of 
the five continents, or is not universal because of underrepresentation of the 
                                                          
44 Jack Donnelly, ‘The Relative Universality of Human Rights’ (2007) 29 Human Rights Quarterly 281, 
p. 288. See also Jack Donnelly, Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice (3rd edn, Cornell 
University Press, Ithaca 2013), pp. 94-95 on international legal universality. 
45 Jack Donnelly, Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice (3rd edn, Cornell University Press, 
Ithaca 2013), p. 95. 
46 Jack Donnelly, ‘The Relative Universality of Human Rights’ (2007) 29 Human Rights Quarterly 281, 
p. 306 and Jack Donnelly, Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice (3rd edn, Cornell 
University Press, Ithaca 2013), p. 118. 
47 Jack Donnelly, ‘Human Rights: Both Universal and Relative (a Reply to Michael Goodhart)’ (2008) 
30 Human Rights Quarterly 194, p. 198. 
48Jack Donnelly, Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice (3rd edn, Cornell University Press, 
Ithaca 2013), p. 95. 
49 Eva Brems, Human Rights: Universality and Diversity (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The Hague 
2001), p. 8.  
50  Jack Donnelly on the historical or anthropological universality in Jack Donnelly, ‘The Relative 
Universality of Human Rights’ (2007) 29 Human Rights Quarterly 281, p. 286. See also the previous 
section in this chapter on the historical origin of human rights. 
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developing world.51 Accordingly, it is argued by some that the UDHR is a Western 
interpretation of human rights that might not be suitable for non-Western 
societies.52 With respect to the latter argument, Flinterman observed that this denies 
the fact that all States and peoples have accepted the UDHR. He also noted this 
argument does not do justice to the development of human rights instruments which 
are formulated from the 1960s onwards and to which States all over the world have 
contributed.53 
With respect to universality in terms of anthropological of philosophical 
acceptance, Brems noted that “the most heated debates” occur in anthropological or 
philosophical terms.54 She furthermore observed that “even when the universality 
concept itself is not defined in this way but rather in a normative matter [conform 
the first notion of universality discussed above], universal acceptance is frequently 
considered to be a precondition of universality”.55 She concluded that the outcome 
of this quest for universality depends on what one aims to discover. A UNESCO 
sponsored research report observed for instance, “the concept of human rights itself, 
at the level of explicit theories, legal rule or objective ethnological description is not 
universal. Yet the existential roots of human rights, the fundamental requirement 
that a certain respect is due to human beings, can be found across the world.”56 So 
in philosophical or anthropological terms, the focus lies on these universal roots, 
while one cannot speak of universality when one tries to find the concept of human 
rights as such in each culture.57 
Donnelly speaks of anthropological or historical or cultural universality, which 
he argues is lacking: “There may be considerable historical/anthropological 
universality of values across time and culture. No society, civilization, or culture 
prior to the seventeenth century, however, had a widely endorsed practice, or even a 
                                                          
51 Eva Brems, Human Rights: Universality and Diversity (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The Hague 
2001), p. 9. 
52 See amongst others Adamantia Pollis and Peter Schwab, 'Human Rights: A Western Construct with 
Limited Applicability' in Christof Heyns and Karen Stefiszyn (eds), Human Rights, Peace and Justice 
in Africa: A Reader (UPEACE Series on Peace and Conflict in Africa, Pretoria University Law Press, 
Pretoria 2006). 
53 Cees Flinterman, ‘De Universaliteit van Mensenrechten’ in Cees Flinterman and Theo van Boven 
(eds.), Universaliteit van Mensenrechten: Fundamenteel en Controversieel (Stichting NJCM Boekerij, 
Leiden 1992), p. 69. 
54 According to Donnelly, anthropological and ontological universality are indefensible. Jack Donnelly, 
‘The Relative Universality of Human Rights’ (2007) 29 Human Rights Quarterly 281, pp. 281, 284-
286, 292-293. 
55 Eva Brems, Human Rights: Universality and Diversity, (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The Hague 
2001), p. 9. 
56Eva Brems, Human Rights: Universality and Diversity, (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The Hague 
2001), p. 9, hereby referring to Jeanne Hersch, ‘Le concept de droits de l’homme est-il un concept 
universel?’ Cadmos 1981, pp. 19-20. 
57 Eva Brems, Human Rights: Universality and Diversity, (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The Hague 
2001), p. 9.  
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vision, of equal and inalienable individual human rights”.58 Instead human rights 
are a response to the threats posed by modern markets and modern States.59 This is 
connected to his idea that human rights are relative in specification, in the sense that 
human rights “reflect a process of social learning with respect to historically 
particular and contingent standard threats to human dignity”.60 As said before, he 
observed that Islamic, Confucianism and traditional African societies did not 
develop substantial bodies of human rights ideas or practices before the twentieth 
century.61 This is also related to universality in terms of time. 
On functional acceptance or universality as an existential reality, 62  Brems 
noted that “it may be said that human rights are universal because human beings in 
all parts of the world, of all backgrounds, cultures, religions and ideologies, 
experience the need of the protection they offer and recognise their existence and 
their value by appealing to them”.63  
Donnelly dealt with the notion of functional universality, which he formulated 
as “the claim that human rights perform certain functions”. He specified these 
functions as protection against certain standard threats to human dignity that are 
posed by modern markets and States in most places in the contemporary world.64 
He argued that human rights are in this respect the most effective response to assure 
human dignity.65 According to Donnelly, human rights provide this remedy for a 
growing number in all regions: 
 
Whatever our other problems, we all must deal with market economies and 
bureaucratic states. Whatever our other religions, moral, legal, and political 
resources, we all need equal and inalienable universal human rights to protect us 
from those threats.66 
                                                          
58 Jack Donnelly, ‘The Relative Universality of Human Rights’ (2007) 29 Human Rights Quarterly 281, 
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62 Eva Brems, Human Rights: Universality and Diversity, (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The Hague 
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Human Rights’ (2007) 29 Human Rights Quarterly 281, pp. 286-288. 
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Universality in terms of multicultural composition of human rights is, according to 
Brems, a rather widespread notion that asserts that universal human rights “must 
contain elements of all different cultures and be apt to respond to the needs of 
people living in very diverging contexts and circumstances”.67 This corresponds to 
Van Boven’s second dimension of universality, the dimension of universal values.  
This concept revolves around the question whether the human rights as 
stipulated in international documents are regarded and accepted as common values 
in all societies and cultures. According to Brems, it could be argued that the current 
international human rights system is universal in this sense and has undergone a 
significant expansion and modification since 1948.68 She furthermore observed that 
most authors who use this idea of universality are of the opinion that human rights 
should incorporate non-Western elements as these rights are not yet sufficiently 
multicultural. Cultural and ideological diversity is, in other words, embraced, rather 
than being considered as a threat to the universality of human rights.69  
The idea that human rights are strengthened by cultural and ideological 
diversity, can for example also be read into Shaw’s observation that the concept of 
human rights is closely related to ethics and morality.70 He stated in this respect that 
“those rights that reflect the values of a community will be those with the most 
chance of successful implementation”.71 
Brems furthermore observed that universality taken as world-wide observance of 
human rights is only mentioned in the negative mode or as an aspiration because 
human rights are violated in different parts of the world.72 This aspiration is for 
example included in the UDHR, in which the ambition of securing universal 
acceptance and effective recognition and observance of human rights was amongst 
others included.73 
Universality can also be interpreted as general opposability of human rights. 
Human rights are universal “because they must be respected by, and hence can be 
                                                          
67 Eva Brems, Human Rights: Universality and Diversity (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The Hague 
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68 Eva Brems, Human Rights: Universality and Diversity (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The Hague 
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69 Eva Brems, Human Rights: Universality and Diversity (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The Hague 
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70 Malcolm N. Shaw, International Law (6th edn, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2008), p. 
266. 
71 Malcolm N. Shaw, International Law (6th edn, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2008), p. 
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72 Eva Brems, Human Rights: Universality and Diversity, (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The Hague 
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invoked against everybody”.74 According to Brems, this means that the protection 
and promotion is a duty of all States at the minimum, but “comes down to all-
inclusiveness at the level of perpetrators”.75 
Human rights as legitimate concern of the international community is a form of 
universality that opposes claims for national sovereignty and non-interference. 
Human rights in this sense are a legitimate or even a mandatory concern of the 
international community.76 In other words, this notion corresponds to the idea that 
human rights are not considered to be part of the internal affairs of a State alone.  
Issues related to national sovereignty and non-interference were also at stake 
during the 1993 World Conference, which led to the adoption of the 1993 Vienna 
Declaration and Programme of Action (Section 3.4 of this Chapter). When relating 
this to ASEAN, ASEAN refers to the universality of human rights, while also 
stressing the idea of non-interference. The principle of non-interference is discussed 
further in Section 3 of Chapter IV. 
Universality interpreted as absence of double standards can complement 
universality in the form of all-inclusiveness and is an oft-heard principle of 
international human rights law. 77  Specifically, it entails “the obligation to be 
consistent in the use of standards to evaluate the human rights situation in different 
parts of the world and in the consequences derived from such evaluations in terms 
of judgments and/or sanctions”.78 Furthermore, Brems correctly argued that it is 
logical to prohibit discrimination among perpetrators of human rights violations in 
case universality is conceived as equality and non-discrimination.79 
Universality can also be related to the priority of human rights. Although an 
essential characteristic of human rights is their prominent place in the hierarchy of 
norms, Brems argued that “it seems preferable to treat it either as a separate trait or 
as a consequence or concomitant of the universality of human rights”.80 
Universality in terms of the indivisibility of human rights means that all human 
rights are equally important; exclusion of certain (categories of) rights is not 
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permitted. 81 The idea of indivisibility is part of an oft-heard adagio in international 
human rights law, i.e. that human rights are universal, indivisible, interdependent 
and interrelated.82 It is striking that it is often mentioned alongside the universality 
of human rights, whilst Brems considered indivisibility as a separate aspect or 
variant of universality. Peter Leuprecht, for instance, considered indivisibility, 
alongside universality and solidarity, as one of the three pillars of ‘the human rights 
edifice’.83 
With respect to universality related to the uniformity of standards, some authors 
stressed that universality does not require uniformity; diversity is in other words 
permitted. These authors treat the universality of human rights as an absolute 
normative concept, as opposed to others who use it as a relative concept. The latter 
refers to “uniformity of standards across different contexts, as opposed to openness 
for contextual diversity”.84  
Van Boven for instance elaborated on uniformity as one of the dimensions of 
universality. He observed that universality must not be confused with uniformity 
because these words are no synonyms of each other. According to Van Boven, 
universality means that all people have human rights (inclusiveness). Uniformity is 
not implied; differences in societies must be respected. This is, for example, 
affirmed by the rights for minorities and indigenous people(s).85 
With respect to universality in time, Brems observed that universality is 
generally conceived at the empirical level when examining the past. According to 
Brems, “the further one goes back in the past, the less likely one is to find human 
rights. Yet at a very abstract and general level, similarities of root concepts can 
always be found”.86 This can also be compared with universality in terms of origin. 
When looking at the future, this author noted that a shift is made to the normative 
level in the sense of eternal validity. 
Donnelly, however, underscored that what he calls international legal 
universality and functional universality are contingent and relative. He argued as 
follows: 
 
It depends on states deciding to treat the Universal Declaration and the Covenants as 
authoritative. Tomorrow, they may no longer accept or give as much weight to 
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human rights. Today, however, they clearly have chosen, and continue to choose, 
human rights over competing conceptions of national and international political 
legitimacy.87 
 
In addition, his idea of historical or anthropological relativity assumes that human 
rights “were not present in “traditional (non-state and nonmarket) societies, and 
there is no reason to assume that they will apply in very different types of societies 
in the future.”88  
A similar line of reasoning can also be found in earlier literature. Norberto 
Bobbio, for instance, stressed that “human rights however fundamental are 
historical rights and therefore arise from specific conditions characterized by the 
embattled defence of new freedoms against old powers. They are established 
gradually, not all at the same time, and not for ever [sic]”.89  Others have also 
underscored relativity in terms of time, such as Joseph Raz who argued that “[t]he 
more plausible claim is that human rights are synchronically universal, meaning 
that all people alive today have them”,90 as it would be absurd to contend that cave 
dwellers in the Stone Age also had those rights”.91 
The concept of universality as a process regards the universality of human rights 
as a claim or goal, while conceptually speaking, human rights must be universal.92 
When examining the aforementioned ideas of universality, Brems rightfully noted 
that the multicultural composition of human rights has de strongest aspirational 
content. This is different from the static conception that focuses on the empirical 
analysis, whereby the universality in terms of historical origin is the most static.93 
When reading the work of Donnelly, yet another form of universality is visible, 
which he called the overlapping consensus universality.94 Ultimately in essence the 
idea is that human rights are endorsed as a political conception of justice in a 
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variety of comprehensive religious and philosophical doctrines, whereby he 
observed the following: 
 
Today, however, the moral equality of all human beings is strongly endorsed by most 
leading comprehensive doctrines in all regions of the world. This convergence, both 
within and between civilizations, provides the foundation for a convergence on the 
rights of the Universal Declaration. In principle, a great variety of social practices 
other than human rights might provide the basis for realizing foundational egalitarian 
values. In practice human rights are rapidly becoming the preferred option.95 
 
From this notion follows that human rights have multiple foundations, giving 
human rights ‘foundational relativity.’ 96  A single trans-historical foundation, or 
what Donnelly calls ontological universality, accordingly lacks as “[h]uman rights 
are not part of the natural fabric of reality; they do not apply everywhere and at all 
times.”97 (See also universality in terms of time) It appears that Leuprecht followed 
the same line of reasoning as Donnelly used in his argumentation on the 
overlapping consensus universality. Specifically, Leuprecht formulated: 
 
A meaningful intercultural dialogue should include the essential issues of human 
rights. Whilst defending the universality of human rights, I believe that one can get to 
human rights by different ways and that the different cultures and civilizations of the 
world can and should contribute to the “common understanding” of human rights to 
which the Preamble of the Universal Declaration refers.98 
  
This research focuses on ASEAN and (the development of) its human rights 
system, in which the ASEAN region offers the contextualisation of human rights. 
Considering the different concepts of the universality of human rights, it is 
important to ascertain which concept is or which concepts are used in the present 
research. Brems also offers the answer in this respect as she argued, in short, “in 
essence the fear about the undermining of universality is a fear about the exclusion 
of some people from the international human rights protection system, or in other 
words a concern about the general and worldwide applicability of human rights”.99 
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The all-inclusive character of human rights100 has a number of connotations, 
which are consistent with the concepts of universality that Brems analysed in her 
research. Brems aptly observed that the other conceptions of universality can be 
discussed “as either potential necessary conditions for universality or potential 
necessary consequences or concomitants of universality”. 101  More specifically, 
because being human is the only criterion, human rights are also equally applicable 
to all; all humans enjoy the same human rights.102 Furthermore, these rights are 
inalienable because one cannot stop being human and, subsequently, one will 
always have these rights.103  
Important to this research is the issue to what extent diversity is allowed based 
on international human rights law.104 In other words, the question is to what extent 
current international human rights law allows relativistic interpretations or 
particularities without impeding the claim to the universality of human rights; a 
context which in the ASEAN region was initially influenced by ‘Asian values’, or 
as Vitit Muntarbhorn preferred to put it, ‘values in Asia’ because Asia is so 
heterogeneous.105 
A lesson learned from the Asian values debate is that one must be realistic in the 
sense that relativistic viewpoints can detract from the universalist human rights 
framework. More specifically, an interpretation could in fact restrict a certain 
human right that could diminish the value of that human right to a point that it no 
longer exists anymore. In addition, human rights can also be downgraded in the 
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event the implementation mechanisms to ensure the actual enjoyment of these rights 
are defective. Therefore, the next section focuses on universalism and relativism 
and the choice for Donnelly’s ‘relative universality’. 
 
3.2 Universalism, relativism and relative universality 
 
When discussing the universality of human rights, the debate with respect to the 
notions of universalism and relativism comes into play. This debate is concerned 
with the question in which way human rights should be interpreted and applied 
across the world. While at first the general tendency was to consider universalism 
and relativism as opposites of one another, in recent decades efforts have been 
made to move beyond this dichotomy.  
Initially, universalism and relativism were often considered as each other’s 
extremes when analysing the room for discretion in the interpretation of human 
rights: the more one is in favour of universalism, the less room is left for relativism, 
and vice versa. This is visible inter alia in Donnelly’s work in the beginning of this 
millennium, who captured this sliding scale in terms of radical universalism and 
strong cultural relativism as each other’s extremes. Weak cultural relativism or 
strong universalism formed the middle ground on which the universality of human 
rights was the starting point, but where local variations, albeit in a limited form, 
were allowed.106 
Universalism means that all human rights can be applied everywhere the same, 
because the morals on which human rights are founded are also similar among the 
different countries.107 Universalists focus on the similarities and the consensus that 
exist among countries, whereas cultural relativists focus on cultural differences. 
Radical universalism in the sense that culture is completely irrelevant to human 
rights cannot be followed, as this would deny the cultural diversity currently present 
in the world. Moreover, it would be contradictory to the conclusions reached at the 
1993 Vienna Conference and implies the risk of moral imperialism. In this respect, 
it is important to bear in mind that at times non-Western States consider the 
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international human rights regime to be a new form of Western imperialism. Moral 
imperialism, however, should be avoided. Donnelly rightly formulated the 
following warning: 
 
The legacy of colonialism demands that Westerners show special caution and 
sensitivity when advancing arguments of universalism in the face of clashing cultural 
values. Westerners must also remember the political, economic, and cultural power 
that lies behind even their best intentioned activities. Anything that even hints of 
imposing Western values is likely to be met with understandable suspicion, even 
resistance. How arguments of universalism and arguments of relativism are advanced 
may sometimes be as important as the substance of those arguments. 108 
 
Connected to this, he continued by stating that international legal and overlapping 
consensus universality (discussed in the previous section) “can provide important 
protection against the arrogant “universalism” of the powerful”. 109  He also 
underscores that peaceful action should – naturally – also be allowed. Specifically, 
he observed that caution and sensitivity by the West should not be confused with 
inattention or inaction as international human rights norms demand for such 
action.110  
Nowadays, the dangers of extreme versions of universalism and relativism are 
generally recognised.111  Indeed, universality in terms of universal application is 
unwarranted in human rights practice.112  A critical stance towards universalism 
denotes, for instance, that universalism does not mean that legal transplants are able 
to take place without any consideration for culture. Païvi Koskinen argued in this 
respect that “it is not for “outsiders” to decide how human rights should be 
protected in another country, but they can influence the decision making”.113  
The relevant question remains what room is available for relativistic attitudes or 
particularities in the international human rights regime. David A. Reidy and 
Mortimer N.S. Sellers described the relativistic element of human rights as follows: 
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Many [human rights] are universal only in the weaker sense of setting core normative 
considerations and fundamental normative limits applicable to all people everywhere, 
considerations and limits that permit a substantial degree of discretionary judgment 
and thus reasonable disagreement.114 
 
Cultural relativism has taken up a major role in the universalism-relativism 
debate. Proponents of cultural relativism propose a decisive impact for cultural 
differences in applying international human rights standards.115 Key to this doctrine 
is the notion that there are variations between different societies, and that there are 
no legitimate reasons allowing for outsiders to utter critique on certain differing 
aspects of a culture.116 Radical critics deny the global relevance of human rights, 
arguing that human rights are a limited tribal concept. Others conclude that human 
rights, as an historical cultural product, must be subject to the laws of social 
evolution and that it is up to social actors to shape and renegotiate the meaning of 
the product. A milder version of cultural relativism argues that human rights in their 
present form represent a culturally limited experience of dubious political 
aspirations.117  
While a critical stance towards extreme forms of universalism should be taken, 
this is also true towards cultural relativism. Koskinen rightfully underlined, for 
instance, that too much stress on cultural values “can be counterproductive” to 
general principles of international law and that “cultural values are not static”.118 
Donnelly concluded in this respect that radical and strong cultural relativism are not 
viable. The first implies that culture is the only source of the validity of a moral 
right or rule, whereas the latter would imply that “culture is the principal source of 
the validity of a right or rule”.119 By placing too much weight on culture, the fact 
that human rights are also influenced by other elements is disregarded. 
Weak cultural relativism (or strong universalism), according to Donnelly in his 
earlier work, “considers culture a secondary source of the validity of a right or rule. 
Universality is presumed, but the relativity of human nature, communities, and rules 
checks potential excesses of universalism. At the furthest extreme, weak cultural 
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relativism recognizes a comprehensive set of prima facie universal human rights but 
allows limited local variations.”120 
In the field of human rights, a moderate form of a relativistic position has the 
following implications. Although human rights are intrinsic to being human, these 
rights must be interpreted and applied according to the context of a particular 
society. Specifically, this view holds that human rights must be contextualised in 
light of political, economic, social and cultural factors. Human rights, according to 
Naruemon Thabchumpon, thus need cultural legitimacy.121 This notion was inter 
alia affirmed during the 1993 Vienna Conference.  
It might, however, be better to speak of relativism in a broader sense, instead of 
cultural relativism. From the previous section, it follows that human rights are 
relative to multiple factors. In addition, culture is not static, making it difficult to 
ascertain what is meant with ‘culture’ in terms of ‘cultural’ relativism. 
Alternatively, one should interpret ‘culture’ – in line with, for instance, 
Thabchumpon – at least in a broad manner, encompassing various particularities. 
Donnelly aptly distinguished cultural relativity from cultural relativism. The first 
means that “cultures differ, often dramatically over space and time”, while the latter 
“imbues culture with an overriding descriptive force”. 122  He hereby correctly 
observed that cultural relativity is undeniable as moral rules and social institutions 
vary among cultures and over time.123 Yet, he argued that culture is not significant 
for the development of ideas and practices of human rights with regard to the notion 
of what rights humans possess.124 This is in line with his argument that cultural 
differences pose only a “modest challenge to the contemporary normative 
universality of human rights”.125 Instead, it is important to the advocacy for and 
reception of internationally recognised human rights.126 In this respect, Daniel A. 
Bell argued that “if the ultimate aim of human rights diplomacy is to persuade 
others of the value of human rights, it is more likely that the struggle to promote 
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human rights can be won if it is fought in ways that build on, rather than challenge, 
local cultural traditions”.127 
 
Donnelly’s model of concepts, conceptions and implementation 
From a closer reading of Donnelly’s research, it follows that for advocating 
universality in our diverse world, and hereby balancing universality and context-
sensitivity, he formulated his three-level scheme of ‘substance’, ‘interpretation’ and 
‘form’. 128  This scheme is further elucidated in his later work as ‘concepts’, 
‘conceptions’ and ‘implementation’. The added value of Donnelly’s line of 
reasoning can in essence be explained as follows: 
 
We do not face an either-or choice between cultural relativism and universal human 
rights. Rather, we need to recognize both the universality of human rights and their 
particularity and thus accept a certain limited relativity, especially with respect to 
forms of implementation. We must take seriously the initial paradoxical idea of the 
relative universality of international recognized human rights.129 
 
More specifically, the added value of his scheme for the present research is that a 
distinction can be made on which levels universality is reached and on which levels 
legitimate variations are able to exist. Consequently, it becomes increasingly 
possible to pinpoint the difficulties in ASEAN’s human rights system.130 As his 
three-level scheme is used for the present research, it is now analysed in more 
detail.  
Donnelly’s scheme is part of his idea of ‘the relative universality of human 
rights’131 (discussed in the previous section), which is “a form of universalism that 
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also allows substantial space for important (second-order) claims of relativism”.132 
This seems to match State practice, as the Dutch Advisory Council of International 
Affairs for instance observed that “[w]hen a State itself (as opposed to local or 
tribal communities) invokes culture, it is mainly within the framework of universal 
human rights protection”.133 
As explained above, Donnelly initially considered universalism and relativism 
as a two-dimensional sliding scale, while in later work he proposed that is better to 
speak of a multiple space as there are different kinds of universality and relativity. 
This idea of a multiple space does justice to the observations in the previous 
section, in which the diversity in universality and relativity is explained. Within this 
multiple space, both relativity and universality are considered to be “essential to 
international human rights”.134 Key to his idea are the following observations: 
 
Functional and overlapping consensus universality lie primarily at the level of 
concepts. Most of the Universal Declaration lies at this level as well. Although 
international human rights treaties often embody particular conceptions, and 
sometimes even particular forms of implementation, they too permit a wide range of 
particular practices. Substantial second order variation, by country, region, culture, or 
other grouping, is completely consistent with international legal and overlapping 
consensus universality.135 
 
In earlier work, Donnelly stated that “[e]ven weak cultural relativists – that is, 
strong universalists – are likely to allow considerable variation in the form in which 
rights are implemented. (…) Important differences between strong and weak 
relativists are likely to arise, however, at the levels of interpretation and, especially, 
substance.”136 This led to his argument that a distinction must be made in terms of 
substance or concept, interpretation and form when evaluating arguments of 
(cultural) relativism,137 whereby: 
 
Concepts [substance] set a range of plausible variations among conceptions 
[interpretation], which in turn restrict the range of practices that can plausibly be 
considered implementations [form] of a particular concept and conception.138 
                                                          
132 Jack Donnelly, ‘The Relative Universality of Human Rights’ (2007) 29 Human Rights Quarterly 
281, p. 282. 
133 Advisory Council on International Affairs, ‘Universality of Human Rights: Principles, Practice and 
Prospects’, No. 63, November 2008, p. 16. 
134 Jack Donnelly, Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice (3rd edn, Cornell University Press, 
Ithaca 2013), p. 104. 
135 Jack Donnelly, ‘The Relative Universality of Human Rights’ (2007), 29 Human Rights Quarterly 
281, p. 300. 
136 Jack Donnelly, Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice (Cornell University Press, Ithaca 
2003), p. 93-94. 
137 Jack Donnelly, Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice (Cornell University Press, Ithaca 
2003), p. 93-98. 
138 Jack Donnelly, ‘The Relative Universality of Human Rights’ (2007) 29 Human Rights Quarterly 
281, p. 300. 
 
 
Theoretical Human Rights Framework 
 32 
 
From his notion follows that the room for legitimate variation is the smallest at the 
level of concepts, and the largest at the level of implementation. According to 
Donnelly, interpretation and implementation are matters of legitimate variation, as 
long as “they fall within the range of variation consistent with the overarching 
concept”.139 
Donnelly described the level of concepts or substance as “an abstract, general 
statement of an orienting value”.140 His argument for universality lies at this level 
only. According to this scholar, functional and overlapping consensus lie primarily 
at this level, as well as most of the UDHR.141 Taking Articles 3-12 UDHR as an 
example, he claimed that only at the level of these abstract and general statements 
do consensus exist. It is also at this level at which most appeals to cultural 
relativism fail, as these rights “are so clearly connected to basic requirements of 
human dignity, and are stated in sufficiently general terms that virtually every 
morally defensible contemporary form of social organization must recognize them 
(although not necessarily as inalienable rights)”.142  
Although for Donnelly civil rights such as the freedom of conscience, speech 
and association, and economic and social rights included in the UDHR may be “a 
bit more relative”,143 he argued that it is hard to imagine “a defensible conception of 
human dignity that did not include (almost all) of these rights”.144 Bearing this in 
mind, Donnelly rightfully warned that one must not read too much into the 
consensus reached at this level, as one might lose sight of the disagreements on 
definitions and systematic implicit limitations across civilisations, which in turn 
could pose challenges to the universalist arguments. Yet, one should be wary of 
“overstating their importance of misinterpreting their character”.145  Specifically, 
Donnelly argued that significant variations at the level of concepts, as well as 
systematic variations in interpretation that undermine conceptual consensus are 
largely not present. This is backed up by the general similarity of the (at the time of 
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research existing) regional human rights instruments146 and the fact “that there are 
strong and increasingly deep international legal and overlapping consensuses on 
internationally recognized human rights”.147 
Donnelly’s second level is the level of conceptions or interpretation, as concepts 
need to be interpreted. According to Donnelly, divergence in interpretation or 
conceptions does not necessarily pose a challenge to the universality of human 
rights. Rather, “variations in interpreting rights seem not merely defensible but 
desirable, and even necessary”.148 He also contended that these interpretations are 
“not free associations or arbitrary, let alone self-interested, stipulations”. 149 
Accordingly, he argued that plausible and defensible interpretations are also quite 
modest and that this divergence is less traceable to culture as cultural relativists 
might imply.150 
At this level, he aptly refers to Walter Bryce Gallie. This author argued that 
certain human rights are “essentially contested concepts”, of which Donnelly noted 
that in these concepts “there is a substantial but rather general consensus on basic 
meaning coupled with no less important, systematic, and apparently irresolvable 
conflicts of interpretation”.151 For Donnelly, culture is one of the plausible and 
defensible mechanisms to select interpretations and forms, while it is likely that the 
number of plausible and defensible interpretations is modest.152 He observed that 
significant divergences in interpretation exist not only between, but also within, 
cultures or civilisations. Donnelly observed in this respect that Europe and the 
United States differ in opinion on the death penalty, while Japan and Vietnam hold 
different interpretations on the freedom of speech and association. In addition, he 
argued that “even where variations in practice exist, culture does much less 
explanatory work than most relativists suggest – or at least that the “culture” in 
question is more local or national rather than regional or a matter of civilization”.153 
Relevant to the research is Donnelly’s claim that communitarian, consensual Asian 
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societies as opposed to individualistic, competitive Western societies explains less 
than proponents of relativism argue.154 
The third level is implementation or form, as interpretations need to be 
implemented in law and practice. Regarding this level, Donnelly argued that “[t]he 
range of actual and defensible variation here is considerable –although limited by 
the governing concept of interpretation.” 155  He argued that differences in 
interpretation seem to have a limited connection to culture or cultural difference and 
that other causes for differences in implementations, such as levels of economic 
development of unique cultural historical experiences can be equally important.156 
Donnelly argued for universality at the level of the concept, while “[t]he ways in 
which these rights are implemented, however, so long as they fall within the range 
of variation consistent with the overarching concept, are matters of legitimate 
variation.” 157  Divergence on the other two levels can thus still lead to the 
universality of human rights. These non-exhaustive options are according to 
Donnelly as follows: 
 
1. Overlapping consensus on the substance despite diversity in interpretations and 
implementations; 
2. Despite differences at the level of substance or concept, there is a large common 
core with minor differences in its periphery; 
3. Despite substantial differences there are “strong statistical regularities and the 
outliners are few and clearly overshadowed by the central tendency”.158 
 
The added value of Donnelly’s line of reasoning is of relevance when balancing 
between the universality of human rights and the interpretation and implementation 
of human rights in a context sensitive way, all within the framework of the 
universality of human rights. Donnelly hereby stressed that “we should talk more of 
the relative universality of human rights, rather than their relative universality”.159 
His view implies that “universal human rights, properly understood, leave 
considerable space for national regional, cultural particularity and other forms of 
diversity and relativity”.160 This fits ASEAN seamlessly, as the ASEAN region has 
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underlined throughout the years the universality of human rights, whilst leaving 
room for national and regional particularities. 
Donnelly formulated four criteria in order to judge divergences from 
international human rights norms that support deviations from authoritative 
international human rights norms, which are possible according to the notion of 
relative universality. This can be best read in his original words: 
 
1) Important differences in threats are likely to justify variations even at the level of 
concepts. Although perhaps the strongest theoretical justification for even fairly 
substantial deviations from international human rights norms, such arguments 
rarely are empirically persuasive in the contemporary world. (Indigenous peoples 
may be the exception that proves the rule.) 
2) Participants in the overlapping consensus deserve a sympathetic hearing when 
they present serious reasoned arguments justifying limited deviations from 
international norms. Disagreements over "details" should be approached 
differently from systematic deviations or comprehensive attacks. If the resulting 
set of human rights remains generally consistent with the structure and 
overarching values of the Universal Declaration, we should be relatively tolerant 
of particular deviations. 
3) Arguments claiming that a particular conception or implementation is, for 
cultural or historical reasons, deeply imbedded within or of unusually great 
significance to some significant group in society deserve, on their face, 
sympathetic consideration. Even if we do not positively value diversity, the 
autonomous choices of free people should never be lightly dismissed, especially 
when they reflect well-established practices based on deeply held beliefs. 
4) Tolerance for deviations should decrease as the level of coercion increases.161 
 
Michael Goodhart commented on Donnelly’s relative universalism stating that it is 
better to use Donnelly’s insights, rather than his vocabulary. Instead, Goodhart 
proposed amongst others that “[h]uman rights are neither relative nor universal. 
They are legitimate because of their global appeal. That’s enough”. 162  On 
Goodhart’s suggestion of omitting wordings such as ‘relative’ and ‘universal’, 
Donnelly aptly responded: 
 
It is striking, however, and I think important, that few people actually do. If it proves 
impossible to clarify the nature of the claims of universality and relativity that are a 
regular part of discussions of internationally recognized human rights, then maybe a 
new language is called for. But until then ... […] The search for alternative 
formulations thus is at best a supplement to, rather than a replacement for, greater 
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clarity, precision, and sophistication in our understanding of the universality and 
relativity of human rights.163 
 
In addition, Donnelly is correct when he stated that legitimacy cannot be based on 
popularity, and that there are other grounds for human rights.164 If a global appeal 
and legitimacy are related, then it would be the other way around: due to the 
legitimacy of human rights, they have a global appeal.165  
The matter of fact is that human rights are still discussed in terms of 
universality, universalism and relativism. The added value of Donnelly’s tree-tiered 
scheme is considered to be of relevance, as argued inter alia by Miod Jovanović. 
This author observed that this scheme has some limitations; for example, it cannot 
arbitrate in the ongoing dispute regarding the superiority of normative theories of 
interpretation. Nevertheless, it is “a useful heuristic tool for reconciling human 
rights claims to universality and the need for their context-sensitive 
implementation”.166 It was underlined that it can help to determine which theories 
are problematic because of their particular nature and specifically, “that this scheme 
sketches contours of legitimate variations of human rights “concepts” at lower 
levels of their abstractness, thereby providing some guidelines for adequate 
interpretative techniques”.167 
Donnelly’s three-tiered scheme forms the groundwork for the framework used in 
the present research to assess ASEAN’s human rights system. Although some 
acknowledged the added value, the limitations of the framework were also revealed. 
The present research complements Donnelly’s framework. In this way, the added 
value of Donnelly’s scheme is retained, whilst at the same time a framework is 
provided in which the ASEAN’s human rights system can be analysed in a more 
integral manner. 
Donnelly’s framework can be summarised as follows. The level of concepts 
comprises of certain values whereby the room for differentiation is the smallest. 
This concept or value is concretised in a human right, or conception, in which more 
room exists for differentiation. The final level is implementation, in which this right 
                                                          
163 Jack Donnelly, ‘Human Rights: Both Universal and Relative (a Reply to Michael Goodhart)’ (2008) 
30 Human Rights Quarterly 194, p. 201. 
164 Donnelly mentioned natural law, divine commandment, moral duty, social contract, or the generally 
utilitarian consequences of accepting such behavioural rule; Jack Donnelly, ‘Human Rights: Both 
Universal and Relative (a Reply to Michael Goodhart)’ (2008) 30 Human Rights Quarterly 194, p. 202. 
165 Jack Donnelly, ‘Human Rights: Both Universal and Relative (a Reply to Michael Goodhart)’ (2008), 
30 Human Rights Quarterly 194, p. 202. 
166 Miodrag A. Jovanovic, ‘Human Rights - Universality and Context-Sensitive Implementation’ in 
Bojan Spaić and Kenneth Einar Himma (eds), Fundamental Rights: Justification and Implementation 
(Democracy and the Role of Law, Eleven Publishers International, The Hague, Forthcoming), p. 22. 
Available at <SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2641275> accessed 8 September 2018. 
167 Miodrag A. Jovanovic, ‘Human Rights - Universality and Context-Sensitive Implementation’ in 
Bojan Spaić and Kenneth Einar Himma (eds), Fundamental Rights: Justification and Implementation 
(Democracy and the Role of Law, Eleven Publishers International, The Hague, Forthcoming), p. 22-23. 
Available at <SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2641275> accessed 8 September 2018. 
 
 
Theoretical Human Rights Framework 
 37 
is in turn concretised and whereby the greatest room for differentiation exists. One 
of Donnelly’s examples illustrates this scheme: according to this author, personal 
autonomy is a concept that is expressed at the level of conceptions in the freedom of 
speech. This, in turn, finds its implementation in the criminalisation of 
pornography.168 When analysing Donnelly’s framework, as far as relevant for its 
application in the context of the present research, the following observations can be 
made: 
Firstly, Donnelly does not refer to the category of norms of ius cogens when 
speaking of universality at the level of concepts. While ius cogens norms have an 
overlap with a number of rights enshrined in UDHR, given the special status of 
these non-derogable rights they deserve explicit attention. More specifically, norms 
of ius cogens can be considered as the ultimate rights on which overlapping 
consensus is reached and of which no derogation is possible. Indeed, these 
universalistic standards transcend cultural and ideological differences, making local 
custom or treaties void when their content contradicts these norms. 169 Due to these 
traits, ius cogens norms can be categorised in what Donnelly calls universality in 
terms of concepts, and more specifically, as the highest attainable level on which 
consensus is reached. Ius cogens standards are, therefore, researched more closely 
in the next section. In addition, as there is no limitative list of rights that can be 
qualified as ius cogens standards, this research investigates whether the ASEAN 
region adds rights to the current body of rights that are perceived as ius cogens 
norms, hereby contributing to the universality at the level of concepts. See Section 3 
of Chapter II and Subsection 2.1 of Chapter VI for the outcome of this analysis. 
Secondly, while Donnelly’s framework aims at uncovering the underlying 
values of human rights, it does not indicate the method in determining whether 
restrictions to these human rights posed by States are compatible with international 
human rights law. A certain human right can be formally endorsed by a State, 
thereby also implicitly acknowledging the underlying value of this right. By 
formulating interpretative declarations, reservations or limitations, however, this 
human right can be restricted in such a way that is incompatible with human rights 
law. In line with this, the underlying value is in essence denied. Accordingly, 
ASEAN’s margin of appreciation in interpreting human rights within the 
framework of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties will be researched. 
The particularities that follow from the reservations and interpretative declarations 
to core UN human rights documents to which the ASEAN Member States are 
parties, and the constitutions of the ASEAN Member States, are in this respect 
instructive. More on this, in Sections 2 and 3 of Chapter III. 
Thirdly, human rights have to be implemented in adequate human rights 
mechanisms. In this way, human rights get their practical relevance next to their 
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conceptual importance. In addition, Donnelly’s idea of the general opposability of 
human rights also dictates the inclusion of the facet. While Donnelly’s level of 
implementation looks into the further concretisation of human rights, it disregards 
an assessment of the mechanisms that can be used to give these rights their practical 
meaning. The present research, therefore, includes an analysis of ASEAN’s human 
rights mechanisms as part of the level of implementation. 
This leads to the following adaptation of Donnelly’s framework, which covers 
both the normative and the procedural aspects: 
1. Concepts: Which human rights are included in ASEAN’s human rights 
system (including norms of ius cogens)? The focal points of this analysis 
are the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration and the constitutions of the 
ASEAN Member States. 
2. Conceptions: Interpretations and restrictions of human rights in ASEAN 
and their conformity to international human rights law. The focus lies on 
the declarations and reservations presented at the moment of ratification of 
or accession to UN core human rights instruments and on fundamental 
rights in the Member States’ constitutions. 
3. Implementation: The way in which human rights are legally protected and 
promoted in ASEAN’s human rights mechanisms. The focus here lies on 
the ASEAN Way and the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on 
Human Rights. 
 
To sum up, from this section follows that strong universalism and strong cultural 
relativism are flawed as they do not provide sufficient room for nuances; moderate 
views are more appealing and in line with practice. While the notion of weak 
cultural relativism was initially considered the most viable as this takes the 
universality of human rights as its starting point, but leaves room for cultural 
particularities, the notion of relative university provides the necessary nuances 
when researching the claim to universality of human rights in the ASEAN region. 
Three levels of universality are distinguished, i.e. the level of concepts or substance 
of human rights, the level of conceptions or their interpretation and the form in 
which they are implemented.  
Although the added value of Donnelly’s relative universality is acknowledged, 
this section also adds aspects to his scheme. In particular, using Donnelly’s 
framework on ASEAN unveiled that this framework needs to be supplemented by 
an explicit reference to norms of ius cogens, the feasibility of human rights 
curtailments based on international human rights law and the procedural 
implementation of human rights. By using Donnelly’s framework from these 
angles, the following chapters demonstrate that the ASEAN region shows nuances 





Theoretical Human Rights Framework 
 39 
3.3 Norms of ius cogens 
 
In the previous section, the argument was proffered that ius cogens norms are part 
of what Donnelly described as universality at the level of concepts. This section 
looks at the concept of ius cogens more closely. Since norms of ius cogens are 
subject of numerous studies, this part of the research has only the ambition to 
briefly discuss the topic as far this is relevant for the research. 
Ius cogens norms, or “peremptory norms of general international law”, are 
obligatory for the international community as a whole170 and have an erga omnes 
character. Within international law, ius cogens norms have a higher status than 
other obligations and are considered to be non-derogable rights. As said, these 
universalistic standards rise above cultural and ideological differences and cannot 
be contradicted by local customs or treaties. In this respect, Article 53 Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties specifies that a treaty is void “if, at time of its 
conclusion, it conflicts with a peremptory norm of general international law”.171 In 
addition, Article 64 stipulates that “if a new peremptory norm of general 
international law emerges, any existing treaty which is in conflict with that norm 
also becomes void and terminates”.172  
These norms are non-derogable rights, in the sense that these norms are 
fundamental and superior values within the international system. According to 
Andrea Bianchi, “[t]he inner moral aspiration of the law thus materialized in 
international law with the advent of jus cogens”.173 Cezary Mik has pointed out that 
authors observed that ‘non derogation means that formal (i.e. through international 
agreements, unilateral acts, or resolutions of international organisations) or informal 
(i.e. through interpretation) rejection, amendment or partial derogation of a ius 
cogens norm is prohibited, as well as ascertaining customary law or general 
principles of law incompatible to these norms.174 This means that ius cogens norms 
are excluded from relativistic interpretations that would contradict these norms. 
As De Schutter rightfully stressed, the concept of ius cogens is difficult given 
the fact that the list of the norms that can be qualified as ius cogens norms is still 
evolving. These norms are identified based on the evolution of thoughts and actions 
within the international community of states. It is observed that the emergence of 
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custom is more important than the element of practice.175 In identifying norms of 
ius cogens, Shaw noted the following: 
  
The appropriate test would thus require universal acceptance of the proposition as a 
legal rule by States and recognition of it as a rule of jus cogens by an overwhelming 
majority of States, crossing ideological and political divides. It is also clear that only 
rules based on custom or treaties may form the foundation of jus cogens norms. 
 
As De Schutter described it, there are doctrinal uncertainties on the criteria to 
recognise these norms. In addition, he argued that the criteria for recognising norms 
of ius cogens are sufficiently vague to adapt the list of human rights that should be 
recognised as such norms.176 In addition, Bianchi observed that the way in which 
these norms come into being is of particular interest for debate,177  while Shaw 
argued that ius cogens norms cannot be based upon ideas of a political or 
ideological minority.178 He noted in this respect that Article 53 Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties entails a two-stage approach: 
 
First the establishment of the proposition as a rule of general international law, and 
secondly, the acceptance of that rule as a peremptory norm by the international 
community of States as a whole […] The appropriate test would thus require 
universal acceptance of the proposition as a legal rule by States and recognition of it 
as a rule of ius cogens by an overwhelming majority of States, crossing ideological 
and political divides.179 
 
With respect to the notion that peremptory norms are part of general international 
law, Bianchi noted: 
 
[I]t has been contended that their coming into being as general rules of international 
law would not occur through the medium of customary law-making and its reliance 
on state practice but rather by general principles. General principles would be 
established by a process similar, but not entirely analogous, to the one that leads to 
custom. In fact, the required general acceptance and recognition would not need to be 
based on state practice, as traditionally understood. It would rather result from a 
variety of manifestations ‘in which moral and humanitarian considerations find a 
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more direct and spontaneous “expression in legal form”’.180 
 
To date, there is no clear agreement on the list of ius cogens norms that are 
identified as such, although Bianchi noted that “[t]here is an almost intrinsic 
relationship between peremptory norms and human rights”.181 Mik noted in this 
regard that catalogues of peremptory norms have been proposed, but that this has 
led to unsatisfactory results and diverging lists.182  
Although there is no exhaustive list of ius cogens norms, consensus has been 
reached on certain norms of ius cogens. These norms include the prohibition of 
slavery and slave trade, racial discrimination, aggression and genocide.183 Other 
norms include the prohibition of torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment, 
arbitrary arrest and detainment, advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred, 
denial of freedom of thought, conscience and religion, the right to a fair trial and to 
be presumed innocent, the right to marry and the rights of minorities to enjoy their 
own culture. 184  Other peremptory norms are basic rules of international 
humanitarian law applicable in armed conflict and the right to self-determination of 
peoples.185 
According to De Schutter, it “remains controversial whether the emergence of 
peremptory norms could be regional, rather than universal and resulting from the 
international community as a whole”. 186  This possibility, however, cannot be 
excluded as other regional human rights systems have brought nuances in the list of 
these norms. For instance, in the European Court of Human Rights case of Soering 
vs. United Kingdom, Judge Meyer wrote in his concurring opinion on capital 
punishment and extraditing a person who could face the death penalty. Specifically, 
he noted that capital punishment “is not consistent with the present state of 
European civilization” and that extraditing a person who could face the death 
penalty “would be repugnant to European standards of justice, and contrary to the 
public order of Europe”.187  
Another example comes from the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in its 
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judgment on Juridical Condition and Rights of Undocumented Migrants, on the 
status of the principle of equality and non-discrimination as a principle of ius 
cogens. The Court elaborated that “the principle of equality before the law, equal 
protection before the law and non-discrimination belongs to ius cogens, because the 
whole legal structure of national and international public order rests on it and it's a 
fundamental principle that permeates all laws. […] At the existing stage of the 
development of international law, the fundamental principle of equality and non-
discrimination has entered the realm of ius cogens”.188  
With respect to the issue of whether the list of norms of ius cogens is broadened 
from a Southeast Asian, or an ASEAN perspective, remains to be seen. The 
ASEAN Human Rights Declaration does not specify which human rights are 
considered to be ius cogens norms and ASEAN’s human rights system does not yet 
have a regional court on human rights. In addition, ASEAN currently has a modest 
overarching human rights commission whose authority still needs to develop (see 
Section 5.2 of Chapter V). Consequently, ASEAN’s views on the list of norms of 
ius cogens are not yet clear. 
Although it seems that regional differences can occur in theory (i.e. in the sense 
that certain rights or aspects thereof should be considered to be norms of ius cogens 
while this is not the case in other regions), the differences between the States will 
be minimal given the particular concept of ius cogens. This leads to the conclusion 
that norms of ius cogens on which international consensus is reached are norms of 
which ASEAN cannot derogate from, while they may add others or make nuances 
to the existing ius cogens norms in the future.  
When unveiling the list from an ASEAN perspective, a starting point may be 
Indonesia’s constitution, for example, which lists non-derogable rights, i.e., the 
right to life, freedom from torture, thought and conscience, religion and 
enslavement, recognition as a person before the law, and the rights not to be tried 
under a law with retrospective effect (Article 28I(1)). The ASEAN Human Rights 
Declaration also forms a starting point, as it explicitly lists, but also omits, certain 
ius cogens norms. See Section 4 of Chapter V and the concluding chapter for a 
detailed analysis of the organisation’s human rights declaration. 
 
3.4 Vienna Conference: Catalyser for the debate 
 
3.4.1 Asia’s regional documents preceding the 1993 Vienna Conference 
 
The 1993 Vienna World Conference on Human Rights can be considered as a 
catalyser for the debate on the universality of human rights and the relativistic 
viewpoints that were surfacing at that time. Asian perspectives were formulated in 
the preceding Bangkok Declarations, both from governments and NGOs. This 
subsection scrutinises these documents closer. 
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In 1989, the UN General Assembly called for a world meeting in which the 
progress made in the field of human rights since the adoption of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights was to be reviewed and assessed. This resulted in the 
1993 World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna. The agenda of the Conference 
was set by the 47th Session of the UN General Assembly in 1992, followed by four 
Preparatory Meetings. During the first Preparatory Meeting in September 1991, it 
already became clear that the issues on national sovereignty and universality were 
amongst others the most controversial ones. 
In the run-up to the 1993 World Conference on Human Rights, representatives 
of States and NGOs discussed their views on human rights. In Asia, this led to two 
documents, which reveal diverging ideas. The States’ representatives, who came 
together in the Regional Meeting for Asia of the World Conference on Human 
Rights in Bangkok in April 1993, formulated the 1993 Bangkok Declaration on 
Human Rights. NGOs in turn prepared their own 1993 Bangkok NGO Declaration 
on Human Rights. The governmental Bangkok Declaration is described as “a 
protest against a world order perceived as perpetuating injustices against developing 
countries: the practice of human rights was projected as an instrument of the West, 
selectively utilised to suit the West's purposes”.189 
When scrutinising the different ideas in both Declarations, Muntarbhorn used 
angles in his research that provide a number of valuable insights. Specifically, he 
focused on the universality of human rights, the indivisibility of human rights, the 
notion of rights and duties, and the concept of Asian values, or in his words, values 
in Asia.190 
Muntarbhorn linked the universality of human rights to the primacy of 
international law, being applicable to all States as basic minimum standards.191 This 
is, however, in contrast to the then position of many States that human rights were 
still primarily part of the internal affairs of States. In this sense, they advocated 
State sovereignty and non-interference in the internal affairs of a State. When 
looking at the 1993 Bangkok Declaration, these views were indeed visible. 
Specifically, this Declaration covered a number of key values, which are to date still 
prevalent in the ASEAN region. Specifically, the Declaration mentioned respect for 
national sovereignty and national integrity and non-interference in the internal 
affairs of States.192 It also underlined the discouragement to attempt to use human 
rights as a conditionality for development assistance (para. 4), the right of States to 
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determine their own political systems (para. 6), and avoidance of double standards 
(para. 7). 
Jau-Hwa Chen has noted that “the words ‘sovereignty” and ‘interference’ have 
been notorious over the past 50 years, used by some Asian states as an excuse for 
no improvement in human rights”.193 Nevertheless, these notions influenced the 
position that regional and national particularities should be upheld and that these 
practices should prevail over international human rights when they are in conflict. 
According to Muntarbhorn, these notions brought about the reluctance to accede to 
international human rights documents, or the accession on extensive reservations.194 
The current state of affairs of ratification of and accession to, as well as the 
reservations and declarations uttered by the ASEAN Member States, is analysed in 
Section 2 of Chapter III. 
34 States and one national liberation movement (Palestine) attended the 
meetings that preceded the 1993 Bangkok Declaration. The observers comprised 
various observing States, specialised agencies, intergovernmental organisations 
such as ASEAN, United Nations organs, National Human Rights Institutions 
(including the Institution from the Philippines), United Nations human rights and 
related bodies, other organisations and non-governmental organisations. Regarding 
the participating States, all ASEAN Member States apart from Cambodia 
participated. 
When examining the text of the 1993 Bangkok Declaration, it is striking that the 
preamble mentions the following, which corresponds to aspects of the ASEAN Way 
(analysed in Section 3 of Chapter IV): 
 
Reaffirming the principles of respect for national sovereignty, territorial integrity and 
non-interference in the internal affairs of States, 
 
Recognizing that the promotion of human rights should be encouraged by 
cooperation and consensus, and not through confrontation and the imposition of 
incompatible values.195 
 
Regarding the latter consideration, Attilio Pisanò rightly questioned “who is entitled 
to decide which of the values underlying human rights are ‘incompatible’ with 
Asian values and which are “compatible”.196 This is indeed one of the points of 
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critique uttered with respect to the Asian values debate, which is analysed in 
Section 2 of Chapter V. 
In addition, the aforementioned positions formulated in the preamble are 
especially visible in Section 5 and 8 of this Declaration. They read as follows: 
 
5. Emphasize the principles of respect for national sovereignty and territorial 
integrity as well as non-interference in the internal affairs of States, and the non-use 
of human rights as an instrument of political pressure; 
 
8. Recognize that while human rights are universal in nature, they must be considered 
in the context of a dynamic and evolving process of international norm-setting, 
bearing in mind the significance of national and regional particularities and various 
historical, cultural and religious backgrounds. 
 
In contrast, the 1993 Bangkok NGO Declaration on Human Rights opted for an 
alternative approach, that is to say promoting the primacy of international human 
rights standards over regional and national particularities. 
It is questioned, however, to what extent this Declaration is representative for 
the region. Brems noted that the 240 representatives of 110 NGO’s who formulated 
the Bangkok NGO Declaration may not represent their society as they may be more 
than average be influenced by the West. Nevertheless, the comparison of both 
document can be “instructive.”197 
When reading the Bangkok NGO Declaration, the viewpoints on the universality 
of human rights are visible in the following sections: 
 
Universality. We can learn from different cultures in a pluralistic perspective and 
draw lessons from the humanity of these cultures to deepen respect for human rights. 
There is emerging a new understanding of universalism encompassing the richness 
and wisdom of the Asia-Pacific cultures. 
 
Universal human rights are rooted in many cultures. We affirm the basis of the 
universality of human rights which afford protection to all of humanity, including 
special groups such as women, children, minorities and indigenous peoples, workers, 
refugees and displaced persons, the disabled and the elderly. While advocating 
cultural pluralism, those cultural practices which derogate from universally accepted 
human rights, including women’s rights, must not be tolerated.  
 
As human rights are of universal concern and are universal in value, the advocacy of 
human rights cannot be considered to be an encroachment upon national 
sovereignty.198 
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In contrast to the views formulated in the Bangkok Declaration formulated by 
governments, in the Bangkok NGO Declaration it was asserted that the universality 
of human rights prevails over cultural practices in case they derogate from 
universally accepted human rights. 
While the universality of human rights is underscored, Peter Baehr has provided 
an insightful nuance when he observed that within NGOs differences were visible 
with respect to the universality of human rights. Specifically, he referred to the 
example of Amnesty International and the question whether the organisation should 
focus on the release of persons who were imprisoned because of their sexuality. In 
Asian (but also African and Latin-American) countries, sections of this organisation 
were against this position, because they considered homosexuality to be an illness 
that had nothing to do with human rights.199 
The second angle adopted by Muntarbhorn relates to the indivisibility of human 
rights, which he observed not all Asian States accepted, or that some felt 
uncomfortable with this notion. 200  In contrast, the view of NGO’s in their 
Declaration was as follows: 
 
2. Indivisibility. We affirm our commitment to the principle of indivisibility and 
interdependence of human rights, be they civil, political, economic, social or cultural 
rights. The protection of human rights concerns both individuals and collectivities. 
The enjoyment of human rights implies a degree of social responsibility to the 
community (…) 
 
Violations of civil, political and economic rights frequently result from the emphasis 
on economic development at the expense of human rights. Violations of social and 
cultural rights are often the result of political systems which treat human rights as 
being of secondary importance. (…) 
 
[Economic rights] can only be protected where people are able to exercise their civil 
and political rights (…) Poverty arises from maldevelopment in the face of systemic 
denial of human rights. 
 
There must be a holistic and integrated approach to human rights. One set of rights 
cannot be used to bargain for another.201 
 
On other occasions, governments and NGOs also adopted diverging views. 
Illustrative is the difference in perception with respect to rights and duties. 
Muntarbhorn noted that less liberal governments tend to advocate human duties or 
responsibilities towards the State and other persons over the need to respect human 
rights. NGOs adopted a contrasting view in their 1998 Universal Declaration on the 
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Duties of Governments and Other Power Groups, in which the following was 
stated: 
 
Article 1. All governments and other power groups, particularly non-government 
armed groups and business enterprises, are under a duty to guarantee that all human 
beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. 
 
Article 2. All governments and other power groups are obliged to promote and 
protect all rights and freedoms set forth in the Universal Declaration on Human 
Rights and other relevant instruments, without distinction of any kind, such as race, 
colour, gender, sexual orientation, language, religion, political or other opinion, 
national, social, or cultural origin, property, birth or other status.202   
 
On the concept of Asian values, or values in Asia, Muntarbhorn summarised the 
concept as the idea that the interests of the family and community and the decision-
making power of governments or States take precedence over individual interests. 
By implication, he noted that human rights of the individual are subordinate to the 
collective interest.203 Muntarbhorn’s question of ‘who is making the argument?’ is 
relevant, as governments and NGOs have diverging views. The Asian values debate 
is researched in more detail in Section 2 of Chapter V. 
Based on the aforementioned, one can conclude that both declarations were a 
reflection of the different viewpoints and interests of States and civil society at that 
time. While governments emphasised human rights to be primarily part of the 
internal affairs of a State, respect for national sovereignty and national integrity and 
non-interference in the internal affairs of States, NGOs promoted (at least at the 
abstract level) the primacy of international human rights standards over regional 
and national particularities and the universality of human rights. NGOs also focused 
more on the indivisibility of human rights, as well as on human rights instead of the 
duties an individual has. This difference in focus might be explained by 
Muntarbhorn’s fourth angle, Asian values. In dealing with his question ‘who is 
making the argument?’, he stated that Asian values, present among less liberal 
circles or authoritarian governments or regimes, implied that the interests of the 
State were more important than the interests of its individuals. Other values in Asia, 
such as compassion, non-violence and respect for other human beings and the 
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3.4.2 The 1993 Vienna Conference and Programme of Action 
 
The final document following from the World Conference on Human Rights was 
adopted by representatives of 171 States on 25 June 1993 on the basis of consensus. 
The Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action was endorsed by the 48th 
Session of the UN General Assembly.205  According to the United Nations, the 
Vienna Declaration and Program of Action marked the culmination of a long 
process of review and debate over the then current status of the human rights 
machinery in the world.206  
In the final document, “the solemn commitment of all States to fulfil their 
obligations to promote universal respect for, and observance and protection of, all 
human rights and fundamental freedoms for all in accordance with the Charter of 
the United Nations, other instruments relating to human rights, and international 
law”207 was reaffirmed. They also upheld the notion that “the universal nature of 
these rights and freedoms is beyond question”.208  In addition, the key role for 
regional arrangements in the promotion and protection of human rights was 
emphasised: 
 
Regional arrangements play a fundamental role in promoting and protecting human 
rights. They should reinforce universal human rights standards, as contained in 
international human rights instruments, and their protection. The World Conference 
on Human Rights endorses efforts under way to strengthen these arrangements and to 
increase their effectiveness, while at the same time stressing the importance of 
cooperation with the United Nations human rights activities. 
 
The World Conference on Human Rights reiterates the need to consider the 
possibility of establishing regional and subregional arrangements for the promotion 
and protection of human rights where they do not already exist.209 
 
The Vienna Declaration also emphasised regional and sub-regional arrangements 
for the promotion and protection of human rights (para. 77). Regarding the 
universality and the indivisibility of human rights and the notions of State 
sovereignty and non-interference, the following compromise was reached: 
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5. All human rights are universal, indivisible and interdependent and interrelated. 
The international community must treat human rights globally in a fair and equal 
manner, on the same footing, and with the same emphasis. While the significance of 
national and regional particularities and various historical, cultural and religious 
backgrounds must be borne in mind, it is the duty of States, regardless of their 
political, economic and cultural systems, to promote and protect all human rights and 
fundamental freedoms. 
 
According to Koskinen, the Vienna Declaration adopted an anti-relativist position 
because of the inclusion of the following phrase: 
 
The universal nature of these rights and freedoms is beyond question...human rights 




From this perspective it seems that because human rights instruments have been 
negotiated, affirmed, and ratified so often and by so many states, they do in fact 
constitute the expression of a universal agreement.211 
 
This observation does not provide the complete picture, as the Vienna Declaration 
also includes relativistic arguments that were brought forward in the debate. Indeed, 
the Declaration refers to national and regional particularities, as well as cultural, 
religious and historic backgrounds. Bearing this in mind, a clear compromise has 
been reached and is visible in the document. This was linked with what Donnelly 
then called “weak cultural relativism”.212 Koskinen summarised this approach as 
follows: 
 
When human rights and various cultural traditional practices enter into conflict, the 
traditions give way to human rights norms. This entails that human rights allow space 
for culturally and socially sensitive variations in the implementation of the rights. 
The idea behind this approach is that states themselves decide on the laws, 
institutions, and procedures they choose to undertake to implement the rights and 
therefore it is evident that states’ value systems, cultures, histories, and politics as 
well as resources will affect them. In other words, in this approach the core concepts 
of rights derived from human rights documents are authoritative, but they are subject 
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to differing interpretations and manners of implementation. This approach is termed 
“weak” relativism because it does not involve questioning the universal nature of 
rights, but it does imply an acceptance that the concrete implementation can be 
dependent on cultural factors.213  
 
Striking is Chien-Huei Wu’s reflection when comparing the governmental Bangkok 
Declaration and the Vienna Declaration, as he observed: 
 
By reading the relevant passages of the Bangkok Declaration and the VDPA [Vienna 
Declaration and Programme of Action], it becomes clear that different weight is 
placed on the “while” clauses: the Bangkok Declaration focuses on regional 
particularities, but the VDPA on the universality of human rights. It can thus be said 
that the VDPA endorses the universality of human rights, while taking into account 
the regional particularities.214  
 
This is in line with Catherine Shanahan Renshaw’s observation, who stated: 
 
After tortuous negotiation during the Vienna World Conference, in the Vienna 
Declaration, the qualifying 'while' was placed in relation to the claim for 
particularism, rather than the claim for universalism. The effect of Article 5 of the 
Vienna Declaration is that regardless of historical, cultural backgrounds (which can 
be borne in mind) it is the State's duty to promote and protect all human rights and 
fundamental freedoms.215 
 
While Donnelly nowadays speaks of the relative universality of human rights, 
rather than weak (cultural) relativism, the observations made by Wu and Renshaw 
appear to correspond to Donnelly’s relative universality of human rights, which 
captures the idea of the Vienna conference. In particular, national and regional 
particularities, as well as cultural, religious and historic backgrounds are borne in 
mind in light of the universality of human rights. 
 
3.4.3 ASEAN after the 1993 Vienna Conference 
 
The Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action called for additional facilities for 
the UN Centre for Human Rights and the establishment of a UN High 
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September 2018). 
215 Catherine Shanahan Renshaw, ‘The ASEAN Human Rights Declaration’ 2013, 13 Human Rights 
Law Review 557, p. 259. 
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Commissioner for Human Rights, which was established in 1994.216 In addition, the 
Vienna Declaration called for possible sub-regional arrangements for the protection 
and promotion of human rights.  
ASEAN’s illustrative reaction is the position brought forward in the Joint 
Communiqué of the 24th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, again arguing from the 
perspective of safeguarding the national sovereignty: 
 
15. The Foreign Ministers exchanged views on the issue of human rights and noted 
with concern its tendentious application in inter-state relations. They agreed that 
while human rights is universal in character, implementation in the national context 
should remain within the competence and responsibility of each country, having 
regarded the complex variety of economic, social and cultural realities. They 
emphasized that the international application of human rights should neither be 
narrow and selective nor should it violate the sovereignty of nations.217 
 
From this follows that, in their view at that time, even a regional arrangement might 
go too far. Indications for this position might be read in the comment of 
Singapore’s Foreign Minister who already underscored at the World Conference on 
Human Rights that “[u]niversal recognition of the ideal of human rights can be 
harmful if universalism is used to deny or mask the reality of diversity. The gap 
between the different points of view will not be bridged if this is ignored. We 
deceive only ourselves if we pretend this is not so”.218 
During the 26th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (Singapore, July 1993) the Foreign 
Ministers commented the following on human rights, which can be read best in its 
original wordings: 
16. The Foreign Ministers welcomed the international consensus achieved during the 
World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna, 14-25 June 1993, and reaffirmed 
ASEAN's commitment to and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms as 
set out in the Vienna Declaration of 25 June 1993. They stressed that human rights 
are interrelated and indivisible comprising civil, political, economic, social and 
cultural rights. These rights are of equal importance. They should be addressed in a 
balanced and integrated manner and protected and promoted with due regard for 
specific cultural, social, economic and political circumstances. They emphasized that 
the promotion and protection of human rights should not be politicized. 
                                                          
216 General Assembly Resolution 48/141, High Commissioner for the Promotion and Protection of all 
Human Rights, UN Doc. A/Res/48/141, 20 December 1993. 
217 ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, Joint Communiqué of the 24th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, Kuala 
Lumpur, 19-20 July 1991, available at <https://cil.nus.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/formidable/18/1991-
24th-AMMJC.pdf> last accessed 10 September 2018. 
218 Statement by Foreign Minister Wong Kan Seng of Singapore at the Vienna Conference on Human 
Rights, 16 June 1993, cited by Fried van Hoof, ‘Asian Challenges to the Concept of Universality: 
Afterthoughts on the Vienna Conference on Human Rights’ in Jacqueline Smith (ed), Human Rights: 
Chinese and Dutch Perspectives (Kluwer Law international, The Hague 1996), p. 8.  
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17. The Foreign Ministers agreed that ASEAN should coordinate a common 
approach on human rights and actively participate and contribute to the application, 
promotion and protection of human rights. They noted that the UN Charter had 
placed the question of universal observance and promotion of human rights within 
the context of international cooperation. They stressed that development is an 
inalienable right and that the use of human rights as a conditionality for economic 
cooperation and development assistance is detrimental to international cooperation 
and could undermine an international consensus on human rights. They emphasized 
that the protection and promotion of human rights in the international community 
should take cognizance of the principles of respect for national sovereignty, 
territorial integrity and non-interference in the internal affairs of states. They were 
convinced that freedom, progress and national stability are promoted by a balance 
between the rights of the individual and those of the community, through which 
many individual rights are realized, as provided for in the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights. 
18. The Foreign Ministers reviewed with satisfaction the considerable and continuing 
progress of ASEAN in freeing its peoples from fear and want, enabling them to live 
in dignity. They stressed that the violations of basic human rights must be redressed 
and should not be tolerated under any pretext. They further stressed the importance 
of strengthening international cooperation on all aspects of human rights and that all 
governments should uphold humane standards and respect human dignity. In this 
regard and in support of the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action of 25 June 
1993, they agreed that ASEAN should also consider the establishment of an 
appropriate regional mechanism on human rights.219 
After thus having emphasised their views of human rights, including their 
commitment to and respect for human rights, the interrelatedness and indivisibility 
of all human rights and the right to development, the ASEAN States agreed that 
ASEAN should coordinate a common approach on human rights. While the 
ASEAN Member States were initially reluctant to consider a regional arrangement 
on human rights, it would appear that the 1993 Vienna Declaration formed a source 
of inspiration for ASEAN. Specifically, while “national sovereignty, territorial 
integrity and non-interference in the internal affairs of states” are elements of the 
ASEAN Way, it was underscored that they should consider the establishment of an 
appropriate regional mechanism on human rights. Chapter III will deal with the 
ASEAN Way, and Chapter IV will provide for a detailed analysis of ASEAN’s 




                                                          
219 ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, Joint Communiqué of the 26th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, Singapore, 
23-24 July 1993, <http://asean.org/?static_post=joint-communique-of-the-twenty-sixth-asean-minis 
terial-meeting-singapore-23-24-july-1993>, last accessed 10 September 2018. 
 
 




International human rights law has evolved gradually over time, hereby also 
anchoring human rights at the international level instead of at the level of nation 
states alone. With this development, the notion of the universality of human rights 
and norms of ius cogens as obligatory norms for the international community as a 
whole grew gradually. 
This chapter has shown that the universality of human rights has different 
meanings, whereby the question arises to what extent current international human 
rights law allows for particularities or relativistic variations. 
The debate on the universality on human rights is captured in the ideas on 
universalism and relativism, which were initially brought as each other’s extremes 
on a sliding scale. In addition, whilst weak cultural relativism (or strong 
universalism) was considered as a common ground between extreme forms of 
universalism and relativism, universalism and relativism could instead be 
considered within a multiple space. This does justice to the different notions of 
universality and relativity. In line with this, Donnelly argued for the ‘relative 
universality of human rights’ and his three-level scheme on ‘concepts’, 
‘conceptions’ and ‘implementation’.  
His theory corresponds to the notion that regional and national particularities 
should be borne in mind when protecting and promoting human rights, whilst also 
upholding the universality of human rights. As the importance of regional and 
national particularities is underscored by ASEAN time and again – but also in other 
regions – his theory has been used in and developed further in the present research. 
From the Vienna Conference and Programme of Action it also follows that this 
combination of universality and relativity is not necessarily contradictory. Universal 
human rights are in other words at the same time relative. The focus hereby lies on 
the relative universality of human rights, or in other words that the room for and 
debate on relativistic positions takes place within the framework of the claim to the 
universality of human rights. Regional and national particularities are thus limited 
in the sense that they cannot detract from the universality of human rights. A 
balance must be struck when protecting and promoting internationally recognised 
human rights standards while bearing in mind the regional and national 
particularities. The exact content and nature of this balancing act in the context of 
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Although ASEAN adopted a number of instruments in which human rights are 
addressed prior to the ASEAN Charter, the inclusion of human rights received an 
impetus with this Charter. Specifically, the Charter led to the establishment of the 
ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights and the adoption of the 
ASEAN Human Rights Declaration. Alongside the ASEAN Intergovernmental 
Commission on Human Rights as the organisation’s overarching human rights 
body, the ASEAN Commission on the Promotion and Protection of the Rights of 
Women and Children and the ASEAN Committee on the Implementation of the 
ASEAN Declaration on the Protection and Promotion of the Rights of Migrant 
Workers were also established.  
As explained before, a regional human rights system such as that of ASEAN and 
the interpretation of its codified human rights depend on each individual Member 
State and the consensus reached among these States. Member States also determine 
the possibilities in the further development of such a system. Within ASEAN, this 
is especially the case because of the so-called ASEAN Way (analysed in the 
following chapter). This is furthermore influenced by the lack of an independent 
regional human rights court or body with interpretative authority. In this chapter, 
the existing human rights systems in the ASEAN Member States are therefore 
researched. 
With respect to the international level, the ASEAN Member States are to a 
varying degree State Parties to the core UN human rights covenants. The signing, 
ratification of and accession to these human rights instruments by these States are 
mapped. In this way, insight is given into the position of ASEAN Member States to 
international human rights standards. 
In addition, an analysis of the constitutions of each Member State illustrates 
what has been at least formally endorsed in the legal domain of the ASEAN 
Member States with respect to human rights. 
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Before discussing each constitution, awareness of the following aspects is 
relevant. Firstly, colonial times influenced the development of constitutional law. 
For example, it is noted that the Malaysian Constitution was mirrored on the 
constitutional principles of the United Kingdom and India after Malaysia became 
independent. 1  Regarding the negotiations on Indonesia’s Constitution between 
Indonesia and the Netherlands, Droogleever wrote a detailed account.2 After the 
French protectorate treaty of 11 August 1863 and the entry of France in Cambodia, 
Cambodia had a written constitution for the first time.3 On the other hand, it was 
left to these States to make adjustments to these constitutions after their 
independence, in case they felt that Western influences were too great or their own 
too small. In fact, a number of the constitutions were revised at a later date, 
allowing these States to include their own nuances to human rights as an 
independent State that might be not be visible in Western constitutions. 
This overview of the uptake of human rights by the ASEAN Member States is 
intended to unveil the formal common ground with respect to human rights based 
on the constitutions of each ASEAN Member State and the core UN human rights 
conventions to which they are party. Based on this analysis, it can be determined 
whether the laws of the ASEAN Member States are – at least on paper – in 
conformity with internationally recognised human rights standards. This can also 
assist to explain the consensus reached at ASEAN level, it provides an indication 
for the way in which human rights are interpreted in ASEAN’s human rights system 
and the possibilities and boundaries for the further development of this system, as 
well as whether ASEAN’s human rights system builds upon or detracts from the 
claim to the universality of human rights.  
2 THE STATUS OF CORE UN HUMAN RIGHTS CONVENTIONS IN THE ASEAN 
MEMBER STATES 
2.1 Ratifications, accessions, interpretative declarations and reservations of the 
ASEAN Member States  
 
ASEAN’s efforts in developing a regional human rights system could form a bridge 
between international human rights law and the protection of fundamental rights at 
the domestic level. This section examines the signing and ratification of and 
accession to UN human rights treaties by the ASEAN Member States. The 
                                                          
1 Mohd Rizal Mohd Yaakop, Ainul Adzellie Hasnul and Norman Suratman, ‘Malaysia’s Constitutional 
Democracy’ (2016) 3 (5) International Journal of Research in Humanities and Social Studies 17, p. 17 
and Asmida bt Ahmad, Fork Yow Leong and Paul Linus Andrews, Legal Systems in ASEAN. Malaysia, 
(ASEAN Law Association, Singapore 2004), p. 14. 
2 Pieter J. Drooglever, ‘The genesis of the Indonesian constitution of 1949’ (1997) 153 Bijdragen tot de 
Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde 65. 
3 Vandeluxe Yan, ‘The historical development of Cambodia’s constitutions’ in Peng Hor, Phallack 
Kong and Jörg Menzel (eds), Cambodian Constitutional Law, (Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, Cambodia 
2016), p. 56. 
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interpretative declarations and reservations that are formulated by these States are 
included in the analysis as they provide an insight in these States’ individual 
perceptions of, or relativistic notions on, human rights, which, in turn, affects 
ASEAN’s human rights system. The ratifications by the Member States are 
summarised in the table in Annex 1. 
While a high number of ratifications of a treaty implies a certain common 
ground among the Member States, the interpretative declarations and reservations 
unveil relativistic notions of and differentiations between these States. Together 
with the examination of the constitutions in the next section, this analysis provides 
insight into which States are taking the lead in the recognition of human rights (– at 
least the formal recognition thereof – ), which Member States are lagging behind, 
the common ground amongst these States, and the question whether the ASEAN 
Member States are building upon or detracting from international human rights 
standards.  
 
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 
(ICERD, 1969)4 
Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam have 
ratified the ICERD. Four of those countries to have ratified the instrument have 
issued declarations and reservations. These four ratifying States have made a 
reservation to Article 22 on the dispute settlement of the International Court of 
Justice (ICJ). 
Regarding the possibility to make a declaration recognising the Committee on 
the Elimination of Racial Discrimination in accordance with Article 14 ICERD,5 
none of the ASEAN Member States made such a declaration. 
 
Indonesia 
Indonesia does not consider itself to be bound by Article 22 and is of the opinion 
that dispute settlement by the ICJ is only possible with the consent of all the parties 
to the dispute.  
 
Singapore 
Singapore made reservations and declarations to Articles 2, 6 and 22. The 
reservations and declarations deal with issues on applying policies on the admission 
and regulation of foreign work-pass holders with promoting and maintaining 
                                                          
4 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, adopted and 
opened for signature and ratification by General Assembly Resolution 2106 (XX) of 21 December 
1965, entry into force 4 January 1969, in accordance with Article 19, United Nations, Treaty Series, 
Vol. 660, p. 195. 
5 Article 14(1) stipulates the following: A State Party may at any time declare that it recognizes the 
competence of the Committee to receive and consider communications from individuals or groups of 
individuals within its jurisdiction claiming to be victims of a violation by that State Party of any of the 
rights set forth in this Convention. No communication shall be received by the Committee if it concerns 
a State Party which has not made such a declaration. 
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cohesion in its racially diverse society, the obligation under Article 2(1)(d) which 
may be implemented by means other than legislation, and the circumstance that 
reparation or satisfaction in Article 6 is fulfilled when one or other of these forms of 
redress is made available and that ‘satisfaction’ in this article includes “any form of 
redress effective to bring the discriminatory conduct to an end”.6 On Article 22, 
Singapore states that its consent is necessary for dispute settlement by the ICJ.  
 
Thailand 
In its interpretative declaration, Thailand stated that it does not interpret and apply 
the Convention as imposing obligations beyond the confines of the State’s 
Constitution and laws. Such interpretations and applications are furthermore limited 
to or consistent with the obligations under other international human rights 
instruments to which Thailand is party. Thailand also made a reservation to Article 
22, to which it considers itself not to be bound. 
The State withdrew its reservation on its interpretation of Article 4 in 2016, 
which required a State Party “to adopt measures in the fields covered by 
subparagraphs (a), (b) and (c) of that article only where it is considered that the 
need arises to enact such legislation”.7 
 
Vietnam 
With respect to Articles 17(1) and 18(1) Vietnam declared that the Convention 
should be open to participation by all States in accordance with the principle of 
sovereign equality of States. A reservation is also made to Article 22, by which the 
State does not consider itself to be bound. It also states that all parties to the dispute 
should consent to dispute settlement by the ICJ. 
 
In line with the objections made by France, Germany, Romania, Sweden and the 
United Kingdom, one could argue that it is unclear which changes Thailand intends 
to introduce under the Convention, as the Convention is subjected to Thailand’s 
Constitution and legislation. Although it is formulated as a declaration, it is more of 
a general reservation. The provisions of the ICERD could become ineffective, 




                                                          
6 Reservations and declarations made by Singapore upon signature and confirmed upon succession, 
United Nations Treaty Collection, International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination, <https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-2&chap 
ter=4&clang=_en>, last accessed 11 September 2018. 
7 United Nations Treaty Collection, International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination, <https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-2&chap 
ter=4&clang=_en#14>, last accessed 11 September 2018. 
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International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR, 1976)8 
Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, the Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam are party to the 
ICCPR. They constitute only a slight majority, despite the fact that this Convention 
is considered to be part of the International Bill of Human Rights. Of these State 
Parties, only Cambodia has not formulated a declaration or reservation. 
Regarding Article 41 ICCPR, the Philippines is the only ASEAN Member State 
that recognises the competence of the Human Rights Committee to receive and 
consider communications when a State Party claims that another party is not 
fulfilling its obligations.  
With respect to the Optional Protocol on the competence of the Committee to 
receive and consider communications from individuals, the Philippines is the only 
State to have ratified this instrument, whilst Cambodia has signed this instrument.9 
The Second Optional Protocol aiming at the abolition of the death penalty has also 
only been ratified by the Philippines.10 
 
Indonesia 
Indonesia made a declaration on the right to self-determination, in the sense that it 
does not apply to “a section of people within a sovereign independent state and can 
not be construed as authorizing or encouraging any action which would dismember 
or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign 
and independent states”.11 
 
Laos 
Laos made a reservation on Article 22 on the freedom of association, as this article 
“shall be so applied as to be in conformity with the Constitution and the relevant 
laws of the Lao People’s Democratic Republic”.12 The State also declared that the 
                                                          
8 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted and opened for signature, ratification 
and accession by General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 1966 
entry into force 23 March 1976, in accordance with Article 49, United Nations, Treaty Series, Vol. 999, 
p. 171 and Vol. 1057, p. 407 (procès-verbal of rectification of the authentic Spanish text); depositary 
notification C.N.782.2001.TREATIES-6 of 5 October 2001 [Proposal of correction to the original of 
the Covenant (Chinese authentic text)] and C.N.8.2002.TREATIES-1 of 3 January 2002 [Rectification 
of the original of the Covenant (Chinese authentic text)]. 
9  United Nations Treaty Collection, Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, <https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-5& 
chapter=4&clang=_en> (last accessed 30 October 20018). 
10 United Nations Treaty Collection, Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights, aiming at the abolition of the death penalty <https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ 
ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV12&chapter=4&clang=_en> (last accessed 30 October 
2018). 
11 Declaration made by Indonesia, United Nations Treaty Collections, International Covenant on Civil 
and Political rights, <https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-
4&chapter=4&clang=_en>, last accessed 11 September 2018. 
12 Reservation made by Laos, United Nations Treaty Collections, International Covenant on Civil and 
Political rights, <https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-
4&chapter=4&clang=_en>, last accessed 11 September 2018. 
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right to self-determination shall be interpreted as being compatible with the 
Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and 
Cooperation Among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations 
and the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action. Laos furthermore declared 
that Article 18 “shall not be construed as authorizing or encouraging any activities, 
including economic means, by anyone which directly or indirectly, coerce or 
compel an individual to believe or not to believe in a religion or to convert his or 
her religion or belief. (…) All acts creating division and discrimination among 
ethnic groups and among religions are incompatible with Article 18 (freedom of 
thought, conscience and religion) of the Covenant”.13 
 
Thailand 
Thailand also formulated an interpretative declaration on the right to self-
determination, as this “shall be interpreted as being compatible with that expressed 
in the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action”. 14  Furthermore ‘war’ in 
Article 20 on the prohibition of war propaganda is understood as war in 
contravention of international law.  
Thailand withdrew its declarations on Article 6(5) and 9(3) ICCPR in 2012. 
These articles deal with death sentences, custody and trial of arrested or detained 
persons. 
On 8 July 2014, Thailand exercised its right of derogation under Article 4(1) 
ICCPR, specifically its obligations under Article 12(1) on the freedom of movement 
and residence, Article 14(5) on the right to appeal in criminal cases, Article 19 on 
the freedom of expression and information and Article 21 on the right of peaceful 
assembly. Thailand hereby stressed that the non-derogable rights as included in 
Articles 6, 7, 8(1), 8(2), 11, 15, 16 and 18 of the Covenant have not been affected 
(right to life, prohibition of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment, prohibition of slavery, slave-trade and servitude, prohibition of 
detention on account of the inability to fulfil a contractual obligation, the principle 
of nulla poena sine praevia lege poenali, recognition as a person before the law and 
freedom of thought, conscience and religion). 
 
Vietnam 
Vietnam made a declaration on Article 48(1) on signing the Convention, namely 
that the Convention should be open to participation by all States in accordance with 
the principle of sovereign equality of States. 
 
                                                          
13 Declaration made by Laos, United Nations Treaty Collections, International Covenant on Civil and 
Political rights, <https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-
4&chapter=4&clang=_en>, last accessed 11 September 2018. 
14  Interpretative declaration made my Thailand, United Nations Treaty Collections, International 
Covenant on Civil and Political rights, <https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src= 
TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-4&chapter=4&clang=_en>, last accessed 11 September 2018. 
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The reservation of Laos to Article 22 of the Convention caused a number of 
objections of other State Parties. In line with the objections of Austria, Finland, 
Ireland, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and Sweden, the observation can be 
made that the general reference to the national Constitution does not make clear to 
what extent the State has accepted the article. It is rightly observed that with such a 
general reference to the State’s constitution or domestic laws, the extent of 
derogation is unclear and may cast doubts as to the State’s commitment to fulfil its 
obligations. 
 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR, 1976)15 
Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Myanmar, the Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam are 
party to the ICESCR. The same observation can be made as formulated on the 
ICCPR, namely that only a slight majority of the ASEAN Member States are party 
to this Convention even though it is considered to be part of the International Bill of 
Human Rights. 
The Optional Protocol regarding the competence of the Committee on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights to receive and consider communications (on 
behalf) of individuals or groups of individuals, has neither been signed nor ratified 
by any of the ASEAN Member States.16 
 
Indonesia 
Indonesia made a declaration on the right to self-determination, by stating that “this 
article does not apply to a section of people within a sovereign independent state 
and can not be construed as authorizing or encouraging any action which would 
dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political unity of 
sovereign and independent states”.17 
 
Myanmar: 
Myanmar formulated the declaration that the right to self-determination “does not 
apply to any section of people within a sovereign independent state and cannot be 
construed as authorizing or encouraging any action which would dismember or 
impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political unity of a sovereign and 
                                                          
15 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, adopted and opened for signature, 
ratification and accession by General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 1966 
entry into force 3 January 1976, in accordance with Article 27, United Nations, Treaty Series, Vol. 993, 
p. 3; depositary notification C.N.781.2001.TREATIES-6 of 5 October 2001 [Proposal of correction to 
the original of the Covenant (Chinese authentic text) and C.N.7.2002.TREATIES-1 of 3 January 2002 
[Rectification of the original of the Covenant (Chinese authentic text)]. 
16  Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
<https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-3-a&chapter=4&clang= 
_en> (last accessed 30 October 2018). 
17  Declaration made by Indonesia, United Nations Treaty Collections, International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, <https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY& 
mtdsg_no=IV3&chapter=4&clang=_en>, last accessed 11 September 2018. 
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independent state”.18 In addition, it was declared that it shall not be applied to 
undermine Section 10 of its national constitution which deals with the prohibition to 
secede from Myanmar. 
 
Thailand 
Thailand’s interpretative declaration also deals with the right to self-determination, 
as the term shall be interpreted as being compatible with that expressed during the 
Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action. 
 
Vietnam 
Vietnam declared on Article 26(1) (regarding signing the document) that the 
Convention should be open to participation by all States in accordance with the 
principle of sovereign equality of States. 
 
Indonesia and Thailand reiterated their declarations on the right to self-
determination that were made with respect to the ICCPR. The declaration of 
Myanmar was objected by Austria, Finland, Germany, Ireland, Latvia, the 
Netherlands, Portugal and Sweden. These States consider that the declaration of 
Myanmar constitutes a reservation which has a general and indefinite scope. It 
subjects the Covenant to national law instead of international law, making it 
incompatible with the object and purpose of the Convention. In addition, Austria 
interprets the right to self-determination differently than Myanmar, whereas 
Germany and Portugal objected to Myanmar’s interpretation. Moreover, Sweden 
argued that “[t]he declaration concerning Article 1 places conditions on the exercise 
of the right of peoples to self-determination not provided for in international law. 
To attach such conditions could undermine the concept of self-determination itself 
and would thereby seriously weaken its universally acceptable character.”19 
 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women 
(CEDAW, 1981)20 
By 2006, CEDAW had been ratified by all ASEAN Member States. This implies a 
certain common ground among them, although seven of these States formulated 
declarations and reservations that gave room for national influences and that 
subjected international standards to the national level.  
                                                          
18  Declaration made by Myanmar, United Nations Treaty Collections, International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, <https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY 
&mtdsg_no=IV-3&chapter=4&clang=_en#EndDec> (last accessed 30 October 2018). 
19 Formulated by Sweden, United Nations Treaty Collections, International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights, <https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no 
=IV-3&chapter=4&clang=_en> (last accessed 30 October 2018). 
20  Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, adopted with 
Resolution 34/180, Official Records of the General Assembly of the United Nations, Thirty-fourth 
Session, Supplement No. 46 (A/34/46), p. 193, United Nations, Treaty Series, Vol. 1249, p. 13. 
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CEDAW’s Optional Protocol is signed by Indonesia, the State Parties are 
Cambodia, the Philippines and Thailand. 
 
Brunei Darussalam 
Brunei Darussalam expressed its reservations “regarding those provisions of the 
said Convention that may be contrary to the Constitution of Brunei Darussalam and 
to the beliefs and principles of Islam”21 and to Articles 9(2) on equality regarding 
the nationality of one’s children, and Article 29(1) on arbitration and dispute 
settlement by the ICJ.  
 
Indonesia 
Indonesia does not consider itself to be bound by Article 29(1) CEDAW and is of 
the opinion that a dispute on the Convention’s interpretation or application may 
only submitted to arbitration or the ICJ when all parties to the dispute agree. 
 
Malaysia 
Malaysia declared that its accession is subject to the understanding that the 
provisions do not conflict with the provisions of Islamic Sharia law and its Federal 
Constitution. In addition, Malaysia does not consider itself to be bound by Articles 
9(2), 16(1)(a), 16(1)(c), 16(1)(f) and 16(1)(g), which deal with equality regarding 
the nationality of one’s children, marriage and family life. Article 11 on 
employment is interpreted “as a reference to the prohibition of discrimination on the 
basis of equality between men and women only”.22 
Malaysia withdrew its reservation to Article 2(f), which constitutes the State’s 
obligation to “to take all appropriate measures, including legislation, to modify or 
abolish existing laws, regulations, customs and practices which constitute 
discrimination against women”.23 It has also withdrawn its reservations on Article 
9(1) on equality regarding nationality and Article 16(1)(b), 16(1)(d), 16(1)(e) and 
16(1)(h) on certain issues with respect to marriage and family life. On the other 
hand, Malaysia also declared Sharia law to be applicable to Article 5(a) on sex role 
stereotyping and prejudice, Article 7(b) dealing with political and public life, and 
Article 16(1)(a) and (2) on marriage and family life at the same time it withdrew 
these reservations in 1998. Article 9(2) on equality regarding the nationality of 
one’s children, Malaysia stated that the reservation would be reviewed if Malaysia 
                                                          
21 Reservation made by Brunei Darussalam, United Nations Treaty Collections, Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, <https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ 
ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-8&chapter=4&clang=_en#EndDec>, last accessed 11 
September 2018. 
22 Declaration made by Malaysia, United Nations Treaty Collections, Convention on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Discrimination against Women, <https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src= 
TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-8&chapter=4&clang=_en#EndDec> , last accessed 11 September 2018. 
23 Withdrawn by Malaysia, United Nations Treaty Collections, Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination against Women, <https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src= 
TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-8&chapter=4&clang=_en#EndDec> , last accessed 11 September 2018. 
 
 
Human Rights Law in ASEAN Member States 
 64 




Myanmar made a reservation on Article 29 on arbitration and dispute settlement by 
the ICJ, to which this State does not consider itself to be bound. 
 
Singapore 
Singapore made a number of reservations. It reserved the right not to apply the 
provisions of Article 2(a) to (f) on policy measures to eliminate discrimination, and 
Article 16(1)(a), 16(1)(c), 16(1)(h) and 16(2) on marriage and family relationships, 
where compliance with these provisions would be contrary to minorities’ religious 
or personal laws. It also considered legislation in respect of Article 11 on 
employment “unnecessary for the minority of women who do not fall within the 
ambit of Singapore's employment legislation”.24 It also does not consider itself to be 
bound by Article 29(1) regarding arbitration and dispute settlement by the ICJ. 
Singapore withdrew a number of its reservations in 2007, which focused on the 
entry into, stay in, employment and departure from Singapore, citizenship of 
women who became citizens based on marriage and children who were born outside 
Singapore. It also partially withdrew its reservations on Articles 2 and 16 CEDAW 
in 2011. Instead of making a reservation to these articles as a whole, Singapore now 
reserves the right not to apply Article 2(a) to (f), and Article 16(1)(a), 16(1)(c), 
16(1)(h) and Article 16(2). In 2015, Singapore partially withdrew its reservation on 
Article 11, which resulted in the current reservation on Article 11. 
 
Thailand 
Thailand formulated a declaration on the purpose of the Convention, namely to 
“eliminate discrimination against women and to accord to every person, men and 
women alike, equality before the law, and are in accordance with the principles 
prescribed by the Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand.”25 Like other States, 
Thailand does not consider itself to be bound by Article 29(1).  
Thailand withdrew its reservations that gave primacy to national law, 
regulations and practices in different phases in the 1990s and 2012. These 
reservations were initially made with respect to Articles 7, 9(2), 10, and 16, which 
deal with political and public life, nationality of one’s children, education, marriage 
and family life. 
 
 
                                                          
24 Reservation made by Singapore, United Nations Treaty Collections, Convention on the Elimination 
of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, <https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src= 
TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-8&chapter=4&clang=_en#EndDec>, last accessed 11 September 2018. 
25 Declaration made by Thailand, United Nations Treaty Collections, Convention on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Discrimination against Women, <https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src= 
TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-8&chapter=4&clang=_en#EndDec>, last accessed 11 September 2018. 
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Vietnam 
Vietnam also does not consider itself to be bound by Article 29 (1) CEDAW. 
 
Declarations and reservations are formulated that provide room for national 
influences and that subject international standards to national legislation. Such 
declarations and reservations detract from international human rights standards. A 
number of these reservations have later been withdrawn. 
Objections were made to the reservations of Brunei Darussalam by a significant 
number of States, namely Austria, Belgium, Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, 
Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, the 
Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, and the 
United Kingdom. These States formulated objections, which in essence relate to the 
observation that Brunei Darussalam’s reservations to the specific articles would 
result in discrimination based on sex. It was argued that the general reservations do 
not specify their extent and raise doubts on this State’s commitment to the object 
and purpose of the Convention. Austria, Denmark, Finland, Germany, the 
Netherlands, Norway and Sweden made similar observations on Malaysia’s 
reservations. In addition, France and the Netherlands partially objected to the 
State’s modification of its reservations. 
Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden voiced their objection 
to Singapore’s reservations as being contrary to the object and purpose of CEDAW. 
Germany, Mexico, the Netherlands and Sweden also objected to Thailand’s 
previous reservation based on national security as contradictory to the object and 
purpose of the Convention, but Thailand later withdrew this reservation. Finally, 
Finland, the Netherlands and Norway objected to Singapore’s reservations as being 
contrary to the object and purpose of CEDAW. 
  
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment (CAT, 1987)26 
Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, the Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam are party to the 
CAT. Brunei Darussalam is a signatory State. Five of them formulated declarations 
and reservations. None of the ASEAN Member States made declarations under 
Articles 21 and 22, which determine the recognition of the Committee against 
Torture to receive and consider communications from States Parties and from or 
behalf of individuals. 
The Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment has the objective “to establish a 
system of regular visits undertaken by independent international and national bodies 
to places where people are deprived of their liberty, in order to prevent torture and 
                                                          
26  Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 
adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession by General Assembly resolution 39/46 of 
10 December 1984, entry into force 26 June 1987, in accordance with Article 27(1), United Nations, 
Treaty Series, Vol. 1465, p. 85. 
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other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment”27 and to establish a 
Subcommittee on Prevention of Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment (or Subcommittee on Prevention).  
So far, the ASEAN Member States are in general reluctant to accede to this 
Protocol. Of the ASEAN Member States, only Cambodia and the Philippines 
became State Parties. The Philippines formulated a declaration. Specifically, this 
State declared the postponement of the implementation of its obligations under Part 
III of the Optional Protocol on the mandate of the Subcommittee on Prevention or 
the Committee against Torture, specifically Article 11(1)(a). This deals with 
visitations by the Subcommittee on Prevention to places referred to in Article 4. 
This Subcommittee can make recommendations to State’s Parties on the protection 
of persons deprived of their liberty against torture and other cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment. 
 
Brunei Darussalam 
Brunei Darussalam declared upon signing that it reserved the right to formulate 
observations, interpretative understandings and/or declarations upon ratification, but 
has not ratified this Convention yet.  
 
Indonesia 
Indonesia declared that Article 20(1), 20(2) and 20(3) on competences of the 
Committee against Torture need to be implemented in strict compliance with the 
principle of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of States. This State also made a 
reservation, as it does not consider itself to be bound by Article 30(1) on arbitration 
and dispute settlement by the ICJ. Disputes on the interpretation and application of 
the Convention which cannot be settled through the channel of Article 30(2) may be 
referred to the ICJ when all parties of the dispute give their consent.  
 
Laos 
Laos does not recognise the competence of the Committee against Torture under 
Article 20 and does not consider itself to be bound by Article 30(1) on arbitration 
and dispute settlement by the ICJ. Laos also formulated a declaration on the term 
‘torture’ in Article 1, which means torture as defined in national and international 
law, and declared that the Convention is not a legal basis for extradition. 
 
Thailand 
Thailand stated that the Thai Criminal Code does not have an equivalent to torture, 
but has comparable provisions. Therefore, it formulated an interpretative 
                                                          
27 Article 1 Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment, Adopted on 18 December 2002 at the fifty-seventh session of the General 
Assembly of the United Nations by resolution A/RES/57/199  
entered into force on 22 June 2006, United Nations, Treaty Series, Vol. 2375, p. 237; GA Resolution 
A/RES/57/199 of 9 January 2003. 
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declaration that states that Articles 1, 4 and 5 (on the term torture, torture as an 
offence under national criminal law and on jurisdiction) are interpreted in 
conformity with the Thai Criminal Code. Also included was the ambition to revise 
domestic law and to be more consistent with Articles 1, 4 and 5. Thailand also made 
a reservation, namely that it does not consider itself to be bound by Article 30(1).  
 
Vietnam 
Vietnam declared that it does not recognise the competence of the Committee 
against Torture and does not consider itself to be bound by Article 30(1) on 
arbitration and dispute settlement by the ICJ. This State also observed that the 
Convention is not a direct legal basis for extradition with respect to offences 
referred to in Article 4.  
 
Three ASEAN Member States do not consider themselves to be bound by the 
provision on arbitration and dispute settlement by the ICJ. Other State Parties have 
objected to a number of the declarations and reservations. Austria objected to the 
declaration of Laos, which Austria considered to constitute a reservation. Austria 
argued that Laos made a reservation of general and indeterminate scope by referring 
to national law, which is not compatible with the object and purpose of the 
Convention. The Czech Republic, Finland, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, 
the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Sweden and the United Kingdom made similar 
objections. Sweden objected to the interpretative declaration of Thailand, as a 
number of the provisions are made subject to provisions of the Thai Criminal Code. 
Accordingly, it is argued that it is unclear to what extent Thailand considers itself to 
be bound by the treaty obligations and raises doubts regarding the commitment to 
the object and purpose of the Convention. Poland objected to Vietnam’s 
reservation, as it would lead to an exemption of certain provisions of the treaty. 
 
Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC, 1990)28 
By 1995, all ASEAN Member States were party to the CRC. This Convention 
proves to be subject to a high number of declarations and reservations, which give 
prevalence to national law, policies and contexts.  
Indonesia withdrew its reservation made upon ratification in 2005, in which 
Articles 1, 14, 16, 17, 21, 22 and 29 were applied in conformity with its 
Constitution. These articles concern the age limit, the freedom of thought 
conscience and religion, the right to privacy, family, home or correspondence, 
access to information, adoption, refugees, education and development. In addition, 
Myanmar withdrew its reservation made upon accession on Articles 15 and 37 in 
1993, which were subjected to laws, rules, regulations, procedures and practice as 
well as with its traditional, cultural and/or religious values. 
                                                          
28 Convention on the Rights of the Child, adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession 
by General Assembly resolution 44/25 of 20 November 1989 entry into force 2 September 1990, in 
accordance with Article 49, United Nations, Treaty Series, Vol. 1577, p. 3. 
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The CRC has three Optional Protocols. The first is the Optional Protocol to the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in armed 
conflict. Except for Myanmar that is only a signatory State, all ASEAN Member 
States are party to this Optional Protocol. These States, with reference to their 
national legislation, formulated declarations on topics like the minimum age of 
recruitment or enlistment, sex, whether it is voluntary or compulsory, and the 
requirements for recruitment. No objections to these reservations were made. 
The second protocol is called the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child on the sale of children, child prostitution and child pornography. 
The majority of the ASEAN Member States are party to this Optional Protocol, 
whereby two of the ASEAN Members formulated declarations. Vietnam withdrew 
its reservations on Article 5(1) to (4) of this Optional Protocol, regarding 
extraditable offences. Laos does not consider itself to be bound by Article 5(2) of 
the Optional Protocol whereby one of the States involved does not have an 
extradition treaty. Malaysia clarified the phrase ‘any representation’ in Article 2(c) 
on child pornography as ‘any visual representation’ and understands that Article 3 
(1)(a)(ii) on improperly inducing consent for adoption is applicable to Parties to the 
Convention on Protection of Children and Co-operation in Respect of Intercountry 
Adoption. The common ground for this Protocol seems to be great, and no 
objections were made to the reservations. 
Only Thailand as ASEAN Member State has ratified the Optional Protocol to 
the Convention on the Rights of the Child on a communications procedure, hereby 
recognising the competence of the Committee of the Rights of the Child. 
 
Brunei Darussalam 
Brunei Darussalam expressed reservations to provisions that may be contrary to its 
Constitution and to the beliefs and principles of Islam, and in particular on Articles 
14 on the freedom of thought, conscience and religion, Article 20(3) on alternative 
care, and Article 21(b) to (e) on intercountry-adoption. In 2015, Brunei Darussalam 
partially withdrew its reservations to Articles 20(1), 20(2) and 21(a), which were 




Malaysia made reservations to Article 2 on non-discrimination, Article 7 on the 
immediate rights after being born, Article 14 on the freedom of thought, conscience 
and religion,29 Article 28(1)(a) on free and compulsory primary education for all, 
and Article 37 on the prohibition of torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading 
                                                          
29 Striking is that paragraph 3 lists a number of general grounds for restrictions, as it reads as follows: 
Freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs may be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed 
by law and are necessary to protect public safety, order, health or morals, or the fundamental rights and 
freedoms of others, see Conventions on the Rights of the Child, 
<http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CRC.aspx>, last accessed 11 September 2018. 
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treatment or punishment and on the deprivation of liberty. It declared that these 
provisions are applicable only if they are in conformity with its Constitution, 
national laws and national policies.  
In 2010, Malaysia declared with respect to Article 28(1)(a) that primary 
education is made compulsory and that monetary aids and other forms of assistance 
is made available. In addition, Malaysia withdrew its reservations made upon 
accession on Articles 22, 28(1)(b), 28(1)(c), 28(1)(d), 28(1)(e), 28(2), 28(3), 40(3), 
40(4), 44 and 45. These articles deal with child refugees, education, criminal law 
and alternatives to institutional care, reporting obligations of State Parties, 
implementation of the Convention and international cooperation. 
 
Singapore 
Of all ASEAN Member States, Singapore made the most reservations and 
declarations to the CRC. It declared that the child’s rights, and in particular those 
defined in Article 12 on the freedom to form and express an opinion and Article 17 
on access to information, are “exercised with respect for the authority of parents, 
schools and other persons who are entrusted with the care of the child and in the 
best interests of the child and in accordance with the customs, values and religions 
of Singapore's multi-racial and multi-religious society regarding the place of the 
child within and outside the family”.30 Regarding Article 19 on the prohibition on 
all forms of violence, injury, abuse, neglect, maltreatment or exploitation and 
Article 37 on the prohibition of torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment national influences are also visible. More specifically, the 
application of any prevailing measures prescribed by law for maintaining law and 
order, measures and restrictions prescribed by law and which are necessary in the 
interests of national security, public safety, public order, the protection of public 
health or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others and the judicious 
application of corporal punishment in the best interest of the child are included. 
With respect to its reservations, Singapore stated that its Constitution and the 
laws “provide adequate protection and fundamental rights and liberties in the best 
interests of the child. The accession to the Convention by the Republic of Singapore 
does not imply the acceptance of obligations going beyond the limits prescribed by 
the Constitution of the Republic of Singapore nor the acceptance of any obligation 
to introduce any right beyond those prescribed under the Constitution”.31 On the 
entry into, stay in and departure from Singapore, as well as citizenship, Singapore 
also reserved the right to apply such legislation and conditions as it may deem 
necessary and in accordance with the laws of Singapore. Singapore also reserved 
the right to apply Article 32 (on protection against economic exploitation and 
                                                          
30  United Nations Treaty Collections, Convention on the Rights of the Child, 
<https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-
11&chapter=4&clang=_en#EndDec>, last accessed 11 September 2018. 
31  United Nations Treaty Collections, Convention on the Rights of the Child, 
<https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-
11&chapter=4&clang=_en#EndDec>, last accessed 11 September 2018. 
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hazardous work) subject to its national employment legislation. On Article 28(1)(a), 
Singapore does not consider itself to be bound by the requirement to provide free 
and compulsory primary education for all. It reasoned that it is unnecessary in its 
social context where “in practice virtually all children attend primary school”.32 
Finally, it also reserved the right to provide free primary education only to children 
who are the State’s citizens. 
  
Thailand 
Thailand made the reservation that the application of Article 22 on refugees is 
subject to its national laws, regulations and prevailing practices. Thailand withdrew 
its reservations on Article 29 on education and development in 1997 and on Article 
7 regarding immediate rights after birth in 2010. 
 
In a similar fashion to the objections made by the other State Parties on the 
declarations and reservations made to CEDAW, the objections with respect to the 
reservations and declarations to the CRC also centre on the critique that they may 
contradict the object and purpose of the Convention or are incompatible with 
international law because of its unlimited scope and undefined character. 
Specifically, Austria objected to the reservation of Brunei Darussalam and 
Malaysia to the admissibility of the reservations if their application would 
negatively affect compliance with the obligations that are essential for the 
fulfilment of the object and purpose. Denmark, Finland, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal and Sweden also objected to the reservation of 
Brunei Darussalam as being incompatible with the object and purpose of the CRC 
or as inadmissible under international law, because of its unlimited scope and 
undefined character. Austria, Finland, Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway, 
Portugal and Sweden drew a similar conclusion on Malaysia. Belgium objected 
Singapore’s constitutional limits, as well as Finland, Germany, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal and Sweden. Germany, Ireland and Portugal 
objected to the reservation of Myanmar, and finally, Ireland also objected to 
Thailand’s reservation.  
 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD, 2008)33 
All ASEAN Member States are party to the CRPD; a slight minority formulated 
reservations or declarations. Thailand decided to withdraw its interpretative 
declaration, which subjected Article 18 on the liberty of movement and nationality 
to Thailand’s national laws, regulation and practices. Brunei Darussalam, Malaysia 
and Singapore have formulated reservations. 
                                                          
32  United Nations Treaty Collections, Convention on the Rights of the Child, 
<https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-
11&chapter=4&clang=_en#EndDec>, last accessed 11 September 2018. 
33 Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, United Nations, adopted on 13 December 
2006 during the sixty-first session of the General Assembly by resolution A/RES/61/106 and entry into 
force on 3 May 2008, in accordance with Article 45(1), United Nations, Treaty Series, Vol. 2515, p. 3 
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The Optional Protocol has only been signed by Cambodia, whilst Thailand has 
acceded to the Protocol. 
 
Brunei Darussalam 
Brunei Darussalam again formulated a general reservation. Specifically, it 
expressed its reservation regarding those provisions “that may be contrary to the 
Constitution of Brunei Darussalam and to the beliefs and principles of Islam, the 
official religion of Brunei Darussalam”.34 
 
Malaysia 
Malaysia also referred to national legislation in its declaration, as it declared that 
“its application and interpretation of the Federal Constitution of Malaysia pertaining 
to the principles of non-discrimination and equality of opportunity shall not be 
treated as contravening Articles 3(b), 3(e) and 5(2) of the said Convention.”35 This 
State also declared that it recognises the rights of persons with disabilities to take 
part in cultural life, recreation, leisure and sport as stipulated in Article 30 and 
considers the recognition a matter for national legislation. It also stated that it does 
not consider itself to be bound by Articles 15 on the prohibition of torture and 
Article 18 on liberty of movement and nationality. 
 
Singapore 
Singapore declared that “it reserves the right to continue to apply its current 
legislative framework in lieu of the regular review referred to in Article 12, 
paragraph 4 of the Convention”. 36  It also underscored the principle of non-
discrimination with a reservation on the provision by private insurers (Article 
25(e)). Finally, with respect to Article 29(a)(iii) it stated that it reserves the right to 
continue to apply its current electoral legislation on assistance in voting procedures.  
 
Objections were made to the aforementioned declarations and principles for 
being incompatible with the object and purpose of the Convention. Austria, 
Belgium, the Czech Republic, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, the 
Netherlands, Norway, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Sweden, Switzerland and 
the United Kingdom objected to this general reservation of Brunei Darussalam as 
being incompatible with the object and purpose of the Convention. Austria, 
Belgium, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, the Netherlands, Portugal, Slovakia, Sweden 
                                                          
34 Reservation made by Brunei Darussalam, United Nations Treaty Collections, Convention on the 
Rights of Persons with Disabilities, <https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mt 
dsg_no=IV-15&chapter=4&clang=_en#EndDec>, last accessed 11 September 2018. 
35 Declaration made by Malaysia, United Nations Treaty Collections, Convention on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities, <https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no 
=IV-15&chapter=4&clang=_en#EndDec>, last accessed 30 October 2018. 
36 Declaration made by Singapore, United Nations Treaty Collections, Convention on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities, <https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no 
=IV-15&chapter=4&clang=_en#EndDec>, last accessed 11 September 2018. 
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and Switzerland objected to Malaysia’s reservation. As Articles 15 and 18 are 
considered to relate to fundamental principles of the Convention, the exclusion of 
their application is considered as being contrary to the object and purpose of the 
Convention. Regarding Malaysia’s declaration, it was argued by the Netherlands 
that it constitutes in substance a reservation. The application is made subject to 
national legislation, which is incompatible with the object and purpose. Romania 
objected to Singapore’s reservation to Articles 12, 25 and 29 of the Convention, as 
it considered that the reservation subordinates the application of some fundamental 
provisions to its domestic law, which is incompatible with the object and purpose of 
the Convention. 
 
With respect to the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of 
All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families and the International 
Convention for the Protection of all Persons from Enforced Disappearance, no 
reservations or declarations are formulated. 
 
International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers 
and Members of their Families (CMW, 2003) 
This Convention has been signed by Cambodia and ratified by Indonesia and the 
Philippines. No declarations and reservations have been made by these States. 
 
International Convention for the Protection of all Persons from Enforced 
Disappearance (CED, 2010)37 
Cambodia acceded to this Convention. Indonesia, Laos and Thailand signed this 
document. These States have not made any declarations and reservations.  
 
2.2 Patterns in the position of the ASEAN Member States towards core UN 
human rights conventions  
 
Based on Table 1 (Annex 1) and the previous section, the following observations 
can be made.  
States may have different reasons for becoming party to a convention, which can 
affect the actual implementation of human rights. Improving one’s legitimacy and 
position in the international community could form a leading motivation of a State 
over the moral motives. In this respect, Cambodia and Laos have become party to a 
significant number of international human rights conventions with a considerable 
number of ratifications in 1992 and the mid-2000s respectively. According to 
Davies, the number of conventions to which Cambodia is a party could be 
                                                          
37 International Convention for the Protection of all Persons from Enforced Disappearance, adopted on 
20 December 2006 during the sixty-first session of the General Assembly by resolution A/RES/61/177, 
entry into force on 23 December 2010, in accordance with Article 39(1), United Nations, Treaty Series, 
Vol. 2716, p. 3. 
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explained by the Paris Accords of 1991, which required Cambodia to observe 
international human rights instruments.38  
Their ratifications contrasts the way in which these States are generally 
perceived in the ASEAN context, as these Member States are grouped within 
ASEAN as part of the so-called ‘CMLV countries’, consisting of Cambodia, 
Myanmar, Laos and Vietnam. These States are described as the illiberal States that 
joined ASEAN in the period from 1995 to 199939 and are regarded as the most 
conservative States in relation to human rights. For instance, they opposed the 
creation of a regional human rights body40 and desired a more conservative human 
rights declaration, limiting the application of universal human rights standards in 
ASEAN.41  
From Table 1 it also follows that Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand ratified 
or acceded to the majority of the discussed UN human rights instruments. This 
corresponds to the general observation that these States are the forerunners in 
ASEAN’s regional human rights cooperation. Related to this, Davies observed that 
“States that combine high levels of engagement with the human rights treaty system 
and more democratic forms of government, such as Indonesia, the Philippines, and 
Thailand, are likely to move towards more norm consistent behaviour under the 
pressure of civil society, treaty bodies, and national human rights institutions 
(NHRIs)”.42 
Regarding the common ground in terms of content, the following observations 
can be made. From Table 1, it follows that all ASEAN Member States are party to 
the CEDAW, CRC and CRPD; the topics of which are considered to be politically 
less sensitive among the ASEAN Member States.43 The CEDAW and CRC were 
both ratified rather quickly by the ASEAN Member States; only Brunei Darussalam 
acceded to CEDAW substantially later than its fellow ASEAN Members. This 
common ground is in line with the ratification and accession by other States, as the 
CRC has been ratified by all States around the world except for the United States of 
America and CEDAW has been ratified by a large number of States. Within 
ASEAN, it corresponds with the room that exists within this organisation for 
including a focus on women and children in ASEAN’s human rights oriented 
                                                          
38 General Assembly Resolution 46/608 (Final Act of the Paris Conference on Cambodia (Agreement 
on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict - Paris Peace Agreement), UN Doc. 
A/46/608, 30 October 1991, cited in Mathew Davies, ‘States of Compliance?: Global Human Rights 
Treaties and ASEAN Member States’ (2014) 13 Journal of Human Rights 414, p. 417. 
39 John D. Ciorciari, ‘Institutionalising Human Rights in Southeast Asia’ (2012) 34 Human Rights 
Quarterly 695, p. 703. 
40 John D. Ciorciari, ‘Institutionalising Human Rights in Southeast Asia’ (2012) 34 Human Rights 
Quarterly 695, p. 708. 
41  Gerard Clarke, ‘The Evolving ASEAN Human Rights System: The ASEAN Human Rights 
Declaration of 2012’ (2012), 11 Northwestern Journal of International Human Rights 1, p. 19. 
42  Mathew Davies, ‘States of Compliance?: Global Human Rights Treaties and ASEAN Member 
States’ (2014) 13 Journal of Human Rights 414, p. 428. 
43  Mathew Davies, ‘States of Compliance?: Global Human Rights Treaties and ASEAN Member 
States’ (2014) 13 Journal of Human Rights 414, p. 415. 
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documents and the establishment of the ASEAN Commission for the Promotion 
and Protection of the Rights of Women and Children, which is further discussed in 
Chapter V.   
Given the fact that all Member States are party to the CRPD, greater 
opportunities are created for regional cooperation on the rights of persons with 
disabilities. This is also in line with the general tendency of ASEAN to focus on the 
rights of vulnerable persons.  
The low number of ASEAN Member States as State Party to the International 
Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members 
of their Families is striking, whereas at ASEAN level, migrant workers are a topic 
of common concern and cooperation. Specifically, ASEAN formulated its ASEAN 
Declaration on the Protection and Promotion on the Rights of Migrant Workers in 
2007 and established the ASEAN Committee on the Implementation of the ASEAN 
Declaration on the Protection and Promotion of the Rights of Migrant Workers in 
the same year (also further discussed in Chapter V). In addition, all ASEAN 
Member States are members of the International Labour Organisation (ILO). Based 
on their membership, States are bound by the ILO Declaration on Fundamental 
Principles and Rights at Work. 
Already in 1999, Liann Thio concluded that the low number of ratifications and 
the wide-ranging use of reservations “framed in terms of non-acceptance of 
obligations beyond constitutional limits” cast doubt over the sincerity of the 
commitment of these States.44 Almost two decades later, it seems that the picture 
has in essence not changed. Nevertheless, it is also argued that reservations can be 
helpful “inasmuch as they promote greater, albeit imperfect, state engagement with 
the rights regime than otherwise would be the case”.45 According to Davies, “[i]t is 
possible that for many ASEAN members, reservations may be a necessary stage to 
pass through as states move from blanket disinterest in the global treaty system to 
engagement and ultimately compliance.”46 This relates to the idea of considering 
the universality of human rights as a process (Subsection 3.2, Chapter II). 
Taking a closer look at CEDAW, CRC and CRPD, the following can be 
observed. While all ASEAN Member States are party to these Conventions, the first 
two are subject to a high number of declarations and reservations. Specifically, 
Brunei Darussalam, Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar, Singapore, Thailand, and 
Vietnam made declarations on and/or reservations to the CEDAW. Regarding the 
CRC, declarations and reservations have been made by Brunei Darussalam, 
Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand. The most salient reservations on these 
                                                          
44 Liann Thio, ‘Implementing human rights in ASEAN countries: “Promises to keep and miles to go 
before I sleep”’ (1999) 2 Yale Human Rights and Development Law Journal 1, p. 9. 
45  Mathew Davies, ‘States of Compliance?: Global Human Rights Treaties and ASEAN Member 
States’ (2014) 13 Journal of Human Rights 414, p. 422. He hereby made reference to Johanna Fournier, 
‘Reservations and the effective protection of human rights’ (2010) 2 Goettingen Journal of 
International Law, 437, pp. 439-442. 
46  Mathew Davies, ‘States of Compliance?: Global Human Rights Treaties and ASEAN Member 
States’ (2014) 13 Journal of Human Rights 414, p. 422. 
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conventions are made by Brunei Darussalam and Malaysia, and in line with their 
statements, Singapore. These States included references to the national legal 
context, as well as religious laws. While Brunei Darussalam, Malaysia and 
Singapore can be grouped together in terms of the type of declarations and 
reservations they make, classifying them in one group corresponds to the way these 
States are generally perceived in ASEAN context, as they are often considered as 
ASEAN’s moderate Member States with respect to human rights.47 With respect to 
the drafting of the ASEAN Charter for instance, Clarke commented that it was 
predominantly Thailand and Indonesia that desired to achieve a progressive 
declaration in which universal human rights standards are upheld, while the CMLV 
countries, and at times in alliance with Singapore, Malaysia and Brunei 
Darussalam, wanted a more conservative document.48 
Primacy is not only provided to the national context with respect to the CEDAW 
and the CRC, but provisions of other conventions are also subjected to national 
constitutions, legislation, regulations and local customs, values and religions; 
furthermore the principle of sovereignty and territorial integrity of States is also 
stressed. Brunei Darussalam, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Singapore and Thailand 
have referred to their internal laws. One of Singapore’s reservations led to 
subjecting a provision of the CRC to its national law on maintaining law and order, 
measures and restrictions prescribed by law and which are necessary in the interests 
of national security, public safety, public order, the protection of public health or 
the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. 
A number of the ASEAN Member States have underscored the importance of 
national particularities in general, and in the past, Asian values in particular. 
Although certain human rights are restricted, the reservations do not concretise 
what these particularities exactly are, as the reservations generally refer to national 
law, policies, customs, values and religions. 
Although it is possible to issue interpretative declarations and reservations, the 
extent to which they are allowed are subject to international treaty law. Following 
customary law and as codified in Article 19(c) Vienna Convention on the Law of 
the Treaties, reservations incompatible with the object and purpose of a treaty are 
not permitted. This limitation is generally also included in each individual 
convention. Accordingly, it is a general principle that a State Party cannot invoke 
provisions of national law as a justification for its failure to comply with its 
obligations under a treaty (see also Article 27 Vienna Convention on the Law of the 
Treaties). 
As many of the objecting States underscored, it is the common interest of State 
Parties that the object and purpose is respected and that States are prepared to 
                                                          
47 For instance observed by Carlos Medina during the interview with the author; Interview with Carlos 
Medina, Director of the Ateneo Law Faculty’s Human Rights Center at Ateneo de Manila University, 
(Manila 10 November 2009). 
48  Gerard Clarke, ‘The Evolving ASEAN Human Rights System: The ASEAN Human Rights 
Declaration of 2012’ (2012), 11 Northwestern Journal of International Human Rights 1, p. 19. 
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undertake legislative and policy changes in order to comply with their treaty 
obligations. However, when one scrutinises a number of the declarations and 
reservations issued by the ASEAN Member States, one can see that a number of 
them include general references to national law. Given the lack of specification in 
these reservations, the extent of commitment is unclear. This in turn raises doubts 
regarding the commitment of the reserving State and could undermine the basis of 
these human rights treaties. These reservations could thus be considered as 
weakening of international human rights standards. The previous section illustrated 
that some relativistic views have been withdrawn, which implies a change in 
thinking on the universal character of human rights.  
Nevertheless, considering the low number of ratifications of certain UN 
conventions by the ASEAN Member States, cooperation on certain human rights 
topics could be problematic. In these cases, it not a matter of difference of opinion 
on the interpretation of application of a certain human rights provision, but non-
ratification of conventions altogether. For instance, the ICCPR and the ICESR have 
only been ratified by a slight majority of ASEAN States, while the UDHR together 
with these Conventions are considered to constitute the International Bill of Human 
Rights. The ICCPR and the ICESR have been ratified by respectively 6 and 7 
ASEAN Member States. While it was often said that Asian States, including 
Southeast Asian States, are more focused on economic, social and cultural rights 
instead of civil and political rights, this is overall not mirrored in the number of 
ratifications of the ICCPR and the ICESR by the ASEAN Member States.  
Except for Myanmar, the group of States that is not party to the ICCPR and the 
ICESR is the same for both conventions: Brunei Darussalam, Malaysia, and 
Singapore. The fact that Myanmar has not acceded to the ICCPR is not surprising 
given the only recent ambition to change from a dictatorial military rule to a 
democracy, while the other three States are surprising. Specifically, during the 
Asian values debate the argument was made that a certain level of advancement 
must be reached by a State before it can promote and protect individual rights such 
as civil and political rights. While it is safe to say that Brunei Darussalam, Malaysia 
and Singapore have reached a certain level of advancement, ratification of the 
ICCPR in these States has not followed. In contrast, ASEAN’s economically less 
advanced Member States have, in fact, ratified these two Conventions.  
Paul Close and David Askew have pointed out that only a minority of the 
world’s population lives in social circumstances favourable to the full enjoyment 
human rights,49 which Donnelly described as the relativity of enjoyment. According 
to Close and Askew, Western States are able to more easily achieve the (high) 
standard of human rights set due to their generally good social conditions. For 
poorer, often non-Western States with less favourable conditions it is difficult to 
live up to these criteria. It has been argued that this inequality makes these non-
                                                          
49  Paul Close and David Askew, Asia Pacific and Human Rights: A Global Political Economy 
Perspective (The International Political Economy of New Regionalism Series, Aldershot, Ashgate 
2004), p. 25. 
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Western States reluctant to adopt the same set of human rights standards.50 While 
this is generally presumed, the ratification in ASEAN Member States brings 
nuances to this observation. 
Regarding the procedural aspects to ensure that the human rights standards to 
which the ASEAN Member States have committed themselves and the extent of the 
mandate of dispute settlement mechanisms, the following observations can be 
made. A large number of the ASEAN Member States do not consider themselves to 
be bound by provisions on (the automatic) arbitration and dispute settlement by the 
ICJ. States which have restricted dispute settlement by the ICJ to the consent of all 
parties in dispute or which do not consider themselves bound by these provisions on 
dispute settlement are Brunei Darussalam, Indonesia, Laos, Myanmar, Singapore, 
Thailand and Vietnam. As seven of ASEAN’s Member States have voiced 
reservations to dispute settlement, it remains to be seen whether there is room for 
dispute settlement on human rights topics at the regional level.  
Also salient is that the competence of the committees mentioned in the different 
human rights instruments are in general not recognised and that the optional 
protocols on the competence of the committees to receive and consider 
communications from individuals are in general not endorsed. The few States that 
have signed or are party to these optional protocols are Cambodia, the Philippines 
and Thailand, whereby this is only the case with respect to a very limited number of 
the documents discussed. Slightly more space is visible with respect to CEDAW, as 
its Optional Protocol on the competence of the Committee on the Elimination of 
Discrimination against Women to receive and consider communications on behalf 
of individuals or groups of individuals, has been signed by Indonesia and ratified by 
Cambodia, the Philippines and Thailand. This supports the notion that there is more 
room for cooperation on topics related to women. However, the general tendency of 
ASEAN Member States is to backtrack with respect to the mechanisms installed at 
the international level to protect human rights. This could have implications for the 
mandate for the ASEAN Intergovernmental Human Rights Commission, the 
ASEAN Commission on the Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Women and 
Children and the ASEAN Committee on the Implementation of the ASEAN 
Declaration on the Protection and Promotion of the Rights of Migrant Workers, 






                                                          
50  Paul Close and David Askew, Asia Pacific and Human Rights: A Global Political Economy 
Perspective (The International Political Economy of New Regionalism Series, Aldershot, Ashgate 
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3 THE CODIFICATION OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS IN THE CONSTITUTIONS OF THE 




Insight in the region’s history and diversity in terms of politics and level of 
democracy contributes to a better understanding of the ASEAN context. The 
existing diversity in the region is a major influence on ASEAN and its ASEAN 
Way. The main characteristics are discussed in the following section. While it falls 
outside the scope of this research to analyse each Member State in depth, some 
general observations are illustrative. Therefore, some basic information regarding 
each State is provided prior to a discussion of the fundamental rights as enshrined in 
each constitution. Other authors have also referred to this added value. 
Muntarbhorn, for instance, observed that “[a]n initial glimpse at the background of 
each country reveals a degree of eclecticism politically which shapes the human 
rights situation at home”.51  
 
3.2 Brunei Darussalam 
 
Brunei Darussalam is a constitutional monarchy headed by a Sultan. Of all ASEAN 
Member States, this Islamic State is the smallest in size, as well as population. After 
being a British protectorate since 1888, Brunei Darussalam regained self-
government in 1959. Furthermore, the country chose not to become part of the 
Federation of Malaysia. On 1 January 1984, the State became independent.52 In 
1987, Brunei Darussalam was the first State that joined ASEAN after its 
establishment in 1967.53  
Brunei Darussalam has the most limited constitutional human rights guarantees. 
The circumstances are in general not favourable to human rights, as this State has 
been in a state of emergency since 1962 and has applied its Internal Security Act 
which was adopted in 1982, making it possible to detain people without judicial 
process. The State’s Constitution was adopted on 29 September 1959 and last 
revised in 2011.54  
The freedom of religion, enshrined in Article 3 of its Constitution, especially 
deserves closer attention. This provision determines that the State’s official religion 
                                                          
51  Vitit Muntarbhorn, Unity in Connectivity? Evolving Human Rights Mechanisms in the ASEAN 
Region (Nijhoff Law Specials, Brill, Leiden 2013), p. 6. 
52 Peter Church (ed), A Short History of South-East Asia (5th edn, John Wiley & Sons, Singapore 
2009), pp. 6-7. 
53  ASEAN Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Declaration of the Admission of Brunei Darussalam into 
ASEAN, Jakarta, 7 January 1984 , <http://agreement.asean.org/media/download/20171011114703.pdf>, 
last accessed 11 September 2018. 
54 The Constitution of Brunei Darussalam, 29 September 1959 (last revised in 2011). Available at 
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is Islam, “provided that all other religions may be practised in peace and harmony 
by the persons professing them”. Yet, professing another religion leads in some 
cases to discrimination in employment. For example, Ministers and Deputy 
Ministers can, in principle, only be appointed if they are from the Malay race and 
profess the Islamic religion, unless otherwise decided by the Sultan (Article 4(5)).55 
Furthermore, the state of emergency (Article 83) can restrict human rights. The 
most striking provisions are enumerated in Article 83(4), which makes it possible to 
make orders on the following subjects: censorship, the control and suppression of 
publications, writings, maps, plans, photographs, communications and means of 
communications (sub a); arrest, detention, exclusion and deportation (sub b); 
transportation by land, air, or water and the control of the transport and movement 
of persons, animals and things (sub d); requiring persons to do work or render 
services (sub i); formation of tribunals and other bodies for the purpose of deciding 
any matters specified in any such orders (sub k); modification, amendment, 
supersession of suspension of all or any of the provisions of any written law (sub l); 
and the entry into, and search of, premises or other places, and search and 
interrogation of persons (sub m).  
3.3 Cambodia 
 
Cambodia is a constitutional monarchy with, at least on paper, a democratic 
political system. The main religion is Buddhism. The country became a French 
protectorate in 1863. After the Japanese intervention during the Second World War, 
France regained control until 1953 when Cambodia became independent.56 In 1999, 
Cambodia was the last to be admitted as a Member of ASEAN.57 
The Constitution of Cambodia58  refers in its preamble to the horrors of the 
Khmer Rouge regime and the determination to become a liberal multi-party 
democracy in which human rights are guaranteed and respect for the law is ensured. 
Chapter III deals with the rights and duties of Khmer citizens. The general 
provision (Article 31) stipulates the recognition and respect for human rights as 
enshrined in the UN Charter, the UDHR and all treaties and conventions related to 
human rights, women’s rights and children’s rights and establishes the principle of 
non-discrimination for Khmer citizens. It furthermore states the general limitation 
that the rights and liberties exercised by an individual shall not adversely affect the 
                                                          
55 Of similar tenor is art. 84A(1) Constitution. 
56 Peter Church (ed), A Short History of South-East Asia (5th edn, John Wiley & Sons, Singapore 
2009), p. 17-21. 
57  ASEAN, Declaration on the Admission of the Kingdom of Cambodia into the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations Hanoi, 30 April 1999, available at <ttps://cil.nus.edu.sg/wp-
content/uploads/formidable/18/1999-Declaration-on-the-Admission-of-the-Kingdom-of-Cambodia-
into-ASEAN.pdf >, last accessed 11 September 2018. 
58 The Constitution of the Kingdom of Cambodia, 24 September 1993, unofficial English translation, 
supervised by Cambodia’s Constitutional Council, October 2015, <http://www.ccc.gov.kh/detail_info_ 
en.php?_txtID=791>, last accessed 11 September 2018. 
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rights and freedoms of others and that this exercise must be in accordance with the 
law.  
The constitution lists nineteen specific articles on rights and duties (Articles 32-
46). These provisions deal with, inter alia, the right to life, liberty and security, 
nationality and the prohibition to be exiled or extradited without mutual agreement 
between the States concerned, the right to vote or to be elected, to participate in 
political, economic, social and cultural life, labour, equal pay, social benefits and 
trade unions, the right to strike or to hold peaceful demonstrations, personal 
integrity, human dignity and the rights of detainees, the right to denounce, complain 
or file claims in case the State or social organisations breach the law, the freedom to 
travel and to reside, confidentiality of correspondence, the freedom of expression, 
assembly, association and to form political parties, the freedom of religion, the right 
to (land) ownership, and women’s rights.  
Furthermore, the duties of individuals are also enshrined in Chapter III. 
Specifically, parents have the duty to take care of their children, raise them and 
educate them in order to become good citizens. Children have the duty to take care 
of their aged parents in accordance with Khmer custom (Article 47). It is mentioned 
that Khmer citizens have the duty to respect the Constitution and the laws, to 
participate in the national construction and to defend the motherland (Article 49), to 
respect the principles of national sovereignty and liberal multi-party democracy, 
and to respect public and private property (Article 50). Furthermore, the State is 
obliged to assure the protection of children’s rights (Article 48). 
Human rights related provisions are also included in other chapters of the 
constitution. These include the priority of the State to improve the living conditions 
and the welfare of its citizens (Article 52), the preservation and protection of the 
environment and the balance of natural resources (Article 59), to promote economic 
development (Article 61), and to secure a suitable living standard for its citizens 
(Article 63). Chapter VI on education, culture and social affairs also includes 
provisions on human rights issues. These entail the right of citizens to quality 
education (Article 65), freedom of education, equal access to schooling, free 
primary and secondary education at public schools for all citizens (Articles 65-68), 
and the preservation and development of national culture (Article 69). The health of 
the people is guaranteed by decease prevention and free medical care (Article 72). 
Special attention is given to mothers and children (Article 73), disabled people and 
families of combatants killed in action (Article 74), and the workforce by 
establishing a social security regime (Article 75). For different State organs Khmer 
citizens have the right to vote and to be elected (Articles 76 and 99 new). The 
judiciary should guarantee impartiality and protect the rights and liberties of the 
citizens (Article 128 new). Furthermore, every citizen has the right to raise the 
unconstitutionality of laws (Article 141 new). Citizens have the right to participate 
in the National Congress. This body is also obliged to keep citizens informed on 
affairs of national interest and to raise issues or makes suggestions to State 
authorities (Article 147 new). Finally, it is made explicit that all laws and decisions 
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of State institutions must be in conformity with the Constitution (Article 152 new 
two). 
When reading these human rights provisions, it is striking that these provisions 
stipulate that Khmer citizens are the bearers of these rights and duties, instead of 
stating that everyone has these rights and duties. Only some provisions dealing with 
the right to life do not restrict the rights to citizens (Articles 32 and 38), which 
could imply that the right to life is considered as a ius cogens norm. The right to 
ownership is not further restricted (Article 44). The provisions on women’s and 
children’s rights are also not limited to Khmer citizens (Articles 45, 46 and 48). 
Interestingly, the Cambodian Constitution also includes the principle of non-
interference in another State’s internal affairs (Article 53). 
Recently, controversial laws and constitutional amendments were signed by the 
Senate President, which included a lese majesté law that is considered incompatible 
with Cambodia’s obligations under international human rights law.59 In addition, 
the appointment of secretaries of state is now accomplished by royal decree based 
on Articles 34, 42, 49, 53 and 118 of the constitution and without ratification by the 




Indonesia is the largest ASEAN Member State both in terms of geographical size, 
as well as population. It is also home to the world’s largest Muslim population. Yet, 
the country is culturally, religiously and ethnically diverse. This diversity is one of 
the reasons that this unitary State, which is headed by a president, became less 
centralised over the years. It also determined the secularity of the country, although 
the role of Islam in politics is still a sensitive topic of debate. The blasphemy 
charges against Jakarta Governor Basuki Tjahaja Purnama, who was eventually 
sentenced to two years imprisonment, for instance, illustrates that the State’s 
democratic politics are being tested.61  
In the colonial era Indonesia experienced Portuguese, Dutch, British and 
Japanese rule. The country declared itself independent on 17 August 1945 and was 
given sovereignty from the Netherlands in December 1949. After ‘Guided 
                                                          
59 The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (UN Human Rights), ‘UN Experts Say 
Constitutional Changes in Cambodia Impinge on Democracy’ (Geneva, 20 February 2018) 
<https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=22674&LangID=E>, last 
accessed 11 September 2018. 
60 Rathavong Ven, ‘Cabinet Okays Penal Code and Constitution Changes’ Khmer Times (2 February 
2018), <https://www.khmertimeskh.com/50106302/cabinet-okays-penal-code-constitution-changes/>, 
last accessed 11 September 2018. 
61  See, for example, Dina Afrianty, ‘Islam and Politics: Indonesia’s Identity Crisis’ Aljazeera (22 
November 2016), <http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2016/11/islam-politics-indonesia-
identity-crisis-161121082414557.html> last accessed 11 September 2018) and Kate Lamb, ‘Jakarta 
Governor Ahok sentenced to two years in prison for blasphemy’ The Guardian (9 May 2017), <https:// 
www.theguardian.com/world/2017/may/09/jakarta-governor-ahok-found-guilty-of-blasphemy-jailed-
for-two-years> last accessed 11 September 2018. 
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Democracy’ of Sukarno (President from 1945 until 1967) and especially after the 
fall of Suharto in 1998, the people’s demand for democracy increased. The country 
has made a leap forward from authoritarian rule towards democracy. Today, it is the 
largest democracy in Southeast Asia. Indonesia furthermore played a leading role in 
the foundation of ASEAN.62  
Indonesia’s Constitution dates back to 18 August 1945. It was repealed in 1948, 
but was reinstated on 5 July 1959.63 Since then, the Constitution has been amended 
four times. The Second Amendment (enacted on 18 August 2000) is key to 
Indonesia’s human rights protection. It expanded the number of human rights 
guaranteed in its constitution, which were quite limited in the 1945 Constitution. 
Also important is Law No. 39 of 1999 on Human Rights. The constitution itself is 
based on Pancasila, Indonesia’s official political philosophy formulated by Sukarno 
in 1945. The five principles are “believe in the one and only God, just and civilised 
humanity, the unity of Indonesia, democracy led by the wisdom of deliberations 
among representatives, [and] social justice for the whole of the people of 
Indonesia.” These values influence the State’s human rights perception. Especially 
the first two principles require further clarification. The first principle is explained 
in the sense of religious tolerance and freedom of religion, whilst the second is seen 
as balancing individual rights, on the one hand, with the individual’s obligations 
towards the society and the State, on the other.64 These principles are captured in 
the preamble of the Constitution, as well as in a number of specific provisions 
highlighted hereafter. 
The constitution has a specific chapter on human rights (Chapter XA), 
containing eleven provisions.65 These include the right to life, family life, children’s 
rights, the right to self-realisation by the fulfilment of basic needs, the right to 
education, and benefitting from science and technology, and art and culture, 
equality, employment, nationality, the freedom of choice (on religion, education, 
occupation, nationality and residency), conscience, association, assembly, 
expression, the right to communicate and to information, the right to protect 
oneself, his or her family and property, the freedom from torture or inhuman and 
degrading treatment, the right to obtain political asylum, the right to physical and 
spiritual prosperity and a home, the right to medical healthcare, social security, 
                                                          
62  Sree Kumar, 'Introduction' in Sharon Siddique and Sree Kumar (eds), The 2nd ASEAN Reader 
(ISEAS, Singapore 2003), p. 3. 
63  In the meantime, Indonesia’s constitutions were the 1949 Federal Constitution and the 1950 
Provisional Constitution. The Provisional Constitution also included human rights. 
64 The Embassy of the Republic of Indonesia in London, 'The Philosophical Basis of Human Rights in 
Indonesia' <http://www.indonesianembassy.org.uk/human_right-2.htm> last accessed 6 December 
2017. 
65 The Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia (unofficial translation), 18 August 1945. Available at 
<http://www.embassyofindonesia.org/index.php/government/> last accessed 11 September 2018. 
Human Rights are also included in Law No. 39 Year 1999 on Human Rights, 23 September 1999, 
unofficial translation available at <http://www.refworld.org/docid/4da2ce862.html> last accessed 11 
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property, non-discrimination, respect for cultural identities and the rights of 
traditional communities. The constitution explicitly lists non-derogable rights, i.e., 
the right to life, the prohibition of torture, the freedom of thought, conscience and 
religion, the prohibition of enslavement, recognition as a person before the law, and 
the right not to be tried under a law with retrospective effect (Article 28I(1)). 
Alongside these rights, individuals have the duty to respect the human rights of 
others and to accept certain restrictions posed by law (Article 28J). The State has 
the responsibility to protect, promote, uphold, and fully realise human rights 
(Article 28I(4)). 
A number of human rights are also guaranteed in other chapters. Customary law 
and traditional rights are recognised and respected by the State, provided that these 
traditions are in accordance with the State’s societal development and principles 
(Articles 18B and 28I(3)). The State’s citizens have the right to equality before the 
law and government, the right to work and the right and duty to participate in 
defending the State (Articles 27 and 30). The freedom of religion is guaranteed in 
Article 29, whereas education is regulated in Chapter XIII. Specifically, alongside 
the right the education, every citizen has the duty to undertake basic education, 
which is funded by the government (Article 31(2)). Moreover, the freedom on the 
maintenance and development of cultural values is guaranteed, and regional 
languages and cultural treasures are respected and preserved by the State (Article 
32). A system of social security is also developed by the State (Article 34). 
In Indonesia, the human rights are in general guaranteed for every person, 




Laos, or Lao People’s Democratic Republic, is also a republic. The change from a 
monarchy into a republic in 1975 was followed by the adoption of ‘market 
socialism’. Nowadays, Laos can still be depicted as a socialist State based on a one-
party system.66 It is one of the poorest countries of Southeast Asia. This former 
French protectorate declared itself independent under pressure from Japan in 1945. 
The French declared Laos independent in 1949, and withdrew from Laos after the 
1954 Geneva Conference.67 Laos joined ASEAN in 1997, together with Myanmar.68  
                                                          
66 Peter Church (ed), A Short History of South-East Asia (5th edn, John Wiley & Sons, Singapore 
2009), p. 77. 
67 Peter Church (ed), A Short History of South-East Asia (5th edn, John Wiley & Sons, Singapore 
2009), pp. 72-73. 
68 ASEAN Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Declaration on the Admission of the Lao People's Democratic 
Republic into the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, Subang Jaya, 23 July 1997, <http://arc-
agreement.asean.org/file/doc/2015/01/declaration-on-the-admission-of-the-lao-people-s-democratic-
republic-into-the-asean.pdf > last accessed 11 September 2018. 
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Although Laos has a one party system, the constitution underscores the State’s 
objective to build Laos as, amongst others, a democratic State.69 Chapter 4 of Laos’ 
Constitution on ‘Fundamental rights and the Obligations of Citizens’ lists in 
eighteen provisions the fundamental rights and obligations of citizens, thus also not 
applying these rights and duties to everyone.70 Only the chapter’s last two articles 
deal with non-citizens. Rights included in this chapter deal with non-discrimination, 
the right to vote and to be elected, gender equality, education, work and related 
rights, the freedom of settlement and movement, the right to lodge complaints, 
petitions and propose ideas to State organisations, integrity of a person and home, 
the freedom of religion (including not to have a religion, which is not the case for 
all ASEAN Member States), speech, press, assembly and demonstration, and 
science, technology and art. The rights of Lao residents who reside abroad are 
protected by the State.  
Duties are also included (Articles 47-49), as Lao citizens are to respect the 
constitution, laws, to observe labour discipline and to comply with regulations 
related to social life and public order. They also have to pay duties and taxes, 
defend the State, maintain security and fulfil military obligations. Article 50 and 51 
deal with the rights of aliens, persons who cannot certify their nationality and 
foreigners. 
Human rights related articles can also be found throughout the Constitution, 
most notably, in the chapters on the political regime and the socio-economic 
regime. These include subjects such as voting (Article 4 new and 54 new), the 
protection of the freedom and democratic rights of the people by the State, whereby 
the honour, well-being, lives, consciences and property of the people are explicitly 
addressed (Article 6), the inclusion of specific social organisations to develop the 
right to self-determination of the people and to protect their legitimate rights and 
interests (Article 7), rights and non-discrimination of ethnic groups and the 
development of their socio-economic level (Article 8), respect for one’s religion 
and the prohibition of creating division between religions and classes (Article 9 
new), property rights (Articles 16 and 17 new), education (including compulsory 
primary education, Article 22 new), the preservation and promotion of culture 
(Article 23 new), health (Articles 25 new and 26 new), labour (Article 27 new), 
social security (Article 28 new), and women and children (Article 29 new). In 
addition, multi-ethnicity is underscored throughout the constitution. Organisations 
and citizens are obliged to protect the environment and natural resources (Article 
                                                          
69 See the Constitution’s preamble; The Constitution of the Lao People's Republic (translation endorsed 
by the Law Committee of the National Assembly of the Lao PDR), 6 May 2003, 
<http://www.mof.gov.la/sites/default/files/news/Constitution%20(2003)%20Eng.pdf> last accessed 11 
September 2018. 
70 The Constitution of the Lao People's Republic (translation endorsed by the Law Committee of the 
National Assembly of the Lao PDR), 6 May 2003, 
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19). Finally, judicial independence, open proceedings and the right to defend 
oneself are also included (Chapter 9).  
Laos also states that one of the principles of its foreign policy is non-




Malaysia was under Portuguese and British control during colonial time and 
occupied by the Japanese during WWII.71 After a short return to British control, 
Malaysia (in the structure of the Federation of Malaya) became independent during 
the Malayan emergency on 31 August 1957.72 Malaysia was formally established 
on 16 September 1963 and also included Singapore at that time. Nowadays, 
Malaysia is a constitutional democracy with a federal structure. Islam is the State’s 
national religion. The role of the King and Royal State Rulers has diminished over 
time. Malaysia was furthermore one of the founding Member States of ASEAN. It 
has been argued that Malaysia’s economic development occurred to some extent at 
the expense of democracy.73 
Malaysia guarantees human rights in its constitution,74 albeit with numerous 
restrictions. While Islam is the religion of the Federation, the freedom of religion is 
also enshrined in the Constitution (Article 3). The constitution lists fundamental 
liberties (Part II) for all persons and citizens, which include the right to life and 
personal liberty, the prohibition of slavery and forced labour, protection against 
retrospective criminal laws and repeated trials, equality before the law and non-
discrimination, the prohibition of banishment or exile, the freedom of movement, 
speech, assembly and association, the freedom of religion and rights in respect of 
education and property. Human rights are also included in other parts of the 
constitution, such as the right to vote (Article 119), restrictions on preventive 
detention (Article 151), the freedom to teach, learn or use any other language than 
the Malay language, except for official purposes (Article 152), and the special 
position of Malays and natives of Sabah and Sarawak, and other communities 
(Article 153). 
                                                          
71 Melaka was between 1641 and the 1824 Anglo-Dutch Treaty under Dutch control; Peter Church (ed), 
A Short History of South-East Asia (5th edn, John Wiley & Sons, Singapore 2009), pp. 85, 88, 93. 
72  In 1963, the Federation of Malaya included next to Malaysia also Singapore and the Bornean 
territories of Sarawak and Sabah; John Bastin and Harry J. Benda, 'Post-Colonial Southeast Asia' in 
Sharon Siddique and Sree Kumar (eds), The 2nd ASEAN Reader (ISEAS, Singapore 2003), p. 13. 
73 Peter Church (ed), A Short History of South-East Asia (5th edn, John Wiley & Sons, Singapore 
2009), pp. 82, 105 and John Subritzky, Confronting Sukarno: British, American, Australian and New 
Zealand Diplomacy in the Malaysian-Indonesian Confrontation, 1961-5 (Palgrave Macmillan 
Basingtoke 2000) p. 214. Mahatir Mohamad’s autocratic leadership reduced the level of democracy that 
Malaysia experienced in the 1960 during his term as Prime Minister; Peter Church (ed), A Short History 
of South-East Asia (5th edn, John Wiley & Sons, Singapore 2009), p. 95. 
74 Federal Constitution of Malaysia, 31 August 1957, last amended on 27 December 2007, reprint as of 
1 November 2010, <http://www.agc.gov.my/agcportal/index.php?r=portal2/left&menu_id=dDI5alZpO 
WFtcGl5MnZ5M1dtT1NNZz09>, last accessed 11 September 2018. 
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When examining the fundamental rights in more detail, some elements of the 
constitution are striking. For example, exceptions to the principle of non-
discrimination are possible when they are expressly authorised by the Constitution 
(Article 8(2)). This includes that affirmative actions to protect the special position 
of Malays of Peninsular Malaysia and the indigenous people of Sabah and Sarawak 
under Article 153 are allowed. Major restrictions are related to Article 10 on the 
freedom of speech, assembly and association, which deserves special attention. 
These restrictions are formulated in Article 10(2), 10(3) and 10(4). Malaysia’s 
Parliament is namely permitted by law to impose restrictions on the freedom of 
speech and expression in the interest of the security of the Federation, friendly 
relations with other countries, public order, morality, to protect the privileges of 
Parliament, to provide against contempt of court, defamation, or incitement to any 
offence. The right of assembly is restricted in light of security and public order. The 
freedom of association is also restricted, in terms of security, public order and 
morality. Finally, Article 10(4) states that Parliament may pass laws prohibiting the 
questioning of any matter, right, status, position, privilege, sovereignty or 
prerogative established or protected by the provisions of Part III, Article 152, 153 or 
181 Malaysian Constitution.  
As stated above, Islam is Malaysia’s national religion. Based on this, Article 
11(4) stipulates that State or federal law may control or restrict the propagation of 
any religious doctrine or belief among persons professing the religion of Islam. 
Also, any act contrary to any general law relating to public order, public health and 
morality is prohibited (Article 11(5)). The importance of Islam is also visible in the 
rights in respect to education, as it shall be lawful for the Federation or a State to 
establish, maintain or assist in establishing or maintaining Islamic institutions or 
provide or assist in providing instruction in the religion of Islam and incur such 
expenditure as may be necessary for the purpose (Article 12(2)).  
Finally, some of the rights are available to citizens only, such as the freedom of 
speech, assembly and association. A general restriction is based on Article 149, on 
legislation against subversion, organised violence, and acts and crimes prejudicial 
to the public and emergency powers. These laws do not have to be consistent with 
Articles 5, 9, 10, 13 of the Constitution (i.e. right to life and personal liberty, the 
prohibition of banishment and the freedom of movement, speech, assembly and 
association, and the right to property). Malaysia’s Internal Security Act was passed 
under this provision, which was replaced in 2012 by the Security Offences (Special 
Measures) Act. It is a controversial law as it grants special investigative powers in 
relation to security offences. 75 Emergency powers are also included in Article 150 
in case security, economic life or public order is threatened and can contradict the 
Constitution, with the exceptions of provisions which relate to Islamic law or 
                                                          
75 See for the text of the Act, Laws of Malaysia, Act No. 747, Security Offences (Special Measures) 
Act, Act 2012, <http://www.federalgazette.agc.gov.my/outputaktap/20120622_747_BI_Act%20747% 
20BI.pdf> last accessed 11 September 2018. 
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customs of the Malays, native law or customs of Sabah and Sarawak, citizenship, 




Myanmar, colonised by the British and occupied by the Japanese during their rule 
in Southeast Asia, became independent on 4 January 1948. It was long the most 
isolated and most disputed Member State of ASEAN. The military staged a coup in 
March 1962; democratic elections became only recently possible again. In this 
respect, the release of Aung San Suu Kyi in November 2010 by the military junta 
and the roadmap to democracy mirrored a change in the country. This led in 
November 2015 to democratic elections, in which the political party of Aung San 
Suu Kyi won with a landslide victory.76  
Myanmar is both ethnically and religiously diverse, with the inward-looking 
military elite distrusting the ethnic minorities.77 The current Rohingya-crisis is a 
clear example. Fearing foreign influences, including from other ASEAN Member 
States, the State continuously stressed the principles of State sovereignty and non-
interference. Nevertheless, Myanmar joined ASEAN in 1997.78  
The most recent Constitution dates from 2008,79 which guarantees human rights 
in Chapter VIII. While it was observed that this Constitution would grant 
Myanmar’s military a leading role,80 Chapter VIII deserves scrutiny to identify 
which human rights are formally included. In addition, Chapter I, on Myanmar’s 
basic principles, addresses the right to equality, liberty and justice, custody, 
responsibilities of citizens, the promotion of socio-economic development, the 
rights of peasants and workers, education, health, the care for mothers, children and 
people in need, the freedom of religion and conscience, the right to property and 
inheritance, the right to vote and to be elected, the prohibition of criminal law with 
retrospective effect, human dignity, and the environment, 
Chapter VIII of the constitution is entitled ‘Citizen, Fundamental Rights and 
Duties of the Citizens’. As can be seen from this title, Myanmar also focuses on 
both rights and duties. Even though equal rights and protection are ensured for any 
                                                          
76  See for example Jonah Fisher, ‘Myanmar’s 2015 landmark elections explained’ BBC news (3 
December 2015), <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-33547036> last accessed 11 September 2018. 
77 Peter Church (ed), A Short History of South-East Asia (5th edn, John Wiley & Sons, Singapore 
2009), pp. 109 and 117. 
78 ASEAN Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Declaration on the Admission of the Union of Myanmar into 
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, Subang Jaya, 23 July 1997 <http://arc-agreement.asean.org 
/file/doc/2015/01/declaration-on-the-admission-of-the-union-of-myanmar-into-asean.pdf> last accessed 
11 September 2018. 
79  Constitution of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar (2008) 
<http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs5/Myanmar_Constitution-2008-en.pdf>, last accessed 11 September 
2018. 
80 Aung Hla Tun, ‘New Myanmar Constitution gives Military Leading Role’ Reuters (19 February 
2008), <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-myanmar-constitution-idUSBKK10184120080219> last 
accessed 11 September 2018. 
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person (Article 347), this State also makes a distinction in its formulation between 
persons in general and its citizens. The constitution pays special attention to 
women, (expecting) mothers and children (Articles 350-351), while also stating that 
the appointment of men to the positions that are suitable for men only cannot be 
prevented by anything in Section VIII (Article 352). Other topics are the right to 
settle and to reside, the protection of citizens’ properties, the prohibition of 
enslavement and trafficking of persons, religion, education, health, the right to vote 
and to be elected, the right to conduct business, access to technology, investment 
and material, the right to ownership and use of property, the rights with respect to 
trials and the right to seek protection from the State. 
A number of the rights may be restricted, such as the right to life and personal 
freedom (Article 353), privacy and security of one’s home, property and 
correspondence (Article 357) and the prohibition of forced labour (Article 359). For 
a number of rights specific reasons for restricting these rights are included. This 
applies to the freedom of expression, assembly, association, and the development of 
one’s language, literature, culture, religion and customs (Article 365), the freedom 
of religion (Article 360), the freedom to develop literature, culture, arts, customs 
and traditions (Article 365), and the right not to be held in custody for more than 24 
hours without the remand of a competent magistrate (Article 376). These grounds 
are broad, vague and include restrictions such as Union security, prevalence of law 
and order, community peace and tranquillity, public order and morality, national 
solidarity, and public interest. A general suspension clause is included in Article 
379, which included the following grounds: time of war, foreign invasion and time 
of insurrection. These last two grounds, together with time of emergency, are 
grounds to deny redress by due process of law for grievances entitled under law 
(Article 381). The rights of defence personnel and members of armed forces can 
also be restricted by law (Article 382).  
Specific attention is paid to religion (Articles 306-264), in the sense that the 
special position of Buddhism is protected, that the recognised religions in Article 
362 are supported and protected to its utmost, and that the abuse of religion for 
political purposes is forbidden.  
Alongside these rights, the Constitution also lists a number of duties in Articles 
383 to 390. Formulated in broadly, these articles embody high expectations for its 
citizens. Firstly, Article 383 indicates that every citizen has the duty to uphold non-
disintegration of the Union and national solidarity and the perpetuation of 
sovereignty. Other duties are to abide by the constitution’s provisions (Article 384), 
to safeguard the State’s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity (Article 
385), to undergo military training and to serve in the armed forces (Article 386) and 
to enhance unity among national races and ensure public peace and stability (Article 
387). This latter duty must be in conformity with the Union Spirit, although this 
provision does not make explicit what this means. The other duties a citizen has, 
concern the duty for the emergence of a modern developed Nation (Article 388), to 
pay taxes (Article 389) and to assist the Union in carrying out four tasks, namely (i) 
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preservation and safeguarding of cultural heritage, (ii) environmental conservation, 
(iii) striving for development of human resources, and (iv) protection and 
preservation of public property (Article 390).  
 
3.8 The Philippines 
 
The Philippines became independent in 1946, after their subordination to Spanish 
colonisers, American control (which had a ‘democratic mission’ and which 
intended on creating an independent Philippines81) and the Japanese occupation 
during the Second World War.82 The country was a parliamentary democracy with a 
strong civil society at the time of the formation of ASEAN in 1967.83 After the 
Marcos era in which ‘constitutional authoritarianism’ and martial law replaced 
democracy, the country experienced a fluctuating level of democracy. The majority 
of its people are Christian, while in the Southern islands of Mindanao and Sulu 
people follow Islam. 
The current Constitution dates back from 1987,84 although president Rodrigo 
Duterte proposed to amend this constitution in order to set up a federal system of 
government to end the conflict with the Muslim community in the south and to 
further boost the economy.85 When reading the Philippine Constitution, one can 
consider that this Member State formally has the most extensive human rights 
coverage of all ASEAN Member States. Nevertheless, there are in practice serious 
challenges, which recently led to the International Court of Justice to open a 
preliminary examination into the Duterte’s war on drugs campaign.86 
Article II enumerates the States’ principles and policies. Alongside references to 
national sovereignty, territorial integrity, national interest and the right to self-
determination in its relation with other States, it also includes the following 
principles and policies: the adoption of the generally accepted principles of 
international law as part of the law of the land, maintaining peace and order, the 
                                                          
81 Peter Church (ed), A Short History of South-East Asia (5th edn, John Wiley & Sons, Singapore 
2009), p. 131. 
82 While many Southeast Asian states were at first not uncharitable towards Japan because of the 
Japanese apparent ambition to oust Western colonisers, thereby using mottos like ‘Asia for the Asians”. 
The Philippines however, are an exception because of the American style of colonialism and the pro-
American attitude; Peter Church (ed), A Short History of South-East Asia (5th edn, John Wiley & Sons, 
Singapore 2009), p. 133. 
83 Peter Church (ed), A Short History of South-East Asia (5th edn, John Wiley & Sons, Singapore 
2009), p. 124. 
84  The Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines 2 February 1987, Official Gazette 
<http://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/constitutions/1987-constitution/> last accessed 11 September 2018. 
85 Manuel Mogato, ‘Philippines’ Duterte starts Moves to amend the Constitution’ Reuters (9 December 
2016,) <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-philippines-politics/philippines-duterte-starts-moves-to-am 
end-the-constitution-idUSKBN13Y10A> last accessed 11 September 2018. 
86 The Office of the Prosecutor, Statement of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Fatou 
Bensouda, on opening Preliminary Examinations, into the Situations in the Philippines and Venezuela 
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protection of life, liberty and property and the promotion of general welfare, 
freedom from poverty, guaranteeing full respect for human rights, the notion of 
family as basic autonomous institution, the protection of the mother and unborn 
child, the role of women and youth in nation building, the right to health, protecting 
and advancing the right to a balanced and healthful ecology, education, workers’ 
rights, and the recognition and promotion of the rights of indigenous cultural 
communities within the framework of national unity and development, and equality. 
The constitution guarantees human rights in Article III. In its Bill of Rights 
twenty-two sections are included. Specifically, they deal with the right to life, 
liberty, property and equal protection, the right to personal integrity, home and 
papers, the privacy of communication and correspondence, the freedom of speech, 
expression and the press, the right to assemble and petition, the freedom of religion, 
the liberty of abode and travel, access to information, the right to form trade unions, 
associations and societies, private property, access to (quasi)judicial bodies and 
legal assistance, the rights of a suspect of an offence, the right to a fair trial and 
related rights (sections 12-17), the prohibition of detention because of political 
beliefs and aspirations, the prohibition of involuntary servitude, the prohibition of 
excessive fines, cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment, the prohibition to be tried 
twice for the same offence, and the prohibition of ex post facto law.  
An unusual provision is: “No person shall be imprisoned for debt or non-
payment of a poll tax” (Section 20). This article is particular to the Philippine 
Constitution as a similar provision is not found in the constitution of any another 
ASEAN Member State. Economic, social and cultural rights are also included in the 
form of positive obligations for the State (Article 2), which covers subjects such as 
promoting a social order (Section 9, i.e., no poverty through policies on social 
services, promotion of employment, rising living standards and improved quality of 
life), social justice (Section 10), human dignity and full respect for human rights 
(Section 11), family life, the life of mother and child (including unborn children) 
and government support to parents in raising their children (Section 12), youth 
(Section 13), the role of women and equality (Section 14), health (Section 15), 
healthy environment (Section 16), education, science, technology, arts, culture and 
sport (Section 17), workers’ rights and welfare (Section 18), indigenous cultural 
communities (Section 22), NGOs, community based or sectoral organisations 
(Section 23).  
Human rights are also enshrined in Article XIII on Social Justice and Human 
Rights, which formulates obligations on the State to protect and improve the right to 
human dignity, reduce inequalities and to remove cultural inequities. Topics that the 
State has to address are labour, agrarian and natural resources reform, urban land 
reform and housing, health, women, the role and rights of people’s organisations, 
and human rights in terms of establishing an independent Commission on Human 
Rights. Article XIV deals with (free) education, the recognition of, respect for and 
the protection of the rights of indigenous cultural communities. Article XV focuses 
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on the family as the foundation of the nation and the duty of the family to take care 




Singapore, a former British colony that was, like other States in the region, also 
under control of the Japanese occupier. While the city-state was first part of the 
newly formed Federation of Malaya, it became a self-governing territory under the 
1958 Constitution and became an independent state on 9 August 1965. The 
protection of its sovereignty is included in a separate section (Part III) of its 
Constitution. Influenced by its past, Singapore’s constitution has many similarities 
with the Constitution of Malaysia.  
Today, it is economically the most prosperous Member State of ASEAN. 
Critique on Singapore has been that it does not live up to an adequate protection and 
promotion of civil liberties.87  The Government is described as paternalistic and 
sometimes authoritarian that makes extensive use of the Internal Security Act and 
punitive defamation actions against its opposition.88 
Part IV of the Constitution enumerates a rather short list of fundamental rights.89 
These rights deal with the life and liberty of a person (including provisions with 
respect to arrest and detainment), the prohibition of slavery and forced labour, 
protection against retrospective criminal laws and repeated trials, equal protection, 
the prohibition of banishment and freedom of movement, the freedom of speech, 
assembly and association, religion, and rights in respect to education. Most rights 
are formulated for every person, although there are some exceptions. The freedom 
of speech, assembly and association for example, is formulated for citizens of 
Singapore, and also the liberty of a person is restricted to citizens under certain 
conditions (Article 9(5)). Minorities and the special position of Malays are 
addressed in the general provisions of Part XIII. 
Furthermore, a number of the rights are restricted. Again, Article 9 notes that it 
does not invalidate any law “(a) in force before the commencement of this 
Constitution which authorises the arrest and detention of any person in the interests 
of public safety, peace and good order or, (b) relating to the misuse of drugs or 
intoxicating substances which authorises the arrest and detention of any person for 
the purpose of treatment and rehabilitation”. Discrimination against Singaporean 
citizens based on religion, race, descent, place of birth is allowed when expressly 
authorised (Article 12(2)). The freedom of movement and to right to reside is 
furthermore subject to any law relating to the security of Singapore, public order, 
public health or the punishment of offenders (Article 13(2)). The freedom of 
                                                          
87 Peter Church (ed), A Short History of South-East Asia (5th edn, John Wiley & Sons, Singapore 
2009), p. 151. 
88 Peter Church (ed), A Short History of South-East Asia (5th edn, John Wiley & Sons, Singapore 
2009), p. 152. 
89  The Constitution of Singapore, 9 August 1965, <https://sso.agc.gov.sg/Act/CONS1963> last 
accessed 11 September 2018. 
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speech, assembly and association may be restricted on a number of grounds by law 
by Parliament (Article 14(2)), including the security of Singapore, public order or 
morality. Article 16 on the rights in respect of education, includes the phrase that 
“no person shall be required to receive instruction in or take part in any ceremony 
or act of worship of a religion other than its own” (sub 3) and that for the purpose of 
this clause, the parent or guardian decides the religion of a person under the age of 
18(4)).  
Finally, Singapore also includes special powers against subversion and 
emergency powers (Part XII). According to Article 149, Acts do not have to be 
consistent with Articles 9, 11, 12, 13 or 14. Restrictions on preventive detention are 
enshrined in Article 151. Emergency powers are also included in Article 150 in case 
the security or economic life is threatened and can contradict the Constitution, with 
the exceptions of provisions which relate to religion, citizenship or language 




This State is with the exception of the southern Islamic states, relatively 
homogeneous. It is the only ASEAN nation that was not colonised, although under 
King Mongkut (1851-68) a number of treaties with Western colonisers were signed 
that reduced the legal power of Thailand. Furthermore, a part of the Thai territory 
under King Chulalongkorn was transferred to what now is Laos, Cambodia and 
Malaysia under pressure of Western colonisers.90 Under King Vajiravudh (1910-25) 
the adage “Nation, Religion (Buddhism) and King” was introduced, which is still 
used today.91 Currently, the king has a constitutional status. Before and during the 
initial years of ASEAN Thailand, which was one of its founders, experienced an 
authoritarian rule (1948-1973).92 With a short intermezzo of authoritarian rule in 
1976, Thailand was developing into a democracy from 1973 onwards, but 
experienced a number of military coups along the way.93 In the most recent ones 
took place in 200694 and 201495, and in between, a major clash took place between 
                                                          
90 Peter Church (ed), A Short History of South-East Asia (5th edn, John Wiley & Sons, Singapore 
2009), pp. 164-165. 
91 Peter Church (ed), A Short History of South-East Asia (5th edn, John Wiley & Sons, Singapore 
2009), p. 167. 
92 Peter Church (ed), A Short History of South-East Asia (5th edn, John Wiley & Sons, Singapore 
2009), pp. 169-171. 
93 Peter Church (ed), A Short History of South-East Asia (5th edn, John Wiley & Sons, Singapore 
2009), pp. 172-173. 
94  ––, ‘Thai PM deposed Military Coup’ BBC News (last updated 20 September 2006) 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/5361512.stm> last accessed 11 September 2018. 
95  ––, ‘Thailand Military seizes Power in Coup’ BBC News (22 May 2014) 
<http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-27517591> last accessed 11 September 2018. 
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pro- and anti-Thaksin supporters and the military in 2010. 96  Change came for 
Thailand’s constitutional monarchy, and a suspension of the 2007 Constitution 
followed the 2014 coup d’état. 
The Constitution was subject to numerous amendments and changes of 
constitutions. On 7 August 2016, a constitutional referendum was held. While the 
charter only offers semi-democracy, the majority of Thai people backed the 
charter.97 On 6 April 2017, the new constitution was promulgated by the King.98  
The preamble refers to the rights and liberties of Thai people, whereby 
restrictions and limitations thereon are considered exceptions. Human dignity, 
rights, liberty and equality are included in the general provisions (Article 4). 
Chapter III lists the rights and liberties of the Thai people, while Chapter IV lists 
their duties. As the titles of these two Chapters are explicitly mentioning Thai 
people, the human rights appear to be restricted to Thai nationals only. 
Nevertheless, the provisions use wordings like ‘all persons’, ‘a person’, ‘every 
person’ or ‘no person’. The exercise of the rights or liberties are restricted in case 
the security of the State or public order or good morals are affected or endangered, 
or in case the rights or liberties of other persons are violated (section 25). 
Specifically, Chapter III includes the following topics, whereby a number of 
these rights are subject to limitations: conditions for the enactment of law, non-
discrimination, the right to life, the prohibition of unlawful arrest and detention, 
torture, brutal acts and cruel or inhumane punishment, the right to a fair trial and 
related rights, the prohibition of forced labour, the freedom of religion, the right to 
privacy, dignity, reputation and family, the liberty of dwelling, the freedom of 
expression and academic freedom, the right to disseminate information and the 
prohibition of censorship, freedom of communication, the right to property and 
succession, the right to travel and to reside, the prohibition to be deported or be 
denied entrance in Thailand, occupation, access to information, the right to petition 
or take legal action, freedom of association and assembly, the right to conserve and 
revive culture and traditions, natural resources and the environment, community 
welfare, the right to form political parties, consumer rights, public health, rights of 
mothers and people in need, and the prohibition to overthrow the democratic 
regime.  
The duties listed in Chapter IV concern the duty to uphold the nation, religions, 
the King and democratic government, to defend the country, maintain national 
interests and to obey the law, enrol in compulsory education, to serve in armed 
forces, respect the rights and liberties of others, to exercise one’s right to vote, to 
                                                          
96 Dan Divers, Sara Ridner, Kocha Olarn Lateef Mungin and Miranda Leisinger, ‘Bangkok like War 
Zone as Military cracks down on Protesters’ CNN (20 May 2010) <http://edition.cnn.com/2010/ 
WORLD/asiapcf/05/19/thailand.protests/> last accessed 11 September 2018. 
97 Jonathan Head, ‘Thai Referendum: Why Thais backed a Military-Backed Constitution’ BBC News (9 
August 2016) <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-37013950> last accessed 11 September 2018. 
98  Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand, 6 April 2018, unofficial translation, 
<http://www.thaiembassy.org/doha/contents/files/news-20170417-203812-158174.pdf>, last accessed 
19 November 2018>. 
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cooperate and support the conservation and protection of the environment, natural 
resources, biodiversity, and cultural heritage, pay taxes, and to not commit or 
support dishonest acts and wrongful conduct. 
The duties of the State (Chapter V) focus on the following topics: the protection 
of Thailand, observing and enforcing the law, education, care and development of 
children, public health, basic public utility services, culture and traditions, the 
environment, access to information, communication, consumer rights, and the 
financial and fiscal status of Thailand. 
Other human rights related topics are visible throughout the document, such as 
access to justice (section 68), the protection of ethnic groups (section 70), the 
family as basic element of society, housing, health, and providing assistance to 
vulnerable groups (section 71), the right to land (section 72), labour (section 74). 
Access to justice is guaranteed in case a person’s rights or liberties are violated 
(Section 25). Section 213 stipulates that a person whose rights or liberties as 
guaranteed in the Constitution are violated, has the right to submit a petition to the 




Vietnam is an initially Confucian oriented ASEAN Member State ruled by the 
Communist Party. While being a socialist state on paper, the country also leaves 
room for a free-enterprise economy. 99  Vietnam was formerly colonised by the 
French, while Japan entered during the Second World War. After the War, the 
country experienced Chinese and French rule, a division in Democratic Republic of 
Vietnam and the Republic of Vietnam and the Vietnam War.100 In 1995, Vietnam 
became ASEAN’s seventh Member State. 101  The turn of the millennium also 
marked developments in the field of the rule of law, accountability and the freedom 
of expression.102 
Stating that Vietnam is “a socialist rule of law State of the people, by the people, 
for the people” (Article 2), the 2013 Constitution103 lists human rights and citizens’ 
fundamental rights and duties in Chapter 2. It is explicitly stated that both civil and 
                                                          
99 Peter Church (ed), A Short History of South-East Asia (5th edn, John Wiley & Sons, Singapore 
2009), p. 197. 
100 Peter Church (ed), A Short History of South-East Asia (5th edn, John Wiley & Sons, Singapore 
2009), pp.186-194. 
101 ASEAN Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Declaration of the Admission of the Socialist Republic of Viet 
Nam into the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, Bandar Seri Begawan, 28 July 1995, <http://arc-
agreement.asean.org/file/doc/2015/01/declaration-on-the-admission-of-the-socialist-republic-of-vietna 
m-into-the-association-of-southeast-asian-nations.pdf> last accessed 11 September 2018. 
102 Peter Church (ed), A Short History of South-East Asia (5th edn, John Wiley & Sons, Singapore 
2009), p. 197. 
103 The Constitution of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, adopted on 28 November 2013, entered into 
force on 1 January 2014, unofficial translation from Vietnamese by International IDEA, 
<http://www.constitutionnet.org/sites/default/files/tranlation_of_vietnams_new_constitution_enuk_2.pd
f> last accessed 11 September 2018. 
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political rights and economic, social and cultural rights are respected, but also that 
rights can be restricted by law for reasons of national defence, national security, 
social order and safety, social morality and community well-being (Article 14). In 
addition, the rights are inseparable from duties (Article 15). In this sense, both the 
State and its citizens have duties towards each other.  
Specifically, Chapter 2 refers to equality and non-discrimination, the prohibition 
to be extradited or expelled, the protection of Vietnamese citizens residing abroad, 
the right to life, the inviolability of his or her body and to the protection by law of 
his or her health, honour and dignity, the protection against torture, violence, 
coercion, corporal punishment or other harmful treatment, the prohibition of 
unlawful arrest and the right to donate human tissue or organs, the right to privacy 
and correspondence and the protection of one’s honour and prestige, the right to a 
legal residence and inviolability of one’s home, freedom of movement, travel and 
residence, the freedom of belief and religion (including the right not to believe), 
freedom of speech, press, access to information, assembly, association and 
demonstration, gender equality and the creation of conditions for the advancement 
of women, the right to vote and to be elected, citizens participation, the right to 
lodge complaints or denunciations about illegal acts of others, the principle of 
presumed innocent and rights to a fair trial, the right to ownership, freedom of 
enterprise, the right to social security, work and labour protection, the right to marry 
and divorce, the right to healthcare and protection, the right to conduct research, or 
engage in literary or artistic creation, rights on cultural heritage, nationality and 
language.  
Furthermore, specific attention is paid to children and the elderly (Article 37). 
Also striking is that citizens have the right as well as the obligation to learn (Article 
39), and have the right to a clean environment as well as the duty to protect it 
(Article 43). They also have an obligation to display loyalty to and to defend their 
Fatherland (Article 44 and 45). Alongside obeying the constitution and the law, 
they must also join in the safeguarding of national security, social order, and safety 
(Article 46). The duty to pay taxes is also included (Article 47). Article 48 deals 
with the duty and protection of foreigners and Article 49 with asylum. In other parts 
of the constitution human rights related provisions are included, such as the notion 
that the State acknowledges, respects and guarantees human rights and citizens’ 
rights (Article 3) and non-discrimination and the rights of ethnic groups (Article 5). 
Chapter 3 entitled ‘economy, society, culture education, science technology and 
environment deals with topics more closely, such as workers’ rights, health, and 
education, 
Article 102 determines that the People’s Courts must safeguard, amongst others, 
human rights, citizens’ rights, and the rights and legitimate interests of 
organisations and individuals, whereas Article 103 determines the independence 
during trials and guarantees the rights of the accused or defendants to a defence and 
the right of involved parties to protect their legitimate interests. Nevertheless, 
Human Rights Watch uttered the critique that fair and impartial trials are still not 
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guaranteed, as Articles 70, 88, and 105 allow a continued Communist Party control 
of the judiciary.104 Vietnam also refers to the principles of State sovereignty and 
non-interference.  
 
3.12 Patterns in the codification of fundamental rights in the Constitutions of 
the ASEAN Member States 
 
Given the fundamental rights as included in the different constitutions, these 
documents show that the initial idea that human rights are mainly a Western 
undertaking is unfounded and out-dated. The constitutions of the Member States 
include civil and political rights, economic, social, and cultural rights and aspects of 
third generation rights, which are also characterised as ‘solidarity rights and 
“promote the idea of collective or peoples’ rights”.105 Examples are the right to self-
determination, development, and a clean and healthy environment. The inclusion of 
such rights can be explained as the ‘first wave’ of third generation rights (such as 
the rights to self-determination and development) were considered as a reaction to 
colonialism and the experience of imperialism. 106  The ‘second wave’ of third 
generation rights, such as the right to a clean and healthy environment, were based 
on ideologies which were previously not visible within international human rights 
law”.107 Rosa Freedman further observed that “[i]n many ways, the subjects of these 
newer rights are unclear, arguably owing to the focus being on responsibilities 
rather than rights. As such, Third Generation Rights have markedly expanded the 
subjects of rights.”108  In this respect, third generation rights have expanded the 
subjects of rights from individuals to peoples, and also on States.109 
This section highlights human rights-oriented provisions in the constitutions of 
ASEAN Member States. In this way, formal commonalities and differences are 
discovered, which may have implications for ASEAN’s human rights system. 
                                                          
104 ––, Vietnam: Amended Constitution a Missed Opportunity on Rights. New UN Human Rights 
Council Member Not Living Up to Commitments, Human Rights Watch (2 December 2013) 
<https://www.hrw.org/news/2013/12/02/vietnam-amended-constitution-missed-opportunity-rights> last 
accessed 11 September 2018. 
105  Rosa Freedman, ‘Third Generation Rights: Is There Room for Hybrid Constructs within 
International Human Rights Law?’ (2013) 2 Cambridge Journal of International and Comparative Law 
935, p. 952. 
106  Rosa Freedman, ‘Third Generation Rights: Is There Room for Hybrid Constructs within 
International Human Rights Law?’ (2013) 2 Cambridge Journal of International and Comparative Law 
935, p. 947. 
107  Rosa Freedman, ‘Third Generation Rights: Is There Room for Hybrid Constructs within 
International Human Rights Law?’ (2013) 2 Cambridge Journal of International and Comparative Law 
935, p. 948. 
108  Rosa Freedman, ‘Third Generation Rights: Is There Room for Hybrid Constructs within 
International Human Rights Law?’ (2013) 2 Cambridge Journal of International and Comparative Law 
935, p. 952. 
109  Rosa Freedman, ‘Third Generation Rights: Is There Room for Hybrid Constructs within 
International Human Rights Law?’ (2013) 2 Cambridge Journal of International and Comparative Law 
935, p. 953. 
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Wiratraman and Syafaat mapped the common ground in human rights among 
the ASEAN Member States. Their observations are complemented with the findings 
in the previous Subsections and of a research report of the American Bar 
Association110 and are included in the table in Annex 2. 
In line with the research of Wiratraman and Syafaat, it can be concluded that 
that certain human rights that are generally protected at the international level are 
absent 111 or missing in a number of constitutions. Specifically, the rights of LGBTIs 
and the right and protection of migrant workers and their families appear to be 
missing, while from Table 2 also follows that not all States include the norms which 
are accepted as ius cogens norms. Furthermore, the right to a nationality, to asylum 
and the right to rest and leisure are examples of rights that are included by only a 
limited number of ASEAN Member States. 
The Member States that have Islam as their national religion interpret the 
freedom of religion in a narrow sense. The case of Malaysian national Lina Joy is in 
this respect illustrative. Although the verdict of the Federal Court dates from 2007, 
it illustrates the position of an ASEAN Member State towards the freedom of 
religion. It also makes clear how the influence of national law can lower the 
universal standard on the freedom of religion. In this case, Lina Joy, a Malay 
woman, converted from Islam to Christianity. She wanted to have this conversion 
legally recognised by the authorities in order to be able to marry her Christian 
fiancé. This change had to be performed in accordance with Sharia law, but 
apostasy is not allowed in Islam. Therefore, she went directly to Malaysia’s High 
Court and Federal Court, but her claim was rejected as she had to renounce her 
religion according to the existing laws and practices of that religion. The Federal 
Court decided that one’s religion can only be renounced according to the laws or 
practices of the particular religion and that “a person cannot, at one’s whims and 
fancies renounce or embrace a religion”. 112  In other words, for the rights to 
                                                          
110 R. Herlambang Perdana Wiratraman and Ali Syafaat, Constitutionalism and the Declaration of 
ASEAN Human Rights (Human Rights Working Group, Jakarta 2011) and American Bar Association, 
The ASEAN Human Rights Declaration: A Legal Analysis (American Bar Association Rule of Law 
Initiative 2014). 
111 R. Herlambang Perdana Wiratraman and Ali Syafaat, Constitutionalism and the Declaration of 
ASEAN Human Rights (Human Rights Working Group, Jakarta 2011), p. 45. 
112 Chief Justice Tun Ahmad Fairuz Sheikh Abdul Halim, quoted in ––, ‘Lina Joy loses Appeal to drop 
‘Islam’ from her NRIC’ The Sun Daily (Putrajaya, 31 May 2007) 
<http://www.thesundaily.my/node/170212> last accessed 11 September 2018. Justice Datuk Alauddin 
Mohd Sheriff dismissed the appeal of Lina Joy and Justice Datuk Richard Malanjum dissented; see 
‘Lina Joy Case: Dissenting Judgment of Justice Richard Malanjum’, posted on the website of the 
Malaysian Bar, 30 May 2007, <http://www.malaysianbar.org.my/selected_judgements/lina_joy_case_ 
dissenting_judgment_of_justice_richard_malanjum.html> last accessed 11 September 2018. Under 
Malaysian law apostasy is considered a crime. Muslims who want to renounce their religion risk jail 
sentences and fines. In addition, because Lina Joy’ religion was not legally recognised, she could not 
marry her Christian partner. The case received critique came from numerous NGOs and international 
media coverage. See for example Forum Asia, ‘Malaysia, No Joy for Lina’ Forum Asia (12 June 2007), 
<https://www.forum-asia.org/?p=5556> last accessed 11 September 2018. On Islam and the change of 
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materialise, secular law has to be complemented by the religious laws and practices 
as well. Neo, however, has rightly pointed out that the freedom to have or to adopt a 
religion “necessarily entails the freedom to choose a religion or belief, including the 
right to replace one’s current religion or belief with another or to adopt atheistic 
views, as well as the right to retain one’s religion or belief”.113  
Recently, Malaysia was again criticised for its interpretation of Islam that 
affected human rights, in this case the rights of two lesbian women. In August 2018, 
two women were charged under Islamic Sharia law and convicted for attempting to 
have lesbian sex. Their sentence was six strokes of caning and a fine after they 
pleaded guilty. It is said that this sentence comes amid growing intolerance to the 
LGBTI community in Malaysia 114  and was amongst others condemned by 
SUHAKAM.115 
Wiratraman and Syafaat also observed that the rights covering women 
(including pregnant women), rights of the poor, the prohibition of forced labour and 
slavery and the protection of the elderly are brought forward as rights “typical of 
ASEAN States”, although the nuance should be made that the prohibition of slavery 
and forced labour are norms of ius cogens. In addition, the other vulnerable groups 
are also protected through international law. 
Comparing the wording in the preamble of the constitutions of each Member 
State, Wiratraman and Syafaat have identified the following common human rights 
values namely, (i) peace, (ii) freedom as the right of all Nations, (iii) freedom, 
social justice and citizen’s rights, (iv) equality and non-discrimination, and (v) 
democracy. These common values are all included in the ASEAN Charter and the 
AHRD, which are analysed in the next chapters. They also categorised the 
constitutions of the ASEAN Member States into three categories: (i) constitutions 
that provide extensive human rights guarantees, (ii) constitutions that give human 
rights guarantees but with numerous restrictions and (iii) constitutions that give 
limited human rights guarantees. In line with this, the authors come to the 
classification: 
 
i) Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, the Philippines and Thailand; 
ii) Malaysia, Myanmar, Vietnam and Singapore; 
iii) Brunei Darussalam. 
                                                                                                                                              
one’s religion, see for instance Abdullahi An-Na’im, 'Human Rights in the Arab World: A Regional 
Perspective' (2001) 23 Human Rights Quarterly 701. 
113 Jaclyn L. Neo, ‘Religious Freedom and the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration: Prospects and 
Challenges’ (2016) 14 (4) The Review of Faith & International Affairs 1, p. 3 and UN Human Rights 
Committee, General Comment 22 on ‘The Right to Freedom of Thought, Conscience and Religion 
(Article 18)’ of 30 July 1993, UN Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.4 The author also addresses difficulties 
of the freedom of religion in other ASEAN Member States in this article. 
114 Thomson Reuters Foundation, ‘Malaysian women to be caned for ‘attempting lesbian sex’ Bangkok 
Post (14 August 2018) <https://www.bangkokpost.com/news/asean/1521538/malaysian-women-to-be-
caned-for-attempting-lesbian-sex> last accessed 25 August 2018. 
115 SUHAKAM, ‘Press Statement No. 32 of 2018’ (15 August 2018). <http://www.suhakam.org.my/ 
press-statement-no-32-of-2018-caning-for-attempted-lesbian-relations/> last accessed 25 August 2018. 
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This categorisation differs slightly in terms of the State’s position on human rights 
as generally perceived at ASEAN level, as Indonesia and the Philippines are 
considered to be forerunners, with Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand forming the 
middle ground. Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Vietnam, and Brunei Darussalam are 
considered to be the conservative States.116 
Another distinction is the subject of these rights. Specifically, a number of the 
constitutions limit the subjects of the rights for their citizens only, i.e. Cambodia, 
Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam. Other constitutions provide restrictions on certain 
human rights, that is to say, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, 
Thailand. Brunei Darussalam is the Member State that is missing in the list, but this 
State only included one human right in its Constitution.  
Consequently, the constitutions provide in various regards, a lower level of 
protection than the international framework. The notion that every person is a 
bearer of human rights as accepted at the international level does not seem to hold 
true in the ASEAN Member States. This does not correspond to the UDHR and the 
UN instruments, of which a number are signed and ratified or acceded to by 
ASEAN Member States. This discrepancy poses a challenge to the ASEAN Human 
Rights Declaration, which forms a bridge between the national and universal legal 
framework. The following chapter deals with the issue whether the ASEAN Human 
Rights Declaration lives up to internationally recognised human rights standards, 
thereby upholding the universal level of the United Nations by connecting human 
rights with human dignity, or whether it provides a lower level of human rights 
standards. 
Finally, also salient is that some ASEAN Member States included the principle 
of non-interference in their Constitutions, which is also part of the ASEAN Way 
since the beginning of the organisation’s existence (see Section 3.2 of Chapter IV).  
4 NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS INSTITUTIONS IN THE ASEAN REGION 
4.1 Introduction 
 
In the previous sections, the status of core UN human rights conventions and 
fundamental rights as enshrined in the Member States’ constitutions were analysed. 
This analysis unveiled the positions of ASEAN Member States towards human 
rights.  
With respect to the procedural aspects of ASEAN’s human rights system, it is 
relevant to examine the mandate of the existing human rights mechanisms in the 
ASEAN region, as they could complement ASEAN’s human rights mechanisms. 
                                                          
116 Mathew Davies, ‘An Agreement to Disagree: The ASEAN Human Rights Declaration and the 
Absence of Regional Identity in Southeast Asia’ (2014) 33 (3) Journal of Current Southeast Asian 
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Specifically, because the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human 
Rights focuses mainly on the promotion of human rights at the expense of a 
protection mandate, the National Human Rights Institutions could possibly narrow 
this lacuna. The ASEAN Human Rights Declaration seems to allow a role of the 
National Human Rights Institutions, as Article 39 states: 
 
ASEAN Member States share a common interest in and commitment to the 
promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms which shall be 
achieved through, inter alia, cooperation with one another as well as with relevant 
national, regional, and international institutions/organisations, in accordance with the 
ASEAN Charter. 
 
The National Human Rights Institutions (NHRIs) of three ASEAN Member 
States are accredited with the A-status, meaning that they are in full compliance 
with the Paris Principles.117 These principles list a number of responsibilities for 
NHRIs that are categorised under the following headings: competence and 
responsibilities, composition and guarantees of independence and pluralism, 
methods of operation, and additional principles concerning the status of 
commissions with quasi-jurisdictional competence.118 The three Institutions which 
are accredited with the A-status are Indonesia’s Komisi Nasional Hak Asasi 
Manusia (Komnas HAM), Suruhanjaya Hak Asasi Manusia Malaysia 
(SUHAKAM) and the Commission on Human Rights of the Philippines (CHR).  
The National Human Rights Commission of Thailand (NHRCT) was 
downgraded to a B-status in October 2014 and was given one year to once again 
comply with the Paris Principles. The Thai Institution was given a B-status in 
November 2015. The Myanmar Human Rights Commission (MHRC) was 
established one month after Tomas Ojea Quintana (UN Special Rapporteur for 
Human Rights in Burma) called for a national human rights body,119 and is also 
accredited with a B-status. The NHRI of Thailand and Myanmar are, therefore, 
omitted from this study. East Timor, which has ambitions to become an ASEAN 
                                                          
117 Global Alliance of National Human Rights Institutions, ‘Chart of the Status of National Institutions 
Accredited by the Global Alliance of National Human Rights Institutions’, accreditation status as of 25 
May 2017, <http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/NHRI/Chart_Status_NIs.pdf> last accessed 
11 September 2018. 
118 UN General Assembly Resolution 48/134 (Principles relating to the Status of National Institutions 
(The Paris Principles)), UN Doc. A/Res/48/134, 20 December 1993. 
119 Established on 5 September 2011, but has been heavily criticised as an empty gesture, being mainly 
a window dressing initiative. Significant challenges are amongst others faced in terms of compliance 
with the Paris Principles, especially the Commission’s independence, and the Commission’s avoidance 
to investigate complaints in ‘conflict areas’ ; see for example ––, 'Burma sets up Human Rights 
Commission', BBC News (6 September 2011) <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-
14807362> last accessed 11 September 2018, Patrick Winn, 'A Human Rights Commission's Shaky 
Rise in Burma/Myanmar' Public Radio International (9 March 2012) <http://www.globalpost.com/ 
globalpost-blogs/southeast-asia/win-mra-myanmar-human-rights> last accessed 11 September 2018 and 
Charlie Cambell, 'Empowering the Myanmar Human Rights Commission' The Irrawaddy (9 May 2012) 
<http://www.irrawaddy.org/archives/3860> last accessed 11 September 2018. 
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Member State120 established an Ombudsman for Human Rights and Justice, also 
known as Provedoria for Human Rights and Justice and is also in line with the Paris 
Principles. Nevertheless, this Commission also falls outside the scope of the 
research, as the focus lies on ASEAN and its current Member States. 
For the purpose of the procedural aspect of this research on ASEAN’s human 
rights system and its Member States, this section investigates the formal mandates 
of the three accredited ASEAN National Human Rights Institutions.  
It falls outside the scope of the research to measure the actual performance and 
challenges of each National Human Rights Institution, as this is a research topic in 
and of itself, 121  although some preliminary remarks have been made after the 
discussion of the mandate of the NHRIs of Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines. 
Illustrative in this respect was also the cut to the Commission’s budget in the 
Philippines, allocating it a budget of 1,000 Philippine Pesos (around 20 Euros) for 
the year 2018 during Duterte’s ongoing war on drugs, 122  which the Philippine 
Congress later restored.123  
4.2 Indonesia 
 
Komisi Nasional Hak Asasi Manusia (Komnas HAM) was established by 
Presidential Decree No. 50/1993 on the National Commission on Human Rights 
during the Suharto regime on 7 June 1993.124 According to Article 3 of this Decree, 
Komnas HAM is an independent body. Law No. 39/1999 concerning Human Rights 
                                                          
120 East Timor joins the ASEAN Regional Forum since 2005, acceded to the Treaty on Amity and 
Cooperation in 2007 and formally applied for ASEAN Membership in 2011, which led to the start of a 
feasibility study in the same year and hosted the ASEAN’s People Forum in 2016. ASEAN Chairman 
Rodrigo Duterte stated at the 30th ASEAN Summit (Manila, Philippines, 29 April 2017) that East 
Timor’s application was still under study; Claire Carter, ‘East Timor’s Accession to ASEAN’ ASEAN 
Today (31 August 2017) <https://www.aseantoday.com/2017/08/east-timors-accession-to-asean/> last 
accessed 11 September 2018.  
121 See for example the extensive work of Ken Setiawan on Komnas HAM and SUHAKAM: Ken 
Setiawan, Promoting Human Rights: National Human Rights Commissions in Indonesia and Malaysia, 
(Leiden University Press, Leiden 2013), Ken Setiawan, ‘From Hope to Disillusion The Paradox of 
Komnas HAM, the Indonesian National Human Rights Commission’ (2016) 172 (1) Bijdragen tot de 
Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde 1 and Vitit Muntarbhorn, Unity in Connectivity? Evolving Human Rights 
Mechanisms in the ASEAN Region (Nijhoff Law Specials, Brill, Leiden 2013), chapter 2. 
122  See for example Red Thaddeus D. Miguel, ‘What Price is the Philippines Human Rights 
Commission Budget Reprieve?’ Health and Human Rights Journal (1 October 2017) <https://www. 
hhrjournal.org/2017/10/what-price-is-the-philippines-human-rights-commission-budget-reprieve/> last 
accessed 11 September 2018, and Barney Porter, ‘Philippines: Commission on Human Rights Budget 
cut to Almost Nothing amid Duterte’s Drug Crackdown’ ABC (13 September 2017) 
<http://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-09-13/duterte-slashes-commission-on-human-rights-annual-budget-
to-$25/8941088> last accessed 11 September 2018. 
123 Manuel Mogato, ‘Philippine Congress agrees to restore rights commission budget from $20’ Reuters 
(Manila, 20 September 2017) <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-philippines-duterte-rights/philippine 
-congress-agrees-to-restore-rights-commission-budget-from-20-idUSKCN1BV28J> last accessed 11 
September 2018. 
124 Indonesia: Presidential Decree No. 50 of 1993 on The National Commission on Human Rights, 7 
June 1993, <http://www.refworld.org/docid/474d2ae22.html> last accessed 18 August 2018. 
 
 
Human Rights Law in ASEAN Member States 
 102
is the current legal basis of the Commission. Chapter VII deals with the 
Commission.125 
In line with Article 4 of Decree No. 50/1993, the Commission’s aims to: 
 
a.  develop conditions conducive to the execution of human rights in accordance 
with Pancasila, the 1945 Constitution, the United Nations Charter, and the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights; and,  
b.  improve the protection and upholding of human rights in the interests of the 
personal development of Indonesian people as a whole and their ability to 
participate in several aspects of life.126 
 
In order to achieve these aims, the Commission is independent and mandated “to 
study, research, disseminate, monitor and mediate human rights issues” (Article 
76(1)). According to Article 89, Komnas HAM is mandated to: 
 
(1) To carry out the functions of the National Commission on Human Rights with 
realize aims as referred to in Article 76, the National Commission on Human Rights 
has the authority to: 
a. study and examine international human rights instruments with the aim of 
providing recommendations concerning their possible accession and ratification; 
b. study and examine legislation in order to provide recommendations concerning 
drawing up, amending and revoking of legislation concerning human rights;  
c. publish study and examination reports;  
d. carry out literature studies, field studies, and comparative studies with other 
countries;  
e. discuss issues related to protecting, upholding and promoting human rights; and,  
f. conduct cooperative research and examination into human rights with 
organizations, institutions or other parties, at regional, national and international 
levels.  
  
(2) To carry out its function as disseminator as referred to in Article 76, the National 
Commission on Human Rights is charged with and authorized to: 
a. disseminate information concerning human rights to the Indonesian public;  
b. take steps to raise public awareness about human rights through formal and non-
formal education institutes and other bodies;  
c. cooperate with organizations, institutions or other parties at national, regional and 
international level with to regard human rights; 
  
(3) To carry out its supervisory function as referred to in Article 76, the National 
Commission on Human Rights is charged with and authorized to:  
a. monitor the execution of human rights and compile reports of the output of this 
monitoring;  
b. investigate and examine incidents occurring in society which either by their nature 
or scope likely constitute violations of human rights;  
                                                          
125  Indonesia: Act No. 39 of 1999 on Human Rights, 23 September 1999 
<http://www.refworld.org/docid/4da2ce862.html> accessed 18 August 2018. 
126 Article 75 Act No. 39/1999. 
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c. call on complainants, victims and accused to request and hear their statements;  
d. call on witnesses to request and hear their witness statements, and in the case of 
prosecution witness to request submission of necessary evidence;  
e. survey incident locations and other locations as deemed necessary;  
f. call on related parties to give written statements or to submit necessary 
authenticated documents as required upon approval of the Head of Court;  
g. examine houses, yards, buildings, and other places that certain parties reside in or 
own, upon approval of the Head of Court;  
h. on approval of the Head of Court, provide input into particular cases currently 
undergoing judicial process if the case involves violation of human rights of public 
issue and court investigation, and the input of the National Commission on Human 
Rights shall be made known to the parties by the judge; 
 
(4) To carry out its function as mediator as referred to in Article 76, the National 
Commission on Human Rights is charged with and authorized to:  
a. arbitrate between the two parties;  
b. resolve cases through consultation, negotiation, mediation, conciliation and expert 
evaluation;  
c. give recommendations to the parties for resolving conflict through the courts;  
d. submit recommendations concerning cases of human rights violations to the 
Government in order that their resolution may be followed up on;  
e. submit recommendations concerning cases of human rights violations to the House 
of Representatives of the Republic of Indonesia for their follow up.127 
 
In addition, an individual complaint procedure is possible under Article 90: 
 
(1) All people and groups of people who have strong grounds that their human rights 
have been violated may submit an oral or written complaint to the National 
Commission on Human Rights. 
(2) Complaints will be dealt with only if the true identity of the complainant is made 
known, and if adequate and clear evidence/statement of the subject matter of the 
complaint is provided. 
(3) In the case in which a complaint is made by a third party, the complaint must 
have the approval of the party whose rights have been violated as victim, with the 
exception of certain human rights violations as based on the consideration of the 
National Commission on Human Rights.  
(4) Violation of human rights as referred to in clause (3) also covers complaints made 
by proxy concerning violation of human rights experienced by the public. 
 
The Act also allows for public participation in Chapter VIII. Articles 101-103 
determine that “all people, groups, political organizations, community 
organizations, and self-reliant organizations and other non-government 
organizations” have the right to submit reports of human rights violations (Article 
101), and to submit proposals on human rights policy (Article 102). Furthermore, 
                                                          
127 Article 89, Act No. 39/1999. 
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these actors together with educational organisations have the right to study, educate 
and disseminate information on human rights (Article 103). 
Finally, the Act also refers to the establishment of a human rights tribunal 
(Article 104), which was established with Act No. 26 Year 2000 concerning Human 
Rights Court (Act No. 26/2000).128 This Court deals with gross violations of human 
rights, i.e. the crime of genocide and crimes against humanity (Chapter 3 of this 
Act). Komnas HAM performs the inquiries (Articles 18-20). 
Law. No. 40/2008 on the Elimination of Racial and Ethnic Discrimination 
provided Komnas HAM extra responsibilities in the prevention of racial and ethnic 
discrimination. 
In comparison with the AICHR, Komnas HAM’s protection mandate is the most 
striking difference, specifically its function as supervisor and mediator and the 
possibility to act upon individual complaints.129 Komnas HAM could serve as an 
example of how to promote and protect human rights in the region. From Komnas 
HAM’s side, cooperation between the two bodies is also possible as it is explicitly 
mentioned that Komnas HAM can cooperate with other institutions, including at the 
regional level.  
4.3 Malaysia 
 
Suruhanjaya Hak Asasi Manusia Malaysia (SUHAKAM) is based on the Human 
Rights Commission of Malaysia Act 1999 (Act No. 597).130 The Commission’s 
inauguration took place on 24 April 2000. SUHAKAM deals with issues 
concerning human rights as included in Part II of the Federal Constitution 
(discussed above). The UDHR is acknowledged as long as it is not inconsistent with 
the Federal Constitution (Article 4 (4)). According to SUHAKAM, this means that 
the UDHR must be considered in the event a right is not mentioned in Part II of the 
Constitution, on the condition that there is no conflict with the Constitution.131 
According to Article 4 (1) of the Act, SUHAKAM’s functions are awareness 
raising and education, providing advice and assistance to the government on 
legislation and procedures as well as accession to international instruments, and 
inquire on its own initiative or on complaints (see also Article 12).  
                                                          
128  Act No. 26 of 2000 concerning Human Rights Court (Act No.26/2000), 23 November 2000 
<https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl-nat.nsf/xsp/.ibmmodres/domino/OpenAttachment/applic/ 
ihl/ihl-nat.nsf/B30917E8E5443532C1257D90004DC6C5/TEXT/Indonesia%20-%20Act%20on%20the 
%20Human%20Rights%20Courts,%202000%20%5BEng%5D.pdf.>. last accessed 11 September 2018. 
129 See for more information on Komnas HAM (in Indonesian) <http://www.komnasham.go.id> last 
accessed 11 September 2018. 
130 Available at SUHAKAM’s website SUHAKAM, 'The Official Portal of Human Rights Commission 
of Malaysia' <http://www.suhakam.org.my/home> last accessed 11 September 2018. SUHAKAM 
underwent revisions in 2009 with Human Rights Commission of Malaysia (Amendment) Act 2009 (Act 
A1353), 2009 and Human Rights Commission of Malaysia (Amendment) (Amendment) Act 2009 (Act 
A1357), 2009, also available on SUHAKAM’s website. 
131  SUHAKAM, ‘Functions & Power’ <http://www.suhakam.org.my/about-suhakam/fungsi-kuasa/> 
last accessed 11 September 2018. 
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Article 4 (2) further expounds on the mandate: 
 
(a) to promote awareness of human rights and to undertake research by conducting 
programmes, seminars and workshops and to disseminate and distribute the 
results of such research;  
(b) to advise the Government and/or the relevant authorities of complaints against 
such authorities and recommend to the Government and/or such authorities 
appropriate measures to be taken; 
(c) to study and verify any infringement of human rights in accordance with the 
provisions of this Act; 
(d) to visit places of detention in accordance with procedures as prescribed by the 
laws relating to the places of detention and to make necessary recommendations; 
(e) to issue public statement on human rights as and when necessary; and  
(f) to undertake any other appropriate activities as are necessary in accordance with 
the written laws in force, if any, in relation to such activities.132 
 
In the event of an infringement, the Commission can issue recommendations and 
refer the issue to the relevant authority or person (Article 13 (2)).  
 Regarding the powers of inquiry, Article 12 stipulates that SUHAKAM can act 
upon its own initiative or complaint of (a representative of) a person or groups of 
persons: 
 
The Commission shall, for the purposes of an inquiry under this Act, have the power: 
(a) to procure and receive all such evidence, written or oral, and to examine all such 
persons as witnesses, as the Commission thinks necessary or desirable to 
procure or examine;  
(b) to require that the evidence, whether written or oral, of any witness be given on 
oath or affirmation, such oath or affirmation being that which could be required 
of the witness if he were giving evidence in a court of law, and to administer or 
cause to be administered by an officer authorized in that behalf by the 
Commission an oath or affirmation to every such witness;  
(c) to summon any person residing in Malaysia to attend any meeting of the 
Commission to give evidence or produce any document or other thing in his 
possession, and to examine him as a witness or require him to produce any 
document or other thing in his possession;  
(d) to admit notwithstanding any of the provisions of the Evidence Act 1950 [Act 
56], any evidence, whether written or oral, which may be inadmissible in civil or 
criminal proceedings; and  
(e) to admit or exclude the public from such inquiry or any part thereof.133 
 
Finally, SUHAKAM adopted a Charter, in which its core values are stated. 
These values are respect, independence, integrity, engagements, efficiency, 
                                                          
132 Article 4 (2) Human Rights Commission of Malaysia Act 1999 (Act No. 597). 
133 Article 14 (1) Human Rights Commission of Malaysia Act 1999 (Act No. 597). 
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openness, and capacity development.134 This translates, for example, into posting 
the reports of the public inquiry on SUHAKAM’s website. Alongside the powers of 
inquiry, which can form an example to the AICHR, the values of independence, 
engagement and openness are especially advisable to the AICHR. In this way, its 
legitimacy could be increased.  
4.4 The Philippines 
 
The creation of the Commission on Human Rights of the Philippines (CHR) is 
enshrined in the  Constitution (Article XIII, Sections 17-19)135 and established by 
Executive Order No. 163,136 making it the only NHRI in ASEAN that predates the 
1993 World Conference. Reiterating the Constitution, the mandate of the 
Commission is as follows: 
 
(1) Investigate, on its own or on complaint by any party, all forms of human rights 
violations involving civil and political rights; 
(2) Adopt its operational guidelines and rules of procedure, and cite for contempt 
for violations thereof in accordance with the Rules of Court. 
(3) Provide appropriate legal measures for the protection of human rights of all 
persons within the Philippines, as well as Filipinos residing abroad, and provide 
for preventive measures and legal aid services to the under-privileged whose 
human rights have been violated or need protection; 
(4) Exercise visitorial powers over jails, prisons, or detentions facilities;  
(5) Establish a continuing program of research, education, and information to 
enhance respect for the privacy of human rights;  
(6) Recommend to the Congress effective measures to promote human rights and 
to provide for compensation to victims of violations of human rights, or their 
families;  
(7) Monitor the Philippine Government's compliance with international treaty 
obligations on human rights; 
(8) Grant immunity from prosecution to any person whose testimony or whose 
possession of documents or other evidence is necessary or convenient to 
determine the truth in any investigation conducted by it or under its authority;  
(9) Request the assistance of any department, bureau, office, or agency in the 
performance of its functions;  
(10) Appoint its officers and employees in accordance with law; and  
(11) Perform such other duties and functions as may be provided by law.137 
                                                          
134 SUHAKAM, Charter Human Rights Commission of Malaysia (SUHAKAM) <http://www.suhakam. 
org.my/about-suhakam/piagam-suhakam/> last accessed 11 September 2018. 
135  The Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines 2 February 1987, Official Gazette 
<http://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/constitutions/1987-constitution/> last accessed 11 September 2018. 
136 Executive Order No. 163 - Declaring the Effectivity of the Creation of the Commission on Human 
Rights as provided for in the 1987 Constitution, providing Guidelines for the Operation thereof and for 
other Proposes, 1987, <http://hrlibrary.umn.edu/research/Philippines/Exec.%20Order%20165%20-
%20Order%20Creating%20the%20CHR.pdf> last accessed 11 September 2018. 
137 Section 18, Constitution and Section 3, Executive Order No. 163. 
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Finally, Section 19 stipulates that “[t]he Congress may provide for other cases of 
violations of human rights that should fall within the authority of the Commission, 
taking into account its recommendations.” 
In a similar manner to the commissions researched above, investigative powers 
are also included in the mandate of the CHR. The Philippine commission takes the 
international level of human rights protection as its reference point, as it monitors 
its Government’s compliance to international treaty obligations on human rights. 
This is also advisable to ASEAN. Given the ratification of human rights treaties by 
all ASEAN Member States, common ground for human rights is able to be 
identified. As mapped above, this is also true for the common ground in 
fundamental rights as included in each Constitution. In this way, the human rights 
can form the focus of the AICHR.  
 
4.5 The protection mandate of the NHRIs 
 
On the basis of the above analysis, it follows that the institutions are impartial and 
mandated to both promote and protect human rights. Muntarbhorn furthermore 
argued that it is key that these NHRIs can “receive complaints, investigate and 
make recommendations with a view to remedies. A new trend is to enable them to 
have quasi-judicial powers and to cross-refer cases to the court for binding 
decisions. Meanwhile, the ASEAN regional bodies are without such powers”.138  
Consequently, the three NHRIs might narrow the lacuna with respect to the 
protection mandate of the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human 
Rights, as nationals from Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines can go their 
respective National Human Rights Institution. James Gomez and Robin Ramcharan 
researched this possibility. They distinguished the following elements as critical for 
human rights protection: 
 
1) The capacity of NHRI’s to investigate allegations of violations, to conduct 
credible hearings on the same and to publicize these for public consumption; and 2) 
To secure remedies for victims of violations.139 
 
According to the authors, the NHRIs in the ASEAN region (i.e. including the 
commission of Myanmar and Thailand): 
 
1) NHRIs are dependent on the political climate in each state; 2) Their quasi-judicial 
investigative processes are lacking in the follow-through that is necessary for the 
advancement of justice, not only for the parties in individual cases but more 
generally for the advancement of human rights consistent with international human 
                                                          
138  Vitit Muntarbhorn, Unity in Connectivity? Evolving Human Rights Mechanisms in the ASEAN 
Region (Nijhoff Law Specials, Brill, Leiden 2013), p. 173. 
139  James Gomez and Robin Ramcharan, ‘The “Protection” Capacity of National Human Rights 
Institutions in Southeast Asia’ (2016) 172 SEARC Working Paper Series, p. 4. 
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rights standards; and 3) They do not seem to be capable of securing remedies or 
advancing this cause for victims of violations of rights.140 
 
With respect to the follow-through, they argued that the NHRIs are unable, and 
maybe also unwilling, and that “their contribution to providing redress and 




This chapter shows that human rights are endorsed in different ways in the ASEAN 
region. These endorsements provide an indication for the common ground among 
the ASEAN Member States as well as the lack thereof, both in terms of content as 
well as procedural aspects. 
With respect to the UN human rights conventions to which the ASEAN Member 
States are party, the following observations can be made. 
First of all, except for CEDAW, CRC and CRPD and some of the Optional 
Protocols, the number of ASEAN Member States that has acceded to or ratified the 
Conventions remains limited. When looking at the overall picture, one can conclude 
that Cambodia, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand are at the forefront when it 
comes to becoming party to UN human rights conventions. They are party to at 
least ten of the instruments discussed. Laos and Vietnam form the middle ground 
each being party to nine instruments, and Brunei Darussalam, Malaysia, Myanmar, 
and Singapore with the least number of ratified instruments (namely 5 instruments). 
Consequently, with respect to the level of ‘concepts’, it could be concluded that not 
all human rights standards are recognised by the ASEAN Member States. This, in 
turn, detracts from the universality of human rights at this level. 
 Furthermore, the ratification of and accession to CEDAW, CRC and CRPD 
corresponds to the acceptance of these human rights topics at ASEAN level, as 
Chapter V of this study will illustrate. However, although CEDAW and CRC have 
been accepted by all States, they are subject to a large number of reservations and 
declarations.  
When comparing the reservations and declarations made by the ASEAN 
Member States to the core human rights conventions, it is noticeable that a number 
of the provisions are subjected to national constitutions, legislation, regulations and 
local customs, values and religions. The principles of sovereignty and territorial 
integrity of States are also stressed. 
In a number of declarations and reservations, ASEAN Member States have 
stressed relativistic ideas on certain aspects of the conventions, although some 
reservations were withdrawn. As such reservations reflect a relativistic background, 
                                                          
140  James Gomez and Robin Ramcharan, ‘The “Protection” Capacity of National Human Rights 
Institutions in Southeast Asia’ (2016) 172 SEARC Working Paper Series, p. 4. 
141  James Gomez and Robin Ramcharan, ‘The “Protection” Capacity of National Human Rights 
Institutions in Southeast Asia’ (2016) 172 SEARC Working Paper Series, p. 19. 
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withdrawing them could indicate a move towards the acceptance of the universality 
of human rights. Due to their often-general nature, these declarations and 
reservations do not clarify what is meant by ‘national particularities’. Consequently, 
they only provide a limited insight into the national particularities, as it becomes 
clear that certain human rights are subjected to national law. The content of the 
relativistic attitudes, in the past partly stressed as Asian values by some ASEAN 
Member States, is not clearly visible. The ASEAN Member States are not party to a 
number of core UN human rights conventions, which unveils a certain reluctance to 
adhere to international human rights standards. In addition, while literature suggests 
that Asian States (including Southeast Asian states) tend to focus on economic, 
social and cultural rights rather than civil and political rights, this is not backed up 
by the number of ratifications of the ICCPR and the ICESCR. 
Moreover, it is argued that these generally formulated declarations and 
reservations are not permitted according to Article 19(c) Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties because they are incompatible with the object and purpose of the 
convention. In addition, it is argued that these declarations and reservations breach 
Article 27 Vienna Convention, in which it is stated that a State Party cannot invoke 
provisions of national law as a justification for its failure to comply with its 
obligations under a treaty. These notions are part of customary international law and 
are general principles of international law. Consequently, by formulating such 
declarations and reservations, Brunei Darussalam, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, 
Singapore and Thailand are lowering the standards that have been set by the 
international human rights conventions and thus contradicting the universality of 
human rights at the level of ‘conceptions’. 
Regarding the procedural aspects, it is striking that a significant number of the 
ASEAN Member States do not consider themselves to be bound by provisions on 
the automatic arbitration and dispute settlement by the ICJ. In addition, the 
competence of the committees formulated in the various human rights instruments 
is in general not recognised. The optional protocols on the competence of the 
committees to receive and consider communications from individuals are in general 
also not endorsed. This overall tendency seems to correspond with the ASEAN 
Way (see the following chapter), and the principle of non-interference in particular 
and negatively affects the universality of human rights at the level of 
‘implementation’. 
At the level of fundamental rights in each ASEAN Member State, the following 
observations can be made. 
Firstly, diverging viewpoints on non-derogable rights are noticeable. For 
instance, Indonesia includes a list of non-derogable rights, whereas Myanmar omits 
human rights that are considered as ius cogens norms in its constitution, or 
formulates restrictions to these rights (for instance, on the prohibition of forced 
labour). Duties, alongside fundamental rights, and specific vulnerable groups are 
also included. On the other hand, a number of rights are missing at this level. The 
rights of LGBTIs and the right and protection of migrant workers and their families 
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appear to be missing. Furthermore, the right to a nationality, to asylum and the right 
to rest and leisure are examples of rights that are included by only a limited number 
of ASEAN Member States. Overall, one can conclude that all ASEAN Member 
States share words and concepts, such as peace, freedom, the rights of all nations, 
social justice and citizen’s rights, equality and non-discrimination, and democracy. 
Salient is that the subject of human rights is restricted in many constitutions. The 
notion that human rights are intrinsic to being human does not seem to apply. 
Referring to duties is another form of restricting human rights; one has duties 
within one’s family, towards the society and the State. In practice, rights imply 
responsibilities as they can conflict with the rights of others. Nevertheless, the list 
of duties included in the constitutions is generally longer and sometimes alien to 
Western, or at least European, States. 
Despite critique on the NHRIs mandate that exist in the ASEAN region, the 
NHRIs of Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines are in line with the Paris 
Principles, which makes that these NHRIs contribute to the universality of human 
rights at the level of ‘implementation’. Their mandate is overall broader than the 
mandate of the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights 
(discussed in Chapter V). For example, the inquiry role is present in all four NHRIs, 
which can act upon their own initiative or a complaint. Other elements which are 
visible in the NHRIs and that could benefit the AICHR’s accountability and 
legitimacy are independence, engagement, openness and reference to the 











UNDERSTANDING ASEAN AS CARRIER OF A 






The Southeast Asian region experienced different initiatives for regional 
cooperation after the end of the Second World War. In the aftermath of the region’s 
colonial times, Southeast Asia was subject to foreign influences. Furthermore, 
supporters and opponents of the United States of America and of Southeast Asian 
regionalism were divided. Yet, initiatives for regional cooperation, albeit 
encompassing a broader geographical scope and in one case taken under the 
auspices of the UN (in the form of UNECAFE),1 were taken in different forms.  
The Colombo Plan for Economic Cooperative and Social Development in Asia 
and the Pacific, which resulted from the Commonwealth Conference of Foreign 
Affairs (Colombo, January 1950), was established on 1 July 1951 and formed one 
of the early initiatives. The Southeast Treaty Organization (SEATO), which aimed 
at collective defence and blocking communism in Southeast Asia, was established 
on 19 February 1955, but dissolved on 30 June 1977.  
Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand and later also Indonesia became important 
actors in the region’s regionalism. The Association of Southeast Asia (ASA), which 
was founded in 1961, but ceased to exist just after the establishment of ASEAN, for 
instance consisted of Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand. MAPHILINDO, 
which brought together Malaysia, the Philippines and Indonesia, was replaced by 
ASEAN. At that time, the Cold War affected the region, and the region was divided 
in pro- and anti-communist States. A number of like-minded (non-communist) 
States established ASEAN. Their main commonalities could be described as fear 
for communist control and their ambition to form a block against communism, the 
prospect of economic aid from the United States, the United Kingdom and Japan, 
and their ambition to regenerate regional cooperation by replacing ASA and 
                                                          
1 United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (UNECAFE) was established by the 
UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) in 1947 and was the predecessor of UN Economic and 
Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP).  
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MAPHILINDO with ASEAN. 2  The inclusion of Indonesia as one of the 
organisation’s founding Member States contrasts the country’s former lack of 
interest in regional cooperation and the policy of Konfrontasi against the British and 
the then proposed Federation of Malaysia (1963-1965).3 
In the years after its establishment, ASEAN expanded in terms of geographical 
scope, institutions and areas of cooperation. Nowadays, ASEAN geographically 
reflects almost the entire Southeast Asian region. Given the criteria for membership 
enumerated in Article 6 of the ASEAN Charter, 4  States that are eligible for 
membership are limited. Papua New Guinea has had an observer status since 1976.5 
East Timor has had an observer status within ASEAN since 2002 and is in the 
process of becoming a Member State of the organisation, although this process has 
been cumbersome.6 
ASEAN is the most suitable candidate to develop a meaningful regional human 
rights system in the Southeast Asian region. Since the start of this research in 2008, 
a number of steps have been made in the field of human rights in a rather short 
period of time. These initiatives include the adoption of the ASEAN Human Rights 
Declaration that was preceded by the ratification of the ASEAN Charter and the 
establishment of the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights. 
Institutionally, the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights, 
ASEAN’s overarching human rights body, the ASEAN Commission for the 
Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Women and Children, and the ASEAN 
Committee on the Implementation of the ASEAN Declaration on the Protection and 
Promotion of the Rights of Migrant Workers have been established. They are 
important indicators for the region’s progress in developing its human rights 
system.  
Due to the region’s historical, political, economic, religious and cultural 
backgrounds and diversity among the Member States, challenges lie ahead in 
further developing a meaningful human rights system. Bearing the latest 
developments in mind, the ambition to develop an appropriate ASEAN human 
                                                          
2 Yoshiyuki Hagiwara, 'The Formation of ASEAN', in Sharon Siddique and Sree Kumar (eds), The 2nd 
ASEAN Reader (2nd edn, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore 2003), p. 19. 
3 Peter Lyon, 'Post-War Regional Cooperation' in Sharon Siddique and Sree Kumar (eds), The 2nd 
ASEAN Reader (Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore 2003), p. 19. 
4 Article 6(2) ASEAN Charter enumerates four criteria for membership: (a) location in the recognised 
geographical region of Southeast Asia; (b) recognition by all ASEAN member states; (c) agreement to 
be bound and to abide by the Charter; and (d) ability and willingness to carry out the obligations of 
membership. 
5 See for the challenges of Papua New Guinea, as well as Timor Leste, Luke Hunt, ‘Papua New Guinea, 
Timor-Leste Prepare for Strategic Elections’ The Diplomat (14 November 2016) 
<https://thediplomat.com/2016/11/papua-new-guinea-timor-leste-prepare-for-strategic-elections/> last 
accessed 12 September 2018. 
6 ASEAN Chairman Rodrigo Duterte stated at the 30th ASEAN Summit (Manila, Philippines, 29 April 
2017) that East Timor’s application was still under study; Claire Carter, ‘East Timor’s Accession to 
ASEAN’ ASEAN Today (31 August 2017) <https://www.aseantoday.com/2017/08/east-timors-
accession-to-asean/> last accessed 11 September 2018. 
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rights mechanism was in fact already expressed during the 26th ASEAN Ministerial 
Meeting (Singapore, 23-24 July 1993). As said in Chapter II, Foreign Ministers 
announced this public engagement after the 1993 Vienna Conference, which 
appears to be a motivation for the ASEAN Ministers’ statement to develop a 
regional human rights system.  
Reaffirming ASEAN’s commitment to human rights and the fundamental 
freedoms that were pronounced in the 1993 Vienna Declaration, the Foreign 
Ministers agreed that “ASEAN should coordinate a common approach on human 
rights and actively participate and contribute to the application, promotion and 
protection of human rights”.7 Therefore, they concurred that “ASEAN should also 
consider the establishment of an appropriate regional mechanism on human 
rights”.8  This ambition was amongst others shared in the 1993 ASEAN Inter-
Parliamentary Organisation (AIPO) Declaration on Human Rights,9 formulated by 
what is now called the ASEAN Inter-Parliamentary Assembly (AIPA). 
The initiatives on human rights brought about both expectations and critique. 
One of the key challenges that ASEAN faces is the realisation of its full potential to 
implement human rights aspirations and subsequently comply with and possibly 
enrich international human rights standards, while still respecting the dynamics of 
the region.  
Whereas the previous chapter focused on each individual ASEAN Member 
State, this chapter focuses on ASEAN and its history of integration. This will lead 
to a better understanding of ASEAN’s development of its human rights system, as 
well as its prospects and challenges. ASEAN’s history, structure and institutional 
development as well as its focal points are researched. This shows a gradual process 
of institutionalisation that has been and still is taking place. During this 
development and over the years, more areas of cooperation have been included. As 
mentioned before and further analysed hereinafter, steps have been taken in the area 
of human rights. This opens up possibilities for ASEAN to further intensify human 





                                                          
7 ASEAN Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Joint Communiqué of the 26th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, 
Singapore, 23-24 July 1993, para. 17, <http://asean.org/?static_post=joint-communique-of-the-twenty-
sixth-asean-ministerial-meeting-singapore-23-24-july-1993> last accessed 10 September 2018. 
8 ASEAN Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Joint Communiqué of the 26th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, 
Singapore, 23-24 July 1993, para. 18, <http://asean.org/?static_post=joint-communique-of-the-twenty-
sixth-asean-ministerial-meeting-singapore-23-24-july-1993> last accessed 10 September 2018. 
9  ASEAN Inter-parliamentary Organization (AIPO), 14th General Assembly, Kuala Lumpur 
Declaration on Human Rights, (September 1993), available at 
<http://www.hurights.or.jp/archives/other_documents/section1/2010/03/kuala-lumpur-declaration-
onhuman-rights1993.html> last accessed 12 September 2018. 
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2 REGIONALISM IN ASEAN 
 
2.1 From a loose framework towards an ASEAN Community 
 
The documents that ASEAN has adopted over the years show that while ASEAN 
was formerly characterised by a loose framework without real legally binding 
agreements, more areas of cooperation have been implemented and ASEAN 
institution building has increased over time.  
Specifically, while ASEAN was at the outset only based on the concise 1967 
Bangkok Declaration, it was complemented by a loose framework of expanding 
institutions established on ad hoc basis over the years in order to respond to the 
needs of the growing organisation. Numerous ministerial meetings, committees of 
senior officials and technical working groups were included.10 Today, ASEAN’s 
organs are the ASEAN Summit, the Committee of Permanent Representatives, the 
ASEAN Coordinating Council, the three Community Councils, the ASEAN 
Sectoral Ministerial Bodies, the Secretary-General and the Secretariat, the 
Committee of Permanent Representatives to ASEAN, the ASEAN National 
Secretariats, the ASEAN Human Rights Body, and the ASEAN Foundation 
(Chapter IV ASEAN Charter). Moreover, the organisation has evolved into an 
ASEAN Community whereby the ASEAN Charter is considered to be the 
organisation’s Constitution.  
This section briefly describes how interstate relations were shaped, because this 
is the framework in which human rights cooperation takes place; this will be 
analysed in the next chapter. 
Established in 1967 with the adoption of the Bangkok Declaration, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand started their cooperation. The 
goals of these States were to strengthen and promote meaningful regional 
cooperation with the aim of contributing to peace, progress and prosperity by means 
of equality and partnership. 11  The Member States considered the promotion of 
regional peace and stability to be key, while the document only mentioned “respect 
for justice and the rule of law” and “adherence to the principles of the United 
Nations Charter” in this regard. It is observed that by giving it a less prominent role, 
they avoided the perception of ASEAN as a military alliance, which could be 
considered to be supportive of one of the sides in the Cold War.12 
                                                          
10  Medardo Castillejos Abad Jr, 'The Association of Southeast Asian Nations. Challenges and 
Responses' in: Sharon Siddique and Sree Kumar (eds), The 2nd ASEAN Reader (Institute of Southeast 
Asian Studies, Singapore 2003), p. 34. 
11  ASEAN, Bangkok Declaration, Bangkok, 8 August 1967, preamble, <http://asean.org/the-asean-
declaration-bangkok-declaration-bangkok-8-august-1967/> last accessed 12 September 2018. 
12  Rodolfo C. Severino, ASEAN (Southeast Asia Background Series, Institute of Southeast Asian 
Studies, Singapore 2008), p. 11. Also in the post-Cold War era ASEAN emphasised that the 
organisation is not a military alliance or a defence pact; see for instance ASEAN, Declaration of 
ASEAN Concord II (Bali Concord II), Bali, 7 October 2003, para. 2 on the ASEAN Security 
Community, <http://asean.org/?static_post=declaration-of-asean-concord-ii-bali-concord-ii> last 
accessed 12 September 2008. 
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The Member States recognised that they would obtain a stronger position 
globally if they could cooperate in one organisation. On account of the region’s 
colonial history and past and recent disputes at that time (such as Konfrontasi, the 
territorial dispute over Sabah and the split of Malaysia, Singapore and Brunei 
Darussalam) and ideological differences, the founding Member States emphasised 
regional cooperation based on equality, partnership, good understanding, good 
neighbourliness and meaningful cooperation. The Bangkok Declaration underlined 
the importance of peace, progress, prosperity, freedom, justice, the rule of law, 
economic and social stability, stability and security free from external interference13 
and preservation of the Member States’ national identities. 14  These principles 
furthermore implied a peaceful settlement of disputes and a renunciation of the use 
of force, which later became explicit elements of the ASEAN Way (discussed 
hereinafter). While the Declaration is not legally binding, the Declaration gave the 
modus operandi to develop from voluntary and informal arrangements towards 
more binding and institutionalised agreements.  
As ASEAN consisted of newly independent States, the focus lay on building a 
sense of nationhood. 15  Political cooperation faced difficulties because of the 
region’s history of disputes, political instability and economic poverty.16 Hence, in 
the first years after the organisation’s establishment political cooperation continued 
to be minimal until the signing of the 1971 Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality 
(ZOPFAN).17  This document stressed respect for the sovereignty and territorial 
integrity of all States, absence from the threat or use of force, peaceful settlements 
of international disputes, equal rights and self-determination and non-interference in 
the affairs of States. These notions are reiterated in, inter alia, the Treaty of Amity 
and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC), which made the ASEAN treaty based, 
and the Declaration of ASEAN Concord (both adopted in Denpasar, Bali, 24 
February 1976). These documents were the first documents regarding the ambition 
to formalise the organisation and remain relevant in ASEAN affairs. Specifically, 
the TAC was described as “the foundational instrument for ASEAN in the ensuing 
                                                          
13 This notion was amongst other included because of endeavours of the former colonial powers to 
regain power in post-colonial times; Rodolfo C. Severino, ASEAN (Southeast Asia Background Series, 
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore 2008), p. 13. The principle of non-interference is also 
applied between the ASEAN Member States at part of the ASEAN Way. 
14 ASEAN, Bangkok Declaration, preamble. 
15 Barry Desker, ‘Is ASEAN a Community?’ [2017] (4) ASEAN Focus 4, p. 4. 
16 ASEAN ‘Political Achievement’ (9 July 2018) <http://asean.org/?static_post=political-achievement> 
last accessed 13 September 2018. Political aspirations have however always been part of ASEAN, as 
Ali Alatas (Indonesia’s former Foreign Minister) pointed out: “The truth is that politics attended 
ASEAN at its birth. It was the convergence in political outlook among the five original members, their 
shared convictions on national priority objectives and on how best to secure these objectives in the 
evolving strategic environment of East Asia which impelled them to form ASEAN.”; ibid, para 3. 
17 Mya Than, Myanmar in ASEAN: Regional Cooperation Experience (ISEAS Publications, Singapore 
2005), p. 15. See for the text ASEAN, Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality Declaration, Special 
ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting, Kuala Lumpur, 27 November 1971 
<http://www.icnl.org/research/library/files/Transnational/zone.pdf> last accessed 13 September 2017. 
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decades”18 and lays down legally binding norms for interstate relations.19 The TAC 
is accompanied by the Rules of Procedure of the High Council20, which is mandated 
to “take cognizance of” disputes (see Chapter IV TAC). Based on Articles 15 and 
16 TAC the High Council is not a dispute settlement mechanism with binding 
authority, whereby Article 15 TAC is only applicable if the parties involved in the 
dispute agree that the procedure of the High Council is to be used. 21  This 
corresponds to the position of a number of ASEAN Member States towards 
arbitration and dispute settlement by the ICJ, as the previous chapter showed.  
The Declaration of ASEAN Concord (or Bali Concord I) was innovative 
because it dealt with political cooperation, whereas this was not explicitly 
mentioned in the 1967 Bangkok Declaration. In the document, the Member States 
formulated objectives and principles contributing to political stability. These 
principles involved strengthening national and ASEAN resilience, establishing a 
Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality, an intensified cooperation in economic and 
social development, providing relief (including disaster), cooperation in 
development programme, peaceful settlement of disputes, promotion of peaceful 
cooperation. In addition, they adopted a programme of action in the field of 
political, economic, social, cultural, security cooperation and the expansion of 
                                                          
18 Barry Desker, ‘Is ASEAN a Community?’ [2017] (4) ASEAN Focus 4, p. 4. 
19 ASEAN, Text of the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia and Related Information 
(ASEAN Knowledge Kit March 2005, ASEAN, Jakarta 2005), p. 1. Online available at 
<http://www.aseansec.org/TAC-KnowledgeKit.pdf> last accessed 13 September 2018. 
20  ASEAN, Rules of Procedure of the High Council of the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in 
Southeast Asia, Hanoi, 23 July 2001, see ASEAN, Text of the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in 
Southeast Asia and Related Information (ASEAN Knowledge Kit March 2005, ASEAN, Jakarta 2005), 
p. 22. Online available at <http://www.aseansec.org/TAC-KnowledgeKit.pdf> last accessed 13 
September 2018. 
21 Rodolfo Severino observed that the States rather turn to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) or the 
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) instead. Mya Than attributed this preference to 
the unwillingness of the ASEAN States to side with one of their fellow Member States which are in 
conflict; Mya Than, Myanmar in ASEAN: Regional Cooperation Experience (ISEAS Publications, 
Singapore 2005), p. 18. For example, a territorial dispute between Malaysia and Singapore was 
adjudicated by the International Court of Justice, see On 2 February 2017 filed an Application to revise 
this judgment and on 30 June 2017 Malaysia requested for an interpretation of this judgement. These 
proceedings were closed on 28 May 2018 after Malaysia notified the Court on 28 May 2018 that the 
Parties came to an agreement; International Court of Justice, Application for revision of the Judgment 
of 23 May 2008 in the case concerning Sovereignty over Pedra Branca/Pulau Batu Puteh, Middle 
Rocks and South Ledge (Malaysia/Singapore) (Malaysia v. Singapore), Order, 29 May 2018, General 
List No. 169 and International Court of Justice, Request for Interpretation of the Judgment of 23 May 
2008 in the case concerning Sovereignty over Pedra Branca/Pulau Batu Puteh, Middle Rocks and 
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organisation’s structure.22 The establishment of an ASEAN Secretariat was also 
agreed upon.23 
Three decades after ASEAN’s establishment, the ASEAN Vision 202024 was 
adopted in 1997, whereby the 1998 Hanoi Plan of Action (for the years 1999-
2004)25  and the 2004 Vientiane Action Programme (VAP, for the years 2004-
2010)26 were set up to implement this Vision. Agreement was reached at the height 
of the Asian financial crisis, 27  which struck the region economically, but also 
affected the region’s stability. Davies observed in this respect that it was widely 
believed that the refusal to comment on the internal affairs of others was a reason 
for the failure of ASEAN Member States to engage with the causes and 
consequences of this crisis.28 
This ASEAN Vision led to the actual establishment of the ASEAN Community. 
Important elements of this Vision are peace, justice, the rule of law, national and 
regional resilience, peaceful settlement of disputes, confidence building, preventive 
diplomacy, conflict-resolution, sustainable and equitable economic growth, 
economic integration and mutual assistance, reducing socio-economic inequalities, 
equality and non-discrimination, reducing poverty, the family as cornerstone of 
society, empowerment of civil society, special care for vulnerable groups, 
combating drugs, technological progress, environment and sustainable 
development, fighting transnational crime, individual welfare and dignity, good of 
the community, external relations based on equal partnership and mutual respect.  
The Hanoi Plan of Action reiterated a number of the principles that were 
included in the ASEAN Vision 2020. The Hanoi Plan of Action referred, amongst 
others, to confidence building and to preventive diplomacy based on consensus and 
at a pace comfortable to all,29 which is typical for ASEAN affairs. 
                                                          
22  ASEAN, Declaration of ASEAN Concord, Denpasar, 24 February 1976 <https://asean. 
org/?static_post=declaration-of-asean-concord-indonesia-24-february-1976> last accessed 15 
September 2018. 
23  ASEAN, Declaration of ASEAN Concord, Denpasar, 24 February 1976 <https://asean. 
org/?static_post=declaration-of-asean-concord-indonesia-24-february-1976> last accessed 15 
September 2018, Section F. Improvement of ASEAN Machinery, Article 1. 
24 ASEAN, ASEAN Vision 2020, 15 December 1997, <http://asean.org/?static_post=asean-vision-2020> 
last accessed 15 September 2018. 
25 ASEAN, Hanoi Plan of Action, Hanoi, 15 December 1998, <https://asean.org/?static_post=hanoi-
plan-of-action 2018> last accessed 15 September 2018. 
26 ASEAN, Vientiane Action Programme, 29 November 2004 <http://www.asean.org/ 
storage/images/archive/VAP-10th%20ASEAN%20Summit.pdf> last accessed 15 September 2018. 
27  Mathew Davies, ‘An Agreement to Disagree: The ASEAN Human Rights Declaration and the 
Absence of Regional Identity in Southeast Asia’ (2014) 33 (3) Journal of Current Southeast Asian 
Affairs 107, p. 111. 
28 Mathew Davies, ‘The ASEAN Synthesis: Human Rights, Non-Intervention, and the ASEAN Human 
Rights Declaration’ (2013) 14 Georgetown Journal of International Affairs 51, p. 52. 
29 Article 8.3 Hanoi Plan of Action. 
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The 2003 Declaration of ASEAN Concord II (Bali Concord II)30  is key for 
ASEAN’s current structure, as agreement was reached on building an ASEAN 
Community based on the political-security, the economic and finance, and the 
socio-cultural community by the year 2020, which was later readjusted to 2015.31 
These are the three Pillars on which ASEAN is nowadays based. The preamble 
again stressed “the determination to move forward at a pace that is comfortable to 
all”.32 Agreement was reached that work had to be done concerning the promotion 
of human rights and the development of the ASEAN Charter in the ASEAN 
Political Security Community. The intensified level of cooperation thus resulted 
amongst others in the inclusion of regional human rights cooperation, which is 
analysed more closely in the next chapter. 
The 2004 Vientiane Action Programme,33 which also reiterated a number of the 
previous values, provided a roadmap for the three pillars (i.e. the political-security, 
the economic and finance, and the socio-cultural community) for the years 2004-
2010.  
The adoption of the ASEAN Charter 34  marks a significant change in the 
organisation in terms of institutionalisation and integration, as ASEAN was 
previously described as an organisation that was essentially a diplomatic 
community, which linked the foreign ministries of the region, and as a loosely 
structured organisation.35 One could say that this Charter represents the ambition to 
change from cooperation to integration. Specifically, the ASEAN Charter is 
perceived as the document that gives ASEAN legal personality and which makes 
“legal commitments enforceable by law”. 36  Indeed, while ASEAN previously 
exercised restraint in developing formal institutions, 37  a legal and institutional 
                                                          
30 ASEAN, Declaration of ASEAN Concord II (Bali Concord II), Bali, 7 October 2003, <https://asean. 
org/?static_post=declaration-of-asean-concord-ii-bali-concord-ii> last accessed 12 September 2018. 
31  Agreed upon at the Twelfth ASEAN Summit, Cebu, 9-15 January 2007. See amongst others 
Chairperson’s Statement on the 12th ASEAN Summit H.E. the President Gloria Macagapal-Arroyo, 
‘One Caring and Sharing Community’, Cebu, 13 January 2007 <https://asean.org/?static_ 
post=chairperson-s-statement-of-the-12th-asean-summit-he-the-president-gloria-macapagal-arroyo-one-
caring-and-sharing-community> last accessed 15 September 2018. 
32 Article 8, Section A. ASEAN Security Community Declaration, ASEAN, Declaration of ASEAN 
Concord II (Bali Concord II), Bali, 7 October 2003, <https://asean. org/?static_post=declaration-of-
asean-concord-ii-bali-concord-ii> last accessed 12 September 2018. 
33  ASEAN, Vientiane Action Programme, 29 November 2004 <http://www.asean.org/ 
storage/images/archive/VAP-10th%20ASEAN%20Summit.pdf> last accessed 15 September 2018. 
34 ASEAN, ASEAN Charter, 20 November 2007, <http://www.asean.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/ 
11.-October-2015-The-ASEAN-Charter-18th-Reprint-Amended-updated-on-05_-April-2016-IJP.pdf> 
last accessed 15 September 2018. 
35 Barry Desker, ‘Is ASEAN a Community?’ [2017] (4) ASEAN Focus 4, p. 5. 
36  Ali Alatas, 'The ASEAN Charter: Towards its Ratification and Implementation' in Pavin 
Chachavalpongpun (ed), The Road to Ratification and Implementation of the ASEAN Charter (ASEAN 
Studies Centre Report No 3, ISEAS Publishing, Singapore 2009), p. 22. 
37 Shunmugam Jayakumar described this concern as “organizational minimalism”, see David Capie and 
Paul Evans, ‘The ASEAN Way’ in Sharon Siddique and Sree Kumar (eds), The 2nd ASEAN Reader 
(ISEAS, Singapore 2003), p. 45, quoted in Lee Kim Chew, ‘Don’t Discard Fundamentals, Straits Times 
(25 July 1998). 
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framework for ASEAN has been codified that matches the dynamics of the 
organisation.38 The preamble of the ASEAN Charter hereby reiterated:  
 
Cognisant that mutual respect for independence, sovereignty, equality, territorial 
integrity and national identity of ASEAN Member Countries has fostered a positive 
environment for the steady development of an ASEAN Community to meet the 
challenges in the future. 
 
In addition, it includes “the right of every state to lead its national existence free 
from external interference, subversion, or coercion and non-interference in the 
internal affairs of one another”. 39  Alongside the codification of these already 
existing ASEAN norms for interstate relations, the Charter also lays down 
additional norms, including norms for internal governance. The rule of law, 
democracy, good governance, human rights and fundamental freedoms, social 
justice, and international (humanitarian) law, the idea of a people-centred society, 
the establishment of legal personality, three ASEAN Community Councils, and 
ASEAN’s motto “One Vision, One Identity, One Community” are also included. 
Although consensual decision-making is still the starting point according to 
Article 20(1) ASEAN Charter, the ASEAN Summit must decide on how a decision 
is made if no consensual decision could be reached at a lower ASEAN level 
(Article 20(2) ASEAN Charter). Anwar observed in this regard that these new 
elements reflect a changing character of the organisation.40 Rizal Sukma, however, 
noted that “it [the Summit] needs consensus in order to depart from consensus. In 
other words, the decision-making mechanism is still fluid and depends on the 
circumstances of the day. Thus, it is hardly different from the current practice [i.e., 
the practice as developed before the ASEAN Charter].”41 
After the Charter, documents were adopted to concretise the ASEAN 
Community. The Cha-am Hua Hin Declaration on the Roadmap for the ASEAN 
Community (2009-2015) was the guiding document to achieve community status by 
2015 and consisted of the ASEAN Political-Security Blueprint, 42  the ASEAN 
Economic Community Blueprint 43 and the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community 
                                                          
38 Thi Ha Hoang, ‘Five Decades of ASEAN’s Evolution’ [2017] (5) ASEAN Focus 2, p. 3. 
39 ASEAN, Kuala Lumpur Declaration on the Establishment of the ASEAN Charter, Kuala Lumpur, 22 
November 2005 <http://asean.org/kuala-lumpur-declaration-on-the-establishment-of-the-asean-com 
munity/> last accessed 15 September 2018. 
40 Dewi Fortuna Anwar, 'The ASEAN Charter: The Case for Ratification' in Pavin Chachavalpongpun 
(ed), The Road to Ratification and Implementation of the ASEAN Charter (ISEAS Publishing, 
Singapore 2009), p. 32. 
41 Rizal Sukma, 'The ASEAN Charter: Neither Bold nor Visionary' in Pavin Chachavalpongpun (ed), 
The Road to Ratification and Implementation of the ASEAN Charter (ISEAS Publishing, Singapore 
2009), p. 53. 
42 ASEAN, ASEAN Political-Security Community Blueprint, Cha-am, 1 March 2009, <http://asean.org/ 
wp-content/uploads/archive/5187-18.pdf> last accessed 15 September 2018. 
43  This Blueprint was already adopted in 2007, which seems to imply an economic focus of the 
organisation, or at least a subject on which consensus is easier to reach. See ASEAN, Declaration on 
the ASEAN Economic Community Blueprint, Singapore, 20 November 2007, 
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Blueprint.44 These and the subsequent Blueprints are discussed in more detail later 
on in relation to their relevance for human rights.  
Also relevant was the adoption of the Bali Declaration on ASEAN Community 
in a Global Community of Nations (Bali Concord III),45 which lists a number of 
areas of cooperation that correspond to the three ASEAN communities. This 
document includes “the importance of the establishment of a comprehensive 
partnership between ASEAN and the United Nations”,46 as well as reference to 
fundamental principles of international and the domestic laws of the ASEAN 
Member States. While ASEAN’s reoccurring values of independence, sovereignty, 
equality, territorial integrity, non-interference, national identity of all Nations, 
peaceful settlement of disputes and the renunciation of the treat and use of force are 
included (Section A, Article 1(a) to (d)), this document also mentions the promotion 
of peace, “which includes inter alia, respect for diversity, promotion of tolerance, 
and understanding of faiths, religions, and cultures, in accordance with applicable 
domestic law”.47 ASEAN community-building is further developed by the Phnom 
Penh Agenda for ASEAN Community Building.48 
While the ASEAN Vision 2020 was adopted to become one ASEAN 
Community by 2015, ASEAN was indeed formally established as a community 
when the ASEAN Leaders signed the Kuala Lumpur Declaration on the 
Establishment of the ASEAN Community during their 27th Summit (Kuala Lumpur, 
22 November 2015). This can be considered as a milestone in the integration and 
evolvement of ASEAN.49 
In the ASEAN Community Vision 2015,50 which charts the path for ASEAN 
until 2025, more focus seems to lie on regional interests and developing an 
                                                                                                                                              
<http://asean.org/?static_post=declaration-on-the-asean-economic-community-blueprint> last accessed 
15 September 2018. See for the Blueprint itself ASEAN, ASEAN Economic Community Blueprint, 
Singapore, 20 November 2007 <http://asean.org/wp-content/uploads/archive/5187-10.pdf> last 
accessed 15 September 2018. 
44 ASEAN, ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community Blueprint, Cha-am, 1 March 2009, <http://asean.org/wp-
content/uploads/archive/5187-19.pdf> last accessed 15 September 2018. 
45 ASEAN, Bali Declaration on ASEAN Community in a Global Community of Nations (Bali Concord 
III), Bali, 7 November 2011, <http://www.asean.org/storage/archive/documents/19th%20summit/Bali% 
20Concord%20III.pdf> last accessed 15 September 2018. 
46 ASEAN, Bali Declaration on ASEAN Community in a Global Community of Nations (Bali Concord 
III), Bali, 7 November 2011, preamble. 
47 ASEAN, Bali Declaration on ASEAN Community in a Global Community of Nations (Bali Concord 
III), Bali, 7 November 2011, Section A, Article 1(d). 
48  ASEAN, Phnom Penh Agenda for ASEAN Community Building, Phnom Penh, 3 April 2012, 
<https://cil.nus.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/formidable/18/2012-Phnom-Penh-Agenda-for-ASEAN-Com 
munity-Building.pdf> last accessed 15 September 2018. 
49 ASEAN, Kuala Lumpur Declaration on the Establishment of the ASEAN Community, Kuala Lumpur, 
22 November 2015, <http://asean.org/kuala-lumpur-declaration-on-the-establishment-of-the-asean-
community/> last accessed 15 September 2018. 
50  ASEAN, ASEAN Community Vision, Kuala Lumpur, 22 November 2015 <http://www.asean.org/ 
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outward-looking, people-centred organisation. While values linked to the ASEAN 
Way are still present, the tone of the document seems to have changed.  
ASEAN’s Pillar Structure was concretised in the Roadmap for an ASEAN 
Community, whereas Bali Concord III formulates the ambition to have a common 
platform by 2022. 
Even though ASEAN does not have an effective enforcement mechanism, 
ASEAN formulated the general principle that the organisation shall maintain and 
establish dispute settlement mechanisms in all of ASEAN’s cooperation (Article 
22(2) ASEAN Charter). This led to the adoption of the Protocol to the ASEAN 
Charter on Dispute Settlement Mechanisms (the DSM Protocol),51 although it has 
not entered into force, because it needs to be ratified by all ten ASEAN Member 
States. After full ratification, this Protocol will be applicable in the event that the 
Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (according to Article 24(2) ASEAN Charter 
applied to disputes “which do not concern the interpretation or application of any 
ASEAN instrument”) and the ASEAN Protocol on Enhanced Dispute Settlement 
Mechanism (the Vientiane Protocol on economic disputes) do not apply. If this 
Protocol is ratified, the instrument will be applied to disputes on all other ASEAN 
instruments, including the ASEAN Charter and a possible future ASEAN 
Convention on Human Rights. 
Based on the above, it can be determined that ASEAN’s communities, at least 
on paper, have developed further. One should, however, bear in mind that there is 
poor cross sectoral interaction and a lack of a ‘whole ASEAN’ approach. 52 
According to Barry Desker, cross-sectoral coordination is still maturing as the focus 
of ASEAN policymakers is currently on their own sectors. He pinpointed poor 
funding of the ASEAN Secretariat and its ineffectiveness in playing a bridging role 
as one of the problems.53 
While these key documents paint the picture of ASEAN’s integration, Hoang 
Thi Ha captured the process of ASEAN as followed: 
 
Although ASEAN is traditionally known for its preference for informal 
arrangements, the organisation has become more rules-based and institutionalised 
over the years. This is a natural and gradual evolution in response to integration and 
community building needs, and a result of growing levels of comfort, trust and 
political maturity among ASEAN member countries. […] From a minimal structure 
centred around the annual meetings of ASEAN foreign ministers in its early years, 
ASEAN now encompasses hundreds of sectoral and coordination mechanisms across 
various political security and socioeconomic areas. ASEAN has also become more 
rules-based with the number of ASEAN legal instruments, both in force and waiting 
for entry into force, increasing from 32 by 1990 to 179 in 2017.54 
                                                          
51 ASEAN, Protocol to the ASEAN Charter on Dispute Settlement Mechanisms, Hanoi, 8 April 2010, 
<https://cil.nus.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/formidable/18/2010-Protocol-to-the-ASEAN-Charter-on-
Dispute-Settlement-Mechanisms.pdf> last accessed 15 September 2018. 
52 Barry Desker, ‘Is ASEAN a Community?’ [2017] (4) ASEAN Focus 4, p. 5. 
53 Barry Desker, ‘Is ASEAN a Community?’ [2017] (4) ASEAN Focus 4, p. 5. 
54 Thi Ha Hoang, ‘Five Decades of ASEAN’s Evolution’ [2017] (5) ASEAN Focus 2, p. 3. 
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While this author observed that ASEAN became more rules-based over the years, it 
is questionable whether the ASEAN Charter actually made a significant change to 
the organisation. The ASEAN Way is maintained in terms of the level of 
informality. The enforcement of compliance, including a form of sanction, is still 
lacking. This is problematic; while the ASEAN Charter formally endorses various 
(new) principles, the problem of implementation and compliance remains. 
The Charter does not, for example, provide for the possibility to suspend or 
expel a Member State in case of non-compliance. Article 5(3) ASEAN Charter, 
which states that “in case of a serious breach of the Charter or non-compliance, the 
matter shall be referred to Article 20”, does not seem to make any difference. 
Article 20(4) ASEAN Charter generally asserts that “in case of a serious breach of 
the Charter or non-compliance, the matter shall be referred to the ASEAN Summit 
for decision”. The ASEAN Summit still has to reach a decision based on 
consultation and consensus unless it is unable to reach a consensual agreement. In 
the latter case, the Summit can decide on its decision-making process. Given the 
necessity of consultation and consensus, consensual decision-making is necessary 
for asserting how it should make a decision that is not based on consensus. 
The current Charter does not necessarily dictate ASEAN’s future practice, as the 
Charter is not considered to be static, but as a document that can advance together 
with the organisation itself.55 Article 48 of the Charter provides for the possibility to 
amend the Charter. In addition, Article 50 of Charter stipulates that the Charter can 
be reviewed after five years after the document came into force or when the 
ASEAN Summit decides so. Tan Sri Ahmad Fuzi bin Abdul Razak, pointed out in 
this respect that “[t]he so-called “lowest common denominator” can be gradually 
upgraded over the years as ASEAN matures”.56  
Concrete steps have to be taken for a successful implementation and further 
development of the Charter. Institutionally, the ASEAN Charter needs, for example, 
more detailed provisions on the ASEAN Community Councils and the AIHCR. 
Further progress should also be made in the field of people participation. While 
ASEAN wants to present itself as a people-oriented organisation, the Charter does 
not specify public participation. The way in which ASEAN evolves, which is still 
very much State centric, remains a challenge. 
 
                                                          
55 Tommy Koh, Rosario G. Manolo and Walter Woon, ‘Preface’ in Tommy Koh, Rosario G. Manolo 
and Walter Woon, The Making of the ASEAN Charter (World Scientific Publishing, Singapore 2009), 
p. xxi. 
56 Tan Sri Ahmad Fuzi bin Abdul Razak, 'Facing Unfair Criticisms' in Tommy Koh, Rosario G. Manolo 
and Walter Woon, The Making of the ASEAN Charter (World Scientific Publishing, Singapore 2009), 
p. 25. Aung Bwa, former member of the ASEAN High Level Task Force on the ASEAN Charter, 
reflected: “We [Myanmar] felt that the ASEAN Charter must be one that every member states must be 
comfortable with, encompassing a sense of belonging and partnership, future-oriented, forward-
looking, and bold but not over-ambitious”; Aung Bwa, 'The Jewel in my Crown' in Tommy Koh, 
Rosario G. Manolo and Walter Woon, The Making of the ASEAN Charter (World Scientific Publishing, 
Singapore 2009), p. 28.  
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2.2 ASEAN’s challenges to regional cooperation 
 
The organisation has grown over time, and currently comprises ten Southeast Asian 
States, incorporating various areas of cooperation and receiving international 
recognition. The Member States cooperate in numerous areas, which are 
categorised in the three Communities. The previous section showed that the 
ASEAN Charter serves as a momentum for further cooperation and integration in 
different areas, including human rights as part of ASEAN’s ambition of becoming a 
people-oriented organisation (Article 1(13) ASEAN Charter, further discussed in 
the next chapter).  
While a deeper level of integration was sought with the adoption of the ASEAN 
Charter and the development of the three ASEAN Communities, challenges remain 
in the areas of political solidarity, implementing agreements and cooperating at a 
more intensified level, amongst others in the field of human rights.57 The following 
observations clarify the challenges that ASEAN faces. 
Rodolfo Severino made the critical observation that ASEAN’s institutions and 
processes have their weaknesses in terms of economic integration, although one 
could place his observation in a broader perspective because it seems a general 
characteristic of the organisation. Specifically, this former ASEAN Secretary-
General argued that it is difficult to make progress on initiatives and to ensure that 
its Member States comply with their obligations. According to Severino, a possible 
explanation is that Member States give prevalence to their respective national and 
political interests over the regional interests.58  
Furthermore, some ASEAN commentators have doubted whether ASEAN could 
become a regional community as is proposed in the various documents. According 
to Sukma, the ASEAN Charter should develop an ASEAN community, which 
caters for a common regional identity. This ASEAN community should have the 
following three characteristics: (i) a people-centred orientation in ASEAN 
processes, (ii) the reconciliation of differences by formulating common norms and 
values, and (iii) compliance to ASEAN’s documents.59 Sukma correctly observed 
that the ASEAN Charter is not adequately approaching these three aims. 60  For 
instance, the ASEAN Charter underscores the importance of a people-oriented 
approach (Article 1(13) ASEAN Charter). Yet, the extent and the way in which 
people, within and outside civil society organisations, can be involved is limited 
                                                          
57  Rodolfo C. Severino, ASEAN (Southeast Asia Background Series, Institute of Southeast Asian 
Studies, Singapore 2008), p. 74. 
58  Rodolfo C. Severino, ASEAN (Southeast Asia Background Series, Institute of Southeast Asian 
Studies, Singapore 2008), p. 58. 
59 Rizal Sukma, 'The ASEAN Charter: Neither Bold nor Visionary' in Pavin Chachavalpongpun (ed.), 
The Road to Ratification and Implementation of the ASEAN Charter (ISEAS Publishing, Singapore 
2009), p. 45. 
60 Rizal Sukma, 'The ASEAN Charter: Neither Bold nor Visionary' in Pavin Chachavalpongpun (ed), 
The Road to Ratification and Implementation of the ASEAN Charter (ISEAS Publishing, Singapore 
2009), pp. 46-47. 
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(see Annex 2 tot the ASEAN Charter regarding the entities which are associated to 
ASEAN).  
In addition, economic, political, social and cultural differences and national 
interests make it a challenge to find common ground in norms and values. The 
diverging political regimes, for example, pose a challenge to finding a shared 
political attitude. Democracy is amongst others a difficult common topic, although 
it is included in the ASEAN Charter. Muntarbhorn observed in this respect: 
 
Some of the countries [are], as we know, non-democratic in real terms. But officially 
and formally, who is going to deny…? So officially and formally, they will all agree 
with democracy as a principle. And then, you know, they have all their own lapses in 
terms of interpretation.61 
 
Also difficult is the topic of human rights and fundamental freedoms and the 
establishment of an appropriate human rights mechanism (included in the preamble 
and Articles 1(7), 2(i) and 14 of the ASEAN Charter), which is analysed in more 
detail in the next chapter. Sukma rightly referred to the extensive debate on the 
AICHR and the Myanmar issue.62  The different attitudes on human rights and 
democracy were furthermore exemplified by the Myanmar military junta and their 
lack of respect for these values during the crackdown in 2007, and the minimum 
response of the other ASEAN Member States. The current Rohinghya crisis in 
Myanmar and the lack of a response from ASEAN and its individual Member States 
is also illustrative. 
Given the existing diversity, Anak Aging Banyu Perwita opted for the 
promotion of Indonesia’s national motto, bhinneka tunggal ika; a principle that 
means ‘unity in diversity’. This principle is in fact included in Article 2(2)(l) 
ASEAN Charter, which mentions “respect for different cultures, languages and 
religions of the peoples of ASEAN, while emphasising their common values in the 
spirit of unity in diversity”. Former ASEAN Secretary-General Le Luong Minh also 
referred to this principle. He stressed that the diversity in terms of culture, religion, 
history and political systems has created the strength for ASEAN. ASEAN turned 
this diversity into an advantage in its process of community-building and 
integration, he added.63 
Although diversity has been proffered by former ASEAN Secretary-General Le 
Luong Minh as one of the reasons for ASEAN’s success, other commentators have 
opted to refer to universal values. It was, for instance, argued that regional identity 
                                                          
61 Interview with Vitit Muntarbhorn, Professor Emeritus of Law, Chulalongkorn University (Manila, 13 
November 2009). 
62 Rizal Sukma, 'The ASEAN Charter: Neither Bold nor Visionary' in Pavin Chachavalpongpun (ed), 
The Road to Ratification and Implementation of the ASEAN Charter (ISEAS Publishing, Singapore 
2009), pp. 48-49. 
63  ––, ‘“Unity in diversity” creates ASEAN identity’, Vietnam Plus (Jakarta, 29 December 2015), 
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is more feasible when it is built upon recognised universal values, which include 
human rights, mutual prosperity and freedom from oppression”.64 When looking at 
the documents discussed in the previous section, it appears that ASEAN is trying to 
combine its diversity with international law and universal values. 
ASEAN also faces challenges with respect to the ability and willingness to 
implement and ensure compliance of its rules and procedures. It was argued that “a 
well-delineated and endowed institutional framework with authoritative procedures 
is not in harmony with the Asean spirit”.65 The Eminent Persons Group on the 
ASEAN Charter (EPG) observed that “ASEAN’s problem is not one of lack of 
vision, ideas, and action plans. The real problem is one of ensuring compliance and 
effective implementation of decisions”. 66  Therefore, the EPG formulated in its 
report a number of recommendations, such as the establishment of a dispute 
settlement mechanism in all fields of cooperation, which should include compliance 
monitoring and advisory, consultation and enforcement mechanisms. A special role 
was given to the ASEAN Secretariat and the Secretary-General, as they should 
monitor compliance with ASEAN agreements and actions plans and report to the 
ASEAN Council and Community Councils respectively. Within ASEAN’s current 
structure, the Secretary-General facilitates and monitors compliance with ASEAN 
agreements and decisions, on which he reports annually to the ASEAN Summit. 
The Secretary-General can also play a role in ASEAN’s dispute settlement 
mechanism (chapter VIII ASEAN Charter). The Secretary-General and the 
Secretariat are independent in the sense that Member States are not allowed “to seek 
to influence them in the discharge of their responsibilities” (Article 11(9) ASEAN 
Charter).  
The EPG also added that the organisation should also have powers to take 
measures to redress serious breaches of ASEAN’s objectives, major principles and 
commitments to important agreements. Non-compliance with decisions following 
from the dispute settlement could, according to the EPG, lead to suspension of 
rights and privileges of membership.67  
Against the backdrop of the recommendations of the EPG, the Charter is 
inadequate with regard to compliance mechanisms. The following articles deal with 
compliance, albeit in general terms. Article 5 on rights and obligations stipulates in 
Section 3: “In the case of a serious breach of the Charter or non-compliance, the 
matter shall be referred to Article 20.” This article deals with consultation and 
consensus. Decision-making is based on consensus unless no consensus can be 
reached. In that case, the Summit will decide upon the way in which a decision is 
                                                          
64 Rizal Sukma quoting Pavin Chachavalpongpun; Rizal Sukma, 'The ASEAN Charter: Neither Bold 
nor Visionary' in Pavin Chachavalpongpun (ed), The Road to Ratification and Implementation of the 
ASEAN Charter (ISEAS Publishing, Singapore 2009), p. 49. See also Pavin Chachavalpongpun, 'In 
Search of an Asean Identity', The Nation (Bangkok, 4 May 2006). 
65 Muthiah Alagappa, ‘Institutional Framework. Recommendations for Change’ in Sharon Siddique and 
Sree Kumar (eds), The 2nd ASEAN Reader (ISEAS, Singapore 2003), p. 22. 
66 ASEAN, Report of the Eminent Persons Group on the ASEAN Charter, December 2006, p. 4. 
67 ASEAN, Report of the Eminent Persons Group on the ASEAN Charter, December 2006, p. 4. 
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made. Article 20(4) lays down the following: “In the case of a serious breach of the 
Charter or noncompliance, the matter shall be referred to the ASEAN Summit for 
decision.” Finally, Article 27 on compliance, reads as follows: 
 
1. The Secretary-General of ASEAN, assisted by the ASEAN Secretariat or any other 
designated ASEAN body, shall monitor the compliance with the findings, 
recommendations or decisions resulting from an ASEAN dispute settlement 
mechanism, and submit a report to the ASEAN Summit. 
2. Any Member State affected by non-compliance with the findings, 
recommendations or decisions resulting from an ASEAN dispute settlement 
mechanism, may refer the matter to the ASEAN Summit for a decision. 
 
This led to the adoption of the Instrument of Incorporation of the Rules for 
Reference of Unresolved Disputes to the ASEAN Summit to the Protocol to the 
ASEAN Charter on Dispute Settlement Mechanisms68 and the Rules for Reference 
of Non-Compliance to the ASEAN Summit69 as alternatives to the Protocol to the 
ASEAN Charter on Dispute Settlement Mechanisms; the latter Protocol has not 
entered into force as not all ASEAN Member States have ratified it. The challenges 
that ASEAN faces while broadening and deepening cooperation are connected to 
and influenced by what is called the ASEAN Way. Therefore, this ASEAN Way is 
analysed in more detail in the next Section.  
 
3 THE ASEAN WAY 
 
The ASEAN Way or ASEAN’s code of conduct has been present in ASEAN since 
the organisation’s establishment and continues to influence ASEAN affairs to date. 
As seen in the previous section, while the TAC lays down the norms for interstate 
relations in a treaty, these notions or code of conduct have been addressed in 
various key ASEAN documents throughout the years. Accordingly, as this style of 
diplomacy naturally also influences the possibilities for regional human rights 
protection and promotion, it is important to analyse this ASEAN approach. In an 
attempt to comprehend the ASEAN Way, together with the implications for 
regional cooperation in the field of human rights, the ASEAN Way is described. 
The principles of non-interference and consensus are hereby addressed in more 
detail.  
This section aims to capture the essence of the ASEAN Way, whereby the 
following must be borne in mind: 
                                                          
68  ASEAN, Instrument of Incorporation of the Rules for Reference of Unresolved Disputes to the 
ASEAN Summit to the Protocol to the ASEAN Charter on Dispute Settlement Mechanisms, Hanoi, 27 
October 2010, < http://agreement.asean.org/media/download/20160316010617.pdf> last accessed 15 
September 2018. 
69 ASEAN, Rules for Reference of Non-Compliance to the ASEAN Summit, <http://www.asean.org/ 
storage/images/archive/documents/ANNEX%206%20Rules%20for%20Reference%20of%20Non-
Compliance%20to%20the%20ASEAN%20Summit.pdf> last accessed 15 September 2018. 
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The “ASEAN Way” has inherited a mythical component, it is everything about 
ASEAN and nothing in particular; a reference point for an intangible character, 
nuance, style, norm and regional law and regime all encompassed in one; a concept 
as pervasive and slippery as the “Asian Values” debate. Naturally, there are many 
definitions as there are perceptions of the aims underlying ASEAN modes of 
cooperation. But according to political leaders who speak its merits, it has worked.”70 
 
The characteristics of ASEAN diplomacy appear to be present in the ASEAN 
region before the organisation’s establishment. Capie and Evans refer in this respect 
to Estrella D. Solidum’s observation on the Association of Southeast Asia, which 
existed from July 1961 until August 1967. This Association stressed that “Asian 
solutions that contain Asian values” must be applied when resolving problems, 
which meant according to Solidum amongst others the use of “very low-key 
diplomacy [which] avoids fanfare before an agreement is reached” and “invisible 
ground rules”.71  
At the start of ASEAN, the perception was that a certain, non-binding form of 
conflict management was necessary between the then five Member States. A low 
level of cooperation was desired, because otherwise the bilateral and regional 
stability or national interests could be jeopardised. 72  In this respect, Pushpa 
Thambipillai provided a plausible explanation for the origins of the ASEAN Way 
when she clarified that the geopolitics in the 1960s required a gradual evolvement 
of regional institutions and identity. To maintain stability, any kind of imposition of 
this process was inconceivable. Instead, a modus to converge common interests 
whereby differences were not openly emphasised was imperative. This form of 
decision-making and the principle of non-interference became crucial for ASEAN, 
whereby it has been observed that this ASEAN Way “stands for flexibility, 
pragmatism, consensus building and gradualism”.73  
Other authors have provided various descriptions. For instance, the ASEAN 
Way is summarised by Ali Alatas as a form of cooperation which has been “loose 
and informal, relying on political persuasion rather than legal enforcement and 
basing itself on musyawarah (consultation) and mufakat (consensus)”,74 discussed 
                                                          
70 Pushpa Thambipillai, 'Challenges to the ASEAN Way: Musyawarah and non-interference' (2000) 18 
Kajian Malaysia 157, p. 159. 
71 David Capie and Paul Evans, ‘The ASEAN Way’ in Sharon Siddique and Sree Kumar (eds), The 2nd 
ASEAN Reader (ISEAS, Singapore 2003), p. 10. Reference is made to Estrella D. Solidum, 'The Role of 
Certain Sectors in Shaping and Articulating the ASEAN Way' in R.P. Anand and Purificacion V. 
Quisumbing (eds), ASEAN Identity, Development and Culture (University of the Philippines Law 
Center and East-West Center Culture Learning Institute, Quezon City and Honolulu 1981). 
72 Pushpa Thambipillai, 'Challenges to the ASEAN Way: Musyawarah and non-interference' (2000) 18 
Kajian Malaysia 157, p. 158. 
73 Kao Kim Hourn, ‘A Personal Reflection’ in Tommy Koh, Rosario G. Manolo and Walter Woon, The 
Making of the ASEAN Charter (World Scientific Publishing, Singapore 2009), p. 156. 
74  Keynote address at the Expert Roundtable Discussion on the Road to Ratification and 
Implementation of the ASEAN Charter (Jakarta, 17 July 2008), see Ali Alatas, 'The ASEAN Charter: 
Towards its Ratification and Implementation' in Pavin Chachavalpongpun (ed), The Road to 
 
 
Understanding ASEAN as Carrier of a Specific Human Rights System 
 128
in more detail hereinafter. This former Indonesian Minister added furthermore that 
“this way of functioning has not resulted in ASEAN being ineffective”,75 as he 
explained that peace and stability is maintained, which provide a stable climate 
favourable to economic cooperation and integration.76 In other words, the ASEAN 
Way is a form of diplomacy, which was initially based on informal structures in 
which inclusive dialogue is key and in which its Member States make non-binding 
agreements based on consultation and consensus. 
Armitav Acharya observed in this regard that ASEAN’s approach is “better 
described as one of conflict avoidance than conflict resolution”.77 He also referred 
to it as an “approach [which] involves a high degree of discreteness, informality, 
pragmatism, expediency, consensus-building, and non-confrontational bargaining 
styles”, contrary to what can be expected from the expanding references to the 
international human rights standards, their process, regulation and coordination”.78 
The building of trust is also an important factor in ASEAN relations. This can best 
be achieved by personal contact between ASEAN leaders and rather without 
agenda’s or interpreters. This practice has been described in the ASEAN region as 
empat mata (meaning four eyes, or face-to-face individual contact). 79  The key 
elements of ‘process’ and ‘inclusiveness’ imply amongst others the notion of 
patience. Capie and Evans referred in this regard to Mahathir Mohamad’s 
observation that a dialogue process begins with “the tedious process of getting to 
know each other” 80  and observations like “the process is as important as any 
eventual agreement”. 81  Mya Than summarised the ASEAN Way as a modus 
operandi, which: 
 
                                                                                                                                              
Ratification and Implementation of the ASEAN Charter (ASEAN Studies Centre Report No 3, ISEAS 
Publishing, Singapore 2009), p. 16. 
75  Ali Alatas, 'The ASEAN Charter: Towards its Ratification and Implementation' in Pavin 
Chachavalpongpun (ed), The Road to Ratification and Implementation of the ASEAN Charter (ASEAN 
Studies Centre Report No 3, ISEAS Publishing, Singapore 2009), p. 16. 
76  Ali Alatas, 'The ASEAN Charter: Towards its Ratification and Implementation' in Pavin 
Chachavalpongpun (ed), The Road to Ratification and Implementation of the ASEAN Charter (ASEAN 
Studies Centre Report No 3, ISEAS Publishing, Singapore 2009) p. 16. 
77 Amitav Acharya, ‘Ideas, Identity and Institution Building: From the ASEAN Way to the Asia-Pacific 
Way?’ (1997) 10 Pacific Review 319, p. 335. 
78 Amitav Acharya, ‘Ideas, Identity and Institution Building: From the ASEAN Way to the Asia-Pacific 
Way?’ (1997) 10 Pacific Review 319, quoted in Howard Loewen, ‘Democracy and Human Rights in the 
European-Asian Dialogue: A Clash of Cooperation Cultures?’ (GIGA Working Paper 92, 2008). See 
also Theodor Rathgeber, ‘Human Rights and the Institutionalisation of ASEAN: An Ambiguous 
Relationship’ (2104) 33 (3) Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs 131, p. 160. 
79 David Capie and Paul Evans, ‘The ASEAN Way’ in Sharon Siddique and Sree Kumar (eds), The 2nd 
ASEAN Reader (ISEAS, Singapore 2003), p. 46, referring to Michael Antolik, ASEAN and Diplomacy 
of Accommodation (East Gate Books, New York 1990), p. 90. 
80 David Capie and Paul Evans, ‘The ASEAN Way’ in Sharon Siddique and Sree Kumar (eds), The 2nd 
ASEAN Reader (ISEAS, Singapore 2003), p. 46. 
81 David Capie and Paul Evans, ‘The ASEAN Way’ in Sharon Siddique and Sree Kumar (eds), The 2nd 
ASEAN Reader (ISEAS, Singapore 2003), p. 46. 
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places a premium on informal approaches and on personal relationships between 
political and governmental elites. It assumes that relations between members should 
not be held hostage to the inability to resolve bilateral disputes, whether territorial or 
otherwise, for indeed the disputes may be complex and not easy to resolve. Rather, 
problems which cannot be resolved should be put aside until such time, which may 
be many years, that they become more amendable to resolution because of changed 
circumstances. The maintenance and development of good cooperative relations in 
other areas are seen as too important to be held up by a few intractable problems.82  
 
The ASEAN Way is also described as an approach “to reach a consensus among 
member countries, arriving at an agreement at the lowest common denominator”.83 
Indeed, the evolvement of ASEAN and its topics of cooperation are based upon the 
lowest common denominator, or what Capie and Evans addressed as a “level of 
comfort” whereby the pace is not “too fast for those who want to go slow and not 
too slow for those who want to go fast”.84 
The key instruments in ASEAN’s integration as discussed in Subsection 2.1 of 
this chapter demonstrate a number of reoccurring objectives and values mirroring 
the ASEAN Way. As can be deduced from these documents, the ASEAN Way 
revolves around equal partnership, good understanding, good neighbourliness, 
mutual trust, confidence building and mutual respect for the independence, 
sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity and national identity of each Member 
State, the right of every State to lead its national existence free from external 
interference, subversion or coercion, self-determination and non-interference in the 
internal affairs of one another, preventive diplomacy, peaceful settlement of 
differences and disputes, renunciation of the threat or use of force, and effective 
cooperation based on dialogue, consultation and consensus.  
Moreover, the documents analysed show a preference for declarations instead of 
treaties. Acharya’s observation on the first Asian-African Conference (Bandung, 
18-24 April 1955)85 is also applicable to ASEAN. More specifically, a discussion of 
the instruments illustrates that the ASEAN Member States show a long-standing 
inclination towards a non-legalistic approach, which can be summarised as non-
intrusive and informal, and that consensus-based diplomacy is preferred over a 
legalistic and formal one. The practice of setting a flexible agenda, omitting 
controversial issues and making decisions by consensus indeed became typical for 
ASEAN. These factors bring about that ASEAN’s progress and the development of 
                                                          
82 Mya Than, Myanmar in ASEAN: Regional Cooperation Experience (ISEAS Publications, Singapore 
2005), p. 18. 
83  Sree Kumar, 'Introduction' in Sharon Siddique and Sree Kumar (eds), The 2nd ASEAN Reader 
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areas of cooperation is mainly determined by the lowest common denominator, both 
regarding the area of cooperation as well as in the pace in which ASEAN evolves.  
The fact that the ASEAN Way has remained relevant over the years is inter alia 
noticeable in the drafting process of the ASEAN Charter. Termsak 
Chalermpalanupap commented in this respect the following:  
 
The ASEAN Charter is certainly imperfect. None of the drafters is completely 
satisfied with the outcome. Anything done by consensus would certainly not be the 
most desirable. But this is how ASEAN keeps every member state on board, moving 
together at a pace comfortable to all. No one is left behind unhappy.86  
 
Moreover, Dian Triansyah Djani observed in this respect:  
 
Early on, there were many quarters […] that were yet to be convinced of the need for 
a Charter. The argument was always that for 40 years of its existence, ASEAN has 
always been able to grow and become a safe region free from the threat of outright 
war, due to its flexibility as an association and due to the “ASEAN Way” of doing 
things. The fear of losing an inch of sovereignty and the suspicious of one’s 
neighbour still linger on. Questions of interference and problems arising from border 
disputes remained unresolved and were swept under the carpet.87  
 
Regarding this attitude, Zakaria Haji Ahmad argued “Perhaps, indeed, there is a 
notion that certain problems are best swept under the carpet, a style which might 
conceivably be regarded as non-Western or even indigenously Southeast Asian”.88 
Furthermore, Tan Sri Ahmad Fuzi bin Abdul Razak, Malaysia’s HLTF-member, 
commented on the negotiations on the ASEAN Charter:  
 
No undue pressure of one or more states by other member states was tolerated. 
Persuasion and the power of arguments were recognised as the basis for compromise 
and final agreement. No single member state could claim to play the dominant role or 
that the Charter was based on its original draft. It was entirely a collective effort from 
the beginning to the end. The process itself reflected a clear example of a politically 
negotiated but legally binding ASEAN document par excellence.89  
 
When analysing the ASEAN Way, the following observations can be made. 
While informality and inclusion have characterised the drafting process of the 
                                                          
86 Termsak Chalermpalanupap, 'In Defence of the ASEAN Charter' in Tommy Koh, Rosario G. Manolo 
and Walter Woon, The Making of the ASEAN Charter (World Scientific Publishing, Singapore 2009), 
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87 Dian Triansyah Djani, 'A Long Journey' in Tommy Koh, Rosario G. Manolo and Walter Woon, The 
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ASEAN Charter, it is this document together with the continuous expansion and 
deepening of cooperation among the ASEAN Member States that necessitate an 
adaption of the ASEAN Way. If not, ASEAN cannot maintain a meaningful role in 
Southeast Asian affairs and maintain and broaden its external relations. Alatas 
seems to share the same line of thinking, as he already noted in 2009 that the 
ASEAN Way has managed to maintain peace and stability thus far, but that current 
and future challenges call for changes in the informal ASEAN Way.90 Indeed, while 
the ASEAN Way implied what Shunmugam Jayakumar described as 
“organizational minimalism” 91  and a preference for informality, ASEAN’s 
increased level of integration affects the relevance of the notions.  
The ASEAN Charter in fact shows a changing attitude, at least on paper. While 
Yuen Foong Khong commented at the end of the millennium that “ASEAN officials 
have contrasted their approach to [those] that emphasize legal contracts, formal 
declarations, majoritarian rules, and confrontational negotiation tactics”, 92  the 
ASEAN Charter deals for instance with the settlement of disputes (Chapter VIII of 
the ASEAN Charter). Article 22(2) ASEAN Charter states that “ASEAN shall 
maintain and establish dispute settlement mechanisms in all fields of ASEAN 
cooperation”. In addition, new topics have been included. A vivid example, and 
subject of this research, is the inclusion of human rights and other related principles, 
which also led to the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration, human rights documents 
that specifically focus on vulnerable groups, and human rights organs. 
The ASEAN Charter, which codified “all ASEAN norms, rules and values” and 
reaffirmed “principles, goals and ideals contained in ASEAN’s milestone 
agreements”93 is indeed an important document for nuancing ASEAN’s values and 
principles. The ASEAN Charter reiterates not only principles governing interstate 
behaviour such as the non-use of force or threat of force, peaceful settlement of 
disputes and non-interference in internal affairs, but also mentions norms dealing 
with the relationship between the Member State and its citizens. Domestic affairs 
according to the Charter should be in conformity with good governance, 
                                                          
90  This observation was made in the keynote address of Ali Alatas during the Expert Roundtable 
Discussion on The Road to Ratification and Implementation of the ASEAN Charter, to which is 
referred by Pavin Chachavalpongpun, 'Introduction' in Pavin Chachavalpongpun (ed), The Road to 
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democracy, social justice and equitable access to opportunities.94 The principles 
enshrined in Article 2(g) to 2(j) of the Charter are new: 
 
(g) Enhanced consultations on matters seriously affecting the common interest of 
ASEAN; 
(h) Adherence to the rule of law, good governance, the principles of democracy and 
constitutional government; 
(i) Respect for fundamental freedoms, the promotion and protection of human 
rights, and the promotion of social justice; 
(j) Upholding the United Nations Charter and international law, including 
international humanitarian law, subscribed to by ASEAN Member States; 
 
As these principles affect the ideas on the State sovereignty, the ASEAN Way is in 
need of reinterpretation. In addition, these principles should enhance the 
accountability of the organisation, of which their importance was especially stressed 
by Indonesia.95 The circumstance that Member States were still wary of intrusion in 
their domestic affairs at the time of the adoption of the ASEAN Charter, can also be 
deduced from the following ASEAN principles as enshrined in Article 2 of the 
Charter: 
  
(e) Non-interference in the internal affairs of ASEAN member states; 
(f) Respect for the rights of every member state to lead its national existence free for 
external influence, subversion and coercion;  
[…] 
(k) Abstention from participation in any policy or activity, including the use of its 
territory, pursued by any ASEAN Member State or non-ASEAN State or any non-
State actor, which threatens the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political and 
economic stability of ASEAN Member States; 
 
Furthermore, from the ASEAN Way follows a State-centric approach while 
ASEAN strives to become more people-oriented. One can see that these newly 
included principles are restricted by the old conservative values that have been 
present since ASEAN’s establishment. Dewi Fortuna Anwar observed in this 
respect that some critics on the ASEAN Charter fear that it may become more 
difficult to address human rights violations in the Member States now that the old 
principles are included in the ASEAN Charter. In particular, addressing one’s 
human rights violations could be considered as breaching another codified ASEAN 
                                                          
94 Pavin Chachavalpongpun, 'Introduction' in Pavin Chachavalpongpun (ed), The Road to Ratification 
and Implementation of the ASEAN Charter (ASEAN Studies Centre Report No 3, ISEAS Publishing, 
Singapore 2009), p. 6. 
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principle, namely the principle of non-interference. 96  While this observation is 
correct, the principles that ASEAN included in the Charter are equally important, 
which could nuance Anwar’s observation. 
From the analysis of ASEAN key instruments follows that the principles of non-
interference and consensus are important principles to ASEAN. Therefore, these 
principles are analysed more closely. 
 
The principle of non-interference 
Severino rightly stressed that the principle of non-interference is not invented by 
ASEAN, as the principle evolved from the time of the Peace of Westphalia 
(1648).97 Muntarbhorn aptly highlighted Severino’s observation: 
 
The frequent implication is that of the “doctrine”, policy or practice peculiar to 
ASEAN, as if the Association had invented it. Sometimes the criticism amounts to 
hackling or jeering. The public complaints have arisen in recent years, most of them 
in commentaries about certain events or situations in Southeast Asia. The leading 
issues have been East Timor, the haze arising from land and forest fires in Indonesia, 
the financial crisis of 1997-8, and above all, Myanmar and the question of human 
rights in general. Most of the commentaries do not specify what precisely ASEAN as 
an association or its member-States should have done about these situations; they 
have generally been appeals to simply “do something” about the problem, blaming 
ASEAN’s failure to act on the member states’ rigid adherence to the principle of 
non-interference. There seems to be an element of frustration in this, in the face of 
the international community’s apparent helplessness or the region’s inaction.98 
 
Yet, a strong emphasis on the principle of non-interference throughout the years is a 
distinctive feature of ASEAN, as is visible in the analysis of ASEAN’s key 
documents. According to Theodor Rathgeber, this principle remains prevalent: 
 
Despite the formal acknowledgement of the international involvement, member 
states of ASEAN continue to define the state’s interest in the human rights context 
predominantly in terms of public order, political stability, economic welfare and 
further instruments to maintain the state’s sovereignty against “international 
intervention” on human rights.99 
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Relationship’ (2104) 33 (3) Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs 131, p. 160, hereby referring to 
Seth R. Harris, ‘Asian Human Rights: Forming a Regional Covenant’ (2000) 1 (17) Asian-Pacific Law 
& Policy Journal 1, Jack Donnelly, ‘The Relative Universality of Human Rights’ (2007) 29 Human 
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Possible explanations for including the principle of non-interference in 
ASEAN’s affairs from the organisation’s commencement could be the colonial 
experiences of almost all Member States and the attempts of former colonisers to 
regain power in early post-colonial times, the threat of communist China during the 
country’s Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution and the existing political, 
economic, cultural and historical diversity among the Member States.100 The strict 
adherence might also be explained by the diversity that exists among the Member 
States. Noel L. Morada’s observation is in this regard relevant, who stated that 
“[t]he pluralist nature of ASEAN essentially limits the capacity of the organization 
to respond effectively to crisis situations within member states that stem from 
political or identity-based conflicts”.101 
The principle of non-interference is, however, not static. It is observed that the 
principle is not as strong as at the start of ASEAN and continues to be tested and 
evolve. 102  In addition, the closed-door meetings affect the transparency of the 
organisation: 
 
[I]t is in these closed-door meetings that ASEAN, in a sense, interfere[s] in the 
internal situations, that, this is where they really discuss things openly. And, outside 
the glare of media [they] are able to come to compromised solutions. So, they find 
this very useful. They do it all the time (…) Play golf, for example. It’s a standard 
informal meeting of ASEAN Officials. There is always a session to play golf as well, 
they discuss many things. And it is in these meetings they are able to discuss very 
contentious issues, which are… can be viewed as interference. So in a way, they have 
been interfering in the internal affairs of one another, but I guess it is really through 
                                                                                                                                              
Rights Quarterly 281 and Jack Donnelly, Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice (Cornell 
University Press, Ithaca 2003). Davies considers these kinds of observations within realist scholarship, 
which “suggests the Declaration reveals both the disinterest of member states in human rights concerns 
and the primacy of traditional state-security concerns”; Mathew Davies, ‘An Agreement to Disagree: 
The ASEAN Human Rights Declaration and the Absence of Regional Identity in Southeast Asia’ 
(2014) 33 (3) Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs 107, p. 108. Setting this aside, together with 
constructivism and what he describes as acculturalist approach, he argues that “the Declaration reveals 
that human rights norms are clearly important to ASEAN members, but this importance has taken very 
different forms in each state, resulting in member states’ diverging motives in approaching the subject”; 
Mathew Davies, ‘An Agreement to Disagree: The ASEAN Human Rights Declaration and the Absence 
of Regional Identity in Southeast Asia’ (2014) 33 (3) Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs 107, 
pp. 108-109. 
100  Rodolfo C. Severino, ASEAN (Southeast Asia Background Series, Institute of Southeast Asian 
Studies, Singapore 2008), p. 23. While it seems that mainly the colonial and post-colonial period 
influenced the importance of the principle of non-interference, the region was in the pre-colonial period 
also subject to foreign influence or occupation. Mainly Indian and Chinese influence occurred in terms 
or religion, trade, culture and politics. See for a short overview of the region’s history Peter Church 
(ed), A Short History of South-East Asia (John Wiley & Sons, Singapore 2009). 
101 Noel L. Morada, ‘Southeast Asian Regionalism, Norm Promotion and Capacity Building for Human 
Protection: An Overview’ (2016) 8 Global Responsibility to Protect 111, p. 112. 
102 According to one of the respondents during the fieldwork conducted in the period from September 
2009 until February 2010. Interview on file with the author. 
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the closed sessions. If you make that very transparent, then they are not prepared at 
this point. They are not… It’s not easy to discuss in public. So it is like a deliberation 
of the Cabinet of Ministers among themselves, which are privileged.103 
 
The fluidity of the principle of non-interference was also visible in the attitudes 
of Indonesian politician Yusuf Wanandi, Malaysia’s former Deputy Prime Minister 
Anwar Ibrahim, and former ASEAN Secretary-General Surin Pitsuwan, then in his 
capacity as Thai Foreign Minister. Already in 1997, Wanandi pleaded for a 
reinterpretation of the idea of non-interference given the Myanmar issue.104 In the 
same year, Anwar focussed on what he called “constructive intervention” or 
“constructive involvement” in order to prevent that regional problems would further 
escalate. 105  A year later, Pitsuwan also addressed the notion of constructive 
intervention during his speech at Thamassat University (Bangkok, 12 June 1998). 
He argued that the principle of non-intervention had to be adjusted for allowing 
“ASEAN to play a constructive role in preventing or resolving domestic issues with 
regional implications”. The ‘constructive intervention’ was shaped as a “form of 
peer pressure or friendly advice, when a matter of domestic concern poses a threat 
to regional stability”.106  
While a debate was prompted on how to reconcile the idea of non-interference 
or non-intervention with the idea of constructive intervention, the observation can 
be made that the latter seems to correspond to the notion of inclusiveness. In this 
way, ASEAN could strive to keep all ASEAN Member States on board. Mya Than 
rightly observed that this idea implied that interference in internal affairs should be 
possible in case the region’s stability or credibility was threatened by domestic 
issues.107 
The question is what kind of intervention is possible.108 John Funston observed 
that Pitsuwan made a plea for ‘flexible engagement’ in order to make it more 
appealing to the ASEAN Foreign Ministers.109 Even though the Ministers did not 
                                                          
103 According to one of the respondents during the fieldwork conducted in the period from September 
2009 until February 2010. Discussed in light of the lack of transparency and an improvement step by 
step; interview on file with the author. 
104  See Pushpa Thambipillai, 'Challenges to the ASEAN Way: Musyawarah and non-interference' 
(2000) 18 Kajian Malaysia, 157, p. 166, referring to Jusuf Wanandi, ‘A Lesson for ASEAN’ Far 
Eastern Economic Review (24 July 1997). 
105 Anwar Ibrahim, ‘Crisis Prevention’ Newsweek (21 July 1997), amongst others referred to by David 
Capie and Paul Evans, The Asia-Pacific Security Lexicon (updated 2nd edn, ISEAS Publishing, 
Singapore 2007), p. 97. 
106 Mya Than, Myanmar in ASEAN: Regional Cooperation Experience (ISEAS Publications, Singapore 
2005), p. 19. 
107 Mya Than, Myanmar in ASEAN: Regional Cooperation Experience (ISEAS Publications, Singapore 
2005), p. 19. 
108 Mya Than, Myanmar in ASEAN: Regional Cooperation Experience (ISEAS Publications, Singapore 
2005), p. 19. But quiet intervention has occurred; Ibid, p. 20. 
109 ASEAN, Opening Statement by His Excellency Dr. Surin Pitsuwan Minister of Foreign Affairs of 
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adopt this concept as such, they did adopt the notion of ‘enhanced interaction’. An 
example is the ASEAN troika for Cambodia, which constituted of the Ministers of 
Foreign Affairs from Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand. The idea of 
constructive engagement arose again in 2009, which is described by Muntarbhorn 
as “avoiding hard pressure and adopting an assuaging tone”.110 He furthermore 
aptly referred to the words of the Thai Prime Minister at the inaugural ceremony of 
the AICHR in 2009: 
 
Our approach is a constructive one. For ASEAN, the issue of human rights is not 
about condemnation, but about awareness, empowerment and improvement. Through 
AICHR, we shall not only demonstrate to the world that human rights is a priority, 
but also show them realistic and constructive ways to deal with it — through the 
promotion of dialogue and cooperation — starting from issues of common concerns 
and interests, issues relating to the humanitarian side and issues that some of us may 
already set good examples, so we can share and reproduce best practices throughout 
the region.111 
 
Related to this, Muntarbhorn commented during an interview with the author in 
2009 that non-interference at the regional level implied that some States considered 
that human rights are more part of the internal affairs and not open to regional 
scrutiny, whereby it is key to bear in mind that this notion is raised by a few 
government officials, who do not define what they mean with this principle.112 This 
still seems to be the case, as Morada observed that “[s]ome member states are more 
sensitive to this issue as they consider it an interference in their internal affairs and 
a violation of asean’s traditional norms.”113 
This principle is at odds with the protection and promotion of human rights 
within ASEAN. Thambipillai noted that this principle is upheld in this area as 
Member States do not want to be criticised by fellow Member States. Hence, they 
do not criticise their fellow Member States in the event of human rights abuses. 
This corresponds to the overall picture regarding the stance of the Member States 
                                                                                                                                              
thailand-at-the-31st-asean-ministerial-meeting-manila-philippines-24-july-1998-2> last accessed 15 
September 2018 and John Funston, ASEAN and the Principle of Non-Intervention – Practice and 
Prospects (ISEAS Publishing, Singapore 2000). 
110  Vitit Muntarbhorn, Unity in Connectivity? Evolving Human Rights Mechanisms in the ASEAN 
Region (Nijhoff Law Specials, Brill, Leiden 2013), p. 188. Muntarbhorn hereby takes ASEAN 
involvement with Myanmar as an example, see pp. 187-188. 
111 ASEAN, Remarks by H.E. Abhisit Vejjajiva, Prime Minister of the Kingdom of Thailand, on the 
Occasion of the Inaugural Ceremony of the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights 
(AICHR), Cha-Am Hua Hin, Thailand, 23 October 2009, available at 
<http://asean.org/?static_post=remarks-by-he-abhisit-vejjajiva-prime-minister-of-the-kingdom-of-
thailand-on-the-occasion-of-the-inaugural-ceremony-of-the-asean-intergovernmental-commission-on-
human-rights-aichr> last accessed 15 September 2018. 
112 Interview with Vitit Muntarbhorn, Professor Emeritus of Law, Chulalongkorn University (Manila, 
13 November 2009). 
113 Noel L. Morada, ‘Southeast Asian Regionalism, Norm Promotion and Capacity Building for Human 
Protection: An Overview’ (2016) 8 Global Responsibility to Protect 111, p. 127. 
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with respect to the core UN human rights instruments, including their position on 
individual complaint procedures, as Section 2 of Chapter III showed. In addition, it 
is shown that arbitration and dispute settlement by the ICJ is in general also not 
accepted, or only in case the States in disputes agree to this settlement.  
Furthermore, Thambipillai remarked that proponents of this practice argue that it 
is bilateral sensitivity as well as harmony that are taken into account.114 On the 
other hand, Muntarhorn rightfully pointed out that the principle of non-interference 
needs to be read within the totality of international law, whereby he argued that this 
principle: 
 
(…) is balanced and counter balanced by other principles such as human rights and 
importantly, international peace and security. In particular, in the international 
setting, the advocacy of human rights vis-à-vis a State is not seen as interference in 
the internal affairs of the State but is part of international jurisdiction to protect those 
who are not adequately protected by the country of origin. This is evident every day 
in the UN in the daily discourse between the UN and States in regard to the need to 
promote and to protect human rights, and has been particularly ostensible in a 
country’s interrelationship with the new system known as UPR.115 
 
Due to ASEAN’s adherence to the principle of non-interference and State 
sovereignty, Morada distinguished ASEAN as a “pluralist international society”,116 
hereby referring to Alex J. Bellamy’s observation: 
 
For pluralists, the normative content of an international society is ‘limited to a mutual 
interest in the continued existence of the units comprising the society… manifested 
in the reciprocal recognition of state sovereignty and the norm of non-intervention.’ 
Pluralists also argue that an agreement among states about issues like human rights 
and redistributive justice is not possible even as they believe that ‘moral and political 
codes’ are rooted in specific cultural contexts and cannot be universal.117 
 
The current state of affairs is that the Member States are not yet willing to 
scrutinise each other due to the principle of non-interference. When following 
                                                          
114 Pushpa Thambipillai, 'Challenges to the ASEAN Way: Musyawarah and non-interference' (2000) 18 
Kajian Malaysia, 157, p. 165. 
115  Vitit Muntarbhorn, Unity in Connectivity? Evolving Human Rights Mechanisms in the ASEAN 
Region (Nijhoff Law Specials, Brill, Leiden 2013), p. 184. 
116 Noel L. Morada, ‘Southeast Asian Regionalism, Norm Promotion and Capacity Building for Human 
Protection: An Overview’ (2016) 8 Global Responsibility to Protect 111, p. 115.  
117 Alex J. Bellamy, ‘Introduction: International Society and the English School’ in Alex J. Bellamy 
(ed), International Society and Its Critiques (Oxford University Press, New York 2005), p. 10. As 
opposed to solidarists, “who consider states in an international society as having agreement or solidarity 
‘in developing and enforcing international law and where the use of force is considered legitimate in 
order to enforce the law…and the upholding of the society’s moral purpose’”, Noel L. Morada, 
‘Southeast Asian Regionalism, Norm Promotion and Capacity Building for Human Protection: An 
Overview’ (2016) 8 Global Responsibility to Protect 111, p. 115, citing Alex J. Bellamy, ‘Introduction: 
International Society and the English School’ in Alex J. Bellamy (ed) International Society and Its 
Critiques (New York, New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 10. 
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Morada’s idea of ASEAN as a pluralist international society, the ASEAN Member 
States cannot agree on an issue such as human rights protection. This, in turn, 
hampers the possibility to criticise each other’s human rights abuses as agreement 
of human rights is lacking. However, this is at odds with international law and the 
notion that human rights protection cannot be considered to be part of the internal 
affairs of a State alone. 
 
The principle of consensus 
The origins of the principle of consensus in decision-making have been traced by a 
number of authors to the Javanese and Malay ideas of musyawarah and mufakat 
(consultation and consensus),118 which take place between friends and brothers.119 
In other words, a decision must be made through a process of consultation between 
the ASEAN Member States in order to reach an agreement based on consensus. Its 
connection with other ASEAN principles becomes clear in Thambipilai’s apt 
description:  
 
The process [of musyawarah and mufakat] may take longer than that practiced in 
other (legalistic) international organisations as there is a vital need to sustain regional 
harmony (read: leadership harmony) in the absence of rules and procedures. The 
need to uphold outward unity and friendliness is of prime concern: the ‘we’ (united 
agreeable) against the ‘them’ (outsiders, out to destabilise us). Thus an intimate 
process of negotiation and musyawarah was necessary to arrive at an acceptable 
outcome ‘mufakat’- without clearly revealing the extent of the division, which 
formalised balloting would do. […] In short, ASEAN succumbed to the prolonged 
way of decision making, not addressing issues directly and openly; the process tried 
to accommodate varying opinions by engaging in a ‘saving face’ ritual. ASEAN was 
concerned with emphasising the process more than the substance of cooperation as 
the meagre end results seemed to support.  
 
ASEAN’s decision-making process by means of consensus, together with the 
organisation’s development from an institutionally loose framework to a formalised 
one, is considered by its proponents as an adequate way of approaching 
regionalism. In this way, confrontation is avoided. The possibility to ‘save face’ is 
furthermore preserved, which appears to be vital in preserving solidarity and 
cohesion within the organisation. 120  In fact, according to Tan See Seng, the 
                                                          
118 See for instance ASEAN, Opening Statement By H.E. Professor S. Jayakumar Minister for Foreign 
Affairs of Singapore, 30th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, Subang Jaya, 24-25 July 1997, 
<http://asean.org/?static_post=opening-statement-by-he-professor-sjayakumar-minister-for-foreign-
affairs-of-singapore> last accessed 15 September 2018. 
119 David Capie and Paul Evans, ‘The ASEAN Way’ in Sharon Siddique and Sree Kumar (eds), The 
2nd ASEAN Reader (ISEAS, Singapore 2003), p. 48, refer to former Indonesian Minister H. Subandrio. 
120 Muthiah Alagappa, ‘Institutional Framework. Recommendations for Change’ in Sharon Siddique 
and Sree Kumar (eds), The 2nd ASEAN Reader (ISEAS, Singapore 2003), p. 22. 
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principle of consensus contributes to ASEAN’s success as a regional 
organisation.121  
On the other hand, it is also recognised that this is becoming a problem and that 
it could lead the institution towards irrelevance if left unaddressed.122 Nevertheless, 
the principle of consensus remains prevalent in ASEAN affairs. In the field of 
human rights, the major downside is that consensus and the subsequent practice 
leads to an opaque decision-making process that is uncontrollable for its people and 
civil society. This hampers the ability of civil society to execute a process of checks 
and balances and is in contrast with ASEAN’s ambition to become a more people-
centred organisation. With respect to this people-centrality, Hoang has observed 
that this is indeed more rhetoric than reality: 
 
ASEAN by nature is intergovernmental, and is often complained as being ‘elitist’ and 
‘out of touch’ with ordinary people. Over the past decade, ASEAN has been trying to 
connect to the grassroots through consultation and engagement with many 
stakeholders, especially the business people and civil society, to get their views and 
feedbacks in making regional policy. However, many such consultations still focus 
more on form than substance, especially at the Summit level.123 
 
Moreover, the process lacks a certain degree of efficiency, which is also visible in 
the development of a regional human rights system.124 Related to the principle of 
consensus, is the observation that “the “ASEAN Way” came to symbolise exclusion 
of disagreeable but perhaps important regional issues, and the inclusion of 
commonly acceptable and non-controversial issues, chosen of course by handful of 
elites”.125 Bilateral meetings have, therefore, been used instead, as they are more 
suitable to discuss issues that proved to be too sensitive to discuss within ASEAN.  
The principle of consensus is codified in Article 20(1) ASEAN Charter. From 
this same article also follows that the consensus principle does not mean unanimity. 
Article 20(2) stipulates: “Where consensus cannot be achieved, the ASEAN 
Summit may decide how a specific decision can be made”. This leaves open the 
possibility that a decision is made on grounds other than consensus, although as 
said consensus is needed in order to deviate from consensus. This makes the effect 
of this possibility limited. Article 21 of the ASEAN Charter furthermore allows “a 
formula of flexible participation” in the implementation of economic commitments 
when consensus is reached to apply such procedure. This includes “ASEAN minus 
                                                          
121 See Seng Tan, ‘Minilateralism: A Way out of ASEAN’s Consensus Conundrum?’ [2017] (5) ASEAN 
Focus 9, p. 9. 
122 See Seng Tan, ‘Minilateralism: A Way out of ASEAN’s Consensus Conundrum?’ [2017] (5) ASEAN 
Focus 9, p. 9. 
123 Thi Ha Hoang, ‘Five Decades of ASEAN’s Evolution’ [2017] (5) ASEAN Focus 2, p. 3. 
124 Muthiah Alagappa, ‘Institutional Framework. Recommendations for Change’ in Sharon Siddique 
and Sree Kumar (eds), The 2nd ASEAN Reader (ISEAS, Singapore 2003), p. 22. 
125 Pushpa Thambipillai, 'Challenges to the ASEAN Way: Musyawarah and non-interference' (2000) 18 
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X formula”, which is described as a “coalition of the willing”126  that “enables 
economic liberalisation between two or more ASEAN states so long as the 
remaining member countries agree to come on board at a later stage”.127 In other 
words, there must be a consensual decision of all Member States that states that 
ASEAN can come to a decision that is not based on unanimity. This truly reflects 
Noordin Sopiee’s observation that consensus in the ASEAN context means 




Given the size of and diversity on the Asian continent, Asia cannot be captured in 
one organisation. This chapter shows that ASEAN was one of the regional alliances 
that were formed in Southeast Asia. ASEAN hereby proved to be a key organisation 
in the region. This chapter focuses on ASEAN’s integration, which eventually led 
to the inclusion of human rights as one of the topics of cooperation, and the 
challenges that ASEAN faces in pursuing their increased level of integration. From 
this analysis, ASEAN’s modus operandi was deduced, which was further analysed 
in the remainder of this chapter. 
While the organisation commenced as a security organisation bringing together 
like-minded States, regional cooperation among the ASEAN Member States 
intensified both in substance, as well as in level of formality, which is captured in 
the different ASEAN instruments as discussed in Subsection 2.2. In addition, 
ASEAN expanded in terms of membership, adding to the diversity among its 
Members. Political solidarity, implementing agreements, cooperating at a more 
intensified level, and ensuring compliance proved to be a challenge to the 
organisation.  
Evolving from loose and informal methods of cooperation, the basis of their 
cooperation is nowadays more solidified in the ASEAN Charter and further 
developed in the roadmaps (further discussed in the following chapter in relation to 
human rights). This embodies the ambition to grow from cooperation to integration.  
Although the ASEAN Charter provides the organisation legal personality and 
divides the areas of cooperation in the ASEAN Political Security Community, 
ASEAN Economic Community and the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community, most 
important for this research is the inclusion of a human rights system. Indeed, the 
ASEAN Charter led to the adoption of the ASEAN Human Rights Body alongside 
the ASEAN Commission for the Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Women 
and Children and ASEAN Committee on the Implementation of the ASEAN 
                                                          
126  David Capie and Paul Evans, The Asia-Pacific Security Lexicon (updated 2nd edn, ISEAS 
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Declaration on the Protection and Promotion of the Rights of Migrant Workers, as 
well as the adoption of the organisation’s own general human rights declaration and 
human rights declarations that focus on vulnerable groups. However, the reference 
to the national level and particularities as well as principles of the ASEAN Way 
continue to be visible in ASEAN and pose an important challenge. While the 
ASEAN Way is analysed in the previous section, the other elements are further 
scrutinised in relation to human rights in the following chapter. 
With respect to the ASEAN Way, the ASEAN documents discussed reveal a 
number of reoccurring values and goals. They can be summarised as equal 
partnership, good understanding, good neighbourliness, mutual trust, confidence 
building and mutual respect for the independence, sovereignty, equality, territorial 
integrity and national identity of each Member State, the right of every State to lead 
its national existence free from external interference, subversion or coercion, self-
determination and non-interference in the internal affairs of one another, preventive 
diplomacy, peaceful settlement of differences and disputes, renunciation of the 
threat or use of force, and effective cooperation based on dialogue, consultation and 
consensus.  
Although they are – naturally – not only typical for ASEAN, the way in which 
they are intertwined and interpreted displays distinct features, which is captured in 
the ASEAN Way, which in turn is always present in ASEAN affairs. According to 
this modus operandi, it is often said that the developments within ASEAN proceed 
on the basis of the lowest common denominator. This is described as the level of 
comfort to which all Member States agree. This chapter illustrates that the ASEAN 
Way is in fact subjected to an ongoing reinterpretation and that changes within this 
ASEAN Way have taken place. 
The inclusion of human rights on the agenda of ASEAN also implies that the 
traditional interpretation of these ASEAN values has to be reinterpreted, such as the 
principle of non-interference. Reinterpreting the values in a less strict manner is 
necessary in order to implement the Roadmap for ASEAN until 2025, and in 
particular with respect to the promotion and protection of human rights. ASEAN 
claims that it strives to become, and ultimately be, a people-oriented, outward-
looking community. This necessitates a reinterpretation of the ASEAN Way, as this 
modus operandi is very much a State centric one. 
While proponents of the ASEAN Way argued that it has benefitted ASEAN, this 
chapter shows that this modus operandi overall negatively affects the possibilities 
for the development of a meaningful human rights system. In particular, the 
ASEAN Way affects the substantive element of human rights, as well as the 
mechanisms to protect and promote human rights and the question whether 
ASEAN’s human rights system is building upon, or detracting from, the 
universality of human rights at the level of concepts, conceptions and 
















The previous chapter showed that ASEAN took steps to embrace more areas of 
cooperation, including human rights. It demonstrated that this commitment is 
mirrored in a number of ASEAN instruments, which resulted in the adoption of an 
ASEAN Human Rights Declaration and the creation of three regional human rights 
bodies. According to Michael Vatikiotis, adherence to ASEAN’s principles is 
important. This includes respect for fundamental freedoms and the promotion and 
protection of human rights and social justice (Article 2(i) ASEAN Charter): 
 
It is important […] for ASEAN not to lose sight of the principles enshrined in the 
ASEAN Charter, which in its preamble declares respect for and protection of human 
rights and fundamental freedoms. One key reason for this is that for ASEAN to 
continue to serve as the cornerstone of regional socio-economic cooperation and 
security, there must be a framework of norms and values to which member states are 
expected to adhere.1 
 
This chapter scrutinises ASEAN’s cooperation and initiatives in the field of 
human rights. Discussions in the ASEAN region revolved around universalism and 
relativistic attitudes in the form of ‘Asian values’ in the early 1990’s, which 
affected the development of ASEAN’s regional human rights system. Therefore, 
these issues are first addressed before moving on to ASEAN’s human rights system. 
  
2 HUMAN RIGHTS AND ASEAN: UNIVERSALISM, RELATIVISM AND ASIAN 
VALUES 
 
The contextualisation of human rights in Southeast Asia took place within the 
debate on the universality of human rights and relativistic attitudes towards these 
rights. Chapter II showed that while universalism and cultural relativism were 
initially brought as each other’s extremes on the spectrum of the universality of 
human rights, it might be better to use Donnelly’s idea of relative universality in 
which this dichotomy is circumvented. From this follows that while the universality 
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of human rights is the common goal, human rights can be relative in various ways. 
Consequently, there is room for certain particularities. 
Relativism in the Southeast Asian region was initially proposed by a limited 
number of States in the Asian values debate. This debate reached its peak in the 
early 1990s and was mainly led by the former Singaporean and Malaysian Prime 
Ministers, respectively Lee Kuan Yew and Mahathir Mohamad. They argued that 
human rights were a Western concept too distant from Asian ideas on the individual 
and its role within society. Alternatively, they argued for an Asian approach 
towards human rights, mainly based on a different balance between the individual 
and society.  
When looking back at the 1993 World Conference in Vienna in relation to 
relativistic viewpoints that were present in the ASEAN region (see also Chapter II, 
Section 3.4), Muntarbhorn made the following observation:  
 
Governments were quite willing to advocate at that time regional particularities of 
certain rather ethnocentric kind or slightly Asian centric kind, while the NGOs 
themselves were taking a more universal approach. What happened in the Vienna 
World Conference is that we had this famous paragraph whereby while of course one 
recognises to some extent the regional particularities, it is the duty of all countries to 
abide by human rights and international law, so it is the prevalence of international 
standards over regional particularities, as accepted by everyone in Vienna. But 
regional particularities, so to speak, is a sort of expression of various concerns in the 
region, sometimes put as Asian values, but I think that, as I said, while both the terms 
particularities and values are raised periodically, today they are less raised than 
before 1997.2 
 
Leena Avonius and Damien Kingsbury observed that parts of the Bangkok 
Declaration expressed the main issues of what was brought forward as Asian 
values, that is to say, the right to self-determination that is linked to the policy of 
non-interference, claims to cultural specificity and prioritising economic 
development,3 thus also including an element which is overall linked to the ASEAN 
Way. An ASEAN spokesperson characterised societies based on Asian values “as 
disciplined group-oriented rather than atomised, and valuing duty to the community 
over the assertion of rights. These societies are further said to feature consensus-
seeking and a deferential respect for public officials and institutions in the interest 
of public hegemony”.4 
According to Muntarbhorn, the Asian values argument in essence revolves 
around the idea that “individuals do not take precedence over the interests of the 
                                                          
2 Interview with Vitit Muntarbhorn, Professor Emeritus of Law, Chulalongkorn University (Manila, 13 
November 2009). 
3 Leena Avonius and Damien Kingsbury, ‘Introduction’ in Leena Avonius and Damien Kingsbury 
(eds), Human Rights in Asia. A Reassessment of the Asian Values Debate (Palgrave Macmillan, New 
York 2008), p. 4. 
4 Liann Thio, ‘Implementing human rights in ASEAN countries: “Promises to keep and miles to go 
before I sleep”’ (1999) 2 Yale Human Rights and Development Law Journal 1, p. 2. 
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family and community and the decision-making power of governments or States”.5 
Other values that were brought forward as ‘Asian values’ during the Asian values 
debate of the early and mid-1990s are hard work, respect for authority, strong 
family ties, reverence for education, thrift, teamwork, balance between the 
individual’s interests and those of society, modesty, integrity and desire for 
continuous improvement.6 This being said, it is relevant to note that these values 
were explicitly brought forward prior to the economic crisis of 1997-98. 
Muntarbhorn commented in this respect as follows: 
 
If you look at the literature later, it does not get into those specifics so much. It is 
only some countries that raise them. But all this was dampened with the economic 
crash, because some ASEAN authorities were very confident about themselves 
before 1997, they were less confident after the economic crash of 1997. That is why, 
I think, you don’t find ultra-advocacy of Asian values or ASEAN values today, 
unlike in the pre-1997 period. And certainly some governments would try to erase or 
block reference to Asian values.7 
 
As said before, Asian values were emphasised by only a limited number of 
States. This was, in fact, one of the points of critique on the Asian values debate. In 
particular, although known as Asian values, the term is misleading with respect to 
the geographical scope it refers to. Amartya Sen pointed out that “cultural diversity 
and heterogeneity of the population throughout Asia makes the existence of some 
quintessential values separating Asians as a group of people from the rest of the 
world impossible”.8 Indeed, while Asian values were proposed as values commonly 
shared by Asian States, Kim Dae Jung, former President of South Korea, was for 
instance fiercely opposed to these anti-democratic values. 9  Related to this, 
Muntarbhorn commented that “if you use the term Asian values, you are falling into 
the trap of abiding by the opinions of two or three countries, rather than the more 
diverse opinions from countries at large, as well as NGOs”.10 In addition, others 
have observed that one can speak of Asian exceptionalism, or an “identitarian 
exceptionalism”, “highlighting the particular ‘nature’ of Asia, where the 
                                                          
5 Vitit Muntarbhorn, Asian Perspective on Human Rights: Perceptions Programmes and Practices 
Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights, Bangkok 2002), p. 7. 
6 Liann Thio, ‘Implementing human rights in ASEAN countries: “Promises to keep and miles to go 
before I sleep”’ (1999) 2 Yale Human Rights and Development Law Journal 1, p. 2. 
7 Interview with Vitit Muntarbhorn, Professor Emeritus of Law, Chulalongkorn University (Manila, 13 
November 2009). 
8 Leena Avonius and Damien Kingsbury, ‘Introduction’ in Leena Avonius and Damien Kingsbury 
(eds), Human Rights in Asia. A Reassessment of the Asian Values Debate (Palgrave Macmillan, New 
York 2008), p. 7. 
9 Dae Jung Kim, ‘Is Culture Destiny? The Myth of Asia’s Anti-Democratic Values’ Foreign Affairs, 
(November/December 1994), <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/southeast-asia/1994-11-
01/culture-destiny-myth-asias-anti-democratic-values> last accessed 19 September 2018. 
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coexistence of so many religions, cultures, and traditions has prevented the creation 
of a unique Asian identity”.11  
Diverging stances were indeed present in the ASEAN region as Member States 
such as Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand favoured universal human rights. 
Rafendi Djamin noted in this respect that some people in power used the term 
‘Asian values’ as a justification when human rights abuses occurred.12  Medina 
observed that the Asian values argument was never accepted by the Philippine and 
Indonesian Governments. Instead, it was pushed by some countries, whereby the 
rest of the world assumed that the whole of Southeast Asia thought in that way.13 
The Suharto period in Indonesia and the Marcos period in the Philippines, during 
which human rights were severely impeded, might explain the attitude of these 
States. After Suharto’s and Marcos’ fall, the call for democracy, the rule of law and 
human rights came from the citizens themselves.  
The stress on human rights was at times considered as a new form of Western 
imperialism. It was observed by one of the respondents during the fieldwork in 
2009 that some of the governments of ASEAN Member States “are weary of human 
rights, because human rights is [sic: are] associated with Western interference”.14 
According to this respondent, these Sates were at that time “Laos, Vietnam, maybe 
Cambodia, Myanmar, Brunei [Darussalam]. (...) Malaysia is improving. Singapore 
is also improving, because there are more civil society groups”.15  
As Thailand was not colonised by Western powers, its experience with this then 
newly considered form of Western influence was different from its fellow ASEAN 
Member States that had been colonised. This could explain why Thailand also did 
not adopt the Asian values argument and instead sided with Indonesia and the 
Philippines. Other Member States, which were either non-democratic or democratic 
                                                          
11  Attilio Pisanò, ‘Human Rights and Sovereignty in the ASEAN Path Towards a Human Rights 
Declaration’ (2014) 15 Human Rights Review 391, p. 392 conform Ben Saul, Jacqueline Mowbray and 
Irene Baghoomians, ‘Resistance to Regional Human Rights Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific: 
Demythologizing Regional Exceptionalism by learning from the Americas, Europe and Africa’ in 
Hitoshi Nasu and Ben Saul (eds), Human Rights in the Asia-Pacific Region. Towards Institution 
Building (Routledge, London 2011). 
12 Interview with Rafendi Djamin, Regional Director for South East Asia and Pacific of Amnesty 
International and former Executive Director of the Human Rights Working Group as well as former 
Indonesian Representative for the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights from 
2009-2015 (Jakarta, 19 October 2009). 
13 Interview with Carlos Medina, Director of the Ateneo Law Faculty’s Human Rights Center at Ateneo 
de Manila University (Manila, 10 November 2009). 
14 According to one of the respondents during the fieldwork conducted in the period from September 
2009 until February 2010. Interview on file with the author. 
15 According to one of the respondents during the fieldwork conducted in the period from September 
2009 until February 2010. Interview on file with the author. According to Davies, the following 
categorisation in terms or progressiveness towards human rights can be made. Progressive are 
Indonesia and the Philippines, the middle category consists of Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand, while 
the conservative States are Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Vietnam, and Brunei Darussalam; Mathew 
Davies, ‘An Agreement to Disagree: The ASEAN Human Rights Declaration and the Absence of 
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with severe restrictions, were hesitant of or opposed human rights and the 
development of a regional human rights system.  
From this follows that the Asian values argument was used as a political tool. In 
this respect, Muntarbhorn’s observation that “a major concern is not only the 
content of what constitutes Asian values but also “who is making the argument?”16 
is relevant. He observed that “the danger of this argument is that it is a viewpoint 
instrumentalised by less liberal or authoritarian governments or regimes for their 
own political end and survival rather than the genuine interests of individuals and 
communities”17 In this respect, Kofi Annan’s commented: 
 
[I]t was never the people who complained of the universality of human rights, nor did 
the people consider human rights as a Western or Northern imposition. It was often 
their leaders who did so.18 
 
Related to this, Muntarbhorn made the following observations based on his work as 
Special Representative of the UN Secretary General for human rights in Cambodia: 
 
I would add that during my years as Special Representative of the UN Secretary 
General for human rights in Cambodia, I had numerous occasions to discuss those 
rights with oppressed and poor people. I was struck by the way in which they, in 
particular women, powerfully put their problems in terms of human rights. Not once 
was I told these rights were “Western” and irrelevant to them; not on a single 
occasion did my interlocutors refer to “Asian values” as opposed to human rights.19 
 
Nonetheless, Muntarbhorn does not deny that there are “Values in Asia”, which he 
summarised as guardian values. 20  Examples are compassion, non-violence, and 
respect for other human beings and the natural environment, but he stressed that 
these values are rather universal in content rather than ethnocentric in emphasis.21 
Alongside the criticism of being a political tool, the Asian values debate lacks a 
solid (philosophical) foundation. In fact, on the one hand, the ASEAN Member 
States argued that the ASEAN Members are historically, politically and religiously 
speaking diverse. Specifically, they underlined the achievement of ASEAN to unify 
                                                          
16 Vitit Muntarbhorn, Asian Perspective on Human Rights: Perceptions Programmes and Practices 
Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights, Bangkok 2002), p. 8. 
17 Vitit Muntarbhorn, Asian Perspective on Human Rights: Perceptions Programmes and Practices 
Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights, Bangkok 2002), p. 8. 
18 Quoted by Peter Leuprecht, ‘Universality and Diversity’ in Colleen Sheppard and François Crépeau 
(eds), Human Rights and Diverse Societies: Challenges and Possibilities (Cambridge Scholars 
Publishing, Newcastle upon Tyne 2013), p. 9. 
19  Peter Leuprecht, ‘Universality and Diversity’ in Colleen Sheppard and François Crépeau (eds), 
Human Rights and Diverse Societies: Challenges and Possibilities (Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 
Newcastle upon Tyne 2013), p.10. 
20 Interview with Vitit Muntarbhorn, Professor Emeritus of Law, Chulalongkorn University (Manila, 13 
November 2009). 
21 Vitit Muntarbhorn, Asian Perspective on Human Rights: Perceptions Programmes and Practices 
Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights, Bangkok 2002), p. 8. 
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these different Member States, thereby maintaining peace and security. On the other 
hand, within the Asian values debate a number of the ASEAN Members stressed 
the common values which the States have. It was argued that these values should 
form the basis of a human rights system specific to the region and which would be 
different from the Western approach of human rights protection and promotion. 
These viewpoints seem to be difficult to coincide. 
As mentioned before, the stress on Asian particularities peaked in the early 
1990s. Muntarbhorn observed that “[i]t has been less advocated since then, but 
there are still some proponents”, although this is done on a lower profile than 
before.22 This appeal to Asian values was sparked again by Kishore Mahbubani 
around 2007, who received international attention for making this argument. 
Avonius and Kingsbury also noted that “incongruence between human rights 
rhetoric and practice remain commonplace in Asian countries”23 and that although 
the 1997 Asian financial crisis was assumed to set aside the Asian values argument, 
ten years later Asian States still continue to suppress political protests in name of 
national stability.24  
Given the stress on Asian values by certain ASEAN Member States in the past 
and relativistic attitudes in ASEAN documents, field research was conducted in the 
ASEAN region in the early stages of this research in 2009-10 (see more details in 
Section 3 of Chapter I on the methodology of this research). From this field 
research, the following can be concluded. 
When applying the notions of universalism and relativism (discussed in Section 
3.1 of Chapter II) to the ASEAN region, the field study pointed out that the ASEAN 
region was a mix of universalistic and relativistic ideas, although it was observed 
that the ASEAN Member States were in general moving more towards a 
universalistic attitude towards human rights. While a high number of the 
respondents were of the opinion that there is a Southeast Asian context in which 
human rights should be interpreted, it was difficult to clarify what this context 
comprises.  
Values that have been brought forward as Asian values during the Asian values 
debate in the early and mid-1990s were often not considered as legitimate factors by 
the respondents in the human rights debate. In line with the literature, the 
respondents generally also questioned whether these values are typically Asian, or 
whether this was only an impression. In line with the observations made above, it 
was noted that Asian values were brought forward by especially Malaysia and 
Singapore as seemingly regionally shared values, while they were in fact not 
                                                          
22 Interview with Vitit Muntarbhorn, Professor Emeritus of Law, Chulalongkorn University (Manila, 13 
November 2009). 
23 Leena Avonius and Damien Kingsbury, ‘Introduction’ in Leena Avonius and Damien Kingsbury 
(eds), Human Rights in Asia. A Reassessment of the Asian Values Debate (Palgrave Macmillan, New 
York 2008), p. 6. 
24 Leena Avonius and Damien Kingsbury, ‘Introduction’ in Leena Avonius and Damien Kingsbury 
(eds), Human Rights in Asia. A Reassessment of the Asian Values Debate (Palgrave Macmillan, New 
York 2008), p. 6. 
 
 
ASEAN and Human Rights 
 149 
adopted as regional values by all ASEAN Member States. It was difficult to 
determine a certain distinctiveness, because Asian values were not echoed in all 
ASEAN Member States due to the diversity within the region and each Member 
State. Respondents did not always agree with each other if and how the Asian 
values argument was used in their respective State and what the content of these 
values was. This is contradictory to the geographical scope the Asian values 
argument implied. 
The argument made by NGOs is also in line with literature. Instead of focussing 
on how particularities could be taken into account while respecting human rights 
standards, the Asian values debate was often used politically. Specifically, Asian 
values were according to NGOs often used as an excuse for governments for not yet 
complying with certain human rights standards. This explains why Cambodia, Laos, 
Myanmar and Vietnam, which are generally considered to be more conservative 
when it comes to human rights, also sided with Malaysia and Singapore. For them, 
these values became also an excuse for not yet complying with international human 
rights standards. 
 




The previous chapter provided a short account of ASEAN’s integration. Although 
ASEAN started as a security organisation, during ASEAN’s gradual development it 
also became possible to incorporate human rights into its structure. This section 
focuses on the way in which human rights became entrenched in the organisation. 
In line with ASEAN’s integration, the inclusion of human rights followed an 
evolutionary path. Important to bear in mind is Muntarhorn’s observation that 
ASEAN is a political and security organisation with economic leaning, rather than a 
human rights organisation. This, he rightfully argued, brings about another mind-
set.25 
This section shows that human rights topics are addressed in numerous ASEAN 
instruments. In these documents, human rights are dealt with in general or 
according to different themes, in terms of universal concerns, or under the heading 
of different vulnerable groups. As addressed in the previous section, relativism in 
the form of Asian values mainly flourished in the early 1990s until the Asian 
economic crisis of 1997-98 and entailed a call for Asian particularities that seemed 
to move away from the universalist human rights framework. Yet, human rights 
initiatives were taken up in the ASEAN region in the same period. This bodes the 
question what the motives were for including these human rights initiatives. In 
order to attain a better insight into the divergence between, what seems, political 
                                                          
25 Interview with Vitit Muntarbhorn, Professor Emeritus of Law, Chulalongkorn University (Manila, 13 
November 2009). Muntarborn put the issue in a different angle, by asking the question “Is NATO, for 
example, to address human rights?”. 
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rhetoric and actual formal acceptance, key ASEAN instruments addressing human 
rights are studied in a chronological order.  
A number of these documents date from the period before the ASEAN Ministers 
stated their ambition to develop a common approach to human rights in 1993. 
Nevertheless, this year can be used as a general starting point, as a common general 
stance on human rights was first expressed during the 1993 ASEAN Ministerial 
Meeting. This was followed by numerous declarations, resolutions and other 
documents over the years. They show that the recent human rights initiatives in the 
form of a human rights declaration, and the establishment of the ASEAN 
Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights, the ASEAN Commission on 
Women and Children and ASEAN Committee on Migrant Workers are not isolated 
efforts but part of ASEAN’s initiatives on human rights over the years.  
Section 2 of Chapter IV scrutinised ASEAN’s integration towards an ASEAN 
Community. In this section, a specific focus lies on the evolutionary approach 
towards the inclusion of human rights as topic of common concern.  
 
3.2 ASEAN’s human rights (oriented) instruments 
 
As early as 1976, the Declaration of ASEAN Concord (Bali Concord I, 1976) 
addressed topics of cooperation in economic and social development, which also 
related to human rights. The Declaration stated amongst others the following: “The 
elimination of poverty, hunger, disease and illiteracy is a primary concern of 
member states. They shall therefore intensify cooperation in economic and social 
development, with particular emphasis on the promotion of social justice and on the 
improvement of the living standards of their peoples.”26  
While this appears to be a human rights-oriented objective, this objective was 
part of ASEAN’s cooperation “in the pursuit of political stability”, 27  one of 
ASEAN’s core objectives. This Declaration mentioned six programmes of action: 
political, economic, social, cultural and information, security and improvement of 
the ASEAN machinery. The social area was relevant for human rights as well, as it 
mentioned cooperation in the area of social development, in which low-income 
groups and the rural population were accentuated. It also attributed special attention 
to women and youth, who continue to be key focal points of the organisation and 
are the focus of the ASEAN Commission on Women and Children. 
In the years after, ASEAN has been characterised by a growing cooperation, 
whereby certain areas of cooperation are linked to human rights. Such functional 
cooperation was one of the topics addressed in the 1987 Manila Declaration. Areas 
of cooperation that were openings for cooperation in the field of human rights were, 
                                                          
26 ASEAN, Declaration of ASEAN Concord, Bali, 24 February 1976, point 3. <https://asean.org/?static_ 
post=declaration-of-asean-concord-indonesia-24-february-1976> last accessed 19 September 2018. 
27 ASEAN, Declaration of ASEAN Concord, Bali, 24 February 1976, general declaration <https://asean. 
org/?static_post=declaration-of-asean-concord-indonesia-24-february-1976> last accessed 19 
September 2018.  
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inter alia, the increase of cooperation on health, the prevention of drug abuse and 
drug trafficking, labour, law, population, the welfare and survival of the child and 
socio-cultural programmes. 28  A number of these topics are still relevant and 
enshrined in the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration and topic of common concern 
on which ASEAN’s human rights commissions and committee are mandated. 
By the mid-1980s until the mid-1990s, other States joined ASEAN. 
Furthermore, the Asian values debate reached its peak and the Vienna Declaration 
and Programme of Action was formulated. Nevertheless, human rights topics were 
increasingly addressed. The 1988 Declaration of the Advancement of Women in the 
ASEAN Region was ASEAN’s first specific human rights declaration. 29  The 
Declaration was based on the acknowledgment that women fulfil numerous roles in 
society and that they should be able to participate and integrate actively in the 
region. In referring to the Manila Declaration, the ASEAN Ministers agreed that 
each Member State should make an effort to promote and implement equitable and 
effective participation of women in all spheres of life at the national, regional and 
international level. Women should be enabled to play a role and benefit from 
national and regional development. Member States should also include specific 
concerns for women in national plans, design and promote programmes, which 
reach to community and nongovernmental women organisations and promote 
harmonisation of views on women concerns.30 
Four years later, the 1993 Resolution on the ASEAN Plan of Action for Children 
was adopted.31 This Resolution referred to initiatives taken at the international level, 
specifically, the 1990 World Declaration on the Survival, Protection and 
Development of Children and the accompanying Plan of Action.32 Dealing with 
children (i.e. persons under 18 years), the Plan of Action stipulated child survival, 
protection, and development as its three priority areas. Specific issues and strategies 
were addressed, which included poverty and lack of access to basic needs and 
services, child abuse and trafficking, specific needs of children such as education 
and recreation. These policies were concerned with advocacy, networking, 
                                                          
28ASEAN, Manila Declaration, Manila, 15 December 1987, Article 19 available at <https://asean. 
org/?static_post=manila-declaration-philippines-15-december-1987> last accessed 19 September 2018. 
29 ASEAN, Declaration of the Advancement of Women in the ASEAN Region, Bangkok, 5 July 1988 
<https://asean.org/?static_post=declaration-of-the-advancement-of-women-in-the-asean-region-bangko 
k-thailand-5-july-1988> last accessed 19 September 2018. 
30 ASEAN, Declaration of the Advancement of Women in the ASEAN Region, Bangkok, 5 July 1988 
<https://asean.org/?static_post=declaration-of-the-advancement-of-women-in-the-asean-region-bangko 
k-thailand-5-july-1988> last accessed 19 September 2018. 
31  The resolution was prompted by the Fourth ASEAN Summit (Singapore, 27-29 January 1992), 
during which the development of children in ASEAN’s functional cooperation was amongst others 
addressed, and adopted on 2 December 1993; ASEAN, Resolution on the ASEAN Plan of Action for 
Children, Manila, 2 December 1993 <https://cil.nus.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/formidable/18/1993-
Resolution-On-The-ASEAN-Plan-Of-Action-For-Children-pdf.pdf> last accessed 19 September 2018. 
32 Agreed to at the UN World Summit for Children, see UN World Summit for Children, Declaration 
on the Survival, Protection and Development of Children and Plan of Action UN Doc. A/45/625, annex 
18 October 1990. 
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information sharing, training, and research. Alongside these initiatives, the Plan of 
Action called for the designation of Desk Officers for Children.33  
At the height of the Asian values debate, a Joint Communiqué was issued by the 
Foreign Ministers at the 26th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (Singapore, 23-24 July 
1993). This Joint Communiqué was the first official document that revealed a 
common ASEAN position on human rights. In order to grasp the sentiments at that 
time, these political statements can be read best in their original words: 
 
16. The Foreign Ministers welcomed the international consensus achieved during the 
World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna, 14-25 June 1993, and reaffirmed 
ASEAN's commitment to and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms as 
set out in the Vienna Declaration of 25 June 1993.They stressed that human rights are 
interrelated and indivisible comprising civil, political, economic, social and cultural 
rights. These rights are of equal importance. They should be addressed in a balanced 
and integrated manner and protected and promoted with due regard for specific 
cultural, social, economic and political circumstances. They emphasized that the 
promotion and protection of human rights should not be politicized. 
17. The Foreign Ministers agreed that ASEAN should coordinate a common 
approach on human rights and actively participate and contribute to the application, 
promotion and protection of human rights. They noted that the UN Charter had 
placed the question of universal observance and promotion of human rights within 
the context of international cooperation. They stressed that development is an 
inalienable right and that the use of human rights as a conditionality for economic 
cooperation and development assistance is detrimental to international cooperation 
and could undermine an international consensus on human rights. They emphasized 
that the protection and promotion of human rights in the international community 
should take cognizance of the principles of respect for national sovereignty, 
territorial integrity and non-interference in the internal affairs of states. They were 
convinced that freedom, progress and national stability are promoted by a balance 
between the rights of the individual and those of the community, through which 
many individual rights are realized, as provided for in the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights. 
18. The Foreign Ministers reviewed with satisfaction the considerable and continuing 
progress of ASEAN in freeing its peoples from fear and want, enabling them to live 
in dignity. They stressed that the violations of basic human rights must be redressed 
and should not be tolerated under any pretext. They further stressed the importance 
of strengthening international cooperation on all aspects of human rights and that all 
governments should uphold humane standards and respect human dignity. In this 
regard and in support of the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action of 25 June 
                                                          
33  ASEAN, Resolution on the ASEAN Plan of Action for Children, Manila, 2 December 1993 
<https://cil.nus.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/formidable/18/1993-Resolution-On-The-ASEAN-Plan-Of-
Action-For-Children-pdf.pdf> last accessed 19 September 2018. 
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1993, they agreed that ASEAN should also consider the establishment of an 
appropriate regional mechanism on human rights.34 
These statements captured ASEAN’s position on human rights, whereby they also 
stressed that human rights should not be politicised, nor be used as a condition for 
economic cooperation and development assistance. In addition, they acknowledged 
the importance of a regional approach and taking into account the regional context. 
Principles that are part of the ASEAN Way (explained in Section 3 of Chapter IV) 
were explicitly mentioned.  
It appears that ASEAN was divided about human rights, as the ASEAN Way 
does not seem to be open for thoroughgoing regional human rights cooperation, 
most notably protection and the redress of human rights violations. In addition, this 
Communiqué was issued in the early 1990s, the time when the Asian values debate 
reached its peak. As is shown in the previous section, this Asian values argument 
was often used by some States as a reason for not complying with international 
human rights standards, thus ensuring that these standards were lowered. 
Muntarbhorn observed that “[i]n essence, this [agreement that ASEAN should 
consider the establishment of an appropriate mechanism] was a nominal gesture 
rather than a substantive comment”.35 
The 1997 Asian financial crisis uncovered weaknesses in the ASEAN region 
and struck the region’s economy and stability. As stated before, it was generally 
believed that the principle of non-interference was a reason for the failure of 
ASEAN Member States to engage with the causes and consequences of this crisis.36 
The explicit stress on Asian values faded into the background with this financial 
crisis. The focus on women and children continued, and other vulnerable groups 
were addressed as well. Reference was made to the international human rights 
framework, for example to it strives to become, and ultimately be, the CEDAW and 
the CRC to which all the ASEAN Member States were already party at that time. 
The 1997 Hanoi Plan of Action (HPA) mainly focused on economic and 
financial cooperation instead of human rights. Davies commented in this regard that 
the HPA mentioned a need to “enhance [the] exchange of information in the field of 
human rights”, but that it did no more than that.37 Nevertheless, the HPA also 
contained initiatives relevant for human rights. Activities primarily involved rural 
development, poverty eradication (Chapter IV) and education (Chapter V). In 
addition, it focused on human trafficking in and violence against women and 
                                                          
34 ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, Joint Communiqué of the 26th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, Singapore, 
23-24 July 1993, paras. 16-18 <http://asean.org/?static_post=joint-communique-of-the-twenty-sixth-
asean-ministerial-meeting-singapore-23-24-july-1993>, last accessed 10 September 2018 
35  Vitit Muntarbhorn, Unity in Connectivity? Evolving Human Rights Mechanisms in the ASEAN 
Region (Nijhoff Law Specials, Brill, Leiden 2013), p. 108. 
36 Mathew Davies, ‘The ASEAN Synthesis: Human Rights, Non-Intervention, and the ASEAN Human 
Rights Declaration’ (2013) 14 Georgetown Journal of International Affairs 51, p. 52. 
37 Mathew Davies, ‘Explaining the Vientiane Action Programme: ASEAN and the Institutionalisation 
of Human Rights’ (2013) 26 The Pacific Review 385, pp. 387-391. 
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children, as well as the care for the elderly and the disabled, thereby setting the 
stage for ASEAN’s future ongoing focus on vulnerable people. The HPA also 
focused on youth and youth employment, who were also addressed earlier in the 
1997 Kuala Lumpur Agenda on ASEAN Youth Development and after the HPA, 
such as the Yangon 2000 Declaration on Preparing ASEAN Youth for the 
Challenges of Globalisation.  
The Hanoi Plan of Action mentioned the implementation of the ASEAN Plan of 
Action for Children and trafficking, crimes, and violence against women and 
children.38 Furthermore, the exchange of information in the field of human rights 
between the Member States should be increased in order to promote and protect all 
human rights, 39  without specifying what this meant. Alongside the regional 
framework, the international human rights regime was also addressed. “The 
promotion and protection of all human rights and fundamental freedoms of all 
peoples in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal 
Declaration on Human Rights and the Vienna Convention and Programme of 
Action”40 and “the full implementation of the Convention in the Rights of the Child 
and the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination” were 
stressed.41 The table in Annex 1 shows that all ASEAN Member States, except for 
Brunei Darussalam, were in fact party to the CEDAW and CRC around the time of 
the adoption of the VAP. Due to these focal points, it is observed that the HPA 
“started to invoke human rights more directly”.42 
The ASEAN Declaration on Transnational Crime (1997) 43 deals with various 
sorts of transnational crime like issues on narcotics and economic crimes, but also 
focuses on illegal migration and trafficking of people. This document is one of the 
relevant documents for the ASEAN Committee on Migrant Workers.  
The Declaration on the Commitments for Children in ASEAN (2001) focused, 
generally speaking, on “the survival, development, protection and participation of 
children”,44 whose rights have to be protected, recognised and respected “through 
                                                          
38  ASEAN, Hanoi Plan of Action, Hanoi, 15 December 1998, Articles 4.4 and 4.5 
<https://asean.org/?static_ post=hanoi-plan-of-action 2018> last accessed 15 September 2018. 
39 ASEAN, Hanoi Plan of Action, Hanoi, 15 December 1998, Article 4.8 <https://asean.org/?static_post 
=hanoi-plan-of-action 2018> last accessed 15 September 2018. 
40 ASEAN, Hanoi Plan of Action, Hanoi, 15 December 1998, Articles 4.8 and 4.9 <https://asean.org/? 
static_post=hanoi-plan-of-action 2018> last accessed 15 September 2018. 
41 ASEAN, Hanoi Plan of Action, Hanoi, 15 December 1998, Article 4.9 <https://asean.org/?static_ 
post=hanoi-plan-of-action 2018> last accessed 15 September 2018. 
42  Vitit Muntarbhorn, Unity in Connectivity? Evolving Human Rights Mechanisms in the ASEAN 
Region (Nijhoff Law Specials, Brill, Leiden 2013), p. 113. 
43 ASEAN, ASEAN Declaration on Transnational Crime, Manila, 20 December 1997 <http://asean.org 
/?static_post=asean-declaration-on-transnational-crime-manila-20-december-1997> last accessed 19 
September 2018. 
44  ASEAN, Declaration on the Commitments for Children, Singapore, 2 August 2001, Article 1 
<https:// cil.nus.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/formidable/18/2001-Declaration-on-the-Commitments-for-
Children-in-ASEAN.pdf> last accessed 19 September 2018. 
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mutual sharing of information on the rights of children by ASEAN members”.45 
Many of the provisions of this Declaration repeated the 1992 ASEAN Plan of 
Action for Children.  
The 2004 Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women in the 
ASEAN Region asserted in its preamble that, in accordance with the 1995 Beijing 
Declaration and Platform for Action,46 “violence against women is an obstacle to 
the achievement of equality, development and peace” as well as a violation of 
human rights.47  In order to tackle violence against women, the Member States 
should “promote an integrated and holistic approach”.48 Alongside a number of 
concrete actions, the Declaration included four focus areas: (a) providing 
appropriate services to survivors, (b) dealing adequately with offenders, (c) 
understanding the violence and its causes, and (d) changing social outlooks and 
conduct.49  
The wording in the document is cautious, given the use of words such as 
‘encourage’, ‘promote’ and ‘intensify efforts’. On the other hand, a significant 
distinction between the 1988 Declaration and this Declaration is that the latter 
instructs Member States to enact, reinforce and amend their national legislation on 
violence against women, which should also include investigation to, and 
prosecution, sentencing and rehabilitation of perpetrators. 50  In this respect, the 
ASEAN notions of State sovereignty and non-interference in the internal affairs of a 
State, seem to become less dominant. In addition, the national level is subjected to 
the regional level. From Chapter III it follows that this kind of subjection does not 
come naturally to the ASEAN Member States.  
Women and children continued to be a focal point for ASEAN with the 2004 
ASEAN Declaration Against Trafficking in Persons Particularly Women and 
Children. 51  This Declaration specified measures to address the trafficking of 
                                                          
45  ASEAN, Declaration on the Commitments for Children, Singapore, 2 August 2001, Article 4 
<https:// cil.nus.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/formidable/18/2001-Declaration-on-the-Commitments-for-
Children-in-ASEAN.pdf> last accessed 19 September 2018. 
46 Fourth World Conference on Women, Report of the Fourth World Conference on Women, UN Doc. 
A/CONF/.177/20, 17 October 1995. 
47 ASEAN, Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women in the ASEAN Region, Jakarta, 
30 June 2004, preamble <https://asean.org/?static_post=declaration-on-the-elimination-of-violence-
against-wo men-in-the-asean-region-4> last accessed 19 September 2018. 
48 ASEAN, Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women in the ASEAN Region, Jakarta, 
30 June 2004, Article 2 <https://asean.org/?static_post=declaration-on-the-elimination-of-violence-
against-wo men-in-the-asean-region-4> last accessed 19 September 2018. 
49 ASEAN, Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women in the ASEAN Region, Jakarta, 
30 June 2004, Article 2 <https://asean.org/?static_post=declaration-on-the-elimination-of-violence-
against-wo men-in-the-asean-region-4> last accessed 19 September 2018. 
50 ASEAN, Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women in the ASEAN Region, Jakarta, 
30 June 2004, Article 4 <https://asean.org/?static_post=declaration-on-the-elimination-of-violence-
against-wo men-in-the-asean-region-4> last accessed 19 September 2018. 
51 ASEAN, ASEAN Declaration Against Trafficking in Persons Particularly Women and Children, 
Vientiane, 29 November 2004 <https://asean.org/asean-declaration-against-trafficking-in-persons-
particularly-women-and-children-4/> last accessed 19 September 2018. 
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persons, but could go only as far as these measures were allowed by domestic laws 
and policies. Concrete measures included the establishment of a regional focal 
network to address the problem, information sharing, increased cooperation 
between the Member States’ immigration and other law enforcement authorities, the 
protection of the human dignity and rights of the victims, and the commitment to 
take measures against the perpetrators. ASEAN is rather opaque in reporting about 
the concrete progress on the measures included in the Declaration. 
While the topic of human rights was discussed by NGOs from the mid-1990s, 
especially the Working Group for an ASEAN Human Rights Mechanism, the 
ASEAN Members States increased their cooperation on human rights after the turn 
of the millennium. Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand were hereby in the lead. 
Other States also started to appreciate the value of having a mechanism, but 
according to Muntarbhorn, “perhaps more introspectively, in terms of, assessing 
ourselves in the face or in the interface of international scrutiny. […] They felt it 
was a value added to have something from the region, rather than just listening to 
the outside all the time”.52  
The 2005 Vientiane Meeting is considered key for the inclusion of human rights 
as one of the areas of cooperation,53 as ASEAN was reluctant to talk about rights 
before the Vientiane Action Programme.54 With the signing of the VAP “human 
rights came to occupy an important and, from that point on, constant role in 
ASEAN’s discussions about regional reform”.55 Human rights were positioned in 
the ASEAN Security Community, although topics related to human rights are also 
addressed in the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community. According to Davies, this 
could be explained because “ASEAN linked its traditional goals, achieved through 
stoic non-interference, with an interest in human rights where all the evidence 
pointed to the defence of human rights as being inimitable to non-interference”.56  
Specifically, the promotion of human rights within the ASEAN Security 
Community should include the following actions according to the VAP:  
 
                                                          
52 Interview with Vitit Muntarbhorn, Professor Emeritus of Law, Chulalongkorn University (Manila, 13 
November 2009). 
53 Medardo Castillejos Abad Jr, 'The Association of Southeast Asian Nations. Challenges and 
Responses' in: Sharon Siddique and Sree Kumar (eds.), The 2nd ASEAN Reader (Institute of Southeast 
Asian Studies, Singapore 2003), p. 34 and Mathew Davies, ‘Explaining the Vientiane Action 
Programme: ASEAN and the Institutionalisation of Human Rights’ (2013) 26 The Pacific Review 385, 
pp. 387-391. 
54 Mathew Davies, ‘Explaining the Vientiane Action Programme: ASEAN and the Institutionalisation 
of Human Rights’ (2013) 26 The Pacific Review 385, p. 388.  
55  Mathew Davies, ‘An Agreement to Disagree: The ASEAN Human Rights Declaration and the 
Absence of Regional Identity in Southeast Asia’ (2014) 33 (3) Journal of Current Southeast Asian 
Affairs 107, p. 111, hereby referring to Mathew Davies, ‘Explaining the Vientiane Action Programme: 
ASEAN and the Institutionalisation of Human Rights’ (2013) 26 The Pacific Review 385, pp. 387-391. 
56 Mathew Davies, ‘Explaining the Vientiane Action Programme: ASEAN and the Institutionalisation 
of Human Rights’ (2013) 26 The Pacific Review 385, p. 389. 
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1. Completion of a stock-taking of existing human rights mechanisms and equivalent 
bodies, including sectoral bodies promoting the rights of women and children 
2. Formulation and adoption of MOU to establish network among existing human rights 
mechanisms 
3. Formulation of work programme of the network 
4. Promote education and public awareness on human rights 
5. Establish a network of cooperation among existing human rights mechanisms 
6. Elaboration of an ASEAN instrument on the protection and promotion of the rights 
of migrant workers 
7. Establishment of an ASEAN commission on the promotion and protection of the 
rights of women and children.57 
 
The VAP specifically dealt with children, women, elderly and persons with 
disabilities, as part of the Socio-Cultural Community in its programme area 
‘Building an Community of Caring Societies’. It determined inter alia the 
following: 
 
1. Implement programmes on child survival, development and protection 
consistent with the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC)  
2. Implement the eight goals of the Declaration on the Elimination of Violence 
Against Women in the ASEAN Region  
3. Strengthen regional collaboration in programmes to combat trafficking in 
women and children 
4. Develop and implement the ASEAN Work Plan on Women’s Advancement 
Agenda in politics 
5. Develop a standardised set of measurement tools for quantifying disability and 
the assessment of health and social care needs for older persons  
6. Collect and exchange information on best practices in family and community-
based care for the elderly and capacity building for professionals involved in 
elderly care 
7. Develop and implement regional activities that assist Member Countries to 
strengthen capacity to facilitate access by all members of society, especially the 
vulnerable groups, to education, consistent with the UN Millennium 
Development Goals 
8. Promoting equitable participation of women in the development process by 
eliminating all forms of discrimination against them58 
 
Pisanò observed that “the VAP gave a new ‘impetus’ to the definition of forms of 
human rights protection in ASEAN, particular for children, women, and migrant 
                                                          
57  ASEAN, Vientiane Action Programme, 29 November 2004, Annex 1, Article 1.1.4 
<http://www.asean. org/ storage/images/archive/VAP-10th%20ASEAN%20Summit.pdf> last accessed 
15 September 2018. 
58  ASEAN, Vientiane Action Programme, 29 November 2004, Annex 3, Article 3.1.3 
<http://www.asean. org/ storage/images/archive/VAP-10th%20ASEAN%20Summit.pdf> last accessed 
15 September 2018. 
 
 
ASEAN and Human Rights 
 158
workers”.59 Salient is that human rights in general are perceived to be part of the 
Security-Pillar, while children, women, elderly and persons with disabilities are 
included in the Socio-Cultural Pillar. Davies aptly determined in this respect that 
issues on women, children – but also other vulnerable groups – are viewed 
“qualitatively differently from human rights generally, and as such are less 
threatening to politically conservative states”.60 This is a viable explanation why 
ASEAN has taken up women, children and other vulnerable groups as common 
concern in earlier stages than human rights in general. 
As described in the previous chapter, the development of the Pillars was 
initiated by the Declaration of ASEAN Concord II. One year later, during the Tenth 
ASEAN Summit, the ASEAN Security Community (ASC) Plan of Action and its 
Annex were adopted (Vientiane, 29-30 November 2004). This Plan stipulated that 
the goal of the ASC is to “ensure that countries in the region live at peace with one 
another and with the world at large in a just, democratic and harmonious 
environment. The ASC would be based on shared norms and rules of good conduct 
in inter-state relations; effective conflict prevention and resolution mechanisms; and 
post-conflict peace building activities”.61 The document listed political development 
as one of its five areas of cooperation, for which the Annex specified concrete 
activities. The promotion of democracy, including the rule of law and good 
governance, and human rights were included in the political development policy. 
The Annex included the following: 
 
Promotion of human rights and obligations: 
a. Establishing a network among existing human rights mechanisms; 
b. Protecting vulnerable groups including women, children, people with disabilities, 
and migrant workers; and 
c. Promoting education and public awareness on human rights.62 
 
The ASEAN Charter (2007)63 and its implementation marks a new era, in which 
old and new principles are combined. Specifically, ASEAN values like “respect for 
independence, sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity and national identity” 
(Article 2(2)(a)) and the principle of “non-interference in the internal affairs of 
ASEAN member states” (Article 2(2)(e)) are stressed again, while respect for the 
                                                          
59  Attilio Pisanò, ‘Human Rights and Sovereignty in the ASEAN Path Towards a Human Rights 
Declaration’ (2014) 15 Human Rights Review 391, p. 397. 
60  Mathew Davies, ‘States of Compliance?: Global Human Rights Treaties and ASEAN Member 
States’ (2014) 13 Journal of Human Rights 414, p. 419. 
61  ASEAN, ASEAN Security Community Plan of Action, Vientiane, 29 November 2004, Article 4 
<https://asean.org/?static_post=asean-security-community-plan-of-action> last accessed 19 September 
2018. 
62 ASEAN, Annex for ASEAN Security Community Plan of Action, Vientiane, 29 November 2004, 
Article I.2 <https://asean.org/?static_post=annex-for-asean-security-community-plan-of-action>, last 
accessed 19 September 2018. 
63 ASEAN, Charter of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, Singapore, 20 November 2007 
<https://asean.org/asean/asean-charter/> last accessed 19 September 2018. 
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“rule of law, good governance, democracy and constitutional government” (Article 
2(2)(h)) and for “fundamental freedoms, the promotion and protection of human 
rights and the promotion of social justice” (Article 2(2)(i)) are also included. 
Human rights as a topic of common concern was thus formalised in the 2007 
ASEAN Charter. Djamin commented that the ASEAN Charter could be considered 
as a step forward in the discussion on the universality and particularity of human 
rights. He also noted that the ASEAN Charter includes principles of non-
interference, sovereignty and respect for culture, but that this does not necessarily 
imply an acknowledgement of the particularity of human rights. 64 
Human rights are mentioned in the preamble, the purposes, and principles of 
ASEAN. Article 14 ASEAN Charter includes the establishment of an ASEAN 
Human Rights Body (AHRB): 
 
1. In conformity with the purposes and principles of the ASEAN Charter relating 
to the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms, 
ASEAN shall establish an ASEAN human rights body.  
2. This ASEAN human rights body shall operate in accordance with the terms of 
reference to be determined by the ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting. 
The Eminent Persons Group on the ASEAN Charter (EPG) 65  did not make 
proposals for creating a regional human rights mechanism during the drafting 
process, but generally stated that “this worthy idea should be pursued further, 
especially in clarifying how such a regional mechanism can contribute to ensuring 
the respect for and protection of human rights of every individual in every Member 
State”.66 Yet, the High-Level Task Force for the Drafting of the ASEAN Charter 
(HLTF) that was part of the drafting process included Article 14 ASEAN Charter 
on an ASEAN Human Rights Body. 
The ASEAN Foreign Ministers established a High-Level Panel (HLP) to draft 
the Terms of Reference of the ASEAN Human Rights Body. Based on the Terms of 
Reference for the High Level Panel on an ASEAN Human Rights Body, the HLP 
                                                          
64 Interview with Rafendi Djamin, Regional Director for South East Asia and Pacific of Amnesty 
International and former Executive Director of the Human Rights Working Group as well as former 
Indonesian Representative for the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights from 
2009-2015 (Jakarta, 19 October 2009). 
65 The EPG was formed by ten ‘eminent persons’, one from each Member State. See for its mandate 
ASEAN, Terms of Reference of the Eminent Persons Group (EPG) on the ASEAN Charter, Kuala 
Lumpur, 12-13 December 2005 <https://asean.org/?static_post=terms-of-reference-of-the-eminent-
persons-group-epg-on-the-asean-charter> last accessed 19 September 2018. The drafting process 
consisted out of their work and the work of the High Level Task Force for the Drafting of the ASEAN 
Charter (HLTF). 
66 Eminent Persons Group on the ASEAN Charter, Report of the Eminent Persons Group on the ASEAN 
Charter (December 2006) <http://www.asean.org/wp-content/uploads/images/archive/19247.pdf> last 
accessed 15 September 2018. 
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started its work.67 During the 15th ASEAN Summit the inauguration of the ASEAN 
Intergovernmental Human Rights Commission took place, 68  together with the 
endorsement of its Terms of Refence (ToR).69 
Also relevant is the adoption of the Bali Declaration on ASEAN Community in 
a Global Community of Nations (Bali Concord III).70  With respect to political 
development, the following is formulated: 
 
Consistent with the purposes and principles of ASEAN basic instruments to ensure 
that peoples and Member States of ASEAN live in peace with the world at large in a 
just, democratic, and harmonious environment, ASEAN resolves at the global level 
to:  
a. Adhere to the rules of law, good governance, the principles of democracy, and 
constitutional government.  
b. Promote and protect human rights and fundamental freedoms, as well as promote 
social justice.71 
 
With regard to socio-cultural cooperation, human rights topics were also addressed, 
such as access to adequate and affordable healthcare, medical services and effective 
medication, universal access to primary education and the protection of (migrant) 
workers.  
The ASEAN Declaration on the Protection and Promotion of the Rights of 
Migrant Workers72 was adopted in 2007. Muntarbhorn aptly noted that this is the 
first declaration with the word ‘rights’ in its title.73 As well as elucidating general 
principles, the Declaration lays down both obligations for the receiving and the 
sending States to protect and promote the rights of migrant workers. For the 
receiving States, this task is crystallised explicitly in the protection of fundamental 
human rights and the promotion of the migrant’s workers welfare and human 
                                                          
67 ASEAN, Terms of Reference for the High Level Panel on an ASEAN Human Rights Body, Singapore, 
21 July 2008 <http://www.asean.org/storage/images/archive/HLP-TOR.pdf> last accessed 15 
September 2018. 
68 ASEAN, Cha-Am Hua Hin Declaration on the Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights, 
Cha-am Hua Hin, 23 October 2009, available at <http://hrlibrary.umn.edu/research/Philippines/Cha-
Am%20Hua%20Hin%20Declaration%20of%20the%20AICHR.pdf> last accessed 19 September 2018. 
69 ASEAN, ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (Terms of Reference), October 
2009 < http://aichr.org/documents/> last accessed 19 September 2018. 
70 ASEAN, Bali Declaration on ASEAN Community in a Global Community of Nations (Bali Concord 
III), Bali, 7 November 2011, <http://www.asean.org/storage/archive/documents/19th%20summit/Bali% 
20Concord%20III.pdf> last accessed 15 September 2018. 
71 ASEAN, Bali Declaration on ASEAN Community in a Global Community of Nations (Bali Concord 
III), Bali, 7 November 2011, Section A, Article 1(1) and 1(2) <http://www.asean.org/storage/archive/ 
documents/19th%20summit/Bali% 20Concord%20III.pdf> last accessed 15 September 2018. 
72 ASEAN, Declaration on the Protection and Promotion of the Rights of Migrant Workers, Cebu, 13 
January 2007 <http://asean.org/?static_post=asean-declaration-on-the-protection-and-promotion-of-the-
rights-of-migrant-workers-3> last accessed 19 September 2018. 
73  Vitit Muntarbhorn, Unity in Connectivity? Evolving Human Rights Mechanisms in the ASEAN 
Region (Nijhoff Law Specials, Brill, Leiden 2013), p. 120. 
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dignity. Fair wages, working and living conditions and exploitation of migrant 
workers are also addressed.74  
The ASEAN commitments for ASEAN as an organisation are also listed in this 
Declaration, whereby a number of them relate to human rights. An example is the 
effort to prevent or decrease trafficking of persons. Also relevant is the last article, 
which “task[s] the relevant ASEAN bodies to follow up on the Declaration and to 
develop an ASEAN instrument on the protection and promotion of the rights of 
migrant workers, consistent with ASEAN’s vision of a caring and sharing 
Community, and direct the Secretary-General of ASEAN to submit annually a 
report on the progress of the implementation of the Declaration to the Summit 
through the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting”.75 
Subsequent to the adoption of the Declaration, the ASEAN Committee On the 
Implementation of the ASEAN Declaration on the Protection and Promotion of the 
Rights of Migrant Workers was established, which is further discussed in 
Subsection 5.4 of this chapter. 
The 2010 Hanoi Declaration on the Enhancement of Welfare and Development 
of ASEAN Women and Children 76  lists actions and measures that essentially 
combine previous commitments. Reference is made to the international level, 
including CEDAW and CRC to which all ASEAN Member States are party. 
Striking is that ASEAN Member States should support the sectoral bodies which 
are listed in the Declaration, by “appropriate instruments as may be necessary and 
consistent with their respective national laws and policies”.77 
The 2011 ASEAN Leaders’ Joint Statement on Enhancing Cooperation Against 
Trafficking in Persons in Southeast Asia 78  mainly stresses to further strengthen 
regional and international cooperation. 
In the 2012 Vientiane Declaration on Enhancing Gender Perspective and 
ASEAN Women’s Partnership for Environmental Sustainability 79  the Member 
                                                          
74 ASEAN, Declaration on the Protection and Promotion of the Rights of Migrant Workers, Cebu, 13 
January 2007, Articles 5, 8 and 9 <http://asean.org/?static_post=asean-declaration-on-the-protection-
and-promotion-of-the-rights-of-migrant-workers-3> last accessed 19 September 2018. 
75 ASEAN, Declaration on the Protection and Promotion of the Rights of Migrant Workers, Cebu, 13 
January 2007, Article 22 <http://asean.org/?static_post=asean-declaration-on-the-protection-and-
promotion-of-the-rights-of-migrant-workers-3> last accessed 19 September 2018. 
76 ASEAN, Hanoi Declaration on the Enhancement of Welfare and Development of ASEAN Women 
and Children, Hanoi, 28 October 2010 <https://asean.org/?static_post=ha-noi-declaration-on-the-
enhancement-of-welfare-and-development-of-asean-women-and-children> last accessed 19 September 
2018. 
77 ASEAN, Hanoi Declaration on the Enhancement of Welfare and Development of ASEAN Women 
and Children, Hanoi, 28 October 2010, last paragraph <https://asean.org/?static_post=ha-noi-dec 
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19 September 2018. 
78  ASEAN, ASEAN Leaders’ Joint Statement on Enhancing Cooperation Against Trafficking in 
Persons in Southeast Asia, Jakarta, 8 May 2011 <http://asean.org/asean-leaders-joint-statement-in-
enhancing-cooperation-against-trafficking-in-persons-in-south-east-asia-jakarta-8-may-2011/> last 
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States declared their commitment to promote nine goals. Reference is made to 
previous ASEAN commitments and international documents such as CEDAW. 
These goals concern the promotion of the knowledge and skills of women and their 
participation and protection in relation to environmental sustainability. The ASEAN 
Commission on Women and Children (further discussed in Subsection 5.3 of this 
chapter) bears the responsibility of its implementation and monitors the progress. 
In the Phnom Penh Agenda for ASEAN Community Building80 it was amongst 
others decided that within the ASEAN Political-Security Blueprint, the efforts 
regarding the conclusion of the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration should be 
intensified. Within the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community, the ASEAN Labour 
Ministers were tasked to continue their work on the implementation of the ASEAN 
Declaration on the Protection and Promotion of the Rights of Migrant Workers. 
According to the document, this included “a phased approach in the development of 
an ASEAN Instrument on the Protection and Promotion of the Rights of Migrant 
Workers in the region, starting by focusing on issues which are comfortable to all 
ASEAN Member States, in line with the existing national laws and/or policies, and 
in accordance with the Cebu Declaration”.81 Finally, the importance of women in 
regional development was recognised. The optimisation of ASEAN mechanisms on 
women’s issues was therefore called for. Specifically, they referred to the ASEAN 
Commission for the Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Women and 
Children, the ASEAN Committee on Women and ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on 
Women, and other sectoral bodies related to women, to ensure effective 
implementation of their planned activities.82 
The Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women and the 
Elimination of Violence Against Children in ASEAN (ACWC Declaration, 2013)83 
refers to previous human rights commitments within ASEAN and the international 
level and was adopted after the AHRD. While reference is made to the international 
level, it also takes various factors into consideration, including the regional and 
national contexts and the different historical, political, socio-cultural religious, legal 
                                                                                                                                              
79 ASEAN, Vientiane Declaration on Enhancing Gender Perspective and ASEAN Women’s Partnership 
for Environmental Sustainability, Vientiane, 19 October 2012 <https://asean.org/wp-content/uploads/ 
images/2012/Social_cultural/ACW/Press_release/First%20draft%20of%20Vientiane_Declaration_of_A
MMW_FINAL.pdf> last accessed 19 September 2018.  
80  ASEAN, Phnom Penh Agenda for ASEAN Community Building, Phnom Penh, 3 April 2012 
<https://cil.nus.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/formidable/18/2012-Phnom-Penh-Agenda-for-ASEAN-Com 
munity-Building.pdf> last accessed 15 September 2018. 
81 ASEAN, Phnom Penh Agenda for ASEAN Community Building, Phnom Penh, 3 April 2012, Article 6 
<https://cil.nus.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/formidable/18/2012-Phnom-Penh-Agenda-for-ASEAN-Com 
munity-Building.pdf> last accessed 15 September 2018. 
82 ASEAN, Phnom Penh Agenda for ASEAN Community Building, Phnom Penh, 3 April 2012, Article 8 
<https://cil.nus.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/formidable/18/2012-Phnom-Penh-Agenda-for-ASEAN-Com 
munity-Building.pdf> last accessed 15 September 2018. 
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and economic backgrounds in the region in its preamble. National legislation can be 
strengthened and, where necessary, enacted or amended (Article 1). Also, the 
ASEAN Commission on Women and Children has a role with respect to adhering 
to the international level, as Article 4 lays down the following: 
 
Strengthen the existing national mechanisms, with the assistance, where necessary, of 
the ACWC and other related stakeholders, in implementing, monitoring and 
reporting the implementation of the Concluding Observations and Recommendations 
of CEDAW, CRC and other Treaty Bodies as well as the accepted recommendations 
under the Universal Periodic Review Process of the United Nations Human Rights 
Council related to the elimination of all forms of violence against women and 
violence against children.84 
 
The ASEAN Commission on Women and Children is, as a monitoring body, tasked 
with the promotion of the implementation and review process. This Commission 
held a joint meeting with the ASEAN Committee on Women to develop the 
ASEAN Regional Plan of Action on the Elimination of Violence against Women. 
In the Nay Pyi Taw Declaration on the Realisation of the ASEAN Community 
by 201585 the importance of cooperation among the ASEAN Member States was 
stressed. Reference was also made to international law and human rights. 
Specifically, Articles 2 and 3 read as follows: 
 
2. To further enhance ASEAN cooperation in promoting democracy, good 
governance and the rule of law, and promotion and protection of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms, with due regard to the rights and responsibilities of the 
ASEAN Member States, so as to further enhance a rule-based community of shared 
values and norms;  
3. To promote and uphold the rule of law in the conduct of relations, including in the 
peaceful resolution of disputes in accordance with universally recognized principles 
of international law; 
 
The ASEAN’s human rights oriented documents discussed above, illustrate how 
the inclusion of human rights as a topic of common concern was included over the 
years. The Blueprints that were adopted for each ASEAN Community were 
excluded so far from this overview. The latest Blueprints succeed the first set of 
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September 2018. 
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ASEAN’s Blueprints 
The first set of Blueprints forms together with the Initiative for ASEAN Integration 
(IAI) Strategic Framework and IAI Workplan 2 (2009-2015) the Roadmap for an 
ASEAN Community 2009-2015). 86  ‘ASEAN 2025: Forging Ahead Together’ 87 
succeeds the Roadmap. This Roadmap consists of the ASEAN Community Vision 
2025 and the three Blueprints. In particular, this Vision includes the determination 
“to consolidate our Community, building upon and deepening the integration 
process to realise a rules-based, people-oriented, people-centred ASEAN 
Community, where our peoples enjoy human rights and fundamental freedoms, 
higher quality of life and the benefits of community building, reinforcing our sense 
of togetherness and common identity, guided by the purposes and principles of the 
ASEAN Charter”.88  
ASEAN has formulated a number of general ambitions for the coming years, 
next to its ambitions per Community. In light of the research, the following are 
especially relevant: 
 Greater emphasis on the peoples of ASEAN and their well-being; 
 Engage all nationals of ASEAN Member States through effective and 
innovative platforms to promote commitment and identification with ASEAN 
policies and regional interests; 
 Ensure fundamental freedoms, human rights and better lives for all ASEAN 
peoples; 
 Implement the ASEAN agenda while pursuing national aspirations, which 
contribute to ASEAN community-building.89 
The three Blueprints have the following elements in common. They are divided 
according to their focal points, which are subdivided in specific areas of 
cooperation. Concrete priority actions are articulated for each area of cooperation. 
Accountability for the overall implementation of each Blueprint lies with the 
ASEAN Political-Security Community Council, the ASEAN Socio-Cultural 
Community Council and the ASEAN Economic Ministers. The Secretary-General 
                                                          
86  ASEAN, Roadmap for the ASEAN Community (2009-2015), Cha-am, 1 March 2009 
<http://www.asean.org/storage/images/ASEAN_RTK_2014/2_Roadmap_for_ASEAN_Community_20
092015.pdf> last accessed 19 September 2018 adopted in ASEAN, Cha-am Hua Hin Declaration on 
the Roadmap for the ASEAN Community (2009-2015), Cha-am, 1 March 2009. 
<http://www.asean.org/storage/images/ASEAN_RTK_2014/2_Roadmap_for_ASEAN_Community_20
092015.pdf> last accessed 19 September 2018. This document replaces the Vientiane Action 
Programme. 
87  ASEAN, Forging Ahead Together, Kuala Lumpur, 22 November 2015 <http://www.asean.org/ 
storage/2015/12/ASEAN-2025-Forging-Ahead-Together-final.pdf> last accessed 19 September 2018. 
88 ASEAN, ASEAN Community Vision, Kuala Lumpur, 22 November 2015, Article 4 <http://www. 
asean.org/storage/images/2015/November/aec-page/ASEAN-Community-Vision-2025.pdf> last 
accessed 15 September 2018. 
89  ASEAN, ‘ASEAN 2025 At a Glance’ (24 November 2015) <https://asean.org/asean-2025-at-a-
glance/>last accessed 19 September 2018. 
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is charged with the responsibility to report annually about the progress to the 
ASEAN Summit and to other relevant Ministerial Meetings and Councils. At the 
national level, activities of the Blueprints are included in the policies of the Member 
States, which have to report on the progress made.90  
This section shortly describes each Blueprint in general and then focuses on the 
inclusion of or orientation towards human rights and explores whether human rights 
could be read into some of the provisions while human rights are not referred to as 
such.  
 
ASEAN Political-Security Community (APSC) Blueprints 
Guided by the ASEAN Charter and its principles and purposes, the first APSC-
Blueprint build on the ASEAN Security Plan of Action, the VAP and decisions by 
different ASEAN Sectoral bodies. In this way, the efforts taken in political security 
cooperation were continued within the then new structure of ASEAN. The 
Blueprint contributed to closer integration and cooperation among the Member 
States in developing shared norms and mechanisms to achieve the goals and 
objectives in their political and security cooperation. In the process, a people-
oriented ASEAN was promoted. This means that “all sectors of society […] are 
encouraged to participate in, and benefit from the process of ASEAN integration 
and community building.”91 
Traditionally, ASEAN has subsumed human rights under the heading of 
political development and security. This line is continued by including human rights 
in the APSC. Under the focal point of ‘a rule-based community of shared values 
and norms’,92 the Blueprint highlighted the following: 
 
ASEAN’s cooperation in political development aims to strengthen democracy, 
enhance good governance and the rule of law, and to promote and protect human 
rights and fundamental freedoms, with due regard to the rights and responsibilities of 
the Member States of ASEAN, so as to ultimately create a Rules-based Community 
of shared values and norms. In the shaping and sharing of norms, ASEAN aims to 
achieve a standard of common adherence to norms of good conduct among member 
states of the ASEAN Community; consolidating and strengthening ASEAN’s 
                                                          
90  Regarding national involvement, only the APSC Blueprint explicitly mentions that APSC 
components should be included in the national development plans (ASEAN, ASEAN Political-Security 
Blueprint, Cha-am 1 March 2009, Article III(A)(28) <http://asean.org/wpcontent/uploads/archive/5187-
18.pdf> last accessed 15 September 2018), whereas the ASCC Blueprints lists specific actions for the 
Member States throughout the document; ASEAN, ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community Blueprint, Cha-
am, 20 November 2007 <http://asean.org/wp-content/uploads/archive/5187-19.pdf> last accessed 15 
September 2018. 
91 ASEAN, ASEAN Political-Security Community Blueprint, Cha-am, 1 March 2009, Article II(7) 
<http://asean.org/wp-content/uploads/archive/5187-18.pdf> last visited 15 September 2018.  
92 ASEAN, ASEAN Political-Security Community Blueprint, Cha-am, 1 March 2009, Subsection II.B. 
The other two focal points of the Blueprint are ‘a cohesive, peaceful and resilient region with shared 
responsibility for comprehensive security’ and ‘a dynamic and outward-looking region in an 
increasingly integrated and interdependent world’ (Subsections II.C and II.D) <http://asean.org/wp-
content/uploads/archive/5187-18.pdf> last visited 15 September 2018.  
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solidarity, cohesiveness and harmony; and contributing to the building of a peaceful, 
democratic, tolerant, participatory and transparent community in Southeast Asia.93 
 
According to Vatikiotis, human rights are “a litmus test of ASEAN’s declared goal 
of creating a rules-based community of shared values and norms.” According to this 
author, “[t]he gains of community-building would be futile if ASEAN fails to 
provide fundamental safeguards and protection for its peoples.”94 
A notable element is the promotion and protection of human rights with due 
regard to the rights and responsibilities of the Member States, which is a reiteration 
of Article 1(7) ASEAN Charter. Human rights, democracy, good governance and 
the rule of law were included as areas of cooperation. This was the first step in 
further strengthening human rights within the improved ASEAN structure. Also 
included was the ambition to create a common standard of values and norms, which 
led to the adoption of the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration. In addition, as part of 
ASEAN’s political development the following seven specific actions were 
mentioned in Article A.1.5: 
 
i. Establish an ASEAN human rights body through the completion of its Terms of 
Reference (ToR) by 2009 and encourage cooperation between it and existing 
human rights mechanisms, as well as with other relevant international 
organizations;  
ii. Complete a stock-take of existing human rights mechanisms and equivalent bodies, 
including sectoral bodies promoting the rights of women and children by 2009;  
iii. Cooperate closely with efforts of the sectoral bodies in the development of an 
ASEAN instrument on the protection and promotion of the rights of migrant 
workers;  
iv. Strengthen interaction between the network of existing human rights mechanisms 
as well as other civil society organisations, with relevant ASEAN sectoral 
bodies;  
v. Enhance/conduct exchange of information in the field of human rights among 
ASEAN countries in order to promote and protect human rights and fundamental 
freedoms of peoples in accordance with the ASEAN Charter and the Charter of 
the United Nations, and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the 
Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action;  
vi. Promote education and public awareness on human rights; and  
vii. Cooperate closely with efforts of the sectoral bodies in the establishment of an 
ASEAN commission on the promotion and protection of the rights of women 
and children.  
 
Democracy was included as one of its areas of cooperation (Article A.1.8); 
democratisation should be pursued by promoting a people-oriented ASEAN (Article 
1(13) ASEAN Charter). This meant that ASEAN, mainly through the Committee of 
                                                          
93 ASEAN, ASEAN Political-Security Community Blueprint, Cha-am, 1 March 2009, Article II(A)(12) 
<http://asean.org/wp-content/uploads/archive/5187-18.pdf> last visited 15 September 2018. 
94 Michael Vatikiotis, ‘ASEAN Needs to Embrace Human Rights’ [2017] (5) ASEAN Focus 11, p. 11. 
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Permanent Representatives and the Secretary-General, engaged with the entities 
that are associated with ASEAN (Chapter 5 and Annex 2 ASEAN Charter). These 
entities include civil society organisations that are involved with human rights. 
Good governance was promoted by, amongst others, the sharing of experiences and 
best practices, undertaking a study in order to come to recommendations to ASEAN 
sectoral bodies and promote dialogue and partnership among governments and 
other relevant sectors to enhance “transparency, accountability, participatory and 
effective governance”. Regarding the rule of law, Article A.1.3 mentioned action 
points for the development of cooperation programmes on the rule of law, judicial 
systems and legal infrastructure, conducting comparative studies, the development 
of a university curriculum on legal systems of the Member States and enhance 
cooperation among ASEAN and other stakeholders. 
The ASEAN Community Vision 2025 envisions the APSC as: 
 
(…) a united, inclusive and resilient community. Our peoples shall live in a safe, 
harmonious and secure environment, embrace the values of tolerance and moderation 
as well as uphold ASEAN fundamental principles, shared values and norms. ASEAN 
shall remain cohesive, responsive and relevant in addressing challenges to regional 
peace and security as well as play a central role in shaping the evolving regional 
architecture, while deepening our engagement with external parties and contributing 
collectively to global peace, security and stability.95 
 
To this end, ASEAN formulated the key aspirations of the ASEAN Political-
Security Community as follows: 
 
 A rules-based, people-oriented, people-centred ASEAN in a region of peace, 
stability and prosperity; 
 A consolidated ASEAN Community; 
 A dynamic, resilient and harmonious community able to effectively respond to 
social and economic vulnerabilities and other non-traditional security threats; 
 A Community that can respond effectively to challenges affecting ASEAN 
from within and beyond the region; 
 A Community that steadfastly maintains ASEAN centrality in regional 
mechanisms; 
 Strengthened ASEAN unity and cohesiveness to protect its leading and central 
role in dealing with matters of common concern; and 
 Enhanced dialogue and cooperation with ASEAN external partners for mutual 
benefit and interest.96 
 
                                                          
95 ASEAN, ASEAN Community Vision 2015, Kuala Lumpur, 22 November 2015, Article 7 
<http://www.asean.org/storage/images/2015/November/aec-page/ASEAN-Community-Vision-2025. 
pdf> last accessed 15 September 2018. 
96  ASEAN, ‘ASEAN 2025 At a Glance’ (24 November 2015) <https://asean.org/asean-2025-at-a-
glance/>last accessed 19 September 2018. 
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With respect to human rights, the following was formulated: 
 
A rules-based, people-oriented, people-centred community bound by fundamental 
principles, shared values and norms, in which our peoples enjoy human rights, 
fundamental freedoms and social justice, embrace the values of tolerance and 
moderation, and share a strong sense of togetherness, common identity and destiny.97 
 
To this end, ASEAN has adopted three key elements: (1) Adhere to and promote 
ASEAN fundamental principles, shared values and norms, as well as principles of 
international law governing the peaceful conduct of relations; (2) Strengthen 
democracy, good governance, the rule of law, promotion and protection of human 
rights and fundamental freedoms as well as combat corruption; and (3) Embed the 
culture of peace, including the values of tolerance and moderation as a force for 
harmony, peace and stability in our region and beyond.  
While respect for the principles of independence, sovereignty, equality, 
territorial integrity, non-interference, and national identity (Article A.1.4) and 
strengthening respect for and recognition of the purposes and principles of the TAC 
(Article A.1.7) refer to the ASEAN Way, ASEAN also aims to strengthen 
democracy, good governance, the rule of law, the promotion and protection of 
human rights and fundamental freedoms, as well as to combat corruption (Section 
A.2). More specifically, Article A.2.5 deals with the promotion and protection of 
human rights, fundamental freedoms and social justice to ensure that ASEAN 
peoples live in dignity, peace, harmony and prosperity. Reference is made to 
strengthening domestic legislation and institutions, the regional level in terms of the 
AICHR and the AHRD, as well as ratifying or acceding to core international human 
rights instruments and ensuring their effective implementation.  
The second focal point is a peaceful, secure and stable region, which also 
includes enhanced cooperation against trafficking in persons and people smuggling 
(see Article B.3.4 of the Blueprint). Other focal points are ASEAN centrality in a 
dynamic and outward-looking region and a strengthened ASEAN institutional 
capacity and presence. 
 
ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) Blueprints 
The ASEAN Economic Community Blueprint98 is the most elaborate of the three 
Blueprints. Although strengthening human rights and fundamental freedoms is 
included as a general principle in the ASEAN Charter,99 making cooperation in the 
field of human rights important to the ASEAN Community as a whole, no reference 
was made to human rights in the first AEC Blueprint. Nevertheless, there was a 
                                                          
97 ASEAN, ASEAN Political-Security Community Blueprint 2025, Kuala Lumpur, 22 November 2015, 
Article II(5)(5.1) <http://www.asean.org/storage/images/2015/November/aec-page/ASEAN-Com 
munity-Vision-2025.pdf> last accessed 15 September 2018. 
98  ASEAN, ASEAN Economic Community Blueprint, Singapore, 20 November 2007 
<http://asean.org/wp-content/uploads/archive/5187-10.pdf> last accessed 15 September 2018. 
99 Article 7 ASEAN Charter. 
 
 
ASEAN and Human Rights 
 169 
limited number of possibilities for reading human rights into this Blueprint. 
Specifically, the single market and production base (Section II.A of the Blueprint), 
entail ASEAN’s five freedoms, that is to say, free flow of goods, free flow of 
services, free flow of investment, freer flow of capital and free flow of skilled 
labour (Section II.A5). The last mentioned is relevant, albeit limited, for the rights 
of individuals. The Blueprint allowed visas and employment passes for 
professionals and skilled labour and cooperation within the ASEAN University 
Network (AUN).  
Striking was ASEAN’s focus on “natural persons engaged in the trade in goods, 
services, and investments”,100 thus restricting the freedom of labour to a defined 
group of persons. ASEAN’s major work force, the semi-skilled and unskilled 
workers, were thus left outside the scope. Nevertheless, the right to work was at 
least established for a selected group, which is a starting point. Furthermore, 
Muntarbhorn observed that “[p]erhaps the nearest the economic blueprint comes to 
interrelating with human rights is on the issue of consumer protection”.101 
The current ASEAN Community Vision 2025 envisions an economic-
community that “shall be highly integrated and cohesive; competitive, innovative 
and dynamic; with enhanced connectivity and sectoral cooperation; and a more 
resilient, inclusive, and people-oriented, people-centred community, integrated with 
the global economy”.102 This vision includes the ambition for “a more equitable and 
inclusive economic growth in ASEAN that narrows the development gap, [and 
which] eliminates if not reduces poverty significantly”.103  
The principles of good governance, transparency, and responsive regulatory 
regimes are promoted (Article 6(iv) AEC Blueprint 2025). Skilled labour is again 
included (Section A.5 AEC Blueprint 2025), and also healthcare is also one of the 
topics of common concern (Section C.7 AEC Blueprint 2025). The stress on a 
resilient, inclusive, people-oriented and people-centred ASEAN is also part of the 
AEC Blueprint 2025, which amongst others focuses on narrowing the development 
gap. 
  
ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community (ASCC) Blueprints 
The first ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community Blueprint described the Community’s 
main goal as to contribute to a people-centred and socially responsible ASEAN 
                                                          
100  ASEAN, ASEAN Economic Community Blueprint, Singapore, 20 November 2007, Section II, 
Subsection A, Article 33. Section II, Article 6 underscores the focus of the AEC on the movement of 
business persons, skilled labour and talents <http://asean.org/wp-content/uploads/archive/5187-10.pdf> 
last accessed 15 September 2018. 
101  Vitit Muntarbhorn, Unity in Connectivity? Evolving Human Rights Mechanisms in the ASEAN 
Region (Nijhoff Law Specials, Brill, Leiden 2013), p. 115. 
102  ASEAN, ASEAN Community Vision 2025, Kuala Lumpur, 22 November 2015, Article 9 
<http://www.asean.org/storage/images/2015/November/aec-page/ASEAN-Community-Vision-2025.pd 
f> last accessed 15 September 2018. 
103 ASEAN, ASEAN Economic Community Blueprint 2025, Kuala Lumpur, 22 November 2015, Article 
6(ii) <http://www.asean.org/storage/images/2015/November/aec-page/ASEAN-Community-Vision-20 
25.pdf> last accessed 15 September 2018. 
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Community. Moreover, “enduring solidarity and unity” was pursued by “forging a 
common identity and building a caring and sharing society which is inclusive and 
harmonious where the well-being, livelihood, and welfare of the peoples is 
enhanced.”104 Human rights were explicitly mentioned in this Blueprint: 
 
The ASCC is characterised by a culture of regional resilience, adherence to agreed 
principles, spirit of cooperation, collective responsibility, to promote human and 
social development, respect for fundamental freedoms, gender equality, the 
promotion and protection of human rights and the promotion of social justice.105 
 
The ASCC aimed at increasing the quality of life of the ASEAN people through the 
following six areas of cooperation: human development, social welfare and 
protection, social justice and rights, ensuring environmental sustainability, building 
the ASEAN identity, and narrowing the development gap. A number of these focus 
points are related to human rights.  
In the area of human development, the most notable elements of the first 
Blueprint were the ambition to achieve universal primary education and the focus 
on gender equality in the access to education (Section A.1), decent work (Section 
A.3), and the attention on women, youth, elderly, disabled people, and the work 
force in particular (throughout the document, but mainly Section A.6). The focus on 
these groups were a continuation of the focus of the human rights (oriented) 
documents that are discussed above. Vulnerable and marginalised groups were also 
included as a group for which participation in the productive workforce should be 
increased, although concrete actions were not included.  
Human rights were explicitly addressed in the ambition to undertake initiatives 
to implement the ASEAN Conference on Civil Service Matters Workplan (2008-
2012) as a means to promote, inter alia, transparency, respect for human rights and 
gender equality, and the ambition to provide special attention to the poor and needy 
by ASEAN public servants who should advocate the goals of the ASCC. 
The area on social welfare and protection included, amongst others, and with 
reference to the Millennium Development Goals on extreme poverty and health, the 
management of socio-economic disparities and poverty (Section II.B.1), social 
protection (Section II.B.2), adequate access to food (Section II.B.3), adequate and 
affordable healthcare and medical services (Section II.B.4). 
The domain of social justice and people’s rights is especially relevant as it dealt 
with disadvantaged, vulnerable and marginalised groups. In line with previous 
documents, ASEAN thereby focused on women, children, the elderly, persons with 
disabilities (Section II.C.1) and migrant workers (Section II.C.2). The ambition to 
establish an ASEAN Commission on the Promotion and Protection of the Rights of 
Women and Children and to make the ASEAN Committee on the Implementation 
                                                          
104 ASEAN, ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community Blueprint, Cha-Am, 1 March 2009, Section II, Articles 
4 and 5 <http://asean.org/wp-content/uploads/archive/5187-19.pdf> last accessed 15 September 2018. 
105 ASEAN, ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community Blueprint, Cha-Am, 1 March 2009, Section II, Article 6 
<http://asean.org/wp-content/uploads/archive/5187-19.pdf> last accessed 15 September 2018. 
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of the ASEAN Declaration on the Protection and Promotion of Rights of Migrant 
Workers operational, were formulated as action points (see Article II.C.1.27.i and 
II.C.2.28.i). Specific reference was made to the Work Plan to Operationalise the 
Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against women in the ASEAN Region, 
and the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (Article II.C.1.27, action point ii 
and iii). 
The ASEAN Commission on Women and Children and the ASEAN Committee 
on Migrant Workers fall within the scope of the ASEAN Socio-Cultural 
Community Pillar, while the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human 
Rights is mentioned in the ASEAN Charter as one of the organisation’s organs. The 
ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights is the overarching 
human rights commission according to its Terms of Reference and Guidelines of 
Operations, whereas the ASEAN Commission on Women and Children and the 
ASEAN Committee on Migrant Workers are not mentioned. They have to give 
account to different organs: the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human 
Rights is accountable to the ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting (Articles 14 and 20 
ASEAN Charter), whereas the other two are accountable to the Senior Labour 
Ministers Meeting (Article II.C.2.28.i ASCC Blueprint). 
ASEAN’s ambition to be a people-oriented organisation in which all sectors of 
society can participate was also included in this Blueprint. Specifically, the 
engagement of NGOs in ASEAN Community building was included by conveying 
an annual ASEAN Social Forum and ASEAN Civil Society Conference at which 
issues such as effective dialogue, consultation and cooperation between ASEAN 
and the relevant actors are discussed (Section E.4). Accountability for the 
implementation of the Blueprint lay with the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Communality 
Council (Section III.A.1). In addition, ASEAN Ministerial Bodies (or their 
equivalent) were also responsible for an effective implementation of the Blueprint 
by including the action points in their work plans, mobilising resources and 
undertaking national commitments (Section IIIA.2). Engagement with relevant 
actors was hereby included. The ASEAN Secretariat was made responsible for 
monitoring and reviewing the implementation of the Blueprint, for which it would 
develop indicators and systems for its assessment (Section III.D). 
The current ASCC Blueprint envisions a community which shall be “one that 
engages and benefits the peoples, and is inclusive, sustainable, resilient, and 
dynamic” by the year 2025.106 ASEAN formulated the key aspirations as follows: 
 
 An inclusive Community that is people-oriented, people-centred and promotes 
a high quality of life and equitable access to opportunities for all, and engages 
relevant stakeholders in ASEAN processes; 
                                                          
106  ASEAN, ASEAN Community Vision 2025, Kuala Lumpur, 22 November 2015, Article 11 
<http://www.asean.org/storage/images/2015/November/aec-page/ASEAN-Community-Vision-
2025.pdf> last accessed 15 September 2018. 
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 A sustainable Community that promotes social development and environmental 
protection through effective mechanisms to meet current and future needs of the 
peoples; 
 A resilient Community with enhanced capacity to continuously respond and 
adapt to current challenges and emerging threats; and 
 A dynamic, open, creative and adaptive Community with an ASEAN identity 
reflecting the region’s collective personality, norms, values and beliefs as well 
as aspirations as one ASEAN Community.107 
 
For each element strategic measures were adopted. The move towards becoming a 
more inclusive community (part B of the Blueprint) is especially relevant as it 
focuses on women, children, youth, the elderly/older persons, persons with 
disabilities, migrant workers, ethnic minority groups, and vulnerable and 
marginalised groups and refers to the ACWC which is a continuation of the 
previous Blueprint. Furthermore, human rights are explicitly mentioned: 
 
An inclusive community that promotes high quality of life, equitable access to 
opportunities for all and promotes and protects human rights of women, 
children, youth, the elderly/older persons, persons with disabilities, migrant 
workers, and vulnerable and marginalised groups.108 
 
3.3 Developing an ASEAN human rights system 
 
ASEAN refers since the 1990s to the international level of the United Nations in its 
human rights instruments. Specifically, the UN Charter, the UDHR, the Vienna 
Declaration and programme of Action, as well as specific human rights documents 
such as CEDAW and CRC were explicitly addressed. ASEAN’s reference to this 
international level started at the same time the Asian values debate reached its peak. 
This confirms the observation that the Asian values debate was more a political 
rhetoric of a small number of ASEAN Member States, while the general tendency 
was to refer to the international level. From this follows that the universality was in 
essence not questioned, while at the same time the ASEAN Member States 
underscored the room for particularities. What these particularities were, was not 
concretised. ASEAN for instance included that the general consideration of 
religious, cultural and social values have to be taken into consideration in its 
Declaration on the Commitments for Children in ASEAN in 2001 without 
specifying what these values were. Section 2 of Chapter IV showed that similar 
reservations that were issued by a number of ASEAN Member States to 
                                                          
107  ASEAN, ‘ASEAN 2025 At a Glance’ (24 November 2015) <https://asean.org/asean-2025-at-a-
glance/>last accessed 19 September 2018. 
108 ASEAN, ASEAN Community Vision 2025, Kuala Lumpur, 22 November 2015, Article 12(12.2) 
<http://www.asean.org/storage/images/2015/November/aec-page/ASEAN-Community-Vision-
2025.pdf> last accessed 15 September 2018 and ASEAN, ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community Blueprint 
2025, Article 5(5.2) <http://www.asean.org/storage/images/2015/November/aec-page/ASEAN-
Community-Vision-2025.pdf> last accessed 15 September 2018. 
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Conventions to which they are party, were not accepted by other States Parties and 
were considered to be contrary to norms of international law. 
Furthermore, certain dominant values of the ASEAN Way were at some 
occasions pushed towards the background. For instance, while the notions of State 
sovereignty and non-interference in the internal affairs of a State are stressed 
throughout ASEAN’s instruments, the Declaration on the Elimination of Violence 
Against Women in the ASEAN Region explicitly instructed the ASEAN Member 
States to enact, reinforce and amend their national legislation on violence against 
women, which should also include investigation to, and prosecution, sentencing and 
rehabilitation of perpetrators. 
ASEAN stated that human rights are relevant to ASEAN as a whole. The 
inclusion of human rights in at least two of its pillars partly endorses this vision. 
This being said, ASEAN seems to consider the rights of vulnerable groups 
differently from human rights in general as the latter is included in the APSC, and 
vulnerable groups in the ASCC. Davies rightly observed in this respect that issues 
on vulnerable groups are viewed differently. As said, this could explain why 
ASEAN took up women, children and other vulnerable groups as common concern 
in earlier stages of its human rights engagement, than human rights in general.  
As stated, human rights are nowadays included in the ASEAN Charter, which is 
considered to be ASEAN’s constitution. This led to the establishment of the 
AICHR, ASEAN’s overarching human rights body, and the adoption of the 2012 
ASEAN Human Rights Declaration. Initiatives on topics which were already 
familiar to ASEAN continued, as the Statement on Enhancing Cooperation on 
Trafficking of Persons and the Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against 
Women and Children show. 
From the Roadmaps follows that ASEAN’s communities, at least on paper, 
further developed, although there is poor cross sectoral interaction. 
 
4. THE ASEAN HUMAN RIGHTS DECLARATION 
 
4.1 Drafting procedure 
 
The ASEAN Human Rights Declaration (AHRD) was adopted with the Phnom 
Penh Statement on the Adoption of the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration at the 
21st ASEAN Summit (18 November 2012),109 and was formally launched on 23 
                                                          
109 ASEAN, ‘Phnom Penh Statement on the Adoption of the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration’, 
Phnom Penh, 18 November 2012 <https://asean.org/phnom-penh-statement-on-the-adoption-of-the-
asean-human-rights-declaration-ahrd/> last accessed 19 September 2018. Striking is that Termsak 
Chalermpalanupap noted in during an interview with the author in 2009 that a human rights declaration 
for ASEAN was not yet feasible; Interview with Termsak Chalermpalanupap, the then ASEAN 
Director of the Political and Security Directorate (Jakarta, 14 October 2009). Djamin commented on 19 
October 2009 that a study on a human rights declaration would be started in the first five years, but that 
it would mainly focus on the development of the institution itself and development of more 
independence and protection mandate; Interview with Rafendi Djamin, Regional Director for South 
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August 2013. This Declaration is considered “a roadmap for the regional human 
rights development”. 110  While previous documents focused on human rights 
cooperation in general or on specific subjects such as women, children and migrant 
workers, this document marks the first time that ASEAN includes a comprehensive 
set of rights in a regional declaration. In addition, it has been considered as a 
forerunner to a formal treaty for the region.111 
The AHRD is developed by the AICHR (Article 4.2 ToR AICHR) and its ad 
hoc Drafting Group. The Terms of Reference for the Drafting Group was not made 
public. 112  This Drafting Group was tasked to develop a basic draft of the 
Declaration, which formed the basis for the deliberations and negotiations among 
the Commissioners. This Drafting Group started their work in July 2011 and 
prepared the basic draft that was submitted to the AICHR for deliberation. From 
January 2012, the AICHR convened meetings on an ASEAN Human Rights 
Declaration. The Commissioners finalised the Progress Report on the AHRD to the 
ASEAN Foreign Ministers to be submitted to the ASEAN Ministers Meeting 
Retreat in January 2012, which led to the adoption of the AHRD in November 
2012.113  
The drafting process of the document lacked transparency. This was due to the 
fact that civil society was mainly excluded from de drafting process, the UN High 
Commissioner for Human Rights commented that “[t]his is not the hallmark of the 
democratic global governance to which ASEAN aspires, and it will only serve to 
undermine the respect and ownership that such an important declaration 
deserves”.114  
                                                                                                                                              
East Asia and Pacific of Amnesty International and former Executive Director of the Human Rights 
Working Group as well as former Indonesian Representative for the ASEAN Intergovernmental 
Commission on Human Rights from 2009-2015 (Jakarta, 19 October 2009). In this sense, it is striking 
that the AHRD was already adopted in 2012. 
110  Underscored by then ASEAN Secretary-General Surin Pitsuwan, see ASEAN/AICHR, 'Press 
Release of the Fifth ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights', Jakarta, 25-29 April 
2011 <http://aichr.org/press-release/press-release-of-the-fifth-asean-intergovernmental-commission-on-
human-rights-asean-secretariat/> last accessed 19 September 2018. 
111 Catherine Shanahan Renshaw, ‘The ASEAN Human Rights Declaration’ (2013) 13 Human Rights 
Law Review 557, p. 558, whereby parallels are drawn with the American Declaration of the Rights and 
Duties of Man, which preceded the American Convention on Human Rights, and the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) which preceded the ICCPR and ICESCR.  
112 Catherine Shanahan Renshaw, ‘The ASEAN Human Rights Declaration’ (2013) 13 Human Rights 
Law Review 557, p. 558. 
113 ASEAN, Phnom Penh Statement on the Adoption of the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration, Phnom 
Penh, 18 November 2012 <https://asean.org/phnom-penh-statement-on-the-adoption-of-the-asean-
human-rights-declaration-ahrd/> last accessed 19 September 2018. 
114 The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (UN Human Rights), ‘UN rights chief 
welcomes focus on human rights and democracy, calls for review of ASEAN draft human rights 
declaration’ (Bali, 8 November 2012) <https://reliefweb.int/report/world/un-rights-chief-welcomes-
focus-human-rights-and-democracy-calls-review-asean-draft > last accessed 19 September 2018. 
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4.2 Human rights as included in the AHRD 
4.2.1 The AHRD as a compromise between the ASEAN Member States 
 
The Commissioners of the AICHR pronounced their hope that the ASEAN Human 
Rights Declaration would “reflect the aspirations of the peoples of ASEAN, and be 
presented as ASEAN’s unique contribution to the international human rights 
discourse”.115 In connection to the diversity in legal systems among the ASEAN 
Member States, Marty Natalegawa, then in his capacity as Indonesia’s Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, commented on the AHRD that a “perfect document” cannot be 
reached due to the diverse systems and interests in the ASEAN Member States.116 
This makes that the AHRD is the result of a compromise, both between the Member 
States and their position on human rights, and between the standards set at 
international and national level. 
The final version of the AHRD includes forty articles divided under the 
headings of general principles, civil and political rights, economic, social and 
cultural rights, the right to development, the right to peace, and cooperation in the 
promotion and protection of human rights.  
The draft versions of 8 January 2012 and 23 June 2012 were leaked and are 
included in this study. When comparing the final version of the AHRD with the 
January and June drafts, topics on which the Member States had to compromise, are 
noticeable. First of all, the January draft included a chapter on the rights of women, 
children and other vulnerable groups, 117  but was omitted in the June version. 
Although the first draft mentioned the death penalty in relation to the right to life, 
the final document does not say anything about the death penalty. In the final 
version the prohibition of enforced disappearances is also not mentioned with 
respect to personal liberty and security. The prohibition of forced labour was 
initially mentioned but was not included in the final version. The right to practice 
one’s religion or belief was changed into the phrase that “all forms of intolerance, 
discrimination and incitement of hatred on religion and beliefs shall be 
eliminated”.118  This does not include the right to change one’s religion and to 
manifest religion in teaching, practice, worship and observance. It is likely that this 
                                                          
115 ASEAN/AICHR, ‘Press Release of the First Meeting of ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on 
Human Rights on the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration’ (Siem Reap, 8-9 January 2012) 
<http://asean.org/?static_post=press-release-of-the-first-meeting-of-asean-intergovernmental-commissi 
on-on-human-rights-on-the-asean-human-rights-declaration-siem-reap-cambodia-8-9-january-2012> 
last accessed 19 September 2018. 
116 Bagus B.T. Saragih, ‘AHRD won’t be perfect, says Marty’ The Jakarta Post (Jakarta, 20 September 
2012) <http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2012/09/20/ahrd-won-t-be-perfect-says-marty.html> last 
accessed 19 September 2018. 
117 ASEAN, ASEAN Human Rights Declaration, Working Draft, 8 January 2012, chapter VII (Articles 
80-90), on file with the author. 
118 Article 22 AHRD, see for the Declaration, ASEAN, ASEAN Human Rights Declaration, Phnom 
Penh, 18 November 2012 <http://www.asean.org/storage/images/ASEAN_RTK_2014/6_AHRD_ 
Booklet.pdf> last accessed 19 September 2018. 
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omission is influenced by positions of certain (Islamic) ASEAN Member States 
towards the freedom of religion and the issue whether this right contains the right to 
apostasy. In addition, while the January draft mentioned the principle of non-
refoulement within ambit of the law,119 this is not included in the final version of 
Article 16 AHRD. Concerning the right to marry, found a family or dissolve a 
marriage, these rights are subjected to national law while that was not the case in 
the January draft. This has implications for, for example, the legality of child 
marriages.120 The right to pursue one’s own economic, and social development and 
to choose one’s own political system are not incorporated in the final document. 
The right to a fiscally responsive government/system is neither included in the final 
version. The right to development was also more elaborate in the January draft. 
Salient is that the January draft mentioned that “[e]veryone whose human rights 
have been violated has the right to an effective and enforceable remedy, to be 
determined by a court or other competent authorities” (Article 6), which was 
proposed by Thailand, Indonesia and the Philippines. These three States also 
suggested to include that “[e]veryone has the right, individually and in association 
with others, to promote and to strive for the protection and realisation of human 
rights and fundamental freedoms at the national, regional and international levels 
without any arbitrary sanction or interference” (Article 4). While the former 
proposal is included in the AHRD, the latter was not adopted. Instead, the final 
version mentions that ASEAN Member States share a common interest in and 
commitment to the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms which shall be achieved through, inter alia, cooperation with one another 
as well as with relevant national, regional and international institutions or 
organisations, in accordance with the ASEAN Charter (Article 39 AHRD). While 
the AICHR was responsible for drafting the AHRD and is considered as ASEAN’s 
overarching human rights body, it is striking that the AICHR is neither explicitly 
included in Article 39 AHRD, nor anywhere else in the document. 
With respect to the following topics, the final version is more elaborate than the 
draft versions. The limitations on the freedom of the media and expression were 
omitted in the final version. The rights of a person in criminal proceedings includes 
also the right that one cannot suffer greater punishment than at the time of crime 
was committed, while the draft did not mention this principle. The final version also 
                                                          
119 Reference to national law was proposed by Malaysia, see ASEAN Human Rights Declaration, 
working draft as of 8 January 2012, footnote 33. 
120 Child marriage occurs in a number of Member States, and it topic of debate. See for example on 
Malaysia: Reuters, ‘Malaysian outraged over Reports of Child Marriage’ The Jakarta Post (Kuala 
Lumpur, 1 July 2018) <http://www.thejakartapost.com/seasia/2018/07/01/malaysians-outraged-over-
reports-of-child-marriage.html> last accessed 19 September 2018 and The Star/ANN, ‘Child Marriages 
not prohibited in Amended Act’ The Jakarta Post (Petaling Jaya, 19 April 2016), 
<http://www.thejakartapost.com/seasia/2016/04/19/child-marriages-not-prohibited-in-amended-
act.html> last accessed 19 September 2018. On Indonesia, see for example Liza Yosephine, ‘Why does 
Marrying Young cause more Harm than Good? The Jakarta Post (Jakarta, 22 August 2016) 
<http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2016/08/22/why-does-marrying-young-cause-more-harm-than-
good.html> last accessed 19 September 2018. 
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mentions technical, vocational and higher education, whereas the draft did not. 
Finally, the right to freely dispose of and control wealth and natural resources, the 
right to peace, harmony and stability in the region, dignity, the freedom to live free 
from poverty and hunger are added to the final version, while the duties of the State 
are addressed in more detail. The right to own, use, dispose and give lawfully 
acquired possessions was not included in the January draft under economic rights, 
but was moved in the final version to Article 17 under the heading of civil and 
political rights. 
Compared to the constitutions of the ASEAN Member States, the AHRD moves 
generally beyond the fundamental rights that are included at the national level. 
Davies observed in this respect that the set of civil and political rights is “far 
beyond those recognised in many of the states that negotiated the Declaration”.121 
This author hereby highlighted Articles 21, 22 and 25(1) AHRD on the freedom of 
thought, expression and the rights to participate in the government of one’s country 
in relation to the more authoritarian and conservative ASEAN Member States.122 
Moreover, the rights included in the AHRD, except for the right to vote, are not 
restricted to ASEAN citizens, whereas the constitutions of the ASEAN Member 
States often apply only to citizens. Echoed is the importance of the family and 
fundamental unit of society (Article 19) and the special attention to children and 
youth (Articles 27(3) and 30(3)), as well as mothers (Article 30(3)).  
Considering the limited common ground in the ratification of the core UN 
conventions (see Chapter III, Section 2 of this study), ASEAN has chosen to mainly 
refer to the UDHR, as it is “the common standard of achievement for all peoples 
and all nations”.123 It is observed that this reference mirrors ASEAN’s ambition to 
endorse the universality of human rights. Chien-Huei Wu observed in this respect 
that “[t]he adoption of the AHRD can be seen as a step forward from regionalism to 
universalism, though how far this step goes should be carefully measured.” 124 
Cooperation at the national, regional and international level in accordance with the 
ASEAN Charter is also underscored (Article 39 AHRD), while Article 40 AHRD 
refers to the international human rights instruments to which the ASEAN Member 
States are parties. 
                                                          
121 Mathew Davies, ‘An Agreement to Disagree: The ASEAN Human Rights Declaration and the 
Absence of Regional Identity in Southeast Asia’ (2014) 33 (3) Journal of Current Southeast Asian 
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122 Mathew Davies, ‘An Agreement to Disagree: The ASEAN Human Rights Declaration and the 
Absence of Regional Identity in Southeast Asia’ (2014) 33 (3) Journal of Current Southeast Asian 
Affairs 107, p. 113. 
123 UN General Assembly Resolution 217 (III) (Universal Declaration of Human Rights), UN Doc. 
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124 Chien-Huei Wu, ‘Human Rights in ASEAN Context: Between Universalism and Relativism’ in 
Chang-fa Lo, Nigel Li & Tsai-yu Lin (eds), Legal Thoughts between the East and the West in the 
Multilevel Legal Order: A Liber Amicorum in Honour of Professor Herbert Han-Pao Ma. (Springer, 
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Furthermore, the wording in the AHRD demonstrates commonalities with the 
UDHR. The AHRD’s general principles, civil and political rights and the economic 
social and cultural rights largely correspond to the articles guaranteed in the UDHR, 
often even literally. It is also stated in the AHRD that all the civil and political 
rights and economic, social and cultural of the UDHR are affirmed by the Member 
States (Articles 10 and 26 AHRD). Pisanò noted in this regard that the civil and 
political rights in Articles 11-25 “are all consistent with the spirit and the letter of 
the UDHR”125 and that the economic, social and cultural rights are almost entirely 
corresponding to the UDHR.  
Nevertheless, the previous subsections show that relativistic attitudes amongst 
the ASEAN Member States which are detrimental to the universality of human 
rights are still present in the ASEAN region. In this respect, the United States 
Department of States, for instance, voiced its concerns that the AHRD might 
“weaken and erode universal human rights and fundamental freedoms as contained 
in the UDHR”.126 From the perspective of civil society, the document was criticised 
for being inadequate and maybe even regressive.127 
Regarding the scope of the human rights in the AHRD, certain human rights are 
subjected to national laws. Reference to national laws is included in the right to life, 
the right to seek asylum, the right to a nationality, the right to marry, found a family 
or divorce, the right to be elected and to vote, the right to form and join trade 
unions. The age limit of child labour and the period of special protection to mothers 
is also left to the discretion of the Member States. 
Furthermore, the right to found a family (Article 19 AHRD) lacks the 
prohibition of discrimination as included in Article 16 UDHR. Article 24 contains 
the right to peaceful assembly, but not the freedom of association. The Declaration 
does not include equal pay for equal work and the right to a just and favourable 
remuneration and does not mention equality in and a just and favourable 
remuneration for work (Article 23(2) and 23(3) UDHR) and Article 24 UDHR on 
the right to rest and leisure. Article 28 UDHR on the right to a social and 
international order in which the rights of the Declaration can be fully realised is also 
                                                          
125 Attilio Pisanò, ‘Human Rights and Sovereignty in the ASEAN Path Towards a Human Rights 
Declaration’ (2014) 15 Human Rights Review 391, p. 405. 
126 Open letter from the Coordination Committee, as referred to by Chien-Huei Wu, ‘Human Rights in 
ASEAN Context: Between Universalism and Relativism’ in Chang-fa Lo, Nigel Li & Tsai-yu Lin (eds), 
Legal Thoughts between the East and the West in the Multilevel Legal Order: A Liber Amicorum in 
Honour of Professor Herbert Han-Pao Ma. (Springer, Berlin 2016), p. 9. Available at SSRN: 
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not mentioned in the AHRD. Social security is also not included when stipulating 
the right to an adequate living standard (Article 28 AHRD).  
Article 33 AHRD tasks the ASEAN Member States to take steps to achieve 
“progressively the full realisation of economic, social and cultural rights recognised 
in this Declaration”. It departs from the ICESR in the sense that the ASEAN 
Member States may decide to what extent they guarantee the economic and social 
rights to non-nationals (Article 34 AHRD), while the ICESCR only allows this for 
developing countries when guaranteeing economic rights (Article 2(3) ICESR). 
This, according to Pisanò, “creates a weak point, having a direct impact on the 
universality, indivisibility, interdependence, and correlativity of human rights”.128 
The AHRD also expands and clarifies the UDHR in some cases, which can 
partly be explained by the fact that the UDHR dates from 1948 and because 
international law underwent further development. Article 13 AHRD includes the 
prohibition of “smuggling or trafficking in persons, including for the purpose of 
trafficking in human organs”, a phenomenon widespread in Southeast Asia,129 when 
formulating the prohibition on servitude and slavery.130 Article 19 AHRD changes 
the order compared to the UDHR in the sense that this article opens with a mention 
of the family “as the natural and fundamental unit of society [that] is entitled to 
protection by society and each ASEAN Member State”, whereas this is mentioned 
last in Article 16 UDHR. Pisano noted that ““inversion” of addenda reflexes a more 
“institutional,” communitarian conception of the relationship between individuals 
and family, closer to African and Asian communitarian cultural traditions”.131  
In line with ASEAN’s overall focus on vulnerable groups, the AHRD mentions 
that the rights of specific vulnerable groups (“women, children, the elderly, persons 
with disabilities, migrant workers, and vulnerable and marginalised groups”) are 
inalienable, integral and indivisible part of human rights and fundamental freedoms 
(Article 4 AHRD). Also added is the principle of ne bis in idem (Article 20(3) 
AHRD). The AHRD also includes the prohibition of economic and social 
exploitation of children and young persons (Article 27(3) AHRD) and non-
discrimination of people suffering from communicable diseases (e.g. HIV/AIDS, 
Article 29(2) AHRD). Motherhood is also paid more attention (Article 30) than in 
the UDHR (Article 25). Two rights are added to the list, namely, the right to 
development (Articles 35-37 AHRD) and the right to peace (Article 38 AHRD).  
The right to a safe, clean and sustainable environment, the right to development 
and the right to peace are included as part of the third generation of human rights, 
which are described by Wu as “ASEAN characteristics, even though the AHRD is 
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not the first instrument to speak of these [solidarity] rights”.132 Pisanò rightfully 
observed that the 1993 Bangkok Declaration already included in paragraph 17 the 
“the right to development […] as a universal and inalienable right and an integral 
part of fundamental human rights”, which led to the inclusion of the right to 
development in paragraphs 10 and 11 of the Vienna Declaration.133 In addition, 
Article 35 AHRD states that “development may not be invoked to justify the 
violations of human rights internationally recognized.” The right to peace (Article 
38 AHRD) is placed within an “ASEAN framework of security and stability, 
neutrality and freedom”. 
This analysis confirms that the AHRD is a compromise between the Member 
States and the international and national legal level. The following sections analyse 
the AHRD in light of the international human rights framework by focussing on the 
following issues: the universality of human rights and the call for particularities 
(Subsection 4.2.2), duties and responsibilities (Subsection 4.2.3) and limitations of 
rights (Subsection 4.2.4).  
 
4.2.2 The universality of human rights and ASEAN’s call for particularities 
 
In the preamble of the AHRD, commitment to the UDHR, the UN Charter, the 
VDPA and other international human rights instruments to which the Member 
States are parties, is reaffirmed. According to its State Parties, the Declaration will 
help to establish a framework for human rights cooperation in the region and the 
ASEAN community building process. At the same time, and characteristically for 
ASEAN, the AHRD also refers to national and regional particularities. 
The January draft of the AHRD referred to the universality of human rights and 
national and regional particularities in its preamble: 
 
v. UPHOLDING the Charter of the United Nations, and international human rights 
standards as prescribed by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Vienna 
Declaration and Programme of Action, and international human rights instruments to 
which ASEAN Member States are parties;  
  
vi. REAFFIRMING that the Declaration adheres to the purposes and principles of the 
ASEAN Charter, and international human rights standards, taking into account 
national and regional particularities; 
 
vii. ENVISAGING this Declaration as a foundational instrument to manifest 
common values, commitments and aspirations in the field of human rights promotion 
                                                          
132 Open letter from the Coordination Committee, as referred to by Chien-Huei Wu, ‘Human Rights in 
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and protection for the peoples of ASEAN, and as a shared vision of ASEAN for the 
fulfilment of the goals and objectives set forth herein, including establishing a 
framework for human rights cooperation through various ASEAN conventions and 
other instruments dealing with human rights; 134 
 
Similar phrases were used in one of its general principles. While the Member States 
included the notion that human rights are universal in nature, they also underscored 
that “the significance of national and regional particularities and various historical, 
cultural and religious backgrounds must be borne in mind”.135 Reference was also 
made to the ASEAN Way in one of its general principles: 
 
The promotion and protection of human rights contained in this Declaration is 
encouraged and realized through cooperation and consensus, and not through 
confrontation, interference and the imposition of incompatible values. Regional 
problems demand regional solutions which can only be achieved through exchanges, 
constructive approaches, non-departure from ideas, values and norms respected by all 
cultures and societies in ASEAN.136 
 
Although the ASEAN Way has been underscored over the years on numerous 
occasions, it is remarkable that neither the June draft nor the final version adopted 
this passage as one of its general principles. Non-confrontation and avoidance of 
double standards and politicisation are upheld as part of the general principles 
(Article 9 AHRD). It is correctly observed by Nicholas Doyle that this phrase 
mirrors the ASEAN Way, and the principle of non-interference especially.137 Laos 
suggested that the principle of non-confrontation should always be upheld when 
realising the human rights and freedoms that are included in the Declaration.138 This 
position appears to be adopted by its fellow Members, as this principle is included 
in the June draft and the final version.139 
Striking is that the June version only included commitment to the UDHR, UN 
Charter, Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, and other international 
human rights instruments to which the ASEAN Member States are parties, thus 
limiting the list of human rights. The phrase that “(…) the Declaration will 
contribute to the ASEAN Community Building process through (…) the creation of 
                                                          
134 ASEAN, ASEAN Human Rights Declaration, Working Draft, 8 January 2012, preamble, on file with 
the author. 
135 ASEAN, ASEAN Human Rights Declaration, Working Draft, 8 January 2012, Article 15, on file 
with the author. Laos proposed the context of regional and national particularities bearing in mind 
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136 ASEAN, ASEAN Human Rights Declaration, Working Draft, 8 January 2012, Article 19, on file 
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137 Nicholas Doyle, “The ASEAN Human Rights Declaration and the Implications of Recent Southeast 
Asian Initiatives in Human Rights Institution-Building and Standard Setting’ (2014) 63 International 
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an environment where the peoples of ASEAN would enjoy, to the fullest possible 
extent, rights and freedoms within the regional context…” [emphasis added] is 
omitted. It is striking that the references to the national and regional contexts are not 
included in the preamble of the June version and the final version, although it is 
included later on.  
The inclusion of ‘regional and national contexts’ is in the final version included 
in Article 7 AHRD, which reads as follows:  
 
All human rights are universal, indivisible, interdependent and interrelated. All 
human rights and fundamental freedoms in this Declaration must be treated in a fair 
and equal manner, on the same footing and with the same emphasis. At the same 
time, the realisation of human rights must be considered in the regional and national 
context bearing in mind different political, economic, legal, social, cultural, historical 
and religious backgrounds.140 
 
This generally corresponds to Article 5 VDPA and Article 8 of the (governmental) 
Bangkok Declaration (discussed in Chapter 2, Section 3.4). Since it is part of the 
general principles, all human rights set forth in the AHRD have to be interpreted 
according to the contexts and backgrounds as indicated.  
The inclusion of this Article 7 led to concerns.141 It is recognised by some as a 
reawakening of the Asian values debate.142 Wu noted that this passage “recalls the 
ghost of the ASEAN particularities”, making the adoption of the AHRD a very 
modest move to universalism.143 
The Philippine member of the drafting team, on the other hand, formulated the 
view that the AHRD “laid to rest the Asian Values Debate and the spectre of 
cultural relativism”. 144  Renshaw argued that it can be read best between the 
Bangkok Declaration and the Vienna Declaration and noted: 
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The AHRD draws attention to the fact that different political, economic, legal, social, 
cultural, historical and religious backgrounds should be 'borne in mind', but it does 
not permit States to defer to particularities of context in the realisation of rights. It is 
not, in this sense, an endorsement of relativism.145 
 
Renshaw’s observation does not correspond with other literature that concluded that 
Article 7 AHRD is proposing a relativist argument. Hien Bui specifically addressed 
Renshaw’s analysis in one of her articles, stating that the universality of human 
rights is stressed in Article 5 VDPA, and that “[t]he reference to “national and 
regional particularities” are in this case merely supplementary considerations”.146 In 
Article 7 AHRD, however, this emphasis on the universality is ignored and 
“emphasizes particularism as a condition for the realization of human rights”147 
instead. The inclusion ‘at the same time’ indeed implies that relativistic attitudes are 
conditional, whereby the inclusion of ‘while’ in the VDPA denotes that 
particularities are allowed within the framework of the universality of human rights. 
In addition, Wu argued that “[t]he ASEAN human rights discourse is still haunted 
by regional particularities, which jealously guard sovereignty and value of the non-
interference principle”.148 
Furthermore, the following general principle was included in the January draft: 
 
Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in the Declaration, 
without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political 
or other opinions, national or social origin, [sexual identity], property, birth, 
disability or [other status]. No one shall be discriminated against by any public 
authority or any third parties on any grounds. 
 
Malaysia commented on this article that the definition of ‘other status’ and ‘sex’ is 
to be determined “in the context of ASEAN Common Values and should not be 
governed by the definition of other status and sex as determined by the Human 
Rights Committee under the ICCPR and the Committee on Economic Social and 
Cultural Rights under the ICESCR. The views of both committees are persuasive in 
nature and only with reference to the State Parties to the same Covenants.” This 
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Comparative Law 111, p. 123. This line of reasoning is also confirmed by Nicholas Doyle, “The 
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ASEAN Context: Between Universalism and Relativism’ in Chang-fa Lo, Nigel Li & Tsai-yu Lin (eds), 
Legal Thoughts between the East and the West in the Multilevel Legal Order: A Liber Amicorum in 
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State furthermore argued that these definitions should be determined by “ASEAN 
common values in the spirit of unity in diversity”.149  
While this seems reminiscent of relativistic viewpoints of the past in the form of 
Asian values, it would appear to be an interpretation of what is later included in the 
final version of the AHRD (preamble) and the Phnom Penh statement on the 
adoption of the AHRD. Specifically, it was stressed that the AHRD would be 
implemented: 
 
in accordance with our commitment to the Charter of the United Nations, the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Vienna Declaration and Program of 
Action, and other international human rights instruments to which ASEAN Member 
States are parties [emphasis added]. It also affirms ASEAN’s commitment to 
relevant ASEAN declarations and instruments pertaining to human rights.150 
 
This phrase leads to confusion as to whether only the international instruments 
to which the ASEAN Member States are party are of relevance and whether all 
Member States have to be party to these documents. Chapter III showed that only 
CEDAW, CRC and CRPD have been ratified by all and that a significant number of 
reservations and interpretative declarations have been formulated. Interpreting the 
above passage in a strict manner, would be detrimental to regional human rights 
protection. The inclusion of national particularities and the observation that 
particularism is conditional for the realisation of human rights implies that an 
ASEAN Member State is only bound to live up to those human rights which are 
also endorsed in an international instrument to which this State is party. The fact 
that Malaysia is not a State Party to all the conventions as included in Table 1, 
backs up this observation. On the other hand, as reference is also made to the 
UDHR, the rights enshrined in this document should be respected, regardless of the 
question whether these specific rights are included in a convention to which the 
ASEAN Member States are party. 
Based on the above, it can be observed that the AHRD reflects the ongoing 
tension among the ASEAN Member States, more specifically: 
 
The text reflects the tension that exists in Southeast Asia between the aspiration on 
the part of some Southeast Asian States to endorse universal human rights and an 
ongoing reluctance on the part of others to cede sovereignty. The former impulse is 
evident in the extent to which the AHRD endorses and replicates the UDHR. The 
latter is evident in the specific provisions of the AHRD that defer to national law, and 
                                                          
149  Malaysia’s comment on general principle 2, see ASEAN, ASEAN Human Rights Declaration, 
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150 ASEAN, Phnom Penh Statement on the Adoption of the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration, Phnom 
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in the broad provisions that exalt ideas about ‘the avoidance of double standards and 
politicisation’.151 
 
Nevertheless, it remains vague what Article 7 AHRD exactly entails. Specifically, it 
opens up the risk for relativistic arguments, which are detrimental to the human 
rights as enshrined in the document. As consensual decision-making is ASEAN’s 
norm, it mirrors the difficult road of human rights engagement. As Davies 
formulated it: “This synthesis between, on the one hand, commitments to rights 
and, on the other, the framing of these rights within traditional ASEAN norms 
accommodates the progressive, cautious and recalcitrant states, each getting at least 
some of what they want”.152  
4.2.3 Duties and responsibilities 
 
The January draft referred to duties and responsibilities in its preamble: 
 
ix. EMPHASIZING the interrelatedness of rights, duties and responsibilities of the 
human person and the ASEAN common values in the spirit of unity in diversity in 
the promotion and protection of human rights, while ensuring the balance between 
such rights, duties and responsibilities, and the primary responsibility to promote and 
protect human rights and fundamental freedoms, which rests with each Member 
State.153 
 
This balancing act is also visible in the June draft and final version of the AHRD. 
Article 6 AHRD is formulated as one of ASEAN’s general principles and reads as 
follows: 
 
6. The enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms must be balanced with 
the performance of corresponding duties as every person has responsibilities to all 
other individuals, the community and the society where one lives. It is ultimately the 
primary responsibility of all ASEAN Member States to promote and protect all 
human rights and fundamental freedoms. 
 
Furthermore, when comparing the January version with the June draft, one can see 
that the first draft is more elaborate as it listed duties and responsibilities of the 
individual, the ASEAN Member States, and corporations under its general 
                                                          
151 Catherine Shanahan Renshaw, ‘The ASEAN Human Rights Declaration’ (2013) 13 Human Rights 
Law Review 557, p. 578. 
152 Mathew Davies, ‘An Agreement to Disagree: The ASEAN Human Rights Declaration and the 
Absence of Regional Identity in Southeast Asia’ (2014) 33 (3) Journal of Current Southeast Asian 107, 
p. 119-120, hereby also referring to Mathew Davies, ‘The ASEAN Synthesis: Human Rights, Non-
Intervention, and the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration’ (2013) 14 Georgetown Journal of 
International Affairs 51, 51–59. 
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principles. The June version toned down the duties and responsibilities of the 
ASEAN Member States and omitted the duties and responsibilities of corporations. 
This line was continued in the final version of the AHRD. 
In all three versions it is included that a person has duties and responsibilities 
towards other individuals, the community and society where one lives, while the 
January version also included this responsibility towards families, communities, 
races, nations and religions as well as the international community. This draft also 
mentioned the idea that these duties and responsibilities “are implicit in the 
understanding of good citizens and responsible members of the ASEAN 
Community”.154 As Chapter III of this research has shown, several constitutions of 
the ASEAN Member States expect highly of their citizens. The January version also 
included a similar expectancy, which reads: “The peoples of ASEAN as members 
of a global community have collective as well as individual duties and 
responsibilities to promote a culture of peace by taking appropriate actions to 
prevent war and foster international and regional peace, collective security and 
cooperation.”155 The June and final version, however, did not include such high 
expectations. Nevertheless, according to Marzuki Darusman, this stress on the 
balance between rights and duties can be considered as a national and regional 
particularity in itself.156 
Renshaw rightly asserted that “[t]he idea of ‘duties’ has a clear pedigree and 
place in international human rights instruments”,157 although the balancing act of 
rights against duties caused concern among civil society. Renshaw commented that 
this is “understandable” because of the typical understanding of duty among some 
governments in Southeast Asia.158 She observed: 
 
The leaders of Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia and Myanmar have all argued, at 
different times, that personal rights and civil and political liberties are less important 
than fulfilling duties and responsibilities towards family, community and nation. In 
relation to ASEAN's communist members, Vietnam and Laos, the idea of balancing 
duties with rights is inherently problematic. In communist societies, the possession of 
rights is contingent on the performance of duties. […] CSOs feared that in any 
balancing act between individual liberties and an individual's duty to ensure the 
                                                          
154 ASEAN, ASEAN Human Rights Declaration, Working Draft, 8 January 2012, Article 7, paragraph 3, 
Article 12 and Article 14, on file with the author. 
155 ASEAN, ASEAN Human Rights Declaration, Working Draft, 8 January 2012, Article 8 which was 
proposed by Laos, on file with the author. 
156 Interview with Marzuki Darusman, lawyer and politician in Indonesia (Jakarta, 18 July 2012). 
157 Catherine Shanahan Renshaw, ‘The ASEAN Human Rights Declaration’ 2013, 13 Human Rights 
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cohesion and security of the State, it would be individual liberty that inevitably 
suffered.159 
  
In addition, while human rights bring about duties when balancing human rights, 
the AHRD goes a step further by subjecting all rights as included in the AHRD to a 
set of duties by including Article 6 AHRD as one of its general principles. 
With respect to Article 6 AHRD, Bui commented that the balancing of rights 
and duties “is used as a tactic to impose unreasonable restrictions on rights and 
freedoms”. 160  Wu noted the concerns that were raised by the Coordination 
Committee of the Special Procedures of the Human Rights Council, who noted that 
“the stress on duties of individuals and balancing between rights and duties may 
bring in the danger of arbitrary, disproportionate and unnecessary restrictions on 
human rights and compromise the purpose and objective of human rights 
instruments”.161  Pisanò observed that while the reciprocity of Article 8 AHRD 
follows Article 29(2) UDHR, the first sentence of Articles 6 and 7 AHRD shows a 
communitarian approach in the relation between an individual and society, in which 
a strong correlation exists between rights and duties and the presence of social 
duties.162  This differs from the wording in Article 29(1) UDHR. Pisanò rightly 
observed the following: 
 
This reference to the need to “balance” rights with duties marks the AHRD and, in 
general, the ASEAN approach to human rights. In the international scenario, it is the 
only human rights declaration which contains a similar reference to the balance 
between rights and duties, and for this reason, it was strongly criticized both by civil 
society organizations during the Bali Democracy Forum on 7 November 2012, and 
by the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, who stated that “the 
balancing of human rights with individual duties was not a part of international 
                                                          
159 Catherine Shanahan Renshaw, ‘The ASEAN Human Rights Declaration’ 2013, 13 Human Rights 
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International Publications, London 2013), p. 12, see Hien Bui, ‘The ASEAN Human Rights System: A 
Critical Analysis’ (2016) 11 Asian Journal of Comparative Law 111, p. 125. 
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human rights law, misrepresents the positive dynamic between rights and duties and 
should not be included in a human rights instrument”.163 
 
While the balancing act included in the AHRD matches the stance of the ASEAN 
Member States, adopting it as a general principle is thus contrary to international 
human rights law. This brings about a lowering of standards compared to 
international human rights standards and is criticised by various stakeholders.  
 
4.2.4 Limitations of rights 
 
The January draft included a significant number of articles in which overlapping 
restrictions on human rights were formulated (Articles 25-41). It was amongst 
others ascertained that these limitations may not be exercised contrary to the 
purposes and principles of the ASEAN Charter and the UN Charter. The limitations 
boiled down to the following: limitations as are determined by law solely for the 
purpose of securing due recognition for the human rights and fundamental freedoms 
and reputation of others (in a democratic society), to meet the just requirements of 
national security, common interest in compliance with international law, public 
safety, public order/law and order, public health, public morals/morality, general 
welfare (of the peoples in a democratic society) or to prevent crime. Malaysia 
suggested to also include the parameters of future generations and the State.164 Laos 
proposed the inclusion of impartiality, objectivity, non-selectivity, non-
discrimination, non-confrontation, avoidance of double standards and non-
politicisation.165 
The June draft showed on which limitations consensus was reached. The 
following is formulated as one of ASEAN’s general principle, and is also included 
as such in Article 8 of the final version of the AHRD: 
 
The human rights and fundamental freedoms of every person shall be exercised with 
due regard to the human rights and fundamental freedoms of others. The exercise of 
human rights and fundamental freedoms shall be subject only to such limitations as 
are determined by law solely for the purpose of securing due recognition for the 
human rights and fundamental freedoms of others, and to meet the just requirements 
of national security, public order, public health, public safety, public morality, as 
well as the general welfare of the people in a democratic society.166 
 
                                                          
163 Attilio Pisanò, ‘Human Rights and Sovereignty in the ASEAN Path Towards a Human Rights 
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ASEAN Human Rights Declaration’ 2013, 13 Human Rights Law Review 557. 
164 ASEAN, ASEAN Human Rights Declaration, Working Draft, 8 January 2012, Article 27, on file 
with the author.  
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Article 8 shows that the common interest in compliance with international law and 
the prevention of crime were omitted, while national security was added. 
Renshaw noted that the limitations of the AHRD do not essentially differ from 
the limitations as included in Article 29(2) UDHR, but that Article 8 was met with 
scepticism because it was included as a general principle. Consequently, all the 
rights as enshrined in the AHRD are subjected to these limitations. 167  Indeed, 
Article 8 was criticised for being a general restriction to all human rights as 
included in the AHRD, which goes further than the limitations at international 
level, 168  and which is not subjected to tests of legality, legitimacy and 
proportionality. 169  Bui observed that this general restriction is “dangerous, 
especially for rights that have already been infringed upon by national law in some 
countries in the region”.170 
In addition, the line of reasoning with respect to the reservations of the ASEAN 
Member States to a number of international human rights treaties, which they 
ratified or acceded to, can be applied to this general principle as well. This boils 
down to the argument that general references that could limit the human rights, 
counter the object and purpose of that human rights document, which contradicts 
international treaty law. In addition, general reservations cast doubts on the actual 
willingness of the State to commit to the obligations that follow from the human 
rights instrument. 
It can be argued that these limitations can only be applied within certain 
boundaries. Generally, rights can be limited when these restrictions are provided by 
law. They may only be imposed for the grounds mentioned in paragraph 3 and must 
pass the tests of necessity and proportionality. The grounds mentioned in this 
paragraph are respect of the rights or reputation of others, and the protection of 
national security, public order, public health or morals. According to the General 
Comment 34 of the ICCPR (2011), “the concept of morals derives from many 
social, philosophical and religious traditions; consequently, limitations... for the 
purpose of protecting morals must be based on principles not deriving exclusively 
from a single tradition”. Any such limitations must be understood in the light of 
universality of human rights and the principle of non-discrimination”.171 
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The example of the ICCPR shows that the limitations as formulated by the 
AIHCR can also be found at the international level. Yet, some of the limitations are 
vague requirements for which implementation is needed to clarify their meaning. 
The next section, however, shows that the implementation mechanisms are 
defective.  
While the limitation of public morality is also broadly included in international 
human rights instruments, the inclusion in the AHRD was subject to critique. 
According to Renshaw, the critique on the inclusion of public morality could be 
attributed to the diversity of opinions on issues of public morality in the region. 
Accordingly, States are given a wide discretion in determining whether freedoms 
should be restricted because of the preservation of public morality.172  
Davies commented that ‘morality’ suggests a far more enduring curtailment than 
limitations like security, order, health, and safety.173 Civil society argued that the 
clause is subjective and discriminatory. Southeast Asia Women’s Caucus in 
ASEAN, for instance, stated that public morality is not defined and that the 
interpretation is based on “dominant political, cultural and religious regimes”.174 
Consequently, minorities and marginalised groups run the risk of being criminalised 
and stigmatised because their ways of life or practices are considered to contradict 
public morality. 175  In practice, the interpretation of public morality generally 
undermines women’s rights and of other vulnerable groups such as LGBTIs.176 UN 
Special Rapporteur on violence against women Yatik Erturk is hereby quoted, 
saying:  
 
’Public morality’ clauses in legislation generally serves to undermine women's rights. 
I think the nuance between the AHRD and the UDHR is an important one, the former 
has a more authoritarian and coercive tone. If the UDHR was drafted today I am sure 
it would have reflected the same tone. Unfortunately both national security and 
public morality have become prioritized over human rights.177 
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The inclusion of public morality was also a topic of debate among the AICHR 
Commissioners, whereby Brunei Darussalam, Singapore and Vietnam were in 
favour of adopting the concept, while Thailand opted against it because of the lack 
of definition in the UDHR.178 As ‘public morality’ is included in the legal systems 
of Brunei Darussalam, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand (‘good morals’), it could 
therefore not be omitted.179 In this sense, individual Member States influenced the 
AHRD in such a way that is detrimental to human rights. 
Furthermore, Article 40 of the final version of the AHRD includes the following 
phrase: 
 
Nothing in this Declaration may be interpreted as implying for any State, group or 
person any right to perform any act aimed at undermining the purposes and 
principles of ASEAN [emphasis added], or at the destruction of any of the rights and 
fundamental freedoms set forth in this Declaration and international human rights 
instruments to which ASEAN Member States are parties.180 
 
Davies argued that this first phrase “effectively undercuts every one of the 
foregoing 39 articles, as the “purposes and principles” referred to are the traditional 
state-centric ones that have served ASEAN since its creation in 1967”.181 According 
to this author, this article can be understood as a self-limiting clause because the 
provisions of the AHRD are made subordinate to the principles of non-intervention 
and sovereign equality. Yet, this conclusion does not give the complete picture as 
the AHRD also refers to upholding the international level. Moreover, while the 
ASEAN way is included in the ASEAN Charter in Article 2(2)(a), 2(2)(e), and 
2(2)(f), the Charter also includes “adherence to the rule of law, good governance 
(and) the principles of democracy” (Article 2(2)(h) ASEAN Charter), and “respect 
for fundamental freedoms, the promotion and protection of human rights” (Article 
2(2)(i) ASEAN Charter). these principles are all formulated as the general 
principles of the AHRD, these principles need to be upheld next to the principles 
distinctive of the ASEAN Way. 
Reference was also made to the ius cogens norms in the January draft, as Article 
35 formulated the following: 
 
No limitations or derogations are permitted in regard to those rights guaranteed 
absolutely in international law, in particular the right to life, freedom from slavery, 
prohibition of torture, prohibition of imprisonment for non-fulfilment of contractual 
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obligation, no retroactive criminal law, recognition as a person before the law, 
freedom of thought, conscience and religion or beliefs.182 
 
This article is not included in the June draft and the final document. Instead, the 
limitations to human rights are formulated as part of the AHRD’s general 
principles. This implies that this principle also applies to ius cogens norms, which 
are non-derogable rights (see Chapter II). Indeed, civil society organisations voiced 
their concern that these limitations could even limit the non-derogable rights, such 
as the right to life and freedom from torture, slavery and religion, which are 
included in the AHRD.183 This is, however, not in line with the status of ius cogens 
norms guaranteed in international law.  
From this analysis it follows that Article 8 was also a compromise, whereby the 
influence of some ASEAN Member States caused a lowering of standards 
compared to international human rights. In addition, Article 8 has been formulated 
as a general restriction and applicable to all human rights as included in the AHRD, 
which detracts from the international level. The article becomes especially 
problematic with respect to the ius cogens norms that are included in the AHRD, as 
these norms are non-derogable rights. Article 35 of the January draft was ultimately 
omitted. A possible explanation could be that it was considered superfluous given 
the nature of ius cogens norms. On the other hand, by setting the limitations as a 
general principle, thereby making it applicable to ius cogens norms, it is 
questionable whether this is actually the case. Regardless of the actual motivation, 
the AHRD runs counter to international human rights law by structuring the 
limitations as a general principle. The gap between the AHRD and international 
level becomes possibly even bigger because effective implementation mechanisms 
to clarify the meaning of the limitations are lacking. Although the inclusion public 
morality in the AHRD corresponds to the inclusion of this restriction in a number of 
the ASEAN Member States, this limitation proved to be especially problematic. 
Finally, the self-limiting clause of Article 40 AHRD has also been criticised. Based 
on this article, the provisions of the AHRD are made subordinate to the ASEAN 
Way, although ASEAN’s new principles that are more favourable to human rights 
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The ASEAN Charter includes human rights as part of its general principles and 
enumerates the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights as one of 
ASEAN’s organs. The previous section showed that human rights cooperation is 
mainly part of the ASEAN Security Community, while human rights references are 
also found in the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community. The AICHR is the key 
human rights body of the organisation, which follows for example from the Terms 
of References of the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights and 
ASEAN Commission on Women and Children. Specifically, these documents state 
that the AICHR is “the overarching human rights institution” for human rights 
(Articles 6.8 ToR AICHR and 7.7 ToR ACWC). Moreover, the establishment of the 
AICHR is based on Article 14 ASEAN Charter, making the Commission one of the 
organs that are stipulated in the ASEAN Charter.  
The other human rights bodies are the ASEAN Commission for the Promotion 
and Protection of the Rights of Women and Children (ACWC), which was 
inaugurated on 7 April 2010,184 and the ASEAN Committee on the Implementation 
of the ASEAN Declaration on the Protection and Promotion of the Rights of 
Migrant Workers (ACMW), which met for the first time in September 2008.185 The 
ASEAN Commission on Women and Children falls within the ASEAN Socio-
Cultural Blueprint and follows from the ambition to establish an ASEAN 
Commission on the promotion and protection on the rights of women and children 
(Article C.27.1 ASCC Blueprint). The ASEAN Committee on Migrant Workers 
follows from the ASEAN Declaration on the Protection and Promotion of the Right 
of Migrant Workers.  
This section first focuses on the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on 
Human Rights before moving on to the ASEAN Commission on Women and 
Children and the ASEAN Committee on the Implementation of the ASEAN 
Declaration on the Protection and Promotion of the Rights of Migrant Workers. The 
AICHR is hereby discussed more elaborately given its status as ASEAN’s 
overarching human rights body. Given the similarities between the ToRs of the 
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AICHR and the ACWC, a number of the observations also apply to the ACWC. 
The ACMW does not have a ToR, but a Work Plan is available.  
 
5.2 The ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights 
 
Although the ASEAN Foreign Ministers agreed to consider a regional human rights 
mechanism in their 1993 Joint Communiqué during the 26th ASEAN Summit,186 
human rights as topic of common concern was formalised in the 2007 ASEAN 
Charter. Whereas human rights are mentioned in the preamble, the purposes, and 
principles of ASEAN, the ASEAN Charter also included the establishment of an 
ASEAN Human Rights Body (AHRB) and designated it as one of its organs. 
The inclusion of an AHRB187 was the most sensitive and controversial topic 
during the drafting process of the ASEAN Charter. First point for debate was the 
desirability to establish such a body. The second point of contention was the content 
of the Terms of Reference. Against this background and the diversity among the 
Member States as States Parties to the core UN human rights instruments, the 
variation of fundamental rights in their constitutions and the existence of National 
Human Rights Institutions that are accredited with the A-status in only three 
ASEAN Member States, it was difficult to agree on an ASEAN Human Rights 
Body.  
Aung Bwa observed that the main points of concern were the risk of politicising 
human rights, the concern for applying double standards and the stress of adopting a 
gradual approach.188 Although this former member of the ASEAN High Level Task 
Force for the ASEAN Charter did not specify exactly what he meant, his 
observations can be interpreted as follows. Human rights run the risk of becoming 
politicised because of the ASEAN Way, which often trumps human rights in 
ASEAN. In addition, criticising each other’s human rights violations could lead to 
double standard as all ASEAN Member States have human rights issues. While the 
stress of adopting a gradual approach based on the lowest common denominator is a 
consequence of the ASEAN way, Djamin noted on his own role within the AICHR, 
just after he was appointed as Indonesia’s Commissioner in 2009, that consensual 
decision making also brings about that he as a more progressive representative 
should also agree.189 This observation is in line with the description of Capie and 
                                                          
186 ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, Joint Communiqué of the 26th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, Singapore, 
23-24 July 1993, <http://asean.org/?static_post=joint-communique-of-the-twenty-sixth-asean-mini 
sterial-meeting-singapore-23-24-july-1993>, last accessed 10 September 2018. 
187 The AHRB, later AICHR, was not initiated by the EPG to be part of the ASEAN Charter. Instead, it 
became subject of debate during the discussions in the HLTF and the ASEAN Foreign Ministers; 
Rosario G. Manolo, 'Drafting ASEAN's Tomorrow: The EPG and the ASEAN Charter' in Tommy Koh, 
Rosario G. Manolo and Walter Woon, The Making of the ASEAN Charter (World Scientific Publishing, 
Singapore 2009) p. 43.  
188 Aung Bwa, 'The Jewel in my Crown' in Tommy Koh, Rosario G. Manolo and Walter Woon, The 
Making of the ASEAN Charter (World Scientific Publishing, Singapore 2009), p. 32-33. 
189 Interview with Rafendi Djamin, Regional Director for South East Asia and Pacific of Amnesty 
International and former Executive Director of the Human Rights Working Group as well as former 
 
 
ASEAN and Human Rights 
 195 
Evans of the “level of comfort” whereby the pace is not “too fast for those who 
want to go slow and not too slow for those who want to go fast.” 190  The 
negotiations led to Article 14 of the ASEAN Charter: 
 
1. In conformity with the purposes and principles of the ASEAN Charter relating to 
the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms, ASEAN 
shall establish an ASEAN human rights body.  
2. This ASEAN human rights body shall operate in accordance with the terms of 
reference to be determined by the ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting.191 
 
Terms of Reference 
The Terms of Reference (ToR) of the Commissioners was drafted by the High 
Level Panel on drafting the Terms of Reference of the ASEAN Human Rights 
Body, which was established by the ASEAN Foreign Ministers. Following the 41st 
ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (Singapore, 21 July 2008),192 the High Level Panel 
commenced its work.193  
Muntarbhorn observed that “[i]intrinsically, the position adopted from the 
beginning of the discourse envisioned that the human rights body should be 
realistic, effective and credible, and address human rights in an evolutionary 
way”.194 Point of critique was that the drafting process lacked transparency and 
consultation with civil society.195  
                                                                                                                                              
Indonesian Representative for the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights from 
2009-2015 (Jakarta, 19 October 2009). This line of reasoning is also reflected in the general observation 
of Medina, who noted that the developments within ASEAN go according to the most conservative 
State only to a certain extent, as it does not mean that “the more progressive States just let it be, because 
they also do what they can to push these [conservative] countries. So, they will not force the issue since 
in ASEAN decisions are made by consensus. But they will make their sentiments known.”; Interview 
with Carlos Medina, Director of the Ateneo Law Faculty’s Human Rights Center at Ateneo de Manila 
University (Manila, 10 November 2009). 
190 This was uttered with respect to the ASEAN Regional Forum, but applies to the ASEAN in general; 
David Capie and Paul Evans, The Asia-Pacific Security Lexicon (updated 2nd edn, ISEAS Publishing, 
Singapore 2007), p. 12. 
191 Article 14 ASEAN Charter. 
192  ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, Joint Communiqué of the 41st ASEAN Ministerial Meeting "One 
ASEAN at the Heart of Dynamic Asia", Singapore, 21 July 2008, <http://asean.org/joint-communique-
of-the-41st-asean-ministerial-meeting-one-asean-at-the-heart-of-dynamic-asia/> last accessed 19 
September 2018. 
193  ASEAN, Terms of Reference for the High Level Panel on an ASEAN Human Rights Body, 
Singapore, 21 July 2008 <http://www.asean.org/storage/images/archive/HLP-TOR.pdf> last accessed 
15 September 2018. 
194  Vitit Muntarbhorn, Unity in Connectivity? Evolving Human Rights Mechanisms in the ASEAN 
Region (Nijhoff Law Specials, Brill, Leiden 2013), p. 128. 
195  James Munro, ‘The Relationship between the Origins and Regime Design of the ASEAN 
Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR)’, 15 The International Journal on Human 
Rights 1185, p. 1189.  
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During the 15th ASEAN Summit, the inauguration of AICHR took place,196 
together with the endorsement of the final version of its Terms of Reference.197 At 
this Summit, the significance of the Commission was expressed in the following 
manner: 
 
The importance of the AICHR [is emphasized] as a historic milestone in ASEAN 
community-building process, and as a vehicle for progressive social development and 
justice, the full realization of human dignity and the attainment of a higher quality of 
life for ASEAN peoples.198 
 
The ToR stipulates the mandate of the AICHR in Article 4:  
 
4.1. To develop strategies for the promotion and protection of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms to complement the building of the ASEAN Community;  
4.2. To develop an ASEAN Human Rights Declaration with a view to establishing a 
framework for human rights cooperation through various ASEAN conventions and 
other instruments dealing with human rights;  
4.3. To enhance public awareness of human rights among the peoples of ASEAN 
through education, research and dissemination of information; 
4.4. To promote capacity building for the effective implementation of international 
human rights treaty obligations undertaken by ASEAN Member States; 
4.5. To encourage ASEAN Member States to consider acceding to and ratifying 
international human rights instruments;  
4.6. To promote the full implementation of ASEAN instruments related to human 
rights; 
4.7. To provide advisory services and technical assistance on human rights matters to 
ASEAN sectoral bodies upon request;  
4.8. To engage in dialogue and consultation with other ASEAN bodies and entities 
associated with ASEAN, including civil society organisations and other stakeholders, 
as provided for in Chapter V of the ASEAN Charter; 
4.9. To consult, as may be appropriate, with other national, regional and international 
institutions and entities concerned with the promotion and protection of human 
rights; 
4.10. To obtain information from ASEAN Member States on the promotion and 
protection of human rights;  
                                                          
196 ASEAN, Cha-Am Hua Hin Declaration on the Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights, 
Cha-am Hua Hin, 23 October 2009, available at <http://hrlibrary.umn.edu/research/Philippines/Cha-
Am%20Hua%20Hin%20Declaration%20of%20the%20AICHR.pdf> last accessed 19 September 2018. 
197 ASEAN, ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (Terms of Reference), October 
2009 <http://aichr.org/documents/> last accessed 19 September 2018. The first draft of the ToR was 
submitted by the HLP to the Foreign Ministers Meeting of 27 February 2009. The endorsement of the 
ToR by the ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting preceded the formal approval of the Summit, which 
took place at the 42nd Foreign Ministers Meeting (Ch-am, 28 February-1 March 2009). 
198 ASEAN, Cha-Am Hua Hin Declaration on the Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights, 
Cha-am Hua Hin, 23 October 2009, available at <http://hrlibrary.umn.edu/research/Philippines/Cha-
Am%20Hua%20Hin%20Declaration%20of%20the%20AICHR.pdf> last accessed 19 September 2018. 
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4.11. To develop common approaches and positions on human rights matters of 
interest to ASEAN; 
4.12. To prepare studies on thematic issues of human rights in ASEAN; 
4.13. To submit an annual report on its activities, or other reports if deemed 
necessary, to the ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting; and 
4.14. To perform any other tasks as may be assigned to it by the ASEAN Foreign 
Ministers Meeting.199 200 
 
The reference to upholding international human rights standards is important, that is 
to say, the UDHR, the 1993 Vienna Convention and the international human rights 
instruments to which the Member States are party (Article 1.6 ToR). 201  As 
discussed in the previous section, the criticism has been that it restricts the focus to 
only those human rights instruments to which the ASEAN Member States are party. 
In addition, it is unclear whether this only includes the instruments to which all the 
Member States are party.  
While AICHR could theoretically build upon and provide an enrichment to 
human rights law when upholding and complementing international human rights 
standards. Christof Heyns and Magnus Killander, are rightly concerned with the 
other side of the coin, namely, that such systems can detract from the universalist 
aspirations of the international level. In this sense, regionalism in the field of human 
                                                          
199 ASEAN, ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (Terms of Reference), October 
2009, Article 4 <http://aichr.org/documents/> last accessed 19 September 2018. 
200 During the 7th Workshop on the ASEAN Regional Mechanism on Human Rights (Singapore, 12-13 
June 2008), the Workshop envisioned that the ToR of AHRB could empower the AHRB in the 
following way: “i. mandated to carry out state and/or thematic reporting coupled with an optional 
protocol to conduct investigations upon complaints by individuals in accordance to international 
standards and broadly, with the power to assess situations and advise member countries; ii. with the 
power to promote and protect human rights; iii. to provide for effective implementation of the ASEAN 
Human Rights body’s findings and adequate resources for its operations. iv. to provide that the 
appointment of its members should be carried out in consultation with civil society groups, NHRIs and 
other stakeholders transparently; v. to provide public education with respect to human rights; vi. to 
study and promote relevant human rights treaties; vii. to promulgate human rights declarations on 
behalf of ASEAN; viii. to consult with NGOs, NHRIs and other stakeholders; ix. to appoint a human 
rights coordinator to advocate in development and work of ASEAN councils, networks of existing 
NHRIs; and x. to engage in capacity building in the implementation and encouraging compliance with 
human rights treaties”; see Working Group for an ASEAN Human Rights Mechanism, ‘7th Workshop 
on the ASEAN Regional Mechanism on Human Rights. Summary of Proceedings’ (Singapore, 12-13 
June 2008) <http://aseanhrmech.org/downloads/7th%20WS%20Summary%20Proceedings%20final. 
pdf> last accessed 19 September 2018. 
201 Muntarhorn observed that during the drafting of the ToR it was debated whether it should concern 
the international human rights documents to which all the Member States are party, but the word ‘all’ 
did not make it to final text, implying that is also the instruments to which some are party, must be 
upheld; Vitit Muntarbhorn, Unity in Connectivity? Evolving Human Rights Mechanisms in the ASEAN 
Region (Nijhoff Law Specials, Brill, Leiden 2013), p. 132. 
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rights can either form a “platform” for human rights or a “shield” against outside 
scrutiny.202 In case of the AICHR, the picture is mixed. 
Heyns and Killander for instance observed that an earlier draft of the AICHR’s 
ToR moved towards the direction of the AICHR as a ‘human rights shield’ since the 
Commissioners were initially required to “[d]efend ASEAN in the case of external 
interference in the domestic affairs of ASEAN member states relating to human 
rights.”203 Although this was omitted in the final version of the ToR, there is a risk 
that the AICHR is a human rights “pretender” instead of a human rights 
“protector”.204  
Based on Article 14(1) ASEAN Charter, conformity with the purposes and 
principles of the ASEAN Charter is required, which includes the ASEAN Way. In 
addition, the ToR was determined by the ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting, 
which, as expected, gave a restrictive mandate to the AICHR. Following from the 
ToR, the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting is also the recipient of the (annual) reports of 
the AICHR and may assign the Commission other tasks than the responsibilities 
that are included in the ToR. In this way, the independence and credibility of the 
Commission is compromised. Wu noted in this respect that this “suggests that it 
does not enjoy competence-competence; in other words, it is not in a position to 
decide its own jurisdiction.205 This corresponds to the viewpoint of one of the then 
ASEAN Officials as Chalermpalanupap stated that the ASEAN Human Rights 
Body is an organ within ASEAN, and it is not intended to be an independent 
watchdog.206 
Furthermore, Article 1.4 ToR AICHR requires its Members:207  
 
                                                          
202 Christof Heyns and Magnus Killander, 'Towards Minimum Standards for Regional Human Rights 
Systems' in Mahnoush H. Arsanjani and others (eds), Looking to the Future: Essays on International 
Law in Honor of W Michael Reisman (Martinus Nijghoff Publishers, Leiden 2011), p. 528. 
203 Christof Heyns and Magnus Killander, 'Towards Minimum Standards for Regional Human Rights 
Systems' in Mahnoush H. Arsanjani and others (eds), Looking to the Future: Essays on International 
Law in Honor of W Michael Reisman (Martinus Nijghoff Publishers, Leiden 2011), p. 529 and High 
Level Panel, Terms of Reference of an ASEAN Human Rights Body, Draft, 15 January 2009, 
<https://www.scribd.com/document/12882981/Draft-of-ASEAN-Human-Right-Body> last accessed 19 
September 2018. 
204 In line with the wordings of Christof Heyns and Magnus Killander , 'Towards Minimum Standards 
for Regional Human Rights Systems' in Mahnoush H. Arsanjani and others (eds), Looking to the 
Future: Essays on International Law in Honor of W Michael Reisman (Martinus Nijghoff Publishers, 
Leiden 2011), p. 530. 
205 Chien-Huei Wu, ‘Human Rights in ASEAN Context: Between Universalism and Relativism’ in 
Chang-fa Lo, Nigel Li & Tsai-yu Lin (eds), Legal Thoughts between the East and the West in the 
Multilevel Legal Order: A Liber Amicorum in Honour of Professor Herbert Han-Pao Ma. (Springer, 
Berlin 2016), p. 6. Available at SSRN: <https://ssrn.com/abstract=2920471> (last accessed 10 
September 2018). 
206  Interview with Termsak Chalermpalanupap, the then Director of the Political and Security 
Directorate, ASEAN Secretariat (Jakarta, 14 October 2009). 
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[t]o promote human rights within the regional context, bearing in mind national and 
regional particularities and mutual respect for different historical, cultural and 
religious background, and taking into account the balance between rights and 
responsibilities. 
 
As observed throughout this research, this could downgrade international human 
rights standards. Rathgeber rightfully noted in this respect: 
 
Thus, the AICHR and the ASEAN Declaration will go against core elements, 
including the universality, of the UN’s view of human rights. Such a misuse of the 
regional framework is not beyond ASEAN’s scope of realistic action, as ASEAN 
includes countries with a long track record of notorious human rights violations. The 
current regional framework allows for the possibility that international human rights 
law will be undermined.208 
 
Moreover, Article 2.1 ToR stipulates that the work of the AICHR should be 
placed within the framework of the principles enshrined in Article 2 ASEAN 
Charter. A number of these principles restrict the Commissioners in their work, 
especially respect for independence, sovereignty, equality and national integrity of 
the ASEAN Member States (principle a in the AICHR’s ToR), non-interference in 
the internal affairs (principle b), and the principle of respect of the rights of the 
ASEAN Member States to lead is national existence without external interference, 
subversion and coercion (principle c). In addition, the ToR mentions that the 
Commission has a subsidiary role to the Member States (Article 2.3), that it has to 
be constructive and non-confrontational in its course of action (Article 2.4), and that 
its work has an evolutionary approach (Article 2.5). 
It is striking that human rights and the principles that contribute to their 
promotion and protection are mentioned after these ‘ASEAN Way’ principles in 
Article 2.1(d) to (g) and Article 2.2). Although it is natural to find these principles 
in an organisation, the analysis of the ASEAN Way (Chapter IV, Section 3) 
illustrated that ASEAN developed its modus operandi by its ongoing stress on these 
principles throughout the years. This has a detrimental effect on the promotion and 
above all the protection of human rights, since human rights are still a sensitive 
topic given the human rights record of the Member States. In particular, together 
with the principle of non-interference and the need for an evolutionary approach, 
these principles restrict the work of the AICHR, especially in terms of protecting 
human rights.  
This could explain the emphasis in the ToR’s on the promotional aspect rather 
than on protection while the ToR mentions both aspects (Article 1.1). The actual 
manner in which the protection of human rights must be executed is not clarified. 
Muntarhorn commented in this respect that protection raised sensitive issues during 
the drafting. In international law, this often implies monitoring, investigations, on 
                                                          
208  Theodor Rathgeber, ‘Human Rights and the Institutionalisation of ASEAN: An Ambiguous 
Relationship’ (2104) 33 (3) Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs 131, pp. 162-163. 
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site visits and complaint procedures for individuals and groups, while the High 
Level Panel did not want to include these elements in the text.209 Furthermore, 
Medina also observed that one “cannot find words which are associated with 
interference, monitor, investigate in the functions of the commission”. 210  The 
AICHR can neither make recommendations to ASEAN States. Effective human 
rights protection proves thus to be a long-term goal.  
Other reasons to be reserved from a universalistic point of view can be found in, 
for example, Article 3 ToR. This article determines that “[t]he AICHR is an inter-
governmental body and integral part of the ASEAN organisational structure. It is a 
consultative body”. According to civil society, the credibility of the Commission is 
affected in the sense that the Commission is lacking independence and teeth.211  
Chalermpalanupap, former Director of the Political and Security Directorate of 
ASEAN, commented that it was not intended to give the AICHR such traits given 
its position inside ASEAN’s organisational structure.212 In fact, he argued that this 
critique “is to bark up the wrong tree”. Just as to every organ of ASEAN, the 
ASEAN Way is also applicable to the AICHR. He continued: “No ‘biting’ is ever 
required. ASEAN would not have come this far if its member states wanted to bite 
one another with sharp teeth just to get things done their own way”.213 He also 
added that the Commission is an “ongoing evolutionary process”, and that “it would 
be unrealistic for anyone to expect the ASEAN human rights body to be a “Big 
Bang””.214 While this ‘Big Bang’ cannot be expected indeed, the score-card that is 
used by Forum Asia based on the Paris Principles, and a Non-Paper, “Principles for 
Regional Human Rights Mechanisms” of the OHCHR, is illustrative. Specifically, 
it shows that the AICHR only scored positive on the following seven points.215 
According to the score card, the AICHR is only mandated to engage in the 
following topics: (1) to make recommendations and proposals to de Member States, 
(2) to request for information from the Member States, (3) to report on general 
                                                          
209  Vitit Muntarbhorn, Unity in Connectivity? Evolving Human Rights Mechanisms in the ASEAN 
Region (Nijhoff Law Specials, Brill, Leiden 2013), p. 130. 
210 Interview with Carlos Medina, Director of the Ateneo Law Faculty’s Human Rights Center at 
Ateneo de Manila University (Manila, 10 November 2009). 
211 See for example Forum-Asia, (2009) 5 (2) Asian Human Rights Defender. 
212 Termsak Chalermpalanupap, 'Life in ASEAN after the Entry in Force of the ASEAN Charter. 
Implications and Follow-Ups' in Sivakant Tiwari (ed), Life after the ASEAN Charter (ISEAS 
Publishing, Singapore 2010), p. 49. 
213  Ary Hermawan, 'AICHR: ASEAN's Journey to Human Rights', The Jakarta Post (Jakarta, 1 
November 2010) <http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2010/01/11/aichr-asean%E2%80%99s-
journey-human-rights.html>. 
214 Termsak Chalermpalanupap, 'Life in ASEAN after the Entry in Force of the ASEAN Charter. 
Implications and Follow-Ups' in Sivakant Tiwari (ed), Life after the ASEAN Charter (ISEAS 
Publishing, Singapore 2010), p. 49. 
215 Pisanò lists the number of commonalities between the AICHR and NHRIs: the mandate on the 
protection and promotion of human rights, linking human rights norms at the international level to the 
domestic level, and creating a bridge to assure state compliance with its international legal obligations; 
Attilio Pisanò, ‘Human Rights and Sovereignty in the ASEAN Path Towards a Human Rights 
Declaration’ (2014) 15 Human Rights Review 391, p. 401. 
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human rights themes, (4) to have an advisory function to the Member States, (5) 
responsibilities with respect to disseminating information and education, (6) to 
ensure a balance of nationalities within the Commission, and (7) diplomatic 
immunity by the Commission Members.216 
Article 5 ToR was also met with scepticism. In this article, the impression is 
given that the Commissioners are State representatives as it states that each AICHR 
Commissioner is appointment by and accountable to their government while acting 
impartially (Article 5.2 ToR). In addition, the respective government can also 
decide to replace its Representative according to Article 5.6 ToR. 
Muntarbhorn commented in this respect that the majority from the outset 
rejected independence during the drafting of the ToR .217 As mentioned before, this 
was also acknowledged by Chalermpalanupap, who stated that the AICHR “is never 
intended to be any independent watchdog” and that “like all other ASEAN organs 
or bodies, the ASEAN Human Rights Body shall operate through consultation and 
consensus, with firm respect for sovereign equality of all member states”.218  
Nevertheless, while critique on the mandate of the AICHR is justified, the ToR 
does provide the Commission important competences. Awareness raising and 
capacity building contribute to developing a meaningful regional human rights 
system. Dialogue with relevant actors is also imperative. Of special importance is 
the mandate to develop common approaches and positions on human rights matters 
of interest to ASEAN and to prepare thematic human rights studies, which open up 
possibilities for further developing the protection mandate of the Commissioners. 
Other important elements are the mandate to encourage Member States to ratify 
the core international human rights instruments (Article 4.5 ToR) and Article 1.5 
ToR, which stipulates that regional cooperation should be enhanced in order to 
complement initiatives in the promotion and protection of human rights that are 
taken at the national and the international level. This implies that the AICHR could 
form a bridge between the two levels, possibly reduce the gap between the national 
and international level, hereby taking the international level as the starting point 
while still allowing room for particularities. 
This corresponds to the way in which an international human rights framework 
should interweave with the lower levels. This is for example visible in the margin of 
appreciation doctrine of the European Court of Human Rights. This Court takes the 
internationally protected human rights as a starting point. At the same time, the 
Court leaves room for diversity among the Member States of the Council of Europe 
                                                          
216 Human Rights in ASEAN-Online Platform, ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human 
Rights, Score Card <https://humanrightsinasean.info/asean-intergovernmental-commission-human-
rights/score-card.html> last accessed 19 September 2018. 
217  Vitit Muntarbhorn, Unity in Connectivity? Evolving Human Rights Mechanisms in the ASEAN 
Region (Nijhoff Law Specials, Brill, Leiden 2013), p. 139. 
218 Termsak Chalermpalanupap, ‘10 about ASEAN Human Rights Cooperation’ (date unknown) 
www.asean.org/storage/images/archive/HLP-OtherDoc-1.pdf> last accessed 19 September 2018. Also 
discussed during an interview in 2009; Interview with Termsak Chalermpalanupap, the then ASEAN 
Director of the Political and Security Directorate (Jakarta, 14 October 2009). 
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in their interpretation of human rights by allowing a certain margin of appreciation 
to the these States.  
 
Guidelines on the Operations of the AICHR 
The AICHR’s work is also based upon the Guidelines on the Operations of the 
AICHR (initially called the Rules of Procedure). 219 These Guidelines were adopted 
in March 2012, but may be amended in the future. The instrument gives more 
information on the AICHR’s procedural aspects. It continues the line of the 
previous documents, as it includes the following:  
 
As the overarching institution responsible for the promotion and protection of human 
rights in ASEAN, the AICHR shall: 
i) Recommend that all ASEAN sectoral bodies dealing with human rights, adhere to 
the international human rights standards as prescribed by the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, 
and international human rights instruments to which ASEAN Member States are 
parties, as well as to ASEAN instruments relating to human rights, bearing in 
mind national and regional particularities and mutual respect for different 
historical, cultural and religious backgrounds, and taking into account the balance 
between rights and duties.  
 
Specifically, the Guidelines deal with the format of the meetings, agenda, 
notification and representation, chairmanship, documentation, summary records, 
public communication, the establishment of a working group or task force, 
reporting procedure, the relationship with other ASEAN bodies, interaction with 
entities associated with ASEAN and other stakeholders, representation at regional 
and international events, resource mobilisation and utilisation, and support from the 
ASEAN Secretariat. 
Even though there is overlap with the ToR, a number of elements are 
noteworthy. First of all, the ToR overrides the Guidelines in case of inconsistency 
between the two documents (Article 15.3), making the ToR more important than the 
Guidelines. With respect to the AICHR’s mandate, the following is stipulated. 
Article 1.4 stipulates that the AICHR may invite others to its meetings, provided 
that consensus is reached, which is discussed on a case by case basis. In addition, 
the public information materials of Article 6.7 ToR are more detailed. These 
include press releases and press conferences and other publications, disseminated 
through the website of ASEAN and other media. This led the development of the 
AICHR’s own website, which provides information on the AICHR, its activities, 
and its key documents. 
Moreover, the Guidelines of Operations form the basis for the possibility to 
establish ad-hoc working groups or task forces to support the work of the 
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Commission (Article 8.1). Accordingly, the Drafting Group on the ASEAN Human 
Rights Declaration was established, which led to the development of the AHRD. 
Pisano observed in this respect: 
 
Yet, there is a fundamental element which distinguishes the AICHR from the other 
regional commissions, namely that it was not created during a regional process to 
develop a regional human rights system based on a regional human rights declaration 
or convention. The AHRD was drafted by the AICHR, which is different from other 
cases where the regional commission was created within the same international 
agreement which states a regional definition of human rights. ASEAN, in fact, 
created a commission on human rights without a regional agreement on the rights 
which were to be promoted. Therefore, the compliance towards the international 
human rights system (based on the three pillars of the UDHR, Vienna World 
Conference, and Core Human Rights Treaties ratified by ASEAN countries), which 
is key to political commitment in the AHRD, is even more important because it 
places the sources of the AICHR beyond the narrow confines of ASEAN.220 
 
It is of note that the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting decides whether the reports of 
the AICHR that are submitted to them based on Article 6.6 ToR are released or not. 
This affects the AICHR’s transparency, accountability and legitimacy. Specifically, 
this brings challenges for the AICHR’s possibilities to become a credible 
Commission and to contribute to ASEAN’s ambition to become more people-
oriented. Indeed, the AICHR is dependent from the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting 
and shuts off NGO participation in its human rights engagements, while NGOs are 
playing a key role in developing ASEAN’s regional human rights cooperation. 
  
The Five-Year Work Plans of the AICHR 
The Work Plans explicate the AICHR’s programmes and activities. The AICHR 
developed separate priority programmes and activities for the periods 2010-2011221 
and 2012222 as the drafting of the first Work Plan took longer than anticipated.223 To 
                                                          
220 Attilio Pisanò, ‘Human Rights and Sovereignty in the ASEAN Path Towards a Human Rights 
Declaration’ (2014) 15 Human Rights Review 391, p. 400. 
221 Adopted at the 43rd ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting; ASEAN, Joint Communiqué of the 43rd 
ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting “Enhanced Efforts towards the ASEAN Community: from Vision to 
Action” Hanoi, 19-20 July 2010 <https://asean.org/?static_post=joint-communique-of-the-43rd-asean-
foreign-ministers-meeting-enhanced-efforts-towards-the-asean-community-from-vision-to-action-hanoi 
-19-20-july-2010-3> last accessed 19 September 2018. 
222 Finalised at the Seventh Meeting; ASEAN/AICHR, 'Press release of the Seventh Meeting of the 
ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human rights (AICHR)' (Kuala Lumpur, 22-23 June 2012) 
<http://aichr.org/press-release/the-seventh-meeting-of-the-asean-intergovernmental-commission-onhum 
an-rights-aichr/> last accessed 19 September 2018. 
223 The Rules of Procedure and the Five-Year Work were initially scheduled to be submitted to the 43rd 
ASEAN Ministerial Meeting for adoption; ASEAN/AICHR, 'Press Statement by the Chair of the 
ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights on the First Meeting of the ASEAN 
Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights' (Jakarta, 1 April 2010) <http://aichr.org/press-
release/asean-intergovernmental-commission-on-human-rights-terms-of-reference/> last accessed 19 
September 2018. At the 43rd ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, only the budget for the High Priority 
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date, two Work Plans were formulated: the first was formulated for the period from 
2010 until 2015, the second for 2016 until 2020. Both Work Plans are structured 
according to the mandate of the AICHR as formulated in Article 4 ToR. In addition, 
the following aspiration was formulated in both documents: 
 
AICHR desires that the ASEAN Community shall be free from fear, war aggression 
and poverty. The peoples of ASEAN shall enjoy the right to live in peace, dignity 
and prosperity. There shall be a balance between rights, duties and responsibilities of 
individuals in the context of the ASEAN Community. The Member States of ASEAN 
and all sectors of their respective societies have the shared responsibility to ensure 
the promotion and protection of these rights and duties.224  
 
The objective of the first Work Plan was to realise the AICHR’s ToR:  
 
To that end, the Work Plan is aimed at realizing the aspiration of the people of 
ASEAN on human rights, strengthening AICHR, promoting awareness on human 
rights in ASEAN and enhancing cooperation with external partners, as well as to 
implement AICHR’s overarching mandate on human rights, thereby contributing to 
the successful building of an ASEAN Community by 2015.225 
 
The Work Plan stipulated that the participation of various sectors of society in 
the implementation of the Work Plan is determined by the AICHR, “(…) taking 
into consideration the need to encourage as broad a participation as possible”.226 
                                                                                                                                              
Programmes and Activities of the AICHR 2010-2011 instead of the whole Work Plan was submitted by 
the AICHR and adopted by the Ministers; ASEAN, Joint Communiqué of the 43rd ASEAN Foreign 
Ministers Meeting “Enhanced Efforts towards the ASEAN Community: from Vision to Action” Hanoi, 
19-20 July 2010 <https://asean.org/?static_post=joint-communique-of-the-43rd-asean-foreign-
ministers-meeting-enhanced-efforts-towards-the-asean-community-from-vision-to-action-ha-noi-19-20-
july-2010-3> last accessed 19 September 2018. The complete Work Plan 2010-2015 is posted on the 
ACIHR’s website; ASEAN/AICHR, Five Year Work Plan of the ASEAN Intergovernmental 
Commission on Human Rights (2010-2015), Jakarta, 2010 <http://aichr.org/documents/> last accessed 
19 September 2018. The Rules of Procedure, entitled ‘The Guidelines on the Operations of the AICHR’ 
serve as a concretisation of the ToR and give details the AICHR’s everyday business and on its relation 
with other ASEAN bodies, entities associated with ASEAN, and external parties; ASEAN/AICHR, 
Guidelines on the Operations of the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights 
(AICHR), Jakarta, 12 March 2012 <http://aichr.org/documents/> last accessed 19 September 2018. 
224 ASEAN/AICHR, Five Year Work Plan of the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human 
Rights (2010-2015), Jakarta, 2010 <http://aichr.org/documents/> last accessed 19 September 2018 and 
ASEAN/AICHR, Five year Work Plan of the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights 
(2016-2021), adopted on 15 June 2015, approved at the 48th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, Kuala 
Lumpur, 3 August 2015 <http://aichr.org/documents/> last accessed 19 September 2018. 
225 ASEAN/AICHR, Five Year Work Plan of the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human 
Rights (2010-2015), Jakarta, 2010, preamble <http://aichr.org/documents/> last accessed 19 September 
2018. 
226 ASEAN/AICHR, Five Year Work Plan of the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human 
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This ambition was, however, not in line with practice as, for example, the entities 
associated with ASEAN remain limited (see Annex II of the ASEAN Charter). 
The ToR’s mandate and functions (Article 4 ToR) were concretised in more 
detail in the Work Plan. Ways to implement Article 4.1 ToR were for example 
dialogue and consultation with all three Communities and the formulation of 
recommendations for these Communities. Also, the review process of the ToR had 
to start in 2014 to identify ways and means to strengthen the mandate of the 
AICHR. Regarding the ASEAN Declaration (Article 4.2 ToR), the Work Plan 
mentioned the establishment of a task force to draft the ASEAN Human Rights 
Declaration, for which the ToR was adopted during the fifth meeting of the AICHR 
(Jakarta, 25-29 April 2011).227 In addition, the AICHR should assess the status of 
existing human rights mechanisms and instruments in ASEAN and strengthen the 
framework of legal cooperation on human rights (Mandate 4.2 Work Plan).  
Remarkable is the AICHR’s ambition to work to ASEAN Conventions on 
Human Rights after the adoption of the ASEAN Declaration on Human Rights 
(AHRD) and their support to the development of other legal human rights 
instruments by other ASEAN sectoral bodies (Mandate 4.2 Work Plan). This 
implies that the AICHR strives for the development of a legally binding framework, 
thus leaving less space for political influence as has been the case so far. However, 
ASEAN does not have, nor does it desire to have, a supranational character. This 
makes it difficult to ensure compliance. 
Public awareness was raised by disseminating information about the AICHR and 
its work, road shows on human rights and the AICHR, holding workshops and 
mapping human rights education programs in the ASEAN region (Mandate 4.3 
Work Plan). While the AICHR’s is often criticised for giving too much weight to 
awareness raising at the expense of protecting human rights, it is argued that this 
element is also necessary for the basic understanding on human rights among 
ASEAN citizens. 
The Work Plan touched upon a critical factor in human rights protection, 
namely, the promotion of capacity building to ensure effective implementation of 
international human rights treaty obligations by the AICHR (Mandate 4.4 Work 
Plan). Indeed, capacity building on the implementation of international framework 
would benefit the implementation of the regional framework as well. Both 
frameworks are encouraged by the AICHR (Mandate 4.5 and 4.6 Work Plan). In 
addition, the AICHR would hold consultations with the ASEAN (Sectoral) Bodies 
and entities associated with ASEAN (Mandate 4.8 and 4.9 Work Plan). 
The AICHR also included the ambition to learn from other national, regional 
and international institutions and other human rights mechanisms. Furthermore, the 
AICHR ambitioned to use the reporting procedure of the UN system, as it strived to 
                                                          
227 ASEAN/AICHR, ‘Press Release of the Fifth ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human 
Rights’, ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR) (Jakarta, 25-29 April 
2011) <http://aichr.org/press-release/press-release-of-the-fifth-asean-intergovernmental-commission-
on-human-rights-asean-secretariat/> last accessed 19 September 2018. 
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obtain these reports and additional information to these reports (Mandate 4.10 Work 
Plan). Cooperation with and reporting obligations to other ASEAN bodies was 
incorporated in Mandates 4.7, 4.13 and 4.14. 
According to the Work Plan, the AICHR would also identify current and 
potential human rights matters relevant to ASEAN (Mandate 4.11 Work Plan). The 
thematic studies could be used to gain insight into ASEAN’s common human rights 
issues. According to the Work Plan, the following thematic studies would be carried 
out by the AICHR: corporate social responsibility, migration, trafficking in persons 
particularly women and children, child soldiers, women and children in conflicts 
and disasters, juvenile justice, the right to information in criminal justice, the right 
to health, the right to education, the right to life and the right to peace (Mandate 
4.12 Work Plan). 
The work of the AIHCR in the first five years is continued under the current 
Work Plan, in which the promotion and the implementation of the AHRD and the 
Phnom Penh Statement is continued. In addition, the ambition is uttered to engage 
with ASEAN Organs and ASEAN Bodies that deal with human rights. Specifically: 
 
[T]he Work Plan is aimed at realizing the aspiration of the people of ASEAN on 
human rights, strengthening AICHR, promoting and protecting human rights in 
ASEAN and enhancing cooperation with external partners, as well as to implement 
AICHR’s overarching mandate on human rights, thereby contributing to the 
successful building of an ASEAN Community and beyond.228 
 
This Work Plan also lists focal points that are structured according to the mandate 
of the AICHR and mentions the years in which a number of these action points are 
taken up. The Work Plan overlaps with the previous Work Plan because it is a 
continuation of the first. Nevertheless, the following observations can be made on 
the current Work Plan. Regarding mandate 4.1, it is striking that the AICHR 
focuses on women, girls and children (as well as persons with disabilities), as the 
ASEAN also established the ASEAN Commission for the Promotion and Protection 
of the Rights of Women and Children. On mandate 4.3, promotional activities on 
the AHRD, the AICHR itself and corporate social responsibility are added. The 
encouragement of information sharing on the implementation of the Convention on 
the Rights of Persons with Disabilities is added to the mandate under 4.5. With 
respect to mandate 4.6, promotional activities on enhancing the role of people with 
disabilities and access to education for children with disabilities is included, as well 
as activities with respect to the AHRD, the Phnom Penh statement and other 
ASEAN instruments on human rights. Dialogue with civil society organisations that 
have a “consultative relationship” and regional stakeholders is also added (mandate 
4.8). The Work Plan omitted the topics of corporate social responsibility and child 
                                                          
228 ASEAN/AICHR, Five year Work Plan of the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human 
Rights (2016-201), adopted on 15 June 2015, approved at the 48th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, Kuala 
Lumpur, 3 August 2015 <http://aichr.org/documents/> last accessed 19 September 2018. 
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soldiers in its list of thematic studies and added the topics of legal aid and the 
freedom of religion and belief (Mandate 4.12). The AICHR only disseminated its 
thematic study on women in natural disasters on its website, so it is unclear whether 
the AICHR completed a thematic study on corporate social responsibility and child 
solders. It seems that the AICHR has conducted work in the area of corporate social 
responsibility, as awareness raising and information sharing on corporate social 
responsibility and human rights is now included in the Work Plan.  
 
5.3 The ASEAN Commission for the Promotion and Protection of the Rights of 
Women and Children 
 
While the AICHR is the overarching human rights body of the organisation (Article 
6.8 ToR of the AICHR), the ASEAN Commission for the Promotion and Protection 
of the Rights of Women and Children is ASEAN’s additional human rights 
commission which seeks alignment with the AICHR (Article 7.7 ToR of the 
ACWC). Women as a topic of common concern is a long-standing tradition within 
ASEAN and dates back to 1975, when the ASEAN Women Leaders’ Conference 
was held. In addition Muntarbhorn observed that “[t]he seeds for an ASEAN 
Commission on the rights of women and children were sown as far back as the mid-
1990s, when the Civil Society Group for an ASEAN Human Rights Mechanism 
implied this as one of the options for a mechanism in the region”.229  
The idea to establish such a commission was uttered in the Vientiane Action 
Programme 230  and reiterated in its successor, the Roadmap for an ASEAN 
Community (2009-2015). This Roadmap determined that the ACWC falls within 
the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community231. Consequently, the Commission has to 
submit its annual reports to the ASEAN Ministers Meeting on Social Welfare and 
Development. 
The ToR of the ACWC was formulated by a Working Group that had two 
representatives per Member State; one focussing on women and the other on 
children. Whereas the ToR was adopted on October 2009,232 the actual inauguration 
of the ACWC took place in Hanoi on 7 April 2010, around a half year after the 
                                                          
229  Vitit Muntarbhorn, Unity in Connectivity? Evolving Human Rights Mechanisms in the ASEAN 
Region (Nijhoff Law Specials, Brill, Leiden 2013), p. 149. 
230  ASEAN, Vientiane Action Programme, 29 November 2004 <http://www.asean.org/ 
storage/images/archive/VAP-10th%20ASEAN%20Summit.pdf> last accessed 15 September 2018. 
231  ASEAN, Roadmap for the ASEAN Community (2009-2015), Cha-am, 1 March 2009 
<http://www.asean.org/storage/images/ASEAN_RTK_2014/2_Roadmap_for_ASEAN_Community_20
092015.pdf> last accessed 19 September 2018 and ASEAN, ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community 
Blueprint, Cha-am, 1 March 2009, Section C.1<http://asean.org/wp-content/uploads/archive/5187-
19.pdf> last accessed 15 September 2018. 
232 ASEAN, Terms of Reference of the ASEAN Commission for the Promotion and Protection of the 
Rights of Women and Children, Cha-Am, 24 October 2009 < 
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AICHR. 233 The ACWC is influenced by the work done with respect to the AICHR, 
as is visible in the parallels in the bodies’ ToRs. This is also the case with respect of 
the lack of mandate to receive and investigate complaints on human rights 
violations and the lack of guaranteeing independence, although the need to act 
impartially in accordance with the ASEAN Charter and the ToR is also underscored. 
In line with the ASEAN Way, the Commissioners also base their decision making 
on consultation and consensus.  
Regarding the purposes (Articles 2.1-2.6 ToR) Muntarbhorn observed that they 
underscore the empowerment and participation angles, and that they list a more 
detailed set of instruments for guidance than the ToR of the AICHR.234 In addition, 
he correctly noted that the functions are listed in greater detail; there is a role in 
capacity/information building, mobilisation/dissemination with more specific 
articles on (data) disaggregation, and prevention.235  
Article 5 of the ToR list the mandate of the ACWC, which boils down to the 
following: 
 
5.1. To promote the implementation of international instruments, ASEAN 
instruments and other instruments related to the rights of women and children. 
5.2. To develop policies, programs and innovative strategies to promote and protect 
the rights of women and children to complement the building of the ASEAN 
Community. 
5.3. To promote public awareness and education of the rights of women and children 
in ASEAN. 
5.4. To advocate on behalf of women and children, especially the most vulnerable 
and marginalised, and encourage ASEAN Member States to improve their situation. 
5.5. To build capacities of relevant stakeholders at all levels, e.g. administrative, 
legislative, judicial, civil society, community leaders, women and children 
machineries, through the provision of technical assistance, training and workshops, 
towards the realisation of the rights of women and children. 
5.6. To assist, upon request by ASEAN Member States, in preparing for CEDAW 
and CRC Periodic Reports, the Human Rights Council’s Universal Periodic Review 
(UPR) and reports for other Treaty Bodies, with specific reference to the rights of 
women and children in ASEAN. 
5.7. To assist, upon request by ASEAN Member States, in implementing the 
Concluding Observations of CEDAW and CRC and other Treaty Bodies related to 
the rights of women and children. 
5.8. To encourage ASEAN Member States on the collection and analysis of 
disaggregated data by sex, age, etc., related to the promotion and protection of the 
rights of women and children. 
                                                          
233 ASEAN, 'Inaugurated: ASEAN Commission on the Promotion and Protection of the Rights of 
Women and Children' (Hanoi, 7 April 2010), <https://asean.org/?static_post=asean-bulletin-april-
2010#Article-2> last accessed 19 September 2018. 
234  Vitit Muntarbhorn, Unity in Connectivity? Evolving Human Rights Mechanisms in the ASEAN 
Region (Nijhoff Law Specials, Brill, Leiden 2013), p. 152. 
235  Vitit Muntarbhorn, Unity in Connectivity? Evolving Human Rights Mechanisms in the ASEAN 
Region (Nijhoff Law Specials, Brill, Leiden 2013), p. 155. 
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5.9. To promote studies and research related to the situation and well-being of 
women and children with the view to fostering effective implementation of the rights 
of women and children in the region. 
5.10.To encourage ASEAN Member States to undertake periodic reviews of national 
legislations, regulations, policies, and practices related to the rights of women and 
children. 
5.11.To facilitate sharing of experiences and good practices, including thematic 
issues, between and among ASEAN Member States related to the situation and well-
being of women and children and to enhance the effective implementation of 
CEDAW and CRC through, among others, exchange of visits, seminars and 
conferences. 
5.12.To propose and promote appropriate measures, mechanisms and strategies for 
the prevention and elimination of all forms of violation of the rights of women and 
children, including the protection of victims. 
5.13.To encourage ASEAN Member States to consider acceding to, and ratifying, 
international human rights instruments related to women and children. 
5.14.To support the participation of ASEAN women and children in dialogue and 
consultation processes in ASEAN related to the promotion and protection of their 
rights. 
5.15.To provide advisory services on matters pertaining to the promotion and 
protection of the rights of women and children to ASEAN sectoral bodies upon 
request. 
5.16.To perform any other tasks related to the rights of women and children as may 
be delegated by the ASEAN Leaders and Foreign Ministers.236 
 
The Commission can build upon ASEAN’s previous work, as this research shows 
that in the past initiatives are already taken in the area of women and children. 
Moreover, the ToR links up to CEDAW, CRC and the Universal Periodic Review. 
The ACWC has a solid basis in CEDAW and the CRC, as all ASEAN Member 
States are party to these conventions. Nevertheless, it is important to bear in mind 
that a significant number of reservations and interpretative declarations were uttered 
that lowered the standards set in these instruments (see Chapter III, Section 2).  
The ACWC also has its own Rules of Procedures, which are the guidelines for 
the work of the Commission and is divided in nineteen rules on the following topics: 
meetings, decision making, agenda, conduct of business, participation, 
documentation, summary records, communications, representatives, (vice-)chair, 
establishment of committees or working groups, reporting procedure, interaction 
with governments of ASEAN Member States, relationship with other ASEAN 
Sectoral Bodies, representation of the ACWC at regional and international events, 
external relations of the ACWC, resource mobilisation and utilisation, support from 
the ASEAN Secretariat, general and final provisions.237 
                                                          
236 ASEAN, Terms of Reference of the ASEAN Commission for the Promotion and Protection of the 
Rights of Women and Children, Cha-Am, 24 October 2009 <http://www.asean.org/storage/images/ 
2012/Social_cultural/ACW/TOR-ACWC.pdf> last accessed 19 September 2018.  
237 ASEAN/ACWC, Rules of Procedure for the ASEAN Commission on the Promotion and Protection 
of the Rights of Women and Children, November 2012 <http://www.asean.org/wp-
 
 
ASEAN and Human Rights 
 210
A Work Plan was formulated for the period 2012-2016, 238  although the 
Commission should have a five-year work plan according to its Article 8.1 ToR. 
This Work Plan dealt with the following areas: strengthening institutional capacity 
of ACWC, the promotion of consultation and dialogue with stakeholders at national 
and regional levels, the elimination of violence against women and children, the 
right of children to participate in all affairs that affect them, trafficking in women 
and children, women participation in politics and decision making, governance and 
democracy, the promotion and protection of the rights of women and children with 
disabilities, a Child Protection System, the right to early childhood and quality 
education, promoting implementation of international, ASEAN and other 
instruments related to the rights of women and children, gender equality in 
education, women and children living with and affected by HIV and AIDS, social 
impact of climate change on women and children, strengthening economic rights of 
women with regards to feminisation of poverty, women’s rights to land and 
property, adolescent physical and mental health, active ageing among women, 
gender perspective in policies, strategies and programmes for migrant workers, and 
gender mainstreaming. 
According to a press release of the 13th meeting of the ACWC (Singapore, 3-5 
October 2016), the Work Plan for 2016-2020 was finalised. Although the ACWC 
did not publish the current Work Plan on its website, according to the press release, 
builds upon the previous work plan. The following thematic project areas are 
included:  
 
(i) strengthening institutional capacity of ACWC,  
(ii) elimination of violence against women and children,  
(iii) the right of children to participate in all affairs that affect them,  
(iv) trafficking in women and children, (v) promotion and protection of the rights of 
women and children with disabilities,  
(v) Child Protection System: Comprehensive / Integrative Approach for Children 
in Need for Special Protection (e.g. victims of abuse and neglect, trafficking, 
child labour, children affected by statelessness, undocumented migrant children, 
HIV/AIDS, natural disaster, conflicts, and children in juvenile justice system / 
children in conflict with the law);  
(vi) the right to early childhood and quality education, 
(vii) promoting implementation of international, ASEAN and other instruments 
related to the rights of women and children,  
(viii) gender equality in education (textbook, curriculum, equal access), (x) social 
impact of climate change on women and children,  
(ix) strengthening economic rights of women with regards to feminization of 
poverty, women’s rights to land and property,  
(x) adolescent physical and mental health,  
                                                                                                                                              
content/uploads/images/2013/resources/publication/ASEAN%20ACWC.pdf> last accessed 19 
September 2018. 
238  ASEAN/ACWC, ACWC Work Plan, Jakarta, 2-5 July 2018 <http://www.asean.org/wp-content/ 
uploads/images/2013/resources/publication/ASEAN%20ACWC.pdf> last accessed 19 September 2018. 
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(xi) gender perspective in policies, strategies and programmes for migrant workers, 
(xii) gender mainstreaming,  
(xiii) women participation in politics and decision making, governance and 
democracy, and 
(xiv) early marriage.239 
 
A score-card was also made for this Commission, which only scored on the 
following points: (1) power to make recommendations and proposals to Member 
States, (2) power to report on general human rights themes, (3) to have advisory 
function to Member States, (4) public information/education function, (5) all 
Commissioners have knowledge of women or child Rights, (6) ensure a balance of 
nationalities within commission, and (7) commission members have diplomatic 
immunities and privileges. Compared to the AICHR, this Commission does not 
have the power to request information from Member States. In addition, the 
Commission is also not independent, makes decision based on consensus, has no 
protection mandate and has limited opportunities to engage with civil society.240 
 
5.4 The ASEAN Committee on the Implementation of the ASEAN Declaration 
on the Protection and Promotion of the Rights of Migrant Workers 
 
Subsequent to the adoption of the Declaration at the 12th ASEAN Summit, the 
ASEAN Committee on the Implementation of the ASEAN Declaration on the 
Protection and Promotion of the Rights of Migrant Workers was established. At this 
Summit, the ASEAN Member States: 
Task the relevant ASEAN bodies to follow up on the Declaration and to develop an 
ASEAN instrument on the protection and promotion of the rights of migrant workers, 
consistent with ASEAN’s vision of a caring and sharing Community, and direct the 
Secretary-General of ASEAN to submit annually a report on the progress of the 
implementation of the Declaration to the Summit through the ASEAN Ministerial 
Meeting.241 
                                                          
239 ASEAN/ACWC, ‘The 13th ASEAN Commission on the Promotion and Protection of the Rights of 
Women and Children (ACWC) Meeting, <http://asean.org/the-13th-asean-commission-on-the-
promotion-and-protection-of-the-rights-of-women-and-children-acwc-meeting/> last accessed 19 
September 2018. 
240 Human Rights in ASEAN-Online Platform, ASEAN Commission on the Rights of Women and 
Children, Score Card <https://humanrightsinasean.info/asean-commission-women-and-children/score-
card.html> last accessed 19 September 2018. 
241 ASEAN, ASEAN Declaration on the Protection and Promotion on the Rights of Migrant Workers, 
Cebu, 13 January 2007 <http://asean.org/?static_post=asean-declaration-on-the-protection-and-
promotion-of-the-rights-of-migrant-workers-3> last accessed 19 September 2018. 
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In line with this provision, it was agreed that the Committee should ensure effective 
implementation of the Declaration and facilitate the development of an ASEAN 
instrument on the protection and promotion of the rights of migrant workers.242  
Muntarbhorn correctly observed that the ACMW is the only ASEAN Committee 
which is based on a special Declaration instead of the Charter. 243  Another 
distinctive feature is that “it is a coordinating committee between ASEAN countries, 
open to officials who interlink as part of the bureaucratic process, rather than a 
committee geared to promote and protect rights in the sense of the AICHR and 
ACWC and to act ‘impartially’”.244 The AMCW divided its work into four “thrust 
areas”: 
1. Step up protection and promotion of the rights of migrant workers against 
exploitation and mistreatment, 
2. Strengthen protection and promotion of the rights of migrant workers by 
enhancing labour migration governance in ASEAN countries, 
3. Regional cooperation to fight human trafficking in ASEAN, 
4. Develop an ASEAN Instrument on the Protection and Promotion of the Rights of 
Migrant Workers.245 
Regarding the functions of this Committee, it is unclear what is meant by the phrase 
that the Committee will “explore all avenues to achieve the objectives of the 
Declaration”.246 The other functions mainly involve sharing best practices on how 
to promote and to protect the rights of migrant workers, and also the further 
improvement of cooperation and assistance, data sharing, harmonisation between 
the sending and receiving states, and the development of an ASEAN instrument.  
The Committee cannot enforce workers’ rights. While protection is mentioned, 
there is an even more limited space for the Commission on protecting human rights. 
Muntarbhorn noted in this respect that “its scope is more confined than that of the 
                                                          
242 ASEAN, 'Statement of the Establishment of the ASEAN Committee on the Implementation of the 
ASEAN Declaration on the Protection and Promotion of the Rights of Migrant Workers', Manila, 30 
July 2007, Purpose of the Committee, Article 1 <https://asean.org/?static_post=statement-of-the-
establishment-of-the-asean-committee-on-the-implementation-of-the-asean-declaration-on-the-protectio 
n-and-promotion-of-the-rights-of-migrant-workers> last accessed 19 September 2018. 
243  Vitit Muntarbhorn, Unity in Connectivity? Evolving Human Rights Mechanisms in the ASEAN 
Region (Nijhoff Law Specials, Brill, Leiden 2013), p. 159. 
244  Vitit Muntarbhorn, Unity in Connectivity? Evolving Human Rights Mechanisms in the ASEAN 
Region (Nijhoff Law Specials, Brill, Leiden 2013), p. 159. 
245  Human Rights in ASEAN-Online Platform, ASEAN Committee on Migrant Workers, < 
https://humanrightsinasean.info/asean-committee-migrant-workers/about.html> last accessed 19 
September 2018. 
246 ASEAN, 'Statement of the Establishment of the ASEAN Committee on the Implementation of the 
ASEAN Declaration on the Protection and Promotion of the Rights of Migrant Workers', Manila, 30 
July 2007, Purpose of the Committee, Article 1 <https://asean.org/?static_post=statement-of-the-
establishment-of-the-asean-committee-on-the-implementation-of-the-asean-declaration-on-the-protectio 
n-and-promotion-of-the-rights-of-migrant-workers> last accessed 19 September 2018. 
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AICHR and ACWC in that its mandate is to help implement the said declaration 
rather than fulfil a function of promotion and protection of migrant workers in the 
broader sense”.247 In addition, it was reasoned that protection would also go too far 
for the ACMW due to the ASEAN Way and the stress on non-interference.  
The decision making process is included in its ToR, which determines that 
[d]ecision making will be made at the ACMW Meeting and if necessary for 
decisions to be made in between meetings, the Committee will use ad-referendum 
mechanism. Adequate time will be given to Member States to review issues 
presented by ad-referendum”.248 
 In 2009, the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community Blueprint reaffirmed the 
Declaration on Migrant Worker Rights, as the protection and promotion of the 
rights of migrant workers as one of its strategic objectives (Section C.2). The 
ACMW reports to the Senior Labour Officials Meeting.  
The ACMW agreed to convene a drafting team on the creation of a Drafting 
Committee on the ASEAN Instrument for the Protection and Promotion of the 
Rights of Migrant Workers. This Drafting Committee initially consisted of 
governments representatives of Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand, 
but was later expanded to all Member States because of a negotiation deadlock. 
This resulted to a ‘Zero Draft’ instrument, which forms the basis for consensus 
building on each of the draft articles. To date, no instrument resulted from these 




While the previous chapter illustrated that ASEAN made progress on its 
cooperation in terms of substance and level of formality, this chapter specifically 
focuses on the inclusion of human rights as topic of common concern in the work of 
ASEAN.  
In 1993, a common stance was determined on the consideration of a regional 
human rights mechanism in reaction to the 1993 Vienna Declaration and 
Programme of Action. While ASEAN addressed the development of a regional 
human rights mechanism, some of its Member States underscored that the region 
had its own set of Asian values that had to be considered when talking about human 
rights in Asia. Even though these values were proposed as commonly shared values 
throughout Asia, critique came from other Asian States and civil society 
organisations that the Asian values debate was politically used as an excuse for not 
complying with international human rights standards. While the Asian values 
argument was damped with the Asian financial crisis of 1997-98, the existence of 
                                                          
247  Vitit Muntarbhorn, Unity in Connectivity? Evolving Human Rights Mechanisms in the ASEAN 
Region (Nijhoff Law Specials, Brill, Leiden 2013), p. 155. 
248 ASEAN, Terms of Reference ASEAN Committee on the Implementation of the ASEAN Declaration 
on the Protection and Promotion of the Rights of Migrant Workers, reprinted in Vitit Muntarbhorn, 
Unity in Connectivity? Evolving Human Rights Mechanisms in the ASEAN Region (Nijhoff Law 
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particularities cannot be denied. This is – naturally – not distinctive for the ASEAN 
region as human rights are implemented and interpreted in a certain way given 
different contexts across the world.  
The inclusion of human rights in ASEAN developed in an evolutionary way and 
advanced together with the increasing level of integration over the years. 
Significant steps were taken to entrench human rights co-operation deeper in 
ASEAN’s structure. Specifically, with the adoption of the Pillar structure of the 
ASEAN Community, human rights were mainly included in the ASEAN Political-
Security Blueprint and the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community. Human rights in 
general are included in the Political-Security Blueprint, whereas the rights of 
vulnerable groups are included in the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community. This 
implies that ASEAN considers human rights primarily in terms of security, while 
vulnerable groups are considered qualitatively differently and less threatening. This 
could explain that ASEAN focussed on vulnerable groups before it addressed 
human rights in general by adopting the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration. 
While human rights were, in a similar vein to topics in other areas of 
cooperation, included in non-binding declarations, the level of formality increased 
with the adoption of the ASEAN Charter. This Charter, together with the further 
development of the ASEAN Community Pillars and the establishment of the 
ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights as ASEAN’s 
overarching human rights body, led to the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration. 
Furthermore, the ASEAN Commission on the Promotion and Protection of the 
Rights of Women and Children and the ASEAN Committee on the Implementation 
of the ASEAN Declaration on the Protection and Promotion of the Rights of 
Migrant Workers were established next to the AICHR, mirroring the emphasis on 
the rights of this groups as a red line through ASEAN’s human rights engagement 
over the years. 
With respect to the content of human rights, this chapter has shown that the 
AHRD can be considered as a compromise between the ASEAN Member States. In 
particular, the drafts unveiled a common ground and the lack thereof. 
Nevertheless, the final version of the AHRD shows that it is overall moving 
beyond the fundamental rights that are included at the national levels. The inclusion 
of civil and political rights in the AHRD goes especially beyond those recognised 
by the majority of the Member States. The AHRD also differs from the 
constitutions by not restricting the rights to ASEAN citizens (except for the right to 
vote). 
A compromise between the ASEAN Member States is visible when reading the 
AHRD in light of the UDHR. The reference in the AHRD to the UDHR could be 
considered as an indication that the ASEAN Member States have the ambition to 
live up to international human rights standards and contribute to the universality of 
human rights. However, from closer reading follows that not all elements of the 
UDHR and subsequent UN human rights instruments are taken on board in the 
AHRD. This affects the universality of human rights at the level of concepts. 
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Specifically, the AHRD omits elements of rights, while they are included in the 
UDHR or the UN’s core human rights treaties and their optional protocols. Omitted 
are the prohibition of the death penalty, the prohibition of enforced disappearances, 
the freedom from forced labour, the principle of non-refoulement and the freedom 
of association, equality in and a just and favourable remuneration for work, the right 
to rest and leisure, the right to a social and international order in which the rights of 
the Declaration can be fully realised, and the right to self-determination and the 
rights of indigenous peoples. Social security is not included when formulating the 
right to an adequate living standard. The freedom to manifest and change one’s of 
religion is replaced with the prohibition of intolerance, discrimination and 
incitement of hatred. The right to found a family lacks the prohibition of 
discrimination.  
The AHRD also expands and clarifies the UDHR. Smuggling or trafficking in 
persons, including for the purpose of trafficking in human organs is included when 
formulating the prohibition on servitude and slavery. Furthermore, the article on the 
family as the natural and fundamental unit of society and the right to (dissolve) a 
marriage reflects a more institutional and communitarian conception of the 
relationship between individuals and family.  
The AHRD lists a number of rights and principles that are not included in the 
UDHR. The AHRD explicitly mentions that the rights of specific vulnerable groups 
are inalienable, integral and an indivisible part of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms. Ne bis in idem, the prohibition of economic and social exploitation of 
children and young persons, non-discrimination of people suffering from 
communicable diseases are also included, whereas motherhood is also given more 
attention. The right to an adequate standard of living, the right to development and a 
safe, clean and sustainable environment and the right to peace, harmony and 
stability in the region are included as part of the third generation of human rights.  
A number of general principles of the AHRD are addressed in this chapter that 
deviate from the international human rights regime. Together with a number of 
missing aspects of human rights, it can be concluded that the AHRD is substandard 
to the UN human rights regime, which affects the universality of human rights in 
terms of concepts.  
Moreover, the conclusion can be drawn that in some cases the AHRD detracts 
from the universality of human rights at the level of conceptions. In particular, 
Article 6 AHRD subjects all rights as included in the AHRD to a set of duties. This 
chapter shows that this can be considered as a way to impose unreasonable, 
possibly politically motivated restrictions upon human rights norms and would thus 
be contrary to international human rights law. 
Article 7 AHRD stresses the importance of national and regional particularities, 
dealing with human rights the ASEAN Way. It was observed that this article makes 
particularism conditional for the realisation of human rights, hereby ignoring the 
universality of human rights. The AHRD reflects the ongoing tension among the 
ASEAN Member States to endorse international human rights standards as 
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formulated in UN conventions on the one hand, and the reluctance to make 
concessions on State sovereignty on the other. Furthermore, a number of rights 
enshrined in the AHRD are subjected to national laws. This goes for, amongst other 
things, the right to life, the right to seek asylum, the right to a nationality, the right 
to marry, found a family or divorce, the right to be elected and to vote, and the right 
to form and join trade unions. In addition, the age limit of child labour and the 
period of special protection to mothers is left to the discretion of the Member States. 
Subjecting these rights to national laws is in many ways contrary to international 
human rights law and raises doubts on the actual commitment of the States towards 
these rights.  
Article 8 AHRD enumerates the limitations. It was criticised for being a general 
restriction to all human rights, which goes further than the limitations at the 
international level. Such general reservations cast doubts on the actual willingness 
of the State to commit to the obligations that follow from UN human rights 
instruments. Moreover, the inclusion of the limitations as a general principle 
implies that even ius cogens might be subjected to the limitations, while this is not 
possible given the character of these rights. Reference to ‘public morality’ as a 
ground for imposing limitations shows to be especially problematic. 
The self-limiting clause (Article 40 AHRD) subordinates the provisions of the 
AHRD to ASEAN’s purposes and principles. This includes the principles that are 
part of the ASEAN Way. Consequently, there is a risk that this provision 
undermines the human rights that are formulated on this. The article’s reference to 
international human rights instruments to which the Member States are parties, 
nuances the critique. It is unclear whether all Member States have to be party to 
these human rights instruments, or whether this article also refers to human rights 
conventions to which a number of ASEAN Member States are parties. 
While human rights were taken up as areas of cooperation, the ASEAN Way 
affects the development of a human rights mechanism in a way that the mechanisms 
installed in ASEAN detract from the universality of human rights at the level of 
implementation. Overall, it can be concluded that the development of ASEAN’s 
human rights mechanisms is restricted by the ASEAN Way as modus operandi, 
which led amongst others to the critique on the AICHR for lacking teeth. The 
principles of State sovereignty, non-interference and non-confrontation, for 
example influence the mandate of the human rights institutions. Consequently, 
these institutions are mainly involved in human rights promotion, instead of 
protection.  
Nevertheless, the initiatives demonstrate that ASEAN is increasingly including 
human rights in its cooperation. Moreover, the development of a meaningful human 
rights system cannot happen overnight, as the set-up of human rights systems in 
other regions has shown. Steps have been taken by incorporating human rights as an 
area of cooperation in the ASEAN Communities, adopting a human rights 
declaration and establishing regional human rights institutions. Albeit ASEAN 
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could learn from the other existing human rights systems, it is not realistic and 
reasonable to expect a fully-fledged human rights system on short term.  
In addition, this chapter has shown that there are possibilities to further develop 
the AICHR’s mandate by progressively interpreting the ToR. It has also been 
argued that the margin of appreciation of the European Court of Human Rights 
might form a source of inspiration for the AICHR. Although ASEAN does not have 
a court as the Council of Europe does, the AICHR could use this concept. In light 
of, for instance, the values of consensus, non-interference and the idea of moving 
forward based on the lowest common denominator, the AICHR could look into 
specific human rights abuses, conduct research on the way in which human rights 
are interpreted by its Member States, ascertain the level of consensus and 
‘persuade’ the lowest common denominator into a certain direction. In this way, a 
Member States’ practice is evaluated against the (consensual) practice of the other 


















This study has been concluded just after ASEAN turned 50 years. In this five-
decade period, ASEAN has expanded in terms of Member States and areas of 
cooperation, including in the field of human rights. The current research focuses on 
the issue whether and to what extent the ASEAN human rights system, with all its 
characteristics, is in accordance with international human rights law. As formulated 
in Chapter I, the research is captured in the following main research question: 
 
(How) does the development of a human rights system in the ASEAN context build 
upon and/or detract from the claim to the universality of human rights? 
 
The research focuses on the substance, as well as the procedural aspects of 
ASEAN’s human rights system. Regarding the substance, it concerns the space 
provided for developing and establishing human rights standards that take existing 
particularities in the ASEAN region into consideration. The procedural aspect 
focuses on the mechanisms used for the promotion and protection of human rights. 
In this research, the choice is made to focus on the normative legal human rights 
standards as adopted by ASEAN and its Member States when analysing the 
characteristics of ASEAN’s regional human rights system. Consequently, this 
research aims to discover what is (at least) formally endorsed in ASEAN and in the 
legal domain of the ASEAN Member States with respect to human rights. This 
normative legal analysis at the national level of the Member States forms the 
background and basis of the research on ASEAN’s regional human rights 
engagement. In this way, certain particularities and the position of ASEAN and its 
Member States towards the claim to the universality of human rights were able to 
be unveiled. With respect to the procedural aspects, the research focuses on 
ASEAN’s human rights mechanisms and the three National Human Rights 
Institutions that are accredited with the A-Status according to the Paris Principles, 
which could be considered as the national counterparts to ASEAN’s human rights 
mechanisms. 
To this end, Donnelly’s idea of the relative universality of human rights has 





point, but acknowledges that human rights are relative to various factors (such as 
culture, economic development and time). In this study, Donnelly’s three-level 
scheme of the universality of human rights is discussed, developed further and 
applied to ASEAN’s human rights system and its Member States. 
 
2. THREE LEVELS OF UNIVERSALITY 
 
Donnelly’s three-tiered scheme of the universality of human rights is discussed and 
developed in Chapter II of this study. The levels of concepts, conceptions and 
implementation are interpreted as follows and used as the framework in which the 
development of a human rights system in the ASEAN region is scrutinised: 
 
1. Concepts: Which human rights are included in ASEAN’s human rights 
system (including norms of ius cogens)? The focal points of this analysis 
are the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration and the constitutions of the 
ASEAN Member States. 
2. Conceptions: Interpretations and restrictions of human rights in ASEAN 
and their conformity to international human rights law. The focus lies on 
the declarations and reservations presented at the moment of ratification of 
or accession to UN core human rights instruments and on fundamental 
rights in the Member States’ constitutions. 
3. Implementation: The way in which human rights are legally protected and 
promoted in ASEAN’s human rights mechanisms. The focus here lies on 
the ASEAN Way and the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on 
Human Rights. 
 
Donnelly argued that the space for legitimate variation is the least at the level of 
concepts, and the greatest at the level of implementation. He also argued that the 
levels of interpretation and implementation are matters of legitimate variation, as 
long as “they fall within the range of variation consistent with the overarching 
concept.”1  In other words, the universality of human rights exists according to 
Donnelly in its most absolute form at the level of concepts. Divergence on the other 
two levels can, however, still lead to a degree of universality of human rights. In the 
aforementioned interpretation of concepts, conceptions and implementation, this 
degree of variation remains applicable. 
The line of reasoning in this concluding chapter is as follows. A regional human 
rights system is only one of the levels in which human rights protection and 
promotion takes place. While the protection and promotion of human rights is 
nowadays part of international law, it originates from the national level. Today, the 
international framework of the United Nations forms the overall context in which 
human rights protection and promotion takes place. Whereas the national and 
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international levels were already present in the ASEAN region, its regional level 
developed last. The development of a human rights system at this level 
compliments other regional organisations of which human rights are (part of) their 
domain, such as the Council of Europe, the European Union, the Organisation of 
American States and the African Union.  
The three levels are not, however, isolated islands, but instead complement each 
other, whereby the regional level also functions as a bridge between the national 
and international frameworks. National constitutions guarantee fundamental rights 
at the level of States. In addition, States have become party to core UN human 
rights conventions, bringing the international level in many ways into the domestic 
domain. As regional organisations comprise individual States, the national and 
regional levels influence each other. A two-way street also lies between individual 
States and regional organisations on the one hand, and international law on the 
other, as these States and organisations exist within the international realm. 
As said, this research focuses on the regional human rights system of ASEAN 
and its Member States in relation to the claim to the universality of human rights at 
the levels of concepts, conceptions and implementation. These elements are 
discussed in the following sections. 
 
2.1 Universality in terms of concepts 
 
Donnelly argued that consensus is reached on human rights at the level of “the 
concept, an abstract, general statement of an orienting value”,2 which are embodied 
in the UDHR. He described that most appeals on relativism fail, especially with 
respect to the abstract and general statements in Articles 3-12 UDHR. Civil rights 
such as the freedom of conscience, speech and association and economic, social and 
cultural rights are considered by Donnelly slightly more relative. Nevertheless, 
divergence at this level is not that great. Donnelly underscored the necessity to 
search for divergence in definitions and implicit limitations, although one should be 
wary of “overstating their importance of misinterpreting their character.3 In other 
words, according to Donnelly this divergence is not so great and systematic that it 
challenges the consensus reached in terms of concepts. 
The ASEAN Member States adopted the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration on 
Human Rights in 2012. Whereas ASEAN focused on vulnerable people prior to the 
adoption of this declaration, the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration is the 
organisation’s first general human rights instrument. Therefore, the choice is made 
to analyse this declaration in assessing whether ASEAN underscores the 
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universality of human rights in terms of concepts. Based on the analysis in the 
previous chapters, the following conclusions can be drawn. 
   
Norms of ius cogens 
While the universality of human rights at the level of concepts can to a limited 
extent differ in Donnelly’s framework of universality of human rights, this study 
argues that ius cogens norms form the exception. In Chapter II it was argued that 
these rights are the ultimate rights on which worldwide overlapping consensus is 
reached. Due to their traits, they deserve specific attention when discussing this 
level of universality. 
Based on Articles 53 and 64 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, no 
derogation is permitted from these peremptory norms of general international law. 
However, the content of ius cogens norms is ambiguous. Chapter II focused on 
rights that are considered to be ius cogens norms. It is argued that presently these 
norms include the prohibition of slavery and slave trade, racial discrimination, 
aggression and genocide, the prohibition of torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading 
punishment, arbitrary arrest and detainment, advocacy of national, racial or 
religious hatred, denial of freedom of thought, conscience and religion, the right to 
a fair trial and the presumption of innocence, the right to marry and the rights of 
minorities to enjoy their own culture, as well as basic rules of international 
humanitarian law applicable in armed conflict and the right to self-determination of 
peoples. This is not an exhaustive list and it evolves over time. For instance, the 
prohibition of applying the death penalty to juveniles and the principle of non-
refoulement are considered to be evolving into peremptory norms.4 
These norms affect the universality in terms of concepts as well as conceptions, 
the second level of universality (discussed in the next section). Due to the nature of 
ius cogens norms and the implications that follow from classifying them as the 
ultimate rights at the level of concepts, ASEAN’s human rights system needs to be 
in line with this framework. This does not mean that the region cannot add human 
rights standards to the norms that are considered to be ius cogens norms. De 
Schutter posed in this respect that this approach towards the universal nature of 
human rights, expressed in globally valid ius cogens norms, might be too 
restrictive. In his view, regional courts for instance can come to the conclusion that 
certain principles are ius cogens norms as well, even if they would be ‘only’ valid 
in that particular region.5 
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The following can be concluded on ASEAN’s position on ius cogens. Article 35 
of the draft on the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration of January 2012, which was 
part of the document’s general principles, included an explicit reference to ius 
cogens norms. This draft article was not included in the final version of the AHRD.  
Norms which were included as ius cogens norms in the January draft were 
freedom from slavery, prohibition of torture, prohibition of imprisonment for non-
fulfilment of contractual obligation, no retroactive criminal law, recognition as a 
person before the law, freedom of thought, conscience and religion or beliefs. 
The reason for omitting this draft article is unclear. A possible explanation could 
be that the ASEAN Member States could not reach consensus on the list of the 
norms of ius cogens. The analysis of the constitutions of the ASEAN Member 
States in Section 3 of Chapter III does not provide insight into a possible common 
ground with respect to norms which are regarded as norms of ius cogens. 
Specifically, Indonesia is the only Member State that formulated a list of non-
derogable rights in its constitution. According to this Member State, the right to life, 
freedom from torture, thought and conscience, religion and enslavement, 
recognition as a person before the law, and the rights not to be tried under a law 
with retrospective effect are non-derogable rights (Article 28I(1) Constitution of 
Indonesia). Although Cambodia’s Constitution limits rights to Khmer citizens, this 
limitation does not apply to the provisions that deal with the right to life. This could 
imply that the right to life is considered by Cambodia as a ius cogens norm. 
Myanmar’s position the prohibition of forced labour differs from the general stance 
that these norms are ius cogens norms, as Myanmar formulates restrictions to the 
prohibition of forced labour. Furthemore, Myanmar’s Constitution does not 
mention the prohibition of torture. From the analysis of the core UN human rights 
documents (Section 2 of Chapter III) follows that Thailand acknowledged that 
Articles 6, 7, 8(1), 8(2), 11, 15, 16 and 18 of the ICCPR are non-derogable rights. 
In addition, not all rights that are generally considered to be non-derogable 
rights are included in each constitution. For example, the prohibition of slavery is 
not included in the constitutions of Brunei Darussalam, Laos and Vietnam. The 
freedom from torture is only included in the constitutions of Cambodia, Indonesia, 
the Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam, whereas the right to be presumed innocent 
is included in the constitutions of Cambodia, the Philippines, Thailand and 
Vietnam. 
With respect to ius cogens, it could be concluded that the ASEAN Human 
Rights Declaration detracts in several ways from the universality of human rights at 
the level of concepts. In addition, the aforementioned examples of the omission of 
human rights standards that are considered to be ius cogens norms in the 
constitutions of the Member States, make clear that also individual Member States 







AHRD’s standards in relation to the standards set by the UN and the ASEAN 
Member States 
The ASEAN Human Rights Declaration is characterised as a document that moved 
beyond the Member State’s constitutions. The inclusion of civil and political rights 
in the AHRD especially overtakes those recognised by the majority of the Member 
States. The AHRD moves beyond the constitutions by not restricting the rights to 
ASEAN citizens (except for the right to vote). This does not necessarily mean that it 
builds upon the universality of human rights. Instead, the conclusion can be drawn 
that the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration undermines the claim to the 
universality of human rights in terms of concepts on the following fronts. 
First of all, the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration fails to include a number of 
human rights that can be found in core UN human rights documents and/or are 
included in the constitutions of a number of the ASEAN Member States. From 
Section 4 of Chapter V follows that the Declaration omits elements of rights, while 
they are included in the UDHR. From the aforementioned (non-exhaustive) list of 
ius cogens follows that a number of these rights are considered to be non-derogable 
rights.  
Specifically, the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration does not include the 
following rights or prohibitions (of which some are discussed in more detail later 
on): the prohibition of the death penalty, the prohibition of enforced disappearances, 
the freedom from forced labour, the principle of non-refoulement and the freedom 
of association. In addition, the freedom to manifest and change one’s of religion is 
replaced with the prohibition of intolerance, discrimination and incitement of 
hatred. The right to found a family lacks the prohibition of discrimination. Equality 
in and a just and favourable remuneration for work, the right to rest and leisure, and 
the right to a social and international order in which the rights of the Declaration 
can be fully realised are also not mentioned in the ASEAN Human Rights 
Declaration. Social security is also not included when stipulating the right to an 
adequate living standard. Finally, the right to self-determination and the rights of 
indigenous peoples are missing altogether. 
The drafts of the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration from January and June 
2012 are included in the present study. When comparing these drafts with the final 
version of November 2012, topics on which the Member States had to compromise, 
become visible. The drafts are at times broader than the final version. Specifically, 
the right to pursue one’s own economic and social development and to choose its 
own political system, the right to a fiscally responsive government and/or system 
were included in the drafts. 
From Donnelly’s observation that at least Articles 3-12 UDHR are universally 
held concepts, it follows that the omission of these rights, such as the freedom from 
forced labour and the freedom of religion, detracts from the claim to the 
universality of human rights at the level of concepts. Moreover, the rights that are 
omitted in the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration are included in the core UN 





Party (see Section 2 of Chapter III), and in a number of the constitutions of the 
Member States (see section 3 of Chapter III). Specifically, by omitting these rights, 
the AHRD is downplaying the standards set at UN level and in the individual 
Member States. Moreover, by excluding internationally recognised human rights 
standards, ASEAN does not live up to its own commitments that the organisation 
has formulated. Specifically, it contradicts ASEAN’s own commitment to the 
UDHR, the UN Charter, the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action and 
other international human rights instruments to which the Member States are parties 
although it is unclear whether these human rights instruments have to be endorsed 
by all ASEAN Member States in order to become relevant at ASEAN level. 
The omission of the aforementioned rights and prohibitions could possibly be 
explained by a lack of consensus on these issues among the ASEAN Member States 
or, instead, an overlap in downplaying certain human rights standards. Regarding 
the right to self-determination, for instance, four of the six ASEAN Member States 
that ratified the ICCPR (Indonesia, Laos, Thailand and Vietnam) made a 
declaration. Three of these States formulated a declaration with respect to the right 
to self-determination. Indonesia, Myanmar and Thailand also made a declaration on 
this right as included in the ICESCR. Related to the right to self-determination, the 
AHRD also fails to include minority groups or indigenous peoples in its final 
version. Although the January draft made clear that Laos and Myanmar made 
reservations to the inclusion of minority groups and indigenous people as 
vulnerable people, the general position of the governments of the other ASEAN 
Member States could also explain this omission. 
The prohibition of forced labour was initially mentioned in the draft of the 
ASEAN Human Rights Declaration, but was not included in the final version. 
Muntarbhorn noted that the prohibition of forced labour was ultimately omitted 
because the AICHR representatives considered forced labour equivalent to 
servitude, which is included in Article 13 AHRD. He rightly argued that forced 
labour is a wider concept than that which is formulated in Articles 13 and 27 AHRD 
(on free choice of employment and working conditions). 
The prohibition of enforced disappearance is not clearly included in the AHRD. 
Salient is that the working draft of January 2012 included this topic in relation to 
the right to personal liberty, whereby reference was made in a footnote to the 
International Convention for the Protection of all Persons from Enforced 
Disappearance. Only Cambodia acceded to this Convention, whereas three other 
ASEAN Member States signed this Convention. From the comparative analysis of 
the constitutions of the ASEAN Member States it also follows that the prohibition 
of slavery and forced labour is not included in the constitutions of Brunei 
Darussalam and Laos. 
Whereas Article 24 AHRD includes the right to freedom of peaceful assembly, 
the general right to the freedom of association is omitted. Only Laos made a 
reservation on Article 22 ICCPR by subjecting this article to national law and the 





Darussalam. Striking is that this omission in the AHRD does not correspond to the 
general formal endorsement in the constitutions of the individual Member States. 
The freedom to manifest and change one’s religion is problematic, as Section 2 
of Chapter III has illustrated. A number of Islamic ASEAN Member States made 
reservations to provisions of UN Conventions that may be contrary to its 
constitution and beliefs and principles of Islam (see section 2 of Chapter III). More 
specifically, the freedom of thought, conscience and religion is also subjected to 
constitutions, national laws and practices.  
According to Donnelly, the right to change one’s religion could either be placed 
under the heading of universality in terms of concepts or conceptions; ultimately he 
argued for the latter. He has indicated that he is inclined to regard the prohibition of 
apostasy by Muslims as probably compatible with the relative universality of 
human rights, although he acknowledged at the same time that his argument accepts 
too great a relativism.6 This latter viewpoint is visible in literature. Jaclyn L. Neo 
argued, for instance, that the freedom to have or to adopt a religion “necessarily 
entails the freedom to choose a religion or belief, including the right to replace 
one’s current religion or belief with another or to adopt atheistic views, as well as 
the right to retain one’s religion or belief”.7 
Based on the aforementioned, one could argue that at the level of concepts, the 
right to change one’s religion is inherent to the freedom of religion. Consequently, 
the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration fails to live up to the international standard 
of the freedom of religion at the level of concepts. 
The ASEAN Human Rights Declaration also lowers for instance the standard of 
the ICESR, which provides developing countries the discretion within the context 
of the ‘progressive realisation’ to determine to what extent they guarantee economic 
and social rights to non-nationals. In contrast, all ASEAN Member States are 
provided this choice according to Article 34 AHRD. While this a reflection of the 
constitutions of the Member States, which are often restricted to their citizens, and 
the principle of State sovereignty, this discretion has been criticised in the present 
study for having a direct impact on the universality, indivisibility, interdependence, 
and correlativity of human rights. 
As to the right to property and the prohibition of arbitrary deprivation of 
property (Article 17 AHRD), it is rightfully observed that this is not included in the 
ICCPR and ICESR.8 It is also observed that this article is “perhaps one of the 
                                                          
6 Jack Donnelly, ‘The Relative Universality of Human Rights’ (2007) 29 Human Rights Quarterly 281, 
pp. 301-303. 
7  Jaclyn L. Neo, ‘Religious Freedom and the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration: Prospects and 
Challenges’ (2016) 14 (4) The Review of Faith & International Affairs 1, p. 3 and UN Human Rights 
Committee, General Comment 22 on ‘The Right to Freedom of Thought, Conscience and Religion 
(Article 18)’ of 30 July 1993, UN Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.4. She furthermore addresses 
difficulties of the freedom of religion in other ASEAN Member States in this article. 
8 American Bar Association, The ASEAN Human Rights Declaration: A Legal Analysis (American Bar 
Association Rule of Law Initiative 2014), p. 46 <https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/ 





clearest and most comprehensive statements of the right to property in a regional 
human rights instrument”.9 Upon accession to or ratification of UN human rights 
treaties, no declarations or reservations are made to the right to property as included 
in the CRPD, ICERD and CMW. The analysis of the constitutions illustrates that 
the majority of the ASEAN Member States have included the right to property in 
their constitutions. 
Respecting the right to development and the right to peace are often described as 
ASEAN characteristics. The right to development is included in Articles 35-37 
AHRD, which cannot be found in the binding core human rights documents of the 
UN as discussed in section 2 of Chapter III. The right to a safe, clean and 
sustainable environment, the rights to live free from poverty and hunger and the 
right to peace are also included. The AHRD also continues ASEAN’s focus on 
women and children. This focus on vulnerable groups is generally considered as 
typical for ASEAN, although these topics are also taken up at UN level. While the 
AHRD expands the UDHR by including the trafficking in human organs in the 
prohibition of smuggling or trafficking in persons, this is not a distinctive feature of 
the AHRD. The provision on the family as the natural and fundamental unit of 
society and the right to marry and dissolve a marriage reflects a more institutional 
and communitarian conception of the relationship between individuals and family. 
In conclusion, it can be observed that the added value of the AHRD in terms of 
contributing to the human rights framework in terms of concepts is visible in 
several ways, although overall limited. As far as the objections to the claim to the 
universality of human rights at the level of concepts – the mirror image of the 
‘added value’ – are concerned, the omissions mentioned above are able to serve as 
examples of non-permitted deviations. 
 
2.2 Universality in terms of conceptions 
 
As elaborated in Chapter II, the universality of human rights is presumed in 
international human rights law. The implications of this universality have, however, 
been debated throughout the years in the discussions on universalism and (cultural) 
relativism. These viewpoints seemed to be irreconcilable at first, whereby Donnelly 
concluded that strong universalism and strong cultural relativism are extreme forms 
and untenable. On the other hand, more moderate views are viable. As Donnelly 
initially considered that they merge into each other on a two-dimensional sliding 
scale, he now instead aptly pictures a multiple space as the universality of human 
rights is relative to various factors. 
                                                                                                                                              
accessed 16 September 2018. Specific human rights documents include the right to property, such 
CEDAW, ICERD and ICRMW. 
9American Bar Association, The ASEAN Human Rights Declaration: A Legal Analysis (American Bar 
Association Rule of Law Initiative 2014), p. 45 <https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/ 
directories/roli/asean/asean-human-rights-declaration-legal-analysis-2014.authcheckdam.pdf> last 





When applying this to the debate on the universality of human rights in the 
ASEAN region, one could conclude the following. The discussion on the 
universality of human rights and the possibility to incorporate national and regional 
particularities in the interpretation of human rights initially revolved around 
relativistic attitudes that were brought by some States as Asian values. By focusing 
too much on these Asian particularities, a form of strong relativism was upheld. As 
concluded in Chapter II, an extreme form of strong relativism (just like an extreme 
form of universalism) is invalid. Section 2 of Chapter V showed that this strong 
form of relativism was used as a political argument, whereby there is a risk that it is 
used as an excuse for not (or at least not yet) complying with universal human 
rights. 
However, one cannot deny that human rights are interpreted in their context. 
This could be considered as a moderate form of relativism and is also visible in 
other regional human rights systems. The margin of appreciation of the Council of 
Europe is in this respect a clear example. In ASEAN context, it might be better to 
speak of ‘Values in Asia’ that could be considered, as Muntarbhorn suggested. 
What these values exactly entail remains, however, difficult to ascertain as 
reference is often made to particularities in general instead of explaining which 
values are dominant in the ASEAN region. In addition, the question of ‘who is 
making the argument?’ remains, as some governmental viewpoints on human rights 
are not shared by civil society organisations. Medina’s answer when discussing the 
existence of a Southeast Asian context or ASEAN context in the field of human 
rights illustrates the validity of this question: “If you ask me as an advocate, I will 
say no. But if you… If I wear the shoes of government I will say yes. Because, their 
thinking is there are certain values, which are peculiar to ASEAN, which are not as 
strong [as] in other countries.”10 
Nevertheless, contextualisation of human rights can be considered as a moderate 
form of relativism, while the universality of human rights still remains the starting 
point. This implies that the focus on national and regional particularities in the 
ASEAN region does not have to be detrimental to the universality of human rights, 
as long as international human rights standards as formulated at UN level are 
upheld. Indeed, all regional human rights systems leave room for, and underscore 
the importance of, considering national and regional particularities.  
Scepticism towards relativistic attitudes of ASEAN Member States is thus 
unfounded when these ideas are plausible and defensible, hereby constituting a 
moderate form of relativism and taking the universality of human rights as a starting 
point. The increasing number of ratifications of core UN human rights documents 
also indicates that a strong form of relativism is not dominant in the region. In 
addition, although Mahbubani tried to spark up strong cultural relativism in 200811 
                                                          
10 Interview with Carlos Medina, Director of the Ateneo Law Faculty’s Human Rights Center at Ateneo 
de Manila University (Manila, 20 November 2009). 
11 During the promotion of Kishore Mahbubani, The New Asian Hemisphere: The Irresistible Shift from 





it seems that it did not obtain a strong foothold in the region, as initiatives have 
been taken for a regional human rights system in which reference is made to 
international human rights standards. 
When looking at the nuances in the interpretation of rights, the choice has been 
made to analyse the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration and the reservation and 
declarations made to the core human rights instruments of the United Nations. It 
could be concluded that the limitations that are formulated by the ASEAN Member 
States overall detract from the universality of human rights at the level of 
conceptions. 
ASEAN Member States have to uphold human rights, which are generally 
considered to be ius cogens norms because of their status in international law. In 
this regard, the general principle formulated in Article 8 AHRD, which deals with 
the limitations to human rights is contrary to international law. The ASEAN Human 
Rights Declaration includes human rights, which are considered to be ius cogens 
norms based on customary law. As Article 8 AHRD is formulated as one of the 
general principles, the limitations listed in this article are applicable to all rights and 
freedoms as formulated in the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration, thus including 
the rights and freedoms which are internationally recognised as ius cogens norms. 
It is often argued that in ASEAN Member States (but also in other parts of the 
world) the focus lies on duties. This is connected to the general assumption that 
Asian societies are communitarian and consensual. These elements would bring 
about a difference in the interpretation of human rights. Donnelly contended that 
this description explains less than proponents of cultural relativism argue. Bearing 
this in mind, the following can be said with respect to the level of conceptions. 
The stress on duties alongside rights is typical for the ASEAN region and other 
mainly non-Western States, albeit this distinction should – in light of the above – 
not be overstressed. In this respect, all rights except for ius cogens norms are 
balanced within a context and rights of others. This implies duties alongside rights, 
also in Western States. Different is, however, the explicit reference to certain duties 
which must be balanced with rights and freedoms, as well as the generality of these 
duties that can in practice lead to limiting one’s human rights. Both the 
constitutions of the ASEAN Member States (see Chapter II, section 3 for more 
details) and the AHRD list a number of duties.  
The AHRD includes duties as one of its general principles (Article 6 AHRD). 
Consequently, all human rights as enshrined in the Declaration are subjected to 
these general duties, which could potentially lead to unreasonable restrictions and a 
departure from the universality of human rights in terms of conceptions. 
Furthermore, Article 7 AHRD states that “the realisation of human rights must 
be considered in the regional and national context, bearing in mind different 
political, economic, legal, social, cultural, historical and religious backgrounds”. 
Although the contextualisation of human rights is typical for ASEAN, the 
formulation of this provision is reminiscent of the Asian values debate and 





The implications of Article 7 AHRD are vague and open up the risk for 
interpreting human rights in such a way that international human rights standards 
are lowered. In this respect, it is argued that this provision differs from Article 5 of 
the Vienna Declaration. In particular, whereas Article 5 UDHR underscores the 
importance of the universality of human rights, Article 7 AHRD makes 
particularism a condition for the realisation of human rights.  
A number of rights enshrined in the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration are 
subjected to national law. This corresponds to the general practice with respect to 
the core UN human rights conventions. Specifically, Section 2 of Chapter III 
showed that a high number of ASEAN Member States have subjected certain 
provisions of the international human rights conventions to national constitutions, 
legislation, regulations and local customs, values and religions. The principles of 
sovereignty and territorial integrity of States were also stressed. Following 
customary law and as codified in Article 19(c) Vienna Convention on the Law of 
the Treaties, reservations incompatible with the object and purpose of a treaty are 
not permitted. Accordingly, a general principle is that a party cannot invoke 
provisions of national law as a justification for its failure to comply with its 
obligations under a treaty (see also Article 27 Vienna Convention on the Law of the 
Treaties).  
In line with this, ASEAN cannot subject all the provisions of the ASEAN 
Human Rights Declaration to national law in a general article that applies to all 
human rights that are formulated in the AHRD. Also, the extent of commitment is 
unclear when specification is lacking, raising doubts with respect to commitment 
and could undermine the basis of these provisions. In addition, the conclusion that 
human rights are restricted in such a way that it detracts from the universality of 
human rights at the level of conceptions, also has implications for the level of 
concepts as these human rights standards are undermined. 
The AHRD’s limitation clause (Article 8 AHRD) is discussed in the previous 
section at the level of concepts. At the level of conceptions, this provision is also 
relevant as it subjects all rights and freedoms to these limitations. This could lead to 
limitations which to not pass the test of legality, legitimacy and proportionality. 
Article 40 AHRD constitutes a general limitation clause. Although reference is 
made to international human rights instruments, there is a risk that this article 
undermines the human rights that are formulated in the ASEAN Human Rights 
Declaration due to its reference to the purpose and principles of ASEAN. This 
includes the ASEAN Way, which is overall detrimental to ASEAN’s human rights 
cooperation. 
The previous section scrutinised the freedom of thought, conscience and 
religion, which a number of Islamic ASEAN Member States subjected to their 
constitutions, national laws and practices. As the example of Lina Joy illustrated, 
this means in practice that the freedom of religion does not include the right to 
change one’s religion. According to Donnelly, this interpretation of the freedom of 





is a difference in nuance, this example shows that these levels are closely connected 
to each other. Placing the right to apostasy at the level of concepts ensures that 
every denial of such a right contradicts the universality of human rights.  
Placing this right at the level of conceptions, as Donnelly does, brings about a 
slightly different line of reasoning, but has the same outcome, namely, that the 
universality of human rights is not upheld. The freedom of thought, conscience and 
religion is formally endorsed in the constitutions of all ASEAN Member States. All 
Members seem to subscribe to this right, although the interpretative declarations 
and reservations show that this right is interpreted by a number of Member States in 
such a way that the freedom of religion does not mean that one is allowed to change 
one’s religion. At this level, there is room for weighing whether the particularity of 
the prohibition of apostasy is an interpretation that falls within the scope of the 
freedom of religion. While Donnelly was inclined to say yes, the general tendency 
is to argue that this interpretation limits the freedom of religion in such a way, that 
it contradicts the object and purpose of this article. Hence, interpreting the freedom 
of thought, conscience and religion in a way in which the particularity of the 
prohibition of apostasy is included, contradicts the universality of human rights at 
the level of conceptions. Furthermore, this universality is impeded because the 
ASEAN Human Rights Declaration only addresses the internal aspect; actual 
practising this freedom is omitted. 
In summary, while ASEAN refers to the UDHR and UN conventions to which 
the ASEAN Member States are party, ASEAN and its Member States detract from 
the universality at the level of conceptions.  
 
2.3. Universality in terms of implementation 
 
Although variation in implementation does not necessarily affect the universality of 
human rights at the level of concepts or conceptions, ASEAN’s mechanisms lead in 
several ways to a denial of the right to invoke one’s human rights and, 
consequently, to a detraction of the universality of human rights. The ‘defective 
implementation mechanisms’ are visible in two ways. Firstly, certain human rights 
provisions that are formulated in the AHRD lack procedural aspects that are 
included in human rights instruments at UN level. A clear example is Article 12 
AHRD, which lacks procedural protections against arbitrary arrest or detention that 
are included in Article 9(2-5) ICCPR. Without these protections, there is a risk for 
unlawful or arbitrary arrests or detention.  
Secondly, the mechanisms that are established to promote and protect the human 
rights enshrined in ASEAN’s human rights instruments have a restricted mandate. 
This study examined the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human 
Rights, the ASEAN Commission on the Promotion and Protection of the Rights of 
Women and Children and the ASEAN Committee on the Implementation of the 
ASEAN Declaration on the Protection and Promotion of the Rights of Migrant 





Human Rights because it is ASEAN’s overarching human rights body, and the 
commonalities in mandate with the other two mechanisms. 
This study shows that the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human 
Rights lacks of independence, has a weak mandate in terms of protection, has no 
dispute settlement mechanism and does not cater for an individual complaint 
procedure, nor is a judicial mechanism installed to hear cases and deliver binding 
judgments. This caused the critique on ASEAN for ‘lacking teeth’, whereby from 
ASEAN’s side it was argued that ‘no biting is required’.  
This research shows that following the ASEAN Way affects the mandate of the 
ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights and the way this 
mandate is exercised. Specifically, the Commissioners take into account the notions 
of non-interference and the respect for the sovereignty of the Member States. Also, 
the notions of consultation and consensus determine the cooperation between the 
Commissioners and the possibilities for human rights promotion and protection. 
Regarding the last two principles, it is likely that this approach hampers developing 
a higher level of human right protection. 
The Commissioners officially meet twice per year and do not make much of 
their work public. This contrasts Article 6.7 of the ToR, which stipulates that “[t]he 
AICHR shall keep the public periodically informed about its work and activities 
and through appropriate public information materials produced by the AICHR”. It 
also makes it impossible for civil society and the National Human Rights 
Institutions to serve as a system of checks and balances on the AICHR. The latter, 
however, would be in line with ASEAN’s own ambition “[t]o promote a people-
oriented ASEAN in which all sectors of society are encouraged to participate in, 
and benefit from, the process of ASEAN integration and community building” 
(Article 13 ASEAN Charter). In addition, these factors and actors could mitigate the 
lack of independence of the Commissioners.  
The limited mandate of the AICHR is clearly visible in the ‘score card’ as 
developed by Forum-Asia. The indicators used in this score board are adapted from 
the 1993 UN Principles Relating to the Status of National (Human Rights) 
Institutions (the Paris Principles), and a Non-Paper, “Principles for Regional 
Human Rights Mechanisms” developed by the Office of the High Commissioner 
for Human Rights (OHCHR). The score card is divided in the topics of mandate and 
power, independence and plurality, and transparency/accountability. The AICHR 
only scored positive on the following seven points: (1) power to make 
recommendations and proposals to Member States, (2) power to request information 
from Member States, (3) power to report on general human rights themes, (4) 
advisory function to Member States, (5) public information/education function, (6) 
ensure a balance of nationalities within commission, and (7) commission members 
have diplomatic immunities and privileges.12 
                                                          
12  Human Rights in ASEAN-Online Platform, ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human 
Rights, Score Card, <http://humanrightsinasean.info/asean-intergovernmental-commission-human-





In addition, while AICHR cannot receive individual complaints, the 
establishment of a human rights court in the ASEAN region is not foreseen. Morada 
correctly observed that “ASEAN can only rely on national legislatures and courts 
within member states to implement or comply with norms, agreements, or action 
plans at the domestic level”.13 
Finally, the National Human Rights Institutions established in Malaysia, 
Indonesia and the Philippines and researched in this study, can at least on paper 
contribute to the universality of human rights at the level of implementation 
because their mandate is overall broader than the mandate of the AICHR. Only time 
will tell in what way they will actually use these competences, and furthermore, to 
what extent they will be able to have an impact upon the ASEAN Member States’ 
action in the field of the implementation of human rights.  
  
                                                          
13 Noel L. Morada, ‘Southeast Asian Regionalism, Norm Promotion and Capacity Building for Human 
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1  The human rights documents are abbreviated. The list includes the following: International 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD, 1969), International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR, 1976), Optional Protocol to the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR, OPT, 1976), Second Optional Protocol to the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, aiming at the abolition of the death penalty (ICCPR, OPT 2, 
1991), International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR, 1976), Optional 
Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESR, OPT, 2013), 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW, 1981), 
Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women 
(CEDAW, OPT, 2000), Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment 
or Punishment (CAT,1987), Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT, OPT, 2006), Convention on the Rights of the 
Child (CRC, 1990), Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement 
of children in armed conflict (CRC, OPT Armed conflict, 2002), Optional Protocol to the Convention 
on the Rights of the Child on the sale of children, child prostitution and child pornography (CRC, OPT 
sale of children,2002), Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on a 
communications procedure (CRC, OPT Communications Procedure, 2014), International Convention 
on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families (CMW, 2003), 
International Convention for the Protection of all Persons from Enforced Disappearance (CED, 2010), 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD, 2008), Optional Protocol to the 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD, OPT, 2008). 
2 Although Democratic Kampuchea had signed the ICCRR, ICESR and CEDAW, the Government of 
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In this scheme, ‘S’ means signed, ‘R’ means ratified, ‘A’ acceded to, whereas ‘-’ means that 
the treaty is neither signed nor ratified or acceded to. ‘D’ indicates that (interpretative) 
declarations and/or reservations are made. The numbers mentioned after S, R and A are the 





which only signed and which are party to the convention is included per convention. This 
scheme also shows the total number of conventions that are signed per State and to which 
the State is party. Also included are the number of conventions to which the State formulated 





Annex 2. Common ground in the Constitutions of the ASEAN Member States 
 
Member States/HR 
(article in the 


























































discrimination (1, 2, 
7, 23 (2)) 
- x x x x x x x x x 
Life (3) 
 
- x x - x x x x x x 
Liberty (3) 
 
- x - - x x x x x x 
Security (3) 
 
- x x x - - x - x x 
Slavery, forced 
labour (4) 




punishment (5)  
- x x - - - x - x x 
Recognition as a 
person before the law 
(6) 
- - x - - - x - - - 
Effective remedy (8) 
 
- x - - - x x - x x 
Arbitrary arrest, 
detention, exile (9) 
- x - x x x x x x x 
Fair, independent 
impartial trial (10) 
- x x - -  x x x - x 
Presumed innocent 
(11 (1)) 
- x - - - - x - x x 
Defence (11 (1)) 
 
- x - - - - x - - x 
Retrospective law (11 
(2)) 
- - x - x x x x x - 
Privacy (12) 
 
- x - x - x x - x x 
Honour, reputation 
(12) 
- x x x - - - - x x 
Movement (13 (1)) 
 
- x x x x x x x x x 
Leave and entry (13 
(2)) 






(article in the 



























































- - x x - x - - - x 
Nationality (15) 
 
- - x - - - - - - x 
Marriage, family (16) 
 
- x x - - - x - x x 
Property (17) 
 
- x x x x x x - x x 
Thought, conscience, 
religion (18) 
x x x x x x x x x x 
Expression (19) 
 
- x x x x x x x x x 
Information, media 
(19) 
- x x - - - x - x x 
Assembly, 
association (20) 
- x x x x x x x x x 
Vote/to be elected, 
access to public 
service (21) 
- x x x x x x - x x 
Social security (22) 
 
- x x x - x x - x x 
Work (23 (1)) 
 
- x x x - x x - x x 
Just, favourable 
remuneration (23 (3)) 
- x x - - - x - - - 
Trade unions (23 (4)) 
 
- x - - - - x - x - 
Rest, leisure (24) 
 
- - - x - - - - - - 
Adequate living 
standard (25 (1)) 
- - x - - - x - - - 
Women, children (25 
(2)) 
- x x - - - x - x x 
Education (26) 
 
- x x x - x x - x x 
Cultural life, arts, 
science (27 (1)) 
- x x x - x x - x x 
Intellectual property 
(27 (2)) 
- - - - - x x - - x 
Duties (29 (1)) 
 






(article in the 


























































rights (29 (2)) 
- x x - - - - - x x 
Affecting others (30) 
 
- x x - - - - - x x 
Aged, disabled 
 
- x x x - x x - x x 
Citizenship 
 




- x x - - x x - x x 
Donation 
tissues/organs 
- - - - - - - - - x 
Health(care)  
 
- - - x - x x - x x 
Imprisonment with 
respect to tax 
- - - - - - x - - - 
Minorities/indigenous 
peoples 
- - x x x - x x - x 
Obligation of 
contracts 
- - - - - - x - - - 
Petition to 
government 
- x - x - x x - x x 
Self-improvement 
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